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PUBLIC OPINION 

IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



PUBLIC OPINION 

IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949 



Edited by 

ANNA J. MERRITT and RICHARD L. MERRITT 



With a Foreword by 
FREDERICK W. WILLIAMS 



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS 

Urbana Chicago London 



© 1970 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois 

Manufactured in the United States of America 

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 74-94397 

252 00077 3 



3oiJSi ^ 



For Christopher, Geoffrey, and Theo 
—our wanderers between two worlds 






CONTENTS 



Foreword xvii 

List of Abbreviations xxiii 

PARTI: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 

THE OMGUS SURVEYS 4 

Questionnaires 4 

Sampling 5 

Field Work 5 

Analysis 8 

IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION POLICIES 9 

Attitudes toward the American Occupation 9 

American Information Policies 12 

Specific Issues of the Occupation 15 

Food Rationing 15 

Refugees and Expellees 18 

The Currency Reform 21 

The Division of Germany 23 

Berlin and the Blockade 26 

DEMOCRATIZING POSTWAR GERMANY 29 

Nazism and Denazification 30 

Attitudes toward National Socialism 30 

The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 33 

Denazification 35 

Re-education for Democracy 39 

German Political Culture 40 

Political Participation 43 

FROM DEMOCRATIZATION TO ANTICOMMUNISM: THE 

REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLICY 50 

NOTES 58 

PART II: THE OMGUS SURVEYS 

1. Radio Listening in Germany, Winter 1946 (1 March 1946) 69 

2. Who in Germany Has Read Mein Kampf? (March 1946) 70 

3. Some Political Attitudes Probed on Recent Surveys (15 March 1946) 71 

4. Income and Expenditures of German Families in the American 

Zone, Winter 1946 (25 March 1946) 73 

5. Special Political Survey, Winter 1946 (1 April 1946) 74 

6. Law No. 3 (20 April 1946) 77 



viii/ CONTENTS 



7. Reactions to Recent Revisions in the Denazification Program 

(11 May 1946) 79 

8. Reactions to the New Tax Laws (1 June 1946) 80 

9. Attitudes toward Religion and the Church as Political Factors 

in German Life (7 June 1946) 81 

10. Attitudes toward Politics as a Career for the Coming Generation 

in Germany (21 June 1946) 83 

1 1 . German Attitudes toward Trade Unions (27 June 1946) 85 

12. Attitudes of Some Bavarian Schoolchildren (28 June 1946) 86 

13. A Preliminary Study of Book Reading in Germany 

(28 June 1946) 88 

14. Mail to Stimme Amerikas, February and March 1946 

(6 July 1946) 89 

14A. German Attitudes toward the Expulsion of German Nationals 

from Neighboring Countries (8 July 1946) 90 

15. Relative Effects of Food Scarcity in Two Countries 

(27 July 1946) 92 

16. German Attitudes toward the Nuremberg Trials 

(7 August 1946) 93 

17. Attitudes toward International Leadership in Germany Compared 

with Attitudes in Seven Other Countries (8 August 1946) 95 

18. A Study of Food Consumption and Attitudes toward 
Rationing and General Health of the German Population 

(14 August 1946) 96 

19. Basic Attitudes Explored by the German Attitude Scale 

(19 August 1946) 99 

20. Preliminary Study of Motion Picture Attendance and Attitudes 

(27 August 1946) 100 

21. Attitudes toward Licensed Newspapers in Some American 

Occupied Areas (25 September 1946) 102 

22. A Study of Attitudes toward the Reconstruction and 

Rehabilitation of Germany (25 September 1946) 103 

23. The Viennese Newspapers: An Opinion Research Study 

(22 October 1946) 106 

24. Mannheim Attitudes toward Negro Troops (22 October 1946) 107 

25. German Knowledge about and Attitudes toward Inflation 

(8 November 1946) 108 

26. Information about the Land Constitutions and the Intention to 

Vote in the Constitutional Elections (13 November 1946) 110 

27. German-American Relations in Germany: Frequencies of 

Group Contacts (13 November 1946) 111 

28. An Investigation to Determine Any Changes in Attitudes of 
Native Germans toward the Expellees in Wuerttemberg-Baden 

(14 November 1946) 112 

29. The Trend of Cares and Worries in Germany (21 November 1946) 114 

30. Radio Listening in Vienna (14 December 1946) 115 

31. The Standard of Living (14 December 1946) 117 

32. Income, Expenditures, and Currency Holdings of the German 
Population and Attitudes toward General Economic Problems 

(10 December 1946) 118 

33. The Trend of Public Reactions to the Nuremberg Trials 

(18 December 1946) 121 

34. Attitudes toward Licensed Newspapers in Some American 

Occupied Areas (28 December 1946) 123 



CONTENTS / ix 



35. Attitudesof Trade Union Members (5 January 1947) 123 

36. The German People and Social Classes (1 1 January 1947) 125 

37. Opinions of Newspaper Readers (13 January 1947) 126 

38. A Preliminary Study of Changes in Job Status 

(14 January 1947) 127 

39. Reactions to and Penetration of Information Media in Vienna 

(14 January 1947) 128 

40. Austrian Economic Difficulties and Attitudes toward Economic 

Problems (21 January 1947) 130 

41. Attitudes toward General Economic Conditions (15 January 1947) 131 

42. The Trend of Rumors (5 February 1947) 134 

43. Readership of Heute, Amerikanische Rundschau and Neue Auslese 

(5 February 1947) 135 

44. Opinions of German Community Leaders on International Affairs 

(6 February 1947) 137 

45. Radio Listening in the American Zone and in Berlin 

(17 February 1947) 140 

46. Army Aid to German Youth Activities Evaluated by German Adults 

(19 February 1947) 142 

47. Opinions on the Expellee Problem (20 February 1947) 144 

48. German Attitudes toward Freedom of Speech (5 March 1947) 145 

49. Anti-Semitism in the American Zone (3 March 1947) 146 

50. A Pilot Study on Displaced Persons (20 March 1947) 148 

51. Attitudes toward Collective Guilt in the American Zone of Germany 

(2 April 1947) 149 

52. Attitudes toward Food, Fuel, and Building Materials Conditions 

(27 March 1947) 150 

53. Magazine Reading in the American Zone (8 April 1947) 152 

54. Viennese Reactions to New Denazification Laws (8 April 1947) 153 

55. Public Attitudes toward Denazification (15 April 1947) 154 

56. German Children Appraise the Youth Program (26 April 1947) 155 

57. Readership and Popularity of the Frankfurt Newspapers 

(29 April 1947) 157 

58. Confidence in News in Present-Day Germany (1 May 1947) 158 

59. Expectations Regarding Reparations (10 May 1947) 159 

60. Trends in German Public Opinion (April 1947) 160 

61. Some Attitudes toward the School System in Wuerttemberg-Baden 

(12 June 1947) 163 

62. German Attitudes toward a Peace Treaty after the Conclusion of 

the Moscow Conference (14 June 1947) 164 

63. German Opinion toward the Prospective Peace Treaty 

(8 August 1947) 166 

64. Trends in Attitudes toward the Food Situation (25 August 1947) 167 

65. Attitudes of Bavarians toward Loritz' Dismissal (27 September 1947) 168 

66. German Attitudes toward Corporal Punishment (27 September 1947) 169 

67. German Attitudes toward International Leadership 

(10 October 1947) 170 

68. Trends in Attitudes toward National Socialism (10 October 1947) 171 

69. German Opinions Regarding the Organization of Europe 

(16 October 1947) 172 

70. German Understanding of the Reasons for the Food Shortage 

(17 October 1947) 173 

71. Berlin: Symbol of a National State (17 October 1947) 174 

72. A Report on German Morale (November 1947) 175 



X /CONTENTS 



73. A Guide to Some Propaganda Problems (28 October 1947) 177 

74. Attitudes of AMZON Germans toward Government and Politics 

(27 October 1947) 178 

75. What Berliners Expect from the London Conference (28 October 1947) 179 

76. German Attitudes toward the Four Occupying Powers 

(29 October 1947) 180 

77. Opinions on the Press in the American Zone of Germany 

(5 November 1947) 181 

78. Bavarian Attitudes toward Newspapers (6 November 1947) 182 

79. Attitudes toward American Capitalism (22 November 1947) 183 

80. Opinions on Denazification (26 November 1947) 185 

81. German Reactions to Expellees and DPs (3 December 1947) 186 

82. German Sentiment for Peace and Economic Security 

(8 December 1947) 187 

83. Newspaper Readership and Newscast Listening 

(9 December 1947) 188 

84. Who Are the Expellees? And What Do They Think? 

(17 December 1947) 189 

85. Summary of Trends of German Public Opinion (17 December 1947) 191 

86. Summary of Reactions to End of London Conference 

(17 December 1947) 193 

87. The Trend of German Attitudes toward Allied Cooperation 

(9 January 1948) 194 

88. German Opinion on the People's Part in Political Affairs 

(20 January 1948) 195 

89. Reception of the Pamphlet O^^en Gesagt (22 January 1948) 196 

90. German Opinions on Socialization of Industry (23 January 1948) 197 

91 . German Conceptions of American Bartering and Black Marketeering 

(24 January 1948) 198 

92. Readers of Mein Kampf (9 February 1948) 199 

93. "The Cream of the Crop" Two Years Later (11 February 1948) 200 

94. Contacts between Germans and Americans (24 February 1948) 202 

95. Appraisal of the Content of Education and Educational Facilities 

(25 February 1948) 203 

96. German Youth versus Adults on Ouestions of Democracy 

(3 March 1948) 205 

97. Berlin Reactions to Nagy's Pamphlet Machtraub in Ungarn 

(3 March 1948) 206 

98. Government by Politicians, Experts, or the People? (6 March 1948) 207 

99. A Report on German Youth (5 March 1948) 208 

100. Trends in German Public Opinion (March 1948) 210 

101. German Youth and Adults View Individual Responsibility 

(24 March 1948) 213 

102. Patronage of U.S. Information Centers (24 March 1948) 215 

103. Readership of Political Books and Pamphlets (24 March 1948) 216 

104. The Marshall Plan in Prospect (24 March 1948) 216 

105. Internationalism in Germany (27 March 1948) 217 

106. The Radio Audience in AMZON, Berlin, and Bremen 

(27 March 1948) 219 

107. Public Reception of the Bizonal Administration (29 March 1948) 220 

108. Magazine Readers (29 March 1948) 222 

109. The Effect of Foreign Travel on Knowledge and Attitudes 

(5 April 1948) 223 



CONTENTS /xi 



110. Bremen Attitudes Compared with Berlin and AMZON 

(15 April 1948) 224 

111. Attitudes toward the Bavarian Party (9 April 1948) 226 

112. Reactions to a Foreign Policy Pamphlet (12 April 1948) 227 

113. AMZON Attitudes and Information about Russia 

(15 April 1948) 228 

114. Germans Assay Their Freedoms (23 April 1948) 229 
114A. Germans Assay Their Freedoms (11 May 1948) 230 

115. The "Advertising Pillar" as an Information Medium 

(26 April 1948) 231 

116. The Moving Picture Audience in AMZON (28 April 1948) 232 

117. Berliners View the Czechoslovakian Situation (27 April 1948) 233 

118. Newspaper Readership (3 May 1948) 234 

119. Cumulative Impact of the Mass Media (10 May 1948) 236 

120. German Opinions on Daylight Saving Time (20 May 1948) 237 

121. Uniformity of Religious Preferences in AMZON Communities 

(19 May 1948) 238 

122. Prejudice and Anti-Semitism (22 May 1948) 239 

123. Reactions to the Volkskongress Petition in Berlin and Darmstadt 

(25 May 1948) 241 

124. Social Characteristics of the German People in the American 

Zone and in Berlin (British and American Sectors) (1 June 1948) 242 

125. Berlin Radio Listeners Appraise "American Voices" (22 June 1948) 243 

126. Religious Instruction in the Schools (29 June 1948) 243 

127. Some Opinions on the University of Berlin (8 July 1948) 244 

128. A Pilot Study of Attitudes toward the Joint Export-Import Agency 

(8 July 1948) 246 

129. Reactions of a Panel of Readers to the Pamphlet Mit Vereinten 

Kraeften (19 July 1948) 246 

130. Berlin Reactions to the Air Lift and the Western Powers 

(23 July 1948) 248 

1 31 . Germans View the Six Power Conference Proposals 

(4 August 1948) 249 

132. Some Aspects of Morale in Berlin (10 August 1948) 250 

133. Reactions toward Currency Reform in the U.S. Zone of Germany 

(10 August 1948) 251 

134. Some Trends in Berlin Morale with Sidelights on Recreation 

(2 September 1948) 253 

135. Radio Listening in Berlin since the Blockade (13 September 1948) 254 

136. Attitudes toward a Government for Western Germany (21 September 255 
1948) 

137. The Munich Movie Audience (21 September 1948) 256 

138. Newspaper Reading in Berlin since Currency Reform and the Blockade 

(17 September 1948) 257 

139. Chief Cares and Worries since the Currency Reform (22 September 1948) 258 

140. Opinions on the Proposed Withdrawal of the Four Occupying Powers 

(24 September 1948) 260 

141. Berlin Attitudes on the Air Lift: Further Trends (4 October 1948) 261 

142. Attitudes toward JE I A (5 October 1948) 262 

143. Government or Administration for Western Germany? (14 October 1948) 262 

144. U.S. Zone Germans View the Air Lift (26 October 1948) 263 

145. The Amerika Haus in Five German Cities (1 November 1948) 265 

146. The Problem of Cleanliness in Present-Day Germany (13 November 1948) 266 



xii/ CONTENTS 



147. How Berliners Expect and Want the Crisis Settled: With Their 
Recommendations (17 November 1948) 267 

148. Radio Bremen Evaluated by Bremen Listeners (30 November 1948) 268 

149. Trends and Present Attitudes on the Marshall Plan 

(10 December 1948) 269 

150. Attitudes and Resources of Berliners as They Look Forward to a 
Blockaded Winter (15 December 1948) 271 

151. Security versus Freedom in Blockaded Berlin (18 December 1948) 272 

152. AMZON Views its Civil Service (24 January 1949) 273 

153. Book Reading in the U.S. Zone, Berlin, and Bremen (26 January 1949) 274 

154. Opinions on the Neue Zeitung (3 February 1949) 274 

155. The Town Hall Meeting in Reilingen (3 February 1949) 275 

156. AMZON Views its Civil Service (9 February 1949) 276 

157. Opinions on the Work Stoppage in Bavaria (3 February 1949) 277 

158. Bremen Views the Picturama America Today (4 February 1949) 278 

159. Bavarian Reactions to Town Hall Meetings and Public Forums 

(11 February 1949) 278 

160. Germans Consider the Withdrawal of the Occupying Powers 

(23 February 1949) 279 

161. Some German Opinions on Occupation Costs (24 February 1949) 280 

162. Characteristics of Natives and Refugees in AMZON in 1948 

(4 March 1949) 281 

163. Social Characteristics of the German People in Bavaria, Hesse, and 
Wuerttemberg-Baden (7 March 1949) 282 

164. AMZON Views its Civil Service (2 April 1949) 282 

165. Opinion on Fusion in Wuerttemberg and Baden (22 April 1949) 283 

166. Public Attitudes toward Postwar German Police (25 April 1949) 284 

167. Public Attitudes toward Postwar German Police (25 April 1949) 285 

168. West Berlin's Reaction to a Single Currency (27 April 1949) 286 

169. German Appraisal of Lasfe/7at/sff/e/c/j (6 May 1949) 287 

170. German Attitudes toward Economic and Political Strikes (16 May 1949) 288 

171. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience 

(23 May 1949) 290 

172. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience 

(23 May 1949) 291 

1 73. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience 

(18 May 1949) 292 

1 74. Hessians Consider the Effect of Lifting the Blockade (27 May 1949) 293 

175. Trends in German Public Opinion (June 1949) 294 

176. German Opinions on the "Voice of America" (27 May 1949) 298 

177. Readership of Heute (15 June 1949) 299 

178. Germans View the Ruhr Statute (30 June 1949) 300 

179. German Desires and Expectations on Future Ownership of the 

Ruhr Factories (1 July 1949) 301 

180. Bonn and Berlin, German Capitals (1 July 1949) 303 

181. The RIAS Audience in West Berlin (7 July 1949) 303 

182. German Views on Denazification (11 July 1949) 304 

183. People in Three Hessian Cities Consider Their Reconstruction Problems 

(21 July 1949) 306 

183A. Knowledge of the Bonn Constitution (26 July 1949) 307 



CONTENTS /xiii 



184. The "Voice of America" Audience (26 July 1949) 307 

185. German Opinions on a Peace Treaty before Unification (29 July 1949) 308 

186. German Opinions on American Aid (22 August 1949) 309 

187. Current Views on a Suggested Withdrawal of the Occupiers 

(23 August 1949) 310 

188. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience 

(1 September 1949) 311 

189. The Public Compares Present and Past Economic Conditions 

(21 September 1949) 312 

190. The Marshall Plan and Western Germany (17 October 1949) 313 

191. The State of German Political Interest at the Outset of the 

West German Republic (9 December 1949) 314 

Index 319 



CHARTS 



1 . Major Cares and Worries of A MZON Germans 1 6 

Question: "What are your greatest cares and worries at the 

present time?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 3. 

2. Government Efforts to Overcome tfie Black Market 22 

Question: "In your opinion, are the government off icials doing everything to 

overcome the black market?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 37. 

3. The Prospects for a United Germany 24 

Question: "Do you believe the Allies will cooperate successfully to leave behind 
a united Germany at the end of the occupation?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 58. 

4a. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: AMZON Views 28 

4b. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: Berlin Views 29 

Question: "In your opinion are the Western Powers doing all they possibly can 
to relieve the needs of Berlin or could they do more?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 52 

5. Views on National Socialism 33 

Question: "Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried 

out?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9. 

6. Collective German Responsibility for World War II 36 

Question: "Do you think that the entire German people are responsible for the 
war because they let a government come to power which plunged the whole 
world into war?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 8. 

7. Government and Racial Superiority 39 

Question: "Do you think that some races of people are more fit to rule than 

others?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 194P, p. 9. 

8. Economic Security vs. Guaranteed Freedoms 42 

Question: "Which of these types of government would you, personally, choose 
as better: 

A. A government which offers the people economic security and the 
possibility of a good income, 

B. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a free 
press and religious freedom?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 7. 



CHARTS / XV 



9. Interest in Politics 44 

Question: "Are you yourself interested in political affairs or do you prefer to 

leave that to others?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 13. 

10. Politics as a Career 45 

Question: "If you had a son who had just finished school, would you like to see 

him take up politics as a career?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1949, p. 15. 

11. Trust in Local German Officials 46 

Question: "In general, do officials in the local German government work for the 
good of the community or are they primarily self-interested?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 16. 

12. Preference for Political Parties 48 

Question: "Which political party do you belong to or prefer?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 18, 19. The following page in the 
same report gives preferences for the smaller parties as well as those responding 
"don't know." 

1 3. The Reconstruction of Germany 53 

Question: "Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion? 

A. Germany herself should bear the responsibility for her reconstruction 
under the supervision of the Allies. 

B. Germany should be occupied by the Allies until she is able to form a good 
democratic government. 

C. The Americans should reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order to 
avoid her becoming a prey to Communism. 

D. The reconstruction of their country should be left to the Germans 
themselves without interference from the Allies." 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 57. 

14. Relative Influence of tfie United States and tfie Soviet Union 54 

Question: "Which country will have the greatest influence on world affairs in 

the next ten years?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 47. 

1 5. The Choice between National Socialism and Communism 55 

Question: "If you had to choose between Communism and National Socialism, 
under which government would you prefer to live?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9. 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 



Many people and institutions assisted us in the preparation of 
tliis volume. For providing us with the OMGUS survey reports, 
we are indebted to Professor Robert E. Lane of the Political 
Science Department and Mrs. Gretchen Swibold of the Pohtical 
Science Research Library of Yale University; Dr. Donald V. 
McGranahan, Research and Development Branch, United 
Nations; Dr. Frederick W. Williams; and the Archives Branch, 
Washington National Records Center. Drs. McGranahan, Wil- 
liams, and Leo P. Crespi of the United States Information 
Agency gave us words of encouragement. Pamela C. TiUing 
assisted in preparing some of the summaries included in Part II. 
Harriet Stockanes typed the bulk of the manuscript. And the 
University Research Board of the University of lUinois gave us a 
grant to faciUtate the task of summarizing the reports. We 
would like to express our appreciation to all these individuals 
and institutions. 

An earlier and shorter version of Part I appeared as "Political 
Perspectives in Germany: The Occupation Period, 1945-1949," 
Social Science Information, 8:2 (April 1969), 129-140. 



A.J.M. & R.L.M. 
Urbana, Illinois 
4 March 1969 



FOREWORD 



I first set foot in Germany late in the summer of 1945. But 
acquaintance with the German people, their history and culture, 
had deep roots in my personal experience. That experience had 
been topped by nearly six months of intensive interviewing and 
samphng of opinion among captured German soldiers in the 
prisoner-of-war camps in England. 

When I left England for Germany, I was assigned briefly to 
the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, 
Allied Expeditionary Force. On arrival in Bad Nauheim, the 
assignment was transferred to Information Control Division 
(Office of Mihtary Government, U.S. — OMGUS). The interests 
and personnel of the Psychological Warfare Division and the 
Information Control Division overlapped closely. Both were 
focused upon understanding the motivations, drives and in- 
terests of the German people so that operations could be 
planned and carried out which would help to guide the German 
people to reacquire responsibihty for and management of their 
nation in freedom. 

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the head of Informa- 
tion Control Division, had recommended to General Lucius D. 
Clay, the deputy military governor, that McClure's Intelligence 
Branch be authorized to establish an organization which would 
sample German public opinion and report regularly the analysis 
of such samplings. General Clay wrote in Decision in Germany: 
"In October 1945 a public opinion survey unit was created. We 
had much faith in these polls, although it was shattered 
somewhat by the election at home in November 1948." 

The planning for the work of the survey unit was 
accomplished in Bad Nauheim prior to establishing its head- 
quarters in Bad Homburg. Essential to making the plan a reality 
was acquisition of personnel, transportation and a sample 
design. Personnel were acquired from the staff of the U.S. 



xviii / FOREWORD 



Strategic Bombing Survey when their assignment was completed 
in early fall, 1945. Jeeps for each man were acquired. The 
sample design was more troublesome. 

Germany in 1945 was a nightmare of dislocated persons. 
Typically, 90 per cent of the buildings in major population 
centers were destroyed. Bridges were out. Roads were torn up. 
People lived under the rubble. Refugees streamed west from 
Soviet-held territories. Soldiers, released from captured armies, 
walked home. Wives and children who had been evacuated from 
the cities returned to start rebuilding. Occupying armies settled 
into those hotels and homes which were still in sound 
condition. 

The scarcity of food and the highly professional adminis- 
tration of a food ration card system made possible the design of 
a practically ideal sample under nearly worst possible condi- 
tions. In essence, there was a current and continuously up-dated 
listing of all persons living within the German economy. This 
meant that every person was attached to an administrative 
center and that any community selected for interviewing could 
be systematically and randomly sampled by drawing cards from 
a card file. Selection of communities for sampling, below the 
largest cities, within each Land (State), was randomized by 
random number selection of cells within a grid applied to an 
enormous map which displayed all communities throughout the 
American-controlled area. The authority and prestige of the 
occupying force was such that requests made to individuals to 
grant an interview were almost universally honored. 

The Strategic Bombing Survey staff members, heavily 
trained and experienced, personally drew the samples and 
conducted the interviews for the early studies. At the same 
time, they were responsible to recruit and train German 
interviewers to whom that particular task was assigned before 
the end of 1945. 

Supervision of the organization, training and scheduling of 
the field operations was commendably handled by William 
Diefenbach. Within the several Laender regions, Robert Speagle, 
George Florsheim, Dr. Richard H. Williams, Norman Sharp, 



FOREWORD /xix 

Fred Brauckmann and Dr. Henry Hart directed the coordinated 
efforts. Dr. Max Ralis worked with these units on special 
assignment. 

During the planning period in Bad Nauheim, skepticism 
was frequently heard about the possibihty of constructing an 
organization which could, in practice, meet strict time 
schedules. That skepticism was almost immediately overcome 
once operations were started. But skepticism was also voiced 
about the worth of the findings. Would the German people tell 
military government representatives what was really in their 
hearts and minds? 

The determining factor, of course, was the attitude of the 
interviewers themselves. Given honest, thoughtful, sensitive, 
decent interviewers, it was reasonable to expect that individual 
Germans would respond in kind. Tests were made comparing 
responses given to the original set of American interviewers with 
responses given to newly trained German interviewers. But the 
ultimate test was to be made in elections of public officials. The 
first elections for city-wide positions were held in January 
1946. The problem posed was to determine in advance the 
turnout of voters. Estimates were simultaneously drawn from 
all official and responsible sources channeled to the military 
governor's office. General Clay reports in Decision in Germany 
how important the size of turnout was to him: "I have listened 
to election returns in the United States many times and with 
eager interest, but never have I waited so anxiously to know 
how many voted. . . ." Among all the estimates reported to the 
mihtary governor's office, the projection from our small sample 
was closest to the actual proportion voting, being well within 
the margin of error. 

The success of that one report placed the operation on a 
well-accepted foundation. It did not presage a flow of requests 
from the highest level for additional subjects to be explored. 

The fact is that the Intelligence Branch had had a proud 
history throughout the European campaigns and had earned the 
highest respect for the quality of its work. It had continually 
brought information to the attention of commanders which was 



XX /FOREWORD 



believed to be critical from the point of view of behavioral 
scientists. That practice was continued within the military 
government organization. Guidance on topics to be explored 
through samples of German public opinion was derived from 
internal staff meetings in the Information Control Division's 
Intelligence Branch. Mr. Alfred Toombs and Dr. Alexander 
George provided continuous and thoughtful counsel. 

Supporting the Intelligence Branch's position of pro- 
fessional anticipation of requirements for essential information 
was the emphasis given to repeating identical questions on 
successive surveys. Such repetition permitted subsequent re- 
ports of trends of public opinion. 

Military government was centrally concerned with 
change — change interpreted as the political maturing of the 
German people, an increase in their readiness to accept 
responsibility as individuals and as a great nation, a deepening in 
awareness of the nature of a free society, with its strengths and 
weaknesses, an improvement in the peoples' knowledge of the 
history of their own nation and the character of the tyrants 
they had supported. Reports of trends of public opinion, in 
these respects, went far to satisfy a deep interest among miUtary 
government and German officials for any information which 
might limit speculation and guide interpretation as to changes 
occurring. 

Reports of the surveys of public opinion were dissemi- 
nated to all major divisions of military government. Wider 
distribution was assured through incorporation of highlights of 
surveys into publications of the Intelligence Branch which 
regularly reached all top commanders and, through the intelli- 
gence community, all operational arms of mihtary government. 

The daily contacts of the survey staff — especially its field 
representatives - with German officials (mayoral, administra- 
tive, police, for example) built, in time, good relations with the 
German government which was being erected parallel to 
mihtary government. Particular studies of public reception of 
the mass media opened doors to conversations with executives 
in radio, newspaper and magazine offices. A continuous effort 



FOREWORD /xxi 



was made to tell such officials informally about aspects of 
public opinion which were related to their areas of responsi- 
bility. As regards the topic of anti-Semitism in Germany, a 
major effort was made to bring the findings of our studies to 
the attention of the broadest range of German leadership so 
that they could, in mutual consultation, consider the implica- 
tions to their own fields of interest and activity. 

Analysis and interpretation of the survey findings were 
more easily coped with in the early days of the work than later, 
toward 1948. Public issues, at first, appeared sharp and 
well-defined, the meaning of the data seemed to be clear. The 
addition of analytical staff, as time passed, brought fresh views 
from the United States, generous and warmly humanitarian in 
outlook toward the German people, tolerant and indulgent 
toward Soviet power. Important contributions toward richer 
interpretations and presentation of the findings were made by 
Dr. Hedvig Ylvisaker, Ann Schuetz, and Henry Halpem. 

But all those interpretations are now historical curiosities. 
They tell us, perhaps, as much about the situations of the day 
and about the interpreter as the facts being analyzed. But the 
facts reported remain as given. 

The reports issued by the survey unit were made enduring 
by the elegance of the sample design, the dedication to 
wholesome interview procedures and the impeccabiUty of the 
card counts (thanks to Louise Hopwood's insistence). The 
studies merit careful consideration by historians, political 
scientists, sociologists, psychologists, communications special- 
ists and other persons who seek to understand the hopes 
and fears, the judgments, the expectations and the response to 
events which characterized German outlooks after the collapse 
of Hitler's Reich. 

Frederick W. Williams 
New York, New York 
August, 1968 



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 



AMG American Military Government 

AMZON American Zone of Occupation 

CDU Christian Democratic Union 

CSU Christian SociaUst Union 

DM Deutsche Mark 

DP Displaced Persons 

DVP Democratic People's Party 

ECA European Cooperation Administration 

ERP European Recovery Program 

IMT International Mihtary Tribunal (Nuremberg 

Trials) 

JEIA Joint Export-Import Agency 

KPD Communist Party of Germany 

LDP Liberal Democratic Party 

MG Military Government 

NSDAP National SociaUst German Workers Party (Nazi 

Party) 

OeVP Austrian People's Party 

OMGUS Office of Mihtary Government of the United 

States for Germany 

PG Party Member (of NSDAP) 

RIAS Radio in the American Sector (Berlin) 

RM Reichsmark 

SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany 

SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany 

SPOe Socialist Party of Austria 

VOA Voice of America 

WAV Economic Reconstruction Party 



PARTI 

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Throughout the years since the end of World War II, as 
Germany was rising from a shattering defeat to resume its 
position as a leading member of the international community, 
American pohcy makers and scholars have closely watched 
developments in German public opinion. Just after the first 
American troops penetrated the crumbling Third Reich in 1 945 
came batteries of social psychologists. These men, responsible 
to the United States Army, were charged with the formidable 
task of ascertaining the potential for resistance among the 
population, singling out those citizens - preferably democrati- 
cally oriented — most likely to be most useful in restoring 
municipal and other services, and in keeping the Army 
administrators informed about the mood and concerns of the 
defeated Germans. 

The Army quickly saw the need for formalized procedures 
to gather information on public perspectives. In October 1945, 
less than six months after the capitulation of Hitler's Germany, 
the Intelligence Branch of the Office of the Director of 
Information Control, Office of Mihtary Government for 
Germany (U.S.), set up its Opinion Survey Section, under the 
direction of Dr. Frederick W. Williams. This agency conducted 
72 major surveys during the course of the next four years, an 
average of one every third week. The reports based on these 
surveys went to the highest levels of the American occupation 
authorities.* 

Even after West Germany regained a measure of sover- 
eignty in September 1949, with the promulgation of the 
Federal Republic, American officials retained their interest in 
the political perspectives of its citizens. The Opinion Survey 
Section within the Office of Military Government, United 
States (OMGUS) became the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of 
Public Affairs, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for 



4 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Germany (HICOG). From 1949 until 1955 this agency, too, 
conducted a multitude of public opinion surveys. Meanwhile 
the United States government had become aware of the utihty 
of such surveys, not for occupied West Germany alone, but for 
other Western European countries as well. A small survey 
research section within the Department of State ultimately 
developed into a major arm of the United States Information 
Agency. More than twenty times since September 1952 the 
USIA has commissioned extensive surveys in at least four major 
Western European countries.^ 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS 

This volume deals specifically with the surveys of West German 
attitudes conducted under the auspices of OMGUS. Its body 
comprises summaries of the reports prepared by the Opinion 
Survey Section. These introductory remarks, after discussing 
some technical aspects of the surveys, will outhne some of the 
main findings of interest to present-day students of public 
policy issues. 

Questionnaires. A review of its procedures by the Infor- 
mation Control Division's Opinion Survey Section reported: 

The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with 
Division or Branch heads who are most closely concerned 
with the problem under investigation. The studies are 
usually designed to produce evidence which is zone-wide in 
its imphcation. But special segments of the population or 
special areas are also studied on occasion. 

The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are 
tried out on small groups of Germans to determine 
whether they are meaningful and understandable to the 
wide variety of types of Germans to be studied. 

A set of the questionnaires is now available through the United 
States National Achives and Records Service.^ 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 5 



Sampling. The Opinion Survey Section's initial intent was 
to concentrate solely upon the American Zone of Occupation in 
the south of Germany, that is, Bavaria, Hesse, and what was 
then called Wuerttemberg-Baden. By March 1946, however, it 
had begun surveying the opinions of West Berhners, and 
somewhat later expanded operations to Bremen (together with 
its harbor city of Bremerhaven), a city-state under American 
control in the north of Germany. The first eight surveys, 
conducted between 26 October 1945 and 13 December 1945, 
rested upon area samples of 39 to 45 communities, with a 
sample size that ranged between 331 and 466 respondents. 
Beginning on 27 December 1945 the Opinion Survey Section 
interviewed approximately 1 ,000 persons in 80 communities; in 
April 1946 it increased this number to about 1,500 respondents 
in 141 communities; and by April 1947 it was surveying 
roughly 3,000 persons in 241 communities (Table 1). 

The earliest surveys made little attempt to stratify the 
sample even by Land. By April 1947, when the Section 
formalized its samphng procedure, it could note that ". . . com- 
munities under 10,000 in size are systematically selected at 
random from lists which order all communities in [the 
American Zone of] Germany according to size within the eight 
administrative areas. Towns over 10,000 in size are weighted 
out in the sample as separate items." The determination of 
individual respondents rested upon the selection of every nXh. 
name from the list of rationcard holders — which, in the earlier 
years at least, doubtless constituted a complete enumeration of 
residents of American-occupied Germany. A visiting expert, 
Ehno C. Wilson, commented in August 1948 that the use of 
such hsts offered a "samplers' paradise" unparalled in the United 
States. He went on to characterize the Opinion Survey Section's 
entire sampling procedure as being "of the highest order.'"* 

Field Work. The field staff carried out the interviews in 
the respondents' homes or offices. For surveys in October and 
November 1945, American service personnel who could speak 
German "like natives" conducted the interviews; thereafter, 



6 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



TABLE 1 . THE OMGUS SURVEYS 



The dates listed below are those printed on the questionnaires, 
and represent the days on which the field workers began 
interviewing. For approximate sample sizes, see the text: an 
asterisk (*) denotes that the entire sample was split into two 
halves, with each half getting a separate questionnaire. 



1. 1945 26 Oct 


37. 1947 7 Jan 


2. 


5 Nov 


38. 


3 Feb 


3. 


12 Nov 


39. 


17 Feb 


4. 


19 Nov 


40. 


7 Apr* 


5. 


26 Nov 


41. 


5 May 


6. 


1 Dec 


42. 


5 Jun 


7. 


6 Dec 


43. 


Jun* 


8. 


13 Dec 


44. 


8 Jul* 


9. 


27 Dec 


45. 


4 Aug 


10. 1946 14 Jan 


46. 


25 Aug* 


11. 


21 Jan 


47. 


15 Sep* 


12. 


31 Jan 


48. 


6 Oct 


13. 


7 Feb 


49. 


10 Nov* 


14. 


14 Feb 


50. 


2 Dec* 


15. 


21 Feb 


51. 1948 5 Jan* 


16. 


1 Mar 


52. 


IFeb 


17. 


8 Mar 


53. 


23 Feb 


18. 


15 Mar 


54. 


29 Mar 


19. 


22 Mar 


55. 


19 Apr* 


20. 


29 Mar 


56. 


17 May* 


21. 


5 Apr 


57. 


8 Jun* 


22. 


15 Apr 


58. 


30 Jun 


23. 


26 Apr 


59. 


19 Jul 


24. 


8 May 


60. 


2 Aug* 


25. 


7Jun 


61. 


23 Aug* 


26. 


21 Jun 


62. 


17 Sep* 


27. 


1 Jul 


63. 


12 Oct 


28. 


25 Jul 


64. 


1 1 Nov* 


29. 


9 Aug* 


65. 


2 Dec* 


30. 


Sep 


66. 1949 8 Jan* 


31. 


4 Oct* 


67. 


3 Feb* 


32. 


3 Sep* 


68. 


1 Mar 


33. 


14 Oct 


69. 


15 Apr 


34. 


28 Oct* 


70. 


8 Jul* 


35. 


25 Nov* 


71. 


1 Aug 


36. 


10 Dec 


72. 


12 Sep* 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 7 



Germans trained by the Opinion Survey Section carried out the 
field work. In all cases the interviewers informed respondents of 
OMGUS sponsorship of the surveys and assured them that their 
anonymity would be preserved. 

Given the fact that Germany was an occupied country, and 
that the agent of the armed occupier was conducting these 
surveys, one might legitimately ask what influence this fact had 
upon the type of responses given by those polled. In November 
1948 the Opinion Survey Section designed a survey specifically 
to determine how much bias OMGUS sponsorship introduced 
into the findings. Two sets of interviewers, one representing the 
"MiUtary Government" and the other a "German public 
opinion institute," asked separate samples in West Berlin a 
variety of questions focusing upon political attitudes, partic- 
ularly issues of occupation policy. In summarizing the results of 
this survey, Leo P. Crespi, at that time chief of the Opinion 
Survey Section, wrote: 

Without in any way denying the importance of the 
sponsorship problems that were uncovered in some areas 
of questioning, it would not be unreasonable to hold that 
the major import of the present experiment is not so much 
the presence of sponsorship differences on MG [Military 
Government] questions but their relative absence. With 
only a third of the questions exhibiting differences at the 
95 per cent level [of significance] and only 14 per cent at 
the 99 per cent level; with a maximum difference of 17.1 
per cent and a non-significant average difference of 6.6 per 
cent on questions in large part selected to show up 
sponsorship differences if they exist, the conclusion seems 
fair that on the score of sponsorship MG polling is an 
entirely workable method of inquiry in occupied Ger- 
many. . . .^ 

The areas of greatest difference seemed to be questions bearing 
upon American prestige and, to a lesser extent, questions about 
militarism and National Socialism. In these areas, Crespi 
continued: 

It is on the side of caution not to take the obtained per- 
centages entirely at face value. Perhaps a feasible suggestion 



8 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 

is to apply in such instances a 10 per cent safety factor— 
the nearest round figure to the 11.1 per cent average 
sponsorship difference found on questions passing the 95 
per cent level. . . .^ 

But to this must be added the fact that sponsorship differences 
do not necessarily mean that the OMGUS-sponsored surveys 
were less valid than those conducted by the "independent" 
German agency. Respondents may simply have given different 
versions of the "truth" to interviewers from different agencies, 
with neither version necessarily being a more accurate reflection 
of the respondents' "true" perspectives than the other. ^ Those 
who would use the OMGUS surveys, however, must bear in 
mind the possibihty of bias. 

Analysis. The staff of the Opinion Survey Section 
transferred the information from the questionnaires to punch- 
cards, produced sometimes elaborate cross-tabulations of the 
data as well as longitudinal comparisons, and wrote reports for 
distribution to other OMGUS agencies. Unfortunately, the 
punchcards for these surveys have disappeared. All that remains 
is the set of 194 reports based upon these data. The reports, 
ranging in length from two to 7 1 pages, analyze specific aspects 
of the data. They frequently contain tables of data broken 
down by demographic characteristics, or cross-tabulated accord- 
ing to expressed opinions on related subjects. Taken together, 
these reports (despite the absence of punchcard data) comprise 
a veritable wealth of information which social scientists have 
not yet begun to mine thoroughly. 

The purpose of this volume is to make this material more 
widely available to the scholarly and pohcy-making community. 
Its bulk is comprised of short summaries of each of the 194 
separate reports, together with an index. Where possible we have 
taken these summaries directly from the reports themselves. 
Similarly, information on sample sizes and interviewing dates 
stems from the individual reports. The complete set of reports, 
in microfilmed or xeroxed form, can be obtained from the 
United States National Archives and Records Service.^ The 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 9 



remainder of this introductory survey will suggest some uses to 
which social scientists could put the information contained in 
the OMGUS reports of public opinion in occupied Germany, as 
well as some findings that emerge from the reports. 



IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION POLICIES 

The OMGUS surveys were oriented toward policy problems 
facing the American occupation authorities. Particularly at 
the outset of the occupation years this meant short-range 
policy — that seeking to deal with the day-to-day issues arising 
in this massive effort to control an alien population. Cardinal 
among these issues were the attitudes of Germans toward the 
occupation itself, the effectiveness of the American information 
policies, and a host of specific problems such as food rationing, 
refugees and expellees, currency control and reform, the 
division of Germany, and the city of Berlin. 



Attitudes toward the American Occupation 

Doubtless few nations relish the prospect of falling under the 
control of a foreign country. The remarkable thing is that 
Germans in the American Zone of Occupation (AMZON) and 
West Berhn did not regard the occupation of the late 1 940s as a 
national humiliation for Germany: For every person who 
considered it as such (an average of 30 per cent of the 
population), more than two (62%) did not view it as a national 
humiliation (#22).^ Moreover, there was a general feeling 
among AMZON Germans that they received better treatment, 
particularly with respect to food rations, than did their 
compatriots in other zones of occupation (#64); and they had 
more confidence that the Americans would treat Germans fairly 
than would the other occupying powers (#76).*° 

Attitudes toward the American occupation forces were 
ambivalent. On the one hand, few Germans came into direct 



10 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



contact with soldiers. A survey in September 1 946 revealed that 
only 28 per cent of Mannheim's citizens had struck up some 
relationship with white soldiers, 16 per cent with black soldiers 
(#24). For the American Zone as a whole, only one in seven 
had come to know an American soldier well or rather well, 
although as many as one in five had had an opportunity since 
the beginning of the occupation to talk with an American 
(#27). A year later almost twice as many AMZON Germans 
(27%) could claim that they had become acquainted with an 
American since the end of the war (#94) - a figure that rose to 
32 per cent by December 1949 (#11/6). 

On the other hand, the lack of direct contact did not 
prevent Germans from forming images of these American 
troops. These images were by and large positive. There seems to 
have been little basic hostiUty toward the soldiers: Almost 
three-quarters (74%), for instance, would not have expressed 
opposition to German girls from their circle of acquaintances or 
family who dated Americans (#94). And surveys taken at 
various times revealed the overwhelming German belief that 
both the behavior and the popularity of the American troops 
were improving rather than worsening as the occupation months 
progressed (#94, 110, and II/6). Minorities felt in November 
1947 (#94) that the Americans enriched themselves through 
barter (30%), had heard that the troops wasted or destroyed 
food (36%), knew of cases where American negligence had 
destroyed German property (21%), or had had unpleasant or 
irritating experiences with Americans (13%). But to this must 
be added the fact that, among respondents who claimed to 
know Americans, the share reporting such negative images 
averaged 13 percentage points greater than among those who 
knew no Americans. Negro troops, although seen as friendher 
than white soldiers, seemed to arouse somewhat greater 
anxieties among Mannheim residents (#24): Most of these 
respondents described the behavior of black soldiers either as 
decent (37%) or as decent with some exceptions (33%), as 
opposed to a small minority (17%) characterizing their behavior 
as not decent; but as many as 29 per cent reported their fear of 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 1 1 



black soldiers (a self-description that the interviewers' estimates, 
based upon the tenor of the respondents' comments, more than 
confirmed). 

Germans in the American Zone were not sanguine about 
the prospects for an early end to the occupation. In April 1946, 
of those willing to estimate how long the occupation would last 
(62 per cent of the entire sample), two-thirds suggested at least 
a decade or "many years." Only one in nine of those willing to 
make an estimate thought that the occupation would end 
within the next three years (#22). The same question was asked 
a half year later of 188 community leaders in areas under 
American control. Three-quarters of this sample felt that the 
occupation would last for at least another ten years, and a 
quarter even thought it might last until 1966 or longer. A large 
majority (76%) backed up their best guesses about the duration 
of the American occupation with the assertion that the 
Americans "should" stay that long (#44). Incidentally, of those 
wilhng to estimate how long Germany would have to continue 
paying reparations (67 per cent of the entire sample), less than 
one in seven thought it would be under 20 years (#59). 

More problematic was the German view on reconstruction. 
In early 1946 residents of the American Zone were optimistic 
despite their recognition that the road to full recovery was long. 
Only a seventh (14%) expected reconstruction within a decade; 
four times as many (57%) thought that it would take two or 
more decades; and a fifth (20%) anticipated that it might 
require at least 50 years (#22). About as many (41%) were 
satisfied that recovery was proceeding more quickly than 
expected as the number seeing it proceeding more slowly than 
expected (40%). Over half (56%) were nonetheless optimistic 
that reconstruction could be accomplished with some degree of 
speed and energy (with 35 per cent expressing pessimism). 

American Zone Germans expected and felt that they were 
getting more assistance in reconstruction from the United States 
than from joint Allied efforts (#22, 76, 100). Satisfaction with 
the American contribution declined, however, from November 
1945, when as many as 70 per cent of AMZON respondents 



12 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



expressed the view that the United States had furthered rather 
than hindered the reconstruction, to September 1946, when 
this percentage stood at 44 per cent; after remaining at this level 
until the following August, it rose again to 55 per cent in 
January 1948 and 63 per cent in August of that year (#60, 85, 
175). 

The Marshall Plan evidently played a large role in 
increasing German confidence in the United States. In August 
1949 as many as 69 per cent of the AMZON Germans were 
aware of this aid program, and all but a handful of these knew 
that Germany was to benefit through it (#190). Asked what 
underlay the Marshall Plan, the bulk of the respondents saw 
America's self-interest: Almost two-thirds (63%) felt that 
America wished to prevent Western Europe from becoming 
communist, and almost half (48%) thought that America 
wanted to win friends in Western Europe so that it would have 
allies in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. Purely 
altruistic motives found third place in this ranking, with 45 per 
cent stating that America was earnestly anxious to help 
homeless and starving people. A few saw sinister motives — a 
desire to use the Marshall Plan to dump surplus goods (18%), to 
achieve dominance over Western Europe (7%), or to penetrate 
the European market (6%). 

On all these points — attitudes toward American soldiers, 
the American contribution to German reconstruction, views of 
the Marshall Plan — West Berliners were consistently more ready 
to express an opinion and more likely to take a pro-American 
position. This trend was in evidence even before the crises that 
led up to the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949. During and after 
the blockade, however, West Berliners were even more predis- 
posed to look upon the Americans as their friends in an 
otherwise hostile environment. 



American Information Policies 

The occupation authorities were quite naturally interested in 
the effectiveness of their information program. This program 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 13 



included the licensing and publication of newspapers and 
magazines, radio programs, pamphlets, special programs, and 
the facihties of the so-called Amerika-Haeuser, or United States 
information centers. 

Although newspaper readership was high in all segments of 
the German population under American control, with roughly 
70 per cent consistently reporting themselves as regular readers 
(#175), it was nonetheless higher among the more educated, 
men rather than women, and city dwellers, particularly West 
Berliners. The American-sponsored newspaper, Neue Zeitung, 
found its greatest readership in West BerUn, where 20 per cent 
of the sample reported reading it regularly, in contrast to ten 
per cent in the American Zone. Of present and past readers, 63 
per cent said that they liked the paper; 22 per cent felt that it 
was one-sided (#154). More generally, AMZON Germans felt 
that the licensed press contained fair and trustworthy news, 
particularly when compared with newspapers published during 
the war (e.g. #58). 

Other written media reached smaller audiences. Less than a 
quarter of the respondents in the American Zone, and 42 per 
cent of those in West Berlin, reported that they regularly read 
magazines (#53, 108). Together, the American-sponsored //ewr^, 
Neue Auslese, and Amerikanische Rundschau accounted for 
about half of the magazine readership (#43). In February 1946 
as many as 55 per cent of the respondents in the American 
Zone reported that they did not read books at all, but by 
October 1948, 50 per cent (64 per cent in West Berlin) said that 
they did (#13, 153). Generally, Germans claimed to prefer 
novels, fiction, and short stories to other types of books; 
specifically, they hsted the Bible (71%), the Prayer Book (27%), 
and the works of Goethe as their favorites. Occasionally the 
American Military Government published information pam- 
phlets on political issues for sale to the general public. Studies 
among those who had received these pamphlets as gifts revealed 
that the readership ranged between 35 and 75 per cent, 
although it was higher among men, upper socioeconomic 
groups, and the better educated (#89, 97, 103, 112, 129). In 
most cases only minorities claimed to have learned something 



14 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



new from these pamphlets. Majorities nonetheless felt that they 
presented a fair rather than one-sided picture of the facts. 

Slightly more than half of the American Zone Germans 
described themselves as regular radio listeners (#175). Most 
preferred the radio station located in their own Land (or state), 
particularly in West Berhn where RIAS (Radio in the American 
Sector) had to compete with programs beamed from the Soviet 
Zone of Occupation (#45). The most popular type of program 
in both AMZON (72%) and West Berhn (85%) was musical. 
Regarding political controls, substantial majorities in both the 
American Zone (64%) and West Berlin (72%) felt that the AUies 
had censored the programs; but in contrast to West Berlin, 
where 58 per cent thought that the programs contained too 
much propaganda, in the American Zone 66 per cent did not 
think that this was the case (#45). The share of the AMZON 
public listening to the "Voice of America" varied, from 63 per 
cent in January 1946 to 75 per cent in October of that year and 
41 per cent in May 1949 (#1, 45, 176).*^ Again, those most 
likely to listen to VOA programs were men, upper socio- 
economic groups, the better educated, and Protestants. Al- 
though the bulk of VOA listeners (56%) considered the 
programming good, criticism focused on its propagandistic 
tendencies and its dullness (#176). More generally, however, 
Germans tended to rely upon the radio rather than the 
newspapers as their chief source of news: In January 1946, 
almost two-thirds (65%) thought the radio more truthful than 
newspapers (#1); but by the spring of 1947 only 24 per cent 
were more inchned to rely upon the radio, with eight per cent 
preferring the press and another 37 per cent finding them equal 
in their trustworthiness (#68). 

The movie audience was not large, fluctuating around 
a quarter of the population (#20, 116, 171). Love themes 
were most popular. Allied policies sharply restricting the 
number of pre- 1945 films that theaters could show, and the 
absence of extensive German production companies in the 
immediate postwar period, meant that foreign films, and 
particularly those made in the United States, dominated the 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 15 



market. Germans nonetheless indicated that they would have 
preferred German films, in large part simply because they 
corresponded more closely to traditional German culture. 

An important aspect of the United States information 
policy was the establishment of information centers. Almost 
every major city had its own Amerika-Haus, where its citizens 
could read books and see films about the United States, hear 
lectures relevant to American foreign policy interests, and 
participate in other activities. It is remarkable that, although a 
majority of the people knew of these information centers and 
about four in ten knew what they offered, only four per cent 
had ever been in one. And most of these were the better 
educated, especially community and opinion leaders (#145). 

A study conducted in early 1948 on the cumulative impact 
of all mass media revealed that 12 per cent of the AMZON 
population seemed to have no source of information whatever, 
and another 1 7 per cent had no regular source of information 
(#192). The more sources of information a person had, it 
turned out, the more hkely that he had a favorable attitude 
toward the United States and its government and economics. 
Similarly, the more information the respondent had about the 
Soviet Union, the more likely it was that his attitude toward 
American capitalism was favorable. 



Specific Issues of the Occupation 

The number of specific issues on which the occupation 
authorities wanted to know German attitudes was too great for 
each of them to be discussed here. A few, however, deserve 
special attention: rationing, expellees, currency problems, the 
division of Germany, the question of Berlin, and more 
specifically, the Berhn blockade. 

Food Rationing. Questions about food rationing pro- 
duced mixed reactions among AMZON Germans. On the one 
hand, they definitely felt that they were suffering from the 



16 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




Fig. 1 . Major Cares and Worries of A MZON Germans 

Question: "What are your greatest cares and worries at the present time?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 3. 



shortages, particularly in the earlier part of the occupation (see 
Figure 1). Even before a cut in rations, which took place in 
April 1946, three in five respondents (61%) stated that they 
were not getting enough food to be able to work efficiently; by 
late April this proportion had reached 72 per cent, and it 
remained at 71 per cent in the following month (#15, 18). Only 
one in eight (12%) was satisfied with his food allotment, and 
another two in eight (24%) considered it adequate. Even as late 
as January 1 949, four in ten continued to feel that they were 
getting insufficient food to permit efficient work (#175).*^ 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 17 




On the other hand, rationing evidently did not pose an 
overwhelming hardship for most Germans in the American 
Zone. For one thing, the rationcard system seemed to be 
equitable (although the number seeing it carried out unjustly 
rose from three per cent in November 1945 to slightly under a 
third in January 1948 before dropping off to about a fifth in 
February 1949). For another, eight out of ten AMZON 
Germans were able to supplement their rations by canning 
foods from their gardens, obtaining food from friends or 
relatives who lived on farms, or securing special supplements 



18 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



because of the nature of their work (#18). Third, and what may 
have been most important, they saw themselves in a good 
position compared to that of the residents of other zones. In 
May 1946, two-fifths (41%) beheved that food rations were 
largest in the American Zone, with 29 per cent citing British 
Zone residents as the best fed. Less than a half of one per cent 
felt that rations were smallest in the American Zone, with 22 
per cent naming the Soviet Zone and 18 per cent the French 
Zone (#18). 

An interesting shift occurred in the perceived causes of 
food shortages. Asked in May 1946 why rations had been 
reduced, the responses given most frequently stressed either 
food shortages in Germany and/or the world (41%) or else 
insufficient stocks and poor crops (27%). In third place (15%) 
stood perceptions that available supplies had to feed others in 
Germany, that the country was overcrowded, or that too many 
occupation forces were in the country (#18). General causes, 
however, soon became specific. In November 1946 and July 
1947, the reason given most frequently for food shortages (46 
and 44 per cent, respectively) was overpopulation due to 
displaced persons, evacuees, and so forth (#70). Other causes 
listed included the loss of the war or wartime destruction (22 
and 10 per cent, respectively), the loss of the eastern territories 
(20 and 22 per cent), an imbalance between imports and 
exports (19 and 17 per cent), and the black market (8 and 26 
per cent). 

Refugees and Expellees. The data on underlying causes of 
food shortages are indicative of growing hostihty in postwar 
Germany toward refugees and expellees. The October 1946 
census revealed that no less than 16.2 per cent of the entire 
AMZON population comprised refugees from the Soviet Zone 
of Occupation, expellees from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and other displaced persons. By 
the end of the occupation period their numbers amounted to 
one-fifth of the total population in the American Zone. In most 
of their characteristics and political attitudes the evacuees did 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 19 



not differ greatly from the natives. Exceptions were that the 
evacuees were more likely to be CathoUc, adherents of the 
Social Democratic Party, and from unskilled occupational 
groups (#84, 162). Integrating these masses of refugees and 
expellees proved to be one of the most serious problems that 
the Western Allies, and later the Federal Republic, had to face. 

The native inhabitants of the American Zone resented the 
circumstances that had led to the influx of the refugees and 
expellees. In March 1946, before food shortages seriously hit 
the AMZON Germans, as many as 14 per cent of them saw 
some justification in the expulsions; thereafter, only about 
three per cent did so, as well over 90 per cent felt them to be 
unjust (#14A, 175). Asked who was responsible for the 
expulsions, over half (51%) attributed them to the Allies, to a 
desire for revenge against the Germans, to antipathy in Eastern 
Europe toward Germans. About three in ten (29%) blamed the 
defunct Nazi government or Hitler himself, one per cent said 
that the Germans themselves were responsible, and a quarter 
would not or could not assign responsibility (#14A). But the 
question of responsibihty raised the further question of who 
should care for the expellees. In March 1946, about two-thirds 
of the AMZON respondents (63%) felt that Germans should 
perform this task, almost half (48%) that it should be up to the 
Allies or the countries which expelled them (#14A). By 
November of that year respondents were inclined to place the 
main burden on the state expelling them (46%), rather than 
either the Germans (28%), or the Allies (14%), although it must 
be added that West Berliners were considerably more willing to 
place the burden on Germans (#47). Somewhat less than a year 
later, in September 1947, almost half of those asked (48%) 
thought that Germany should provide for the expellees; a 
quarter continued to feel that the native countries of the 
expellees should bear the costs, and 13 per cent continued to 
name the Alhes (#81). 

These native inhabitants were not much less resentful 
toward the expellees themselves. Throughout the occupation 
period, whereas about half expected the expellees to be able to 



20 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



get along with the native population, a solid third expected 
trouble (#14A, 28, 47, 175). In November 1946, at the height 
of the food crisis, as many as 46 per cent foresaw trouble, in 
contrast to a more optimistic 47 per cent. In March 1946, 
substantial majorities despaired of finding solutions to food 
(71%) and housing (64%) problems. More than a third (35%) 
thought the matter of jobs insoluble. In November of that year, 
78 per cent of a sample in Wuerttemberg-Baden expressed their 
conviction that the expellees constituted an economic burden 
for the American Zone.^^ 

It was a burden that the native residents were nonetheless 
willing to accept, if sometimes begrudgingly. Large majorities 
agreed in March 1946 that the expellees should have both 
economic equality (81%) and full political rights (74%). In 
November of the same year five in six Wuerttemberg-Badeners 
(83%) wanted to permit the expellees to participate fully in 
politics. The share of native residents seeing the expellees as 
German citizens rose from 49 per cent in early 1946 to 67 per 
cent in late 1947, during which period those viewing them as 
foreigners dropped from 28 to 18 per cent. Even so, throughout 
the entire occupation years roughly 90 per cent expected that 
the expellees would return to their homelands if they were 
permitted to do so. 

The perceptions of the expellees themselves differed 
sharply in important respects. To be sure, most expressed a 
desire to return to their homelands, but the percentage 
expressing this desire declined steadily, and it was persistently 
lower than the percentage of native inhabitants expecting the 
expellees to return to their homelands if given a chance.^* 
Moreover, almost three in four (73%) viewed themselves in 
September 1947 as German citizens. By June 1947 almost 
two-thirds (64%) were expressing the expectation that they 
would not get along with the native Germans. The share of 
those expressing actual dissatisfaction with their treatment by 
local populations rose from seven per cent in March 1946 to 50 
per cent in June 1948. And majorities persistently felt that the 
Land governments were not doing all within their power to 
assist the expellees. To all this, however, must be added the fact 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 21 



that, after the severe food and economic crises were over, the 
level of latent hostility among the expellees dechned. 



The Currency Reform. The key to ending the economic 
crises that contributed so much to such problems as mounting 
tensions between the expellees and the native residents was the 
currency reform, carried through in June 1948. In their earhest 
surveys the American occupation authorities focused on popu- 
lar perceptions of inflationary trends, the standing of the 
Reichsmark, rent and price controls, rationing, the black 
market, and still other problems emanating in part from the 
Allied inabiUty to cooperate fully on currency reform. 

The first two years of the occupation saw increasing 
desperation among AMZON Germans. In January 1946, 67 per 
cent of the respondents reported that their incomes were 
adequate; two years later only 57 per cent felt this way (#100). 
Between January and June 1946 half the population believed 
that anti-inflationary measures would not succeed (#60). 
Confidence in the Reichsmark fell to the point where, in June 
1947, about as many persons felt that it would maintain its 
then-current value as thought it would not (#100). We noted 
earlier a declining belief in the fairness of the rationcard system, 
accompanying increasing worries about the adequacy of food 
rations. Meanwhile, there was a growing recognition of the 
importance of the black market in German economic life. 
Although in February 1946 over half (51%) denied the 
existence of a black market in their community, two years later 
71 percent knew of one (see Figure 2). A more general mood of 
pessimism underscored all these trends: Whereas in December 
1945 nearly eight in ten thought that economic conditions would 
improve, by April 1947 only 45 per cent thought so (#100). 

There was a measure of confusion about the sources and 
solutions of their economic woes. Asked why ten times as much 
currency was in circulation in July 1946 as before the war, most 
attributed it either to black market dealers (66%) or Nazis 
and war profiteers (33%), and 17 per cent were unable to 
suggest a reason. And yet pluraUties of 40 per cent in the 



22 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




Fig. 2. Government Efforts to Overcome the Black Market 

Question: "In your opinion, are the government off icials doing everything 

to overcome the black market?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 37. 



American Zone and 52 per cent in West Berlin opposed a 
currency reform at that time (with 36 and 40 per cent 
respectively, favoring it). Presented with alternative schedules 
for carrying out such a reform, however, a plurality in the 
American Zone (44%) favored an immediate adjustment rather 
than delaying it until economic conditions should improve 
(12%) or until a new government should be formed (16%). In 
the meantime, most of those with opinions preferred to keep 
their reserves in goods rather than cash or bank accounts (#32). 
Once instituted, the currency reform received hearty 
approval (#133). Nine in ten termed it necessary, and over half 
(53%) thought that it should have taken place earher. It tended 
to create an optimistic mood: Over half (54%) expected the 
new currency to retain its value, 58 per cent believed that they 
would get along better during the coming year because of the 
currency reform, seven in ten intended to make additional 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 23 



purchases, and most expected the reform either to Hmit (71%) 
or overcome (14%) the black market. There was nonetheless 
some dissatisfaction. It focused particularly upon the ten to one 
conversion ratio which, according to more than a third (35%) of 
the AMZON Germans, treated the small savers more harshly 
than the rich. And 77 per cent expected — correctly, as it 
turned out — that the currency reform would lead to greater 
unemployment (see Figure 1). 

The actual effect of the currency reform was a bag of 
blessings mixed with curses. On the one hand, after some 
temporary dislocations, it permitted the three western zones of 
Germany and the three western sectors of Berlin to get their 
economies moving again. That these West Germans could, 
before another decade was over, establish themselves as the 
economically strongest state in Europe is in no small measure an 
indication of the success of the currency reform and similar 
decisions made during the occupation. But, on the other hand, 
for Germans throughout the occupied territories it was a 
symbolic step that sealed the division of Germany into East and 
West. 

The Division of Germany. The occupation years 
witnessed growing uneasiness about the prospect for ending the 
"temporary" division of Germany. Germans in territories under 
American control saw clearly a split emerging along east-west 
lines, due in large part to the inabihty of the victorious wartime 
Allies to agree upon the course of Germany's future. The 
percentage seeing the AUies as having furthered the reconstruc- 
tion of Germany increased from a quarter in September 1 946 to 
a half in January 1948, with the share of more optimistic 
responses declining from four to three in nine (#100). By 
January 1948 some 85 per cent of the respondents thought that 
the Four Powers were not cooperating successfully in the recon- 
struction (see Figure 3). Four in five did not think that a unified 
Germany would survive the end of the occupation (#175). 

The failure of successive conferences of foreign ministers 
in 1947 enhanced this pessimistic mood. AMZON Germans 
thought that the Soviet Union had torpedoed the Moscow 



24 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




5 


25 


5 


JUN 


AUG 


JAN 


1947 




1948 



Fig. 3. The Prospects for a United Germany 

Question: "Do you believe the Allies will cooperate successfully to leave 
behind a united Germany at the end of the occupation?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 58. 



Conference (10 March-24 April). A substantial plurality (49%) 
did not expect the Allies to conclude a peace treaty by the 
summer of 1948 (#62, 63). To be sure, Berliners in the 
American-controlled borough of Neukoelln hoped that the 
London Conference (25 November- 16 December) would pro- 
duce such a peace treaty, but only 14 per cent dared to beheve 
that it would (#75). A spot survey after the breakdown of this 
conference revealed an overwhelming sentiment among West 
Berliners that the Soviets were to blame (#86). One in three 
(32%) felt that it meant the final division of Germany, another 
26 per cent expected a continuation of the status quo, and as 
many as one in seven (15%) said simply that conditions would 
deteriorate or that war would ensue. 

By the spring of 1948 Germans were prepared to accept a 
government for the three western zones of occupation. Ameri- 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 25 



can, British, and French representatives, together with their 
colleagues from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, 
met in London during the first half of 1948 to lay the 
groundwork for such a government. Of the relatively few 
respondents who later claimed to know anything about the 
London proposals, the bulk favored them (#131). And, when 
apprised of these proposals, 78 per cent of all respondents in 
the American Zone (89 per cent in West Berhn, 93 per cent in 
Bremen) reacted positively. Support dropped to 72 per cent, 
however, when the interviewers pointed out the possibility that 
only representatives from the western zones would be able to 
help set up the government. A subsequent survey in August 
1 948 found 70 per cent favoring the creation of a provisional 
government for western Germany, with only one in eight (12%) 
opposed to the idea (#136). 

In agreeing to a West German government, the respondents 
were evidently well aware that it meant a continued, and 
perhaps permanent, division of their country. The comment 
made most frequently by informed respondents (26%), when 
asked about the disadvantages of the London proposals, was 
"the division of Germany" but, it must be added, more either 
expressed no opinion (35%) or saw no disadvantages (8%). Told 
that, according to the London proposals, the French Zone 
would be added to the bizonal (American-British) economic 
arrangements, 72 per cent of the entire sample saw it as a step 
toward unification, six per cent as a step backward (#131). A 
more exphcit question in August 1948 seemed to clarify this 
apparent ambiguity: Almost half (47%) of the respondents in 
the American Zone thought that the establishment of a 
provisional government for western Germany would widen the 
East-West split, with only two-thirds as many (33%) feehng that 
it would make no difference (#136). 

The reasons for favoring a West German government were 
diverse. Asked what advantages the London proposals meant for 
western Germany, 36 per cent of the respondents who knew 
what these proposals were pointed to better living conditions 
and another 14 per cent mentioned that they were a step 
toward independence. Five times more respondents either saw 



26 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



no advantages ( 1 8%) or had no opinion (24%) than the number 
(8%) mentioning that the proposals would constitute a bar to 
communism (#131). And yet, as subsequent questions and 
surveys revealed, a fear of communism was very prevalent. ^^ In 
July 1948, 95 per cent of all AMZON respondents expressed a 
preference for a democratic government in western Germany 
alone and only one per cent for a communist central govern- 
ment for all of Germany. More generally, Germans were becom- 
ing increasingly outspoken in asserting their dislike of the Soviet 
Union and distrust of its intentions (e.g. #185). Throughout the 
period from January 1947 to February 1949 approximately 
half agreed with the proposition that "The Americans should 
reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order to avoid her 
becoming a prey to Communism" (#175). 

We shall return later to the question of German attitudes 
toward communism and the Soviet Union. The point to be 
stressed here is that these negative views helped induce Germans 
in the western zones of occupation to accept a specific policy. 
This policy sought to strengthen the abiUty of these areas to 
resist pressure from the East, at the cost of steps aimed at 
restoring German unity. And perhaps in no place in that portion 
of Germany under Western controls and at no time was this 
hostihty to the East more prevalent than in West Berlin during 
the blockade months from June 1948 to May 1949. 

Berlin and the Blockade. The breakdown of interallied 
cooperation, the currency crisis, and the competition to create a 
Germany that would be an ally in the raging Cold War all met in 
June 1948 on the banks of the Spree River in BerHn. Using the 
Western currency reform as its justification, on the 24th of that 
month the Soviet Union closed the roads and canals leading to 
the western sectors of the city. The West's response was quick 
to come. American officials agreed that it would be technically 
feasible, however difficult, to airUft sufficient supplies to the 
two and a quarter miUion West Berliners. But the effectiveness 
of this tactic in countering the blockade would rest upon the 
morale of the city's leadership and its people. Ernst Reuter and 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 27 



other leaders gave their assurances immediately. But what about 
the mass of West Berliners? 

Spot surveys, bolstered by more substantial investigations 
later, revealed that Berhners in the western sectors stood soUdly 
behind the West and the Allied air lift. Four weeks after the 
imposition of the blockade 98 per cent of a Berlin sample 
expressed the view that the West was pursuing the correct 
policy (#130). From the very outset and throughout the 
blockade about nine in ten were confident that the Americans 
would stay in Berlin as long as they remained in Germany. This 
is not to say that they were without worries. Although three in 
four (77%) felt that the Western Powers were doing their 
utmost to relieve distressed conditions in Berlin (see Figure 4) 
and five in six (84%) thought that the air lift could provide 
them with sufficient food, more than half (52%) doubted that 
the air Uft could carry them through the winter months. 

Confidence grew as the air lift proved increasingly success- 
ful. By September 85 per cent — and by October 89 per 
cent — expected the air hft to provision them adequately during 
the winter months (#141, 150). Meanwhile, however bad their 
circumstances were, 88 per cent of the West Berhners preferred 
them to uniting their city under the communists (4%). And the 
percentage of those reporting that, if given an opportunity, they 
would leave Berlin dropped from 43 per cent in July to 30 per 
cent in October. Respondents in the American Zone were 
somewhat less sanguine about the Berhn situation. Only seven 
in ten were convinced that the Americans would remain in 
Berhn, nine in ten thought the Western position to be the 
correct one, and only somewhat over half (56%) thought that 
the air Hft was providing sufficient food to maintain rations at 
their preblockade levels (#144, 175). 

Ultimately, of course, the air hft exceeded all earlier 
hopes. The Soviet hfting of the blockade in May 1949 was 
widely seen as a triumph both for the American policy of 
hardness and the West Berhners' firmness. It is this perception 
that West Berhners celebrate down to the present day in their 
loyalty to the West in general and the United States in 



28 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




Fig. 4a. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: AMZON Views 



particular. ^^ But the blockade also left a divided Berlin in its 
wake - a divided Berlin that symbolized the division of 
Germany as a whole. What is more, the Federal RepubUc that 
emerged in West Germany no longer had Berlin as the focal 
point of its attention. If 58 per cent of the residents of the 
American Zone agreed in August 1947 that Berlin should be 
Germany's capital, it remains a fact that the founding fathers of 
the Federal Republic located their capital in Bonn, a choice in 
which two out of three AMZON Germans with opinions 
concurred (#71, 180). Berlin itself became a symbol - a symbol 
of the united Germany that used to be, a symbol of the united 
Germany that many hope for in the future. 

In their concern with these and a plethora of other issues 
stemming both from the need to make immediate policy 
decisions and from changes in the environment of interaUied 
cooperation, the researchers of the Opinion Survey Section did 
not lose sight of the long-range issues that had brought them, 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 29 




Fig. 4b. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: Berlin Views 

Question: "In your opinion are the Western Powers doing all they possibly 
can to relieve the needs of Berlin or could they do more?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 52. 



and indeed the entire structure of the military occupation, to 
Germany in the first place. 



DEMOCRATIZING POSTWAR GERMANY 

Among the purposes announced by Churchill, Roosevelt, and 
Stalin when they were formulating plans for the postwar 
occupation of Germany, the democratization of the country 
was particularly important. This policy implied several things. 
Most immediately, of course, it meant the punishment of those 
guilty of the Nazi excesses, the removal of Nazi sympathizers 
from important posts in governmental or private life, the 
effective disarmament of the country, and, more generally, the 
elimination of symbols of the Nazi past. More problematic was 
a second task — democratizing Germany's political culture. 



30 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Removing the leaders and reminders of the past was one thing, 
but revising the predispositions, perceptions, and values of an 
entire population was quite another. For the Opinion Survey 
Section it meant, on the one hand, an assessment of the state of 
German pohtical culture and, on the other, a continual 
evaluation of the effectiveness of Alhed programs aimed at 
changing this culture. 



Nazism and Denazification 

Many Americans, no less than Europeans, harbored deep 
resentments toward their wartime enemy, Germany. What 
explained the fact, many asked themselves, that Germany had 
initiated major wars of expansion three times within the past 
century? Was it something inherent in German national charac- 
ter? A common assumption was that in the breast of every 
German beat the heart of a Nazi. It was this assumption on 
which rested some of the early wartime policies for the postwar 
occupation — the Morgenthau-White plan, which called for a 
demilitarized, dismembered, and pastoralized Germany, and 
even Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 1067 (JCS 1067), which set 
down guidelines for the American Military Government to 
follow. And one even sees it in the initial questions and reports 
emanating from the offices of the OMGUS Opinion Survey 
Section. But how true was it? To what extent were Germans 
bUnd adherents of National Socialism? 

Attitudes toward National Socialism. It is not entirely 
clear how thoroughly mobilized in their support of Adolf Hitler 
the German population was. Few (7%) claimed to have read his 
Mein Kampf in its entirety, although another 16 per cent 
remembered reading part of it (#2; cf. #92). Only one in eight 
(12%) recalled trusting Hitler as a leader up to the end of the 
war; over half claimed either never to have trusted him (35%) or 
to have lost their faith in him by the time war had broken out 
in 1939 (16%). Asked whether they would like to have seen 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 31 



Hitler before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 
interestingly enough, 72 per cent of AMZON Germans re- 
sponded positively in October 1946, and only 12 per cent felt it 
better that he had spared himself this ignominy.*'' 

Attitude toward Hitler notwithstanding, large numbers of 
postwar Germans in the areas under American control con- 
tinued to express perceptions characteristic of National Socialist 
ideology (#19). To cite some examples, nine per cent agreed 
that "a civihan is an unworthy (lower) person compared to a 
member of the army"; ten per cent that "in all probability 
foreign nations and races are enemies; therefore, one should be 
prepared at all times to attack them first," and that "if a pure 
German marries a non-Aryan wife he should be condemned"; 
1 2 per cent that "the horrors committed by the Germans are an 
invention of the propaganda of our enemies"; 15 per cent that 
"the Communists and the Social Democrats should be sup- 
pressed"; 18 per cent that "only a government with a dictator is 
able to create a strong nation," and that "this war was caused 
by a conspiracy between the International Bankers and the 
Communists"; 19 per cent that "the German people were the 
victims of a conspiracy by other nations"; 20 per cent that "it 
would have been much better for the Allies to have had a war 
with Russia instead of with Germany"; 29 per cent that "the 
publication of no book that criticizes a government or 
recommends any changes in government should be permitted"; 
30 per cent that "Negroes are members of an unworthy (lower) 
race"; 33 per cent that "Jews should not have the same rights as 
those belonging to the Aryan race"; 37 per cent denied that 
"extermination of the Jews and Poles and other non-Aryans was 
not necessary for the security of Germans"; and 52 per cent 
agreed that "territories such as Danzig, Sudetenland, and 
Austria should be part of Germany proper." Two caveats are 
important in interpreting these findings. First, we must wonder 
whether these response patterns are typically German or 
whether, to the contrary, Americans, Frenchmen, and citizens 
of other industrialized countries might not agree to similar 
propositions. Second, these data say nothing about the extent 



32 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



to which such perceptions antedated the emergence of Nazism 
in Germany. 

The Opinion Survey Section made an interesting attempt 
to test the latter point. Using the split-sample technique, it 
sought to find out what differences would emerge on perspec- 
tives according to whether assertions were explicitly identified 
as stemming from Hitler. Thus half of a sample responded to 
the question, "Before the war it was often said that parts of 
Europe with considerable German minorities (e.g. Sudetenland) 
should be legally reincorporated in Germany; did you agree to 
that or not?" and the other half got the question, "Before the 
war Hitler often said that parts of Europe with considerable 
German minorities (e.g. Sudetenland) should be legally rein- 
corporated in Germany; did you agree to that or not?" In 
response to the questions, 36 per cent of the first sample 
reported having agreed, as did 39 per cent of the second sample. 
A similar pair of questions dealt with the prewar sentiment that 
"international Jewry alone would profit from the war." In this 
case 14 per cent agreed with the generalized proposition and 1 1 
per cent were willing to identify themselves with Hitler in 
accepting it. A third pair of questions asked about the putative 
superiority of the "Nordic race," with results similar to the 
second. In short, there were no statistically significant dif- 
ferences in the responses to differently-worded questions. This 
in turn suggests that Hitler may merely have tapped a set of 
underlying perspectives while, to be sure, reinforcing them at 
the same time through his propaganda. 

Further indications of this are to be found in the postwar 
population's unwilhngness to reject Nazism completely. In 
eleven surveys between November 1945 and December 1946, an 
average of 47 per cent expressed their feehng that National 
Socialism was a good idea badly carried out; by August 1947 
this figure had risen to 55 per cent remaining fairly constant 
throughout the remainder of the occupation (#60, 68, 175). 
Meanwhile, the share of respondents thinking it a bad idea 
dropped from 41 to about 30 per cent (see Figure 5).^^ A 
breakdown of the August 1947 survey revealed that the 
respondents most likely to describe National Socialism as a 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 33 




Fig. 5. Views on National Socialism 

Question: "Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried out?' 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9. 



good idea badly carried out were those with nine to twelve 
years of schooUng (64%), people under the age of 30 (68%), 
Protestants (64%), former NSDAP members (67%), West Ber- 
liners (62%), and Hessians (61%). They also tended to be more 
critical than others of the postwar news media, to be more 
likely to find fault with democracy, and to prefer a government 
offering security rather than one stressing liberty. Moreover, 
asked to choose between National Socialism and Communism, 
the number opting for the former increased from 19 per cent in 
November 1945 to well over twice that figure in February 
1949, with the number preferring the latter alternative declining 
from 35 to 3 per cent (#60, 175). 

The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. The relatively cool 
attitude that postwar Germans displayed toward Hitler carried 
over to other leaders of the Nazi state. This view came out 
clearly in their reactions to the trial of the major war criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. 
Originally, the IMT brought an indictment against 24 top Nazi 
leaders, three of whom ultimately did not stand trial. After 
sessions lasting from November 1945 to October 1946, the 
Tribunal handed down 1 1 death sentences (plus another death 
sentence for Martin Bormann, tried in absentia), seven prison 



34 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



sentences ranging from ten years to life, and three acquittals. 
The Tribunal also declared the leadership corps of the Nazi 
Party, the Gestapo and the State Security Service, and the SS to 
be "criminal organizations." 

Generally speaking, popular interest in the trial was high. 
In January 1946, 78 per cent of German respondents in the 
American Zone of Occupation indicated that they had read 
newspaper articles about the trial. Subsequent surveys, however, 
revealed both a declining interest in following the press 
treatment (67 per cent in March and 72 per cent in August) and 
that less than half of these read the reports in their entirety (34 
per cent in March and 3 1 per cent in August). In October 1946, 
93 per cent of the respondents claimed to have heard about the 
judgments (#16, 33). Confidence in the completeness and 
reliabiUty of the press also dropped, from 79 per cent in 
October 1945 to 67 per cent in August 1946. In October, after 
the trial's completion, 48 per cent indicated that the newspaper 
reports had been complete, 65 per cent reliable (45 per cent 
complete and reUable), and six per cent thought that they had 
been neither. 

The trial increased AMZON Germans' knowledge of the 
Nazi era. In December 1945, 84 per cent of these respondents 
indicated that they had learned something new from the trial: 
64 per cent specified the concentration camps, 23 per cent the 
extermination of Jews and other groups, and seven per cent the 
character of the Nazi leaders; one out of eight (13%) said that 
he had known nothing about the evils of National Socialism 
prior to the trial. ^^ In October 1946, the share of Germans 
saying that they had learned something new had dropped off to 
71 per cent, and the number claiming that they had not learned 
anything new doubled to 27 per cent from 13 per cent in 
December 1945. 

Asked about the guilt of the accused, AMZON Germans 
gave increasingly differentiated answers. The share of respon- 
dents holding all the accused to be guilty rose from 70 per cent 
in December 1945 to 75 per cent in the following March, only 
to drop to 52 per cent by August 1946. (In March, 71 per cent 
indicated that all the accused shared guilt for the preparation of 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 35 

the war, with another ten per cent wanting to except some of 
them; 59 per cent did not feel that the accused could defend 
themselves in the face of the charges levied against them.) 
Conversely, the share holding none to be guilty dropped from 
five per cent in December 1945 to one per cent in March 1946 
and to less than a half of one per cent by August. After hearing 
the verdicts, the respondents were generally satisfied: 55 per 
cent felt that the sentences had been just, but 21 per cent felt 
them to be too mild and nine per cent too harsh. ^*^ Well over 
half felt it proper that organizations should be indicted for their 
criminal activity; the percentages varied from 56 per cent in 
October 1945 to 60 per cent in December 1945 to 59 per cent 
in October 1946. 

Most AMZON Germans with opinions felt that the trial 
was being conducted fairly (an average of 79 per cent in seven 
surveys conducted from October 1945 to August 1946, as 
opposed to four per cent who saw them as unfair). To this, 
however, must be added the fact that the perception of 
unfairness crept up slowly over this period. In October 1946, 
after the conclusion of the trial, 78 per cent of the respondents 
thought that it had been fair, and six per cent thought it unfair. 

These data lend themselves, of course, to varying interpre- 
tations. One possible interpretation is that the postwar Germans 
were truly desirous of seeing those responsible for the Nazi 
excesses punished by the International Mihtary Tribunal. Others 
may see in these findings a large body of politically apathetic 
and irresponsible Germans looking for scapegoats to exonerate 
themselves of any blame for the crimes of the Nazi era (see 
Figure 6). Either interpretation clearly needs additional infor- 
mation (such as that provided by close readings of the German 
press, the works of postwar publicists, and memoirs) before it 
can be accepted. Another hne of collateral data stems from 
public attitudes in postwar Germany toward the extensive 
denazification proceedings. 

Denazification. Set up under JCS 1067, the denazifica- 
tion proceedings aimed at removing from "public office and 
from positions of importance in quasi-public and private 



36 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




10 5 

NOV JAN. 
1947 1948 



Fig. 6. Collective German Responsibility tor World War II 

Question: "Do you think that the entire German people are responsible for 
the war because they let a government come to power which plunged the 
whole world into war?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 8. 



enterprises" those Germans who had been "active supporters of 
Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to AlUed 
purposes." This meant searching the records of some 1 3 million 
residents of the American Zone of Occupation, and ultimately 
processing some 3.5 million cases. By the beginning of 1947 the 
American authorities had removed 292,089 such persons from 
public or important private positions and excluded an addi- 
tional 81,673.^1 

Unlike the war crimes trials, which focused upon a handful 
of very prominent Nazis, the denazification proceedings 
affected the AMZON population more directly. In principle, at 
least, every fourth citizen was subject to punishment. The 
immensity of the task of trying all such persons, together with 
the imphcations for the efficient operation of German industry 
and government should this many people be removed from 
positions of responsibility, soon led the occupation authorities 
to lower their sights. ^^ Even so, the potential disruption of 
German life was great. 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 37 



What at first glance is most surprising is the fact that 
Germans in the American Zone seemed to endorse the idea of 
denazification. Indeed, in January 1949, when the hearings 
were coming to a close, two-thirds (66%) thought it important 
to hold to account "such people as furthered National Sociahsm 
in any way" (#182). Significantly enough, however, the most 
ardent opponents of the idea of denazification were the highly 
educated and the upper middle and upper socioeconomic groups. 

Acceptance in principle did not imply acceptance in 
practice. The number of respondents satisfied with the way in 
which denazification was being carried out declined from 
roughly half in the winter of 1945-1946, when the idea was new 
and relatively untried, to about a third from October 1946 to 
the following September, to about a sixth in January 1949 (#7, 
60, 182). The dissatisfied respondents (65%) were almost equal 
in number to those approving of the idea of denazification 
(66%).^^ And again the more socially mobilized groups within 
the population were the most likely to express criticism. 

The most frequently heard objection to the denazification 
procedures was that they dealt too harshly with minor party 
members in comparison with the major ones (#7, 182). The 
second most persistent complaint was that the proceedings were 
too arbitrary and the judgments too inconsistent. Only from 
those who thought the program too easy did interviewers hear 
the view expressed that some punishments should be harsher. 

Those directly affected by the proceedings, because of 
their past affiliation with the NSDAP, did not share this latter 
view. In contrast to respondents without such connections, only 
five per cent of whom had been dismissed from their jobs once 
or more times between January 1945 and September 1947, well 
over a third of the former members had suffered such a fate 
(#80). Over four in five reported that they were either much 
worse off (69%) or somewhat worse off (13%) in their current 
jobs than they were formerly. Half (51%) of the unaffected but 
as many as 78 per cent of those who claimed former 
membership in the NSDAP expressed dissatisfaction with the 
denazification proceedings. Asked what the most serious con- 
sequences of these proceedings were, former Nazi adherents 
most frequently named the lack of governmental and business 



38 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



experts, as well as the economic stress suffered by those 
removed from their jobs. 

All this bitterness notwithstanding, few Germans were 
wilhng to take denazification entirely out of the hands of 
American occupation authorities. In March 1946 only one in 
eleven wanted primary German responsibility, a position held 
by every sixth respondent a year later (#7, 55). The reason 
most frequently given for this was the expectation that the 
Americans would be more impartial than Germans in meting 
out justice. But underlying this was the simple unwilhngness to 
assume full responsibility for an unpopular program. 

Summing up, the views on National Sociahsm, the Nurem- 
berg trials, and the denazification proceedings uncovered by the 
OMGUS surveys point to a persistent pattern. On the one hand, 
there were relatively few wholehearted Nazis in the American 
Zone. Our impressionistic judgment, based on a review of all the 
surveys reported in this volume, is that roughly 15 to 18 
percent of the adult population were unreconstructed Nazis in 
the immediate postwar period.^"* The bulk of Germans emphati- 
cally rejected the specifically Nazi aspects and leaders of their 
recent history. And it seemed unlikely, at least for the near 
future, that they would again follow a pied piper of Hitler's 
caliber — especially if he were garbed in explicitly Nazi robes. 

un the other hand, however, AMZON Germans were far 
from unanimous in turning their backs on National Socialism, 
They increasingly expressed their view that National Socialism 
was basically a good idea, although carried out poorly (see 
Figure 5). Substantial numbers continued to subscribe to 
sentiments closely tied up with Nazi ideology (as well, of 
course, as with other racist and reactionary ideologies, such as 
shown in Figure 7). And not only did they refuse to accept 
responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era, but they objected 
when denazification boards levied stiff penalties upon the lesser 
supporters of the NSDAP. 

Even if the Nazi Party and its leaders were discredited, 
then, it was by no means certain that their underlying principles 
were. The eradication of the outward manifestations of Nazism 
seems not to have eliminated the potential for movements 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 39 













10 


12 


10 


5 


DEC. 


MAY 


NOV. 


JAN. 


1946 


1947 




1948 



Fig. 7. Government and Racial Superiority 

Question: "Do you think that some races of people are more fit to rule 

than others?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 9. 



equally totalitarian in their aims although explicitly eschewing 
the "brown" past. But what about the more positive aspects of 
the American occupation policy — those seeking to change, or 
democratize, German political culture? 



Re-education for Democracy 

Crucial to any attempt to change German political culture was a 
determination of what, in fact, its chief characteristics were. 
Although this is a topic that has interested writers since the 
time of Tacitus, the possibihty of investigating it in an 
objective, systematic manner did not really exist before World 
War II. The OMGUS surveys came at a time when social 
scientists were developing the necessary concepts and tools. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that these surveys sometimes seem 
naive to the modern scholar: The hypotheses are occasionally 
primitive, the questions used to test them often not very 
sophisticated and the conclusions rather overly simpUfied. 



40 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Moreover, given the preoccupation of American occupation 
authorities with the heinous interlude of Nazism, it is also not 
surprising that some of their research suffered from an 
underlying tendentiousness. These caveats notwithstanding, the 
surveys provided some material basic both to the occupiers 
trying to change the perspectives on which German pohtics 
rested as well as to subsequent investigators interested in the 
actual impact of the occupation upon Germany's political 
culture. ^^ 

German Political Culture. There are, of course, many 
aspects of German poUtical culture that deserve mention. Of 
most importance here are the views of Germans on authority 
and democratic processes, no less than aspects of their political 
behavior. 

"Two souls, alas, do dwell in my breast!" lamented 
Goethe's Faust. And roughly the same is true of the postwar 
German body politic (although not necessarily of individual 
Germans). Living amongst a sizable proportion of "democrats" 
was a goodly number of "authoritarians," conceivably suscep- 
tible to the sirens of yet another demagogue promising an 
ordered society. 

As suggested earlier, it is not difficult to demonstrate the 
persistence in postwar Germany of perspectives closely 
associated with National Socialist ideology: 15 per cent of the 
AMZON Germans and West Berliners wilhng to suppress 
leftwing parties; 18 per cent agreeing on the importance of a 
dictator in creating a strong nation; 29 per cent amenable to 
censorship of publications critical of the government; 33 per 
cent feehng that Jews should not have the same rights as others 
(#19). Perhaps one in six could be said to have held explicitly 
Nazi orientations. In December 1946 the Opinion Survey 
Section classified 21 per cent of its AMZON respondents as 
anti-Semites, and another 18 per cent as intense anti-Semites — 
a total of 39 per cent (#49). 

And yet to write off the mass of postwar Germans as 
authoritarians and racists would most surely be an injustice. 
Indeed, the main finding of the extensive survey cited in the 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 41 



previous paragraph is that most Germans had perspectives that 
were by and large democratic. An average of three in ten 
responded in a democratic direction on each of the eleven scales 
included in the survey; an additional third answered in a 
democratic direction on all but one question in each scale 
(#19). Similarly, the later survey on anti-Semitism found a fifth 
(20%) of the AMZON population to have little bias and another 
fifth (19%) to be nationahsts but not racists - again a total of 
39 per cent (#49). 

Other signs of a predispositional duahty in German society 
are scattered throughout the OMGUS surveys. Consider, for 
example, German views on the purpose and means of education. 
In January 1948, respondents considered the chief purpose of 
the schools to be a comprehensive education (37 per cent in 
West Berhn and 52 per cent in Stuttgart); the second most 
frequently mentioned purpose in West Berlin (28%) was 
discipline and, in Stuttgart (20%), job training; and only one in 
six opted for the response "to teach children to think for 
themselves" (#95). An earlier survey revealed that 65 per cent 
in the American Zone and 51 per cent in the American and 
British sectors of Berhn approved of granting teachers the right 
to whip or beat "very disobedient and very unruly children" 
(#66). (It must be added, however, that those opposing such a 
right were much more vehement in expressing their views than 
were those favoring it.) 

Another example focuses upon the freedoms that Germans 
thought necessary. Asked whether they preferred a government 
offering "economic security and the possibility of a good 
income" or else one guaranteeing "free elections, freedom of 
speech, a free press and religious freedom," six out of ten 
persistently opted for economic security from February 1947 
to January 1949, with half that number preferring guaranteed 
liberties (#175; see Figure 8). Asked in June 1947 which of a 
hst of four freedoms they considered most important, a 
plurality (31%) selected commercial freedom. Of the remainder, 
22 per cent chose religious freedom, 19 per cent free elections, 
and 14 per cent free speech (#82). Close to a third indicated 
that they would give up certain rights "if the state would 



42 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




FEB 
1947 

Fig. 8. 



5 


19 


B 


1*^1 


APR 


JUN 


1946 







Economic Security vs. Guaranteed Freedoms 

Question: "Which of these types of government would you, personally, 
choose as better: 

A. A government which offers the people economic security and the 
possibility of a good income, 

B. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a 
free press and religious freedom?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 7. 



thereby promise economic security" (#175). About half of 
those wiUing to give up some rights were wiUing to do without 
the right "to vote for the pohtical party" of their choice; almost 
a third the right "to read all the books and magazines" they 
wished to read; almost a quarter the right "to work in the 
place" they liked; about a tenth the right "to express [their] 
opinion freely"; and roughly a twentieth the right "to bring up 
[their] children according to [their own] view." Regarding 
freedom of speech, although 77 per cent were willing to grant it 
to all Germans, only 55 per cent agreed that it should be 
applicable for communists (#48). 

Still another area in which this duality appears in the 
survey data comprises German attitudes toward leadership. On 
the one hand, large majorities felt that the people should 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 43 



determine what direction the government should follow: In 
response to one question, 78 per cent of the AMZON residents 
thought that the people, rather than the pohticians, (14%) 
should perform that task; in response to another question they 
expressed their preference for the people (70%) over the 
"experts" (23%) to perform it {#9d>)}^ On the other hand, in a 
situation close to them, AMZON youth displayed a different 
predisposition (#96, 99, 101). Two-fifths of those in youth 
clubs reported having appointed leaders rather than elected 
leaders (51%). Roughly the same percentages (41 and 58 
percent, respectively), preferred the different modes of selec- 
tion. In the event of a difference of opinion on the day on 
which their club should meet next, 43 per cent felt that they 
should meet on the day the leader wanted, and 56 per cent 
wanted to meet on the day chosen by the majority. 

In evaluating these data, several points must be borne in 
mind. First, although they suggest a duality, this duahty did not 
permeate all aspects of social Ufe or politics. There were many 
areas which enjoyed high degrees of consensus. It nonetheless 
does seem that there was a sharp split in occupied Germany on 
some of the more crucial aspects of political Ufe. Second, this 
duahsm was not spread evenly throughout the areas of Germany 
under American control. Typically, the more democratic 
individuals were those living in large cities, respondents with 12 
or more years of schoohng, professionals rather than workers or 
employees, adherents of the Social Democratic Party, and 
middle income groups. Third, the data presented above say Uttle 
about either the salience of the issues to the respondents or the 
hkelihood that they would translate their perspectives into 
action. Finally, the data also tell us nothing about the middle 
groups — the sometimes substantial numbers of Germans hover- 
ing between democratic and authoritarian perspectives. In what 
circumstances, for instance, would they swing their support in 
one direction or another? 

Political Participation. The first surveys conducted by the 
American mihtary authorities revealed a fairly low interest in 
political activity: Only half felt themselves sufficiently in- 
formed about political events, and most of the remainder 



44 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




Interest in Politics 



Question: "Are you yourself interested in political affairs or do you prefer 

to leave that to others?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 13. 



indicated that they were making no effort to get more 
information (see Figure 9); over three-quarters were not and did 
not intend to become members of a poUtical party; whereas 
seven in ten knew that political meetings were allowed, less than 
a third of these claimed to have attended one; and about 
two-thirds of those eligible to vote in elections held in January 
1946 had in fact done so (#3). In April 1946, 76 per cent flatly 
said that, if they had a son leaving school, they would not Hke 
to see him choose politics as a profession (#10; see Figure 10). 
Typical of the comments made by those respondents were 
"politics is a dirty business" and "one is a poUtician for ten 
years and then lands in a concentration camp" (see also Figure 
1 1). The percentage seeing politics as a worthy profession (14%) 
was considerably lower than that in England (25%) or the 
United States (21-25%). In September of the same year, just 
before referenda on the state constitutions and elections to the 
state parhaments, a series of questions demonstrated that only 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 45 



100% 
90% 
80% 
70% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
20% 



^^^^SSSms^msmarj^JorMsmi 



io%- 

0- 



0ESl i 



15 
APR. 
1946 



7 
APR. 
1947 



S 
JAN. 
1948 



Fig. 10. Politics as a Career 



Question: "If you had a son who had just finished school, would you like 
to see him take up politics as a career?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1949, p. 15. 



one in five persons was sufficiently interested to have even the 
barest of information on the issues at stake (#26). 

Similar findings emerged from surveys in the middle of 
1947, more than two years after the beginning of the 
occupation. About two in five (42 per cent in May, 40 per cent 
in August) felt sufficiently well informed about current pohtical 
events; of the remainder almost four in five either had not 
bothered to seek further information or did not care to (#72, 
74). Levels of political information varied. Although 88 per 
cent knew the name of their town's mayor, only 47 per cent 
could name the minister president of their Land and 60 per cent 
could adequately define a secret ballot. Two-thirds (67 per cent 
in May, 64 per cent in August) preferred to leave politics to 
others rather than to concern themselves personally with it. 
And, indeed, few were active politically. In May, 90 per cent of 
the AMZON respondents indicated that they were personally 
doing everything possible to help rebuild Germany - but only 
seven per cent reported voluntarily helping with the census of 
October 1946, six per cent did any sort of volunteer work in 



46 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




1 


9 


7 


DEC 


AUG 


JAN 


1945 


1946 


1947 



1^ 



JAN 
1948 



fIb 

1949 



Fig. 1 1 . Trust in Local German Officials 

Question: "In general, do officials in the local German government work 
for the good of the community or are they primarily self-interested?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 16. 



their local community, and four per cent were members of a 
political party. As many as 40 per cent claimed no preference 
for any political party — a figure half again as great as for the 
occupation period as a whole (see Figure 12). More generally, 
they were inclined to see the responsibihty for government 
lying with officials rather than with voters: Asked about poor 
government, 38 per cent held government officials responsible, 
26 per cent the voting pubhc, with 12 per cent assigning 
responsibility to both; regarding good government, 48 per cent 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 47 



were willing to give credit to government officials, 21 per cent 
to the voters, and 13 percent to both equally. 

Two years later, on the eve of the promulgation of West 
Germany's Federal Republic, political participation continued 
at relatively low levels (#191). Few were well informed about 
politics: Less than one in six could venture a guess as to 
whether or not their state constitutions contained provisions for 
initiatives and referenda (and of these only somewhat over half 
gave the correct answer), 58 per cent could name the minister 
president of their Land, and as few as 39 per cent knew that the 
Parliamentary Assembly, which had met in Bonn since the fall 
of 1948, had drawn up a constitution for West Germany (but 
less than half of these could claim any familiarity with this 
constitution). Nor was interest in politics much greater. 
Two-thirds (67%) continued to prefer leaving poUtics to others 
(see Figure 9), only 38 per cent perceived any great interest in 
politics among their contemporaries, and, when asked the cause 
of low participation in the affairs of government, 61 per cent 
indicated a general lack of interest, 20 per cent a lack of 
opportunity. Whereas 76 per cent expressed a willingness to 
work an hour daily without pay for the economic reconstruc- 
tion of Germany, only a third of that number (24%) were 
prepared, if asked to do so, to take a responsible position in the 
political Ufe of their community. 

These findings, taken together, reveal two key aspects of 
German pohtical participation during the occupation period. 
First, it was not high. And yet, compared to other countries, as 
subsequent surveys have indicated, levels of political participa- 
tion in Germany are not inordinately low. There is nonetheless 
an interesting stylistic difference in political behavior. In their 
survey of the late 1950s, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba 
found West Germans more interested in and knowledgeable 
about politics than citizens of four other democracies. The 
German sample ranked about midway between Americans and 
Englishmen on the one hand, and, on the other, Italians and 
Mexicans with respect to their behef that individuals should 
participate actively in the life of their community, their feeling 
that their activity could influence the course of pohtical events, 



48 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




Fig. 12. Preference for Political Parties 

Question: "Which political party do you belong to or prefer?" 



and their expectation that they would receive serious considera- 
tion both in a government office and from the police. Almond 
and Verba concluded that, in West Germany "Awareness of 
politics and political activity, though substantial, tend to be 
passive and formal. Voting is frequent, but more informal 
means of poHtical involvement, particularly pohtical discussion 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 49 




JAN FEB FEB MAR APR 



-=^: 



SPD 



JAN FEB FEB MAR APR 















































^^ 




































^^^^^^^^^y 






1 


1 


1 


1 


1 


II 


■ 




8 4 25 6 10 S 1 23 29 19 8 1 2 23 17 12 II 2 8 3 

JOl AUS AUG OCT NOV JAN FEB FEB MAR APR JUN JUL AUG AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FE 

1947 ' 1948 L1949J 


B 




Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 18, 19. The following page in 
the sanne report gives preferences for the smaller parties as well as those 
responding "don't know." 



and the forming of political groups, are more limited . . . And 
norms favoring active political participation are not well 
developed. Many Germans assume that the act of voting is all 
that is required of a citizen," West Germans were satisfied 
enough with what their government was doing for them — but 
otherwise they felt no strong emotional ties to the West German 



50 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



political system. ^'^ The OMGUS data of the late 1940s suggest a 
similar detachment from politics. But whether this detachment 
is a long-standing characteristic of German poUtical behavior, or 
whether it stemmed from a feehng that too much pohtical 
activity in the past had led to too many burnt fingers, these 
data cannot tell us. 

Second, the level of participation in the American-con- 
trolled areas remained fairly constant throughout the occupa- 
tion years. (And, judging by data currently available, this level 
has not changed substantially in the two decades since the 
formation of the Federal Republic!) This finding raises a serious 
question about the overall effectiveness of the democratization 
program pursued by American occupation authorities — at least 
in terms of its measurable effects. Germans proved wilhng to go 
along with the destruction of Nazi symbols, including the last 
remnants of Nazi leadership. They were also agreeable to the 
principle of removing Nazi party members and sympathizers 
from important public and private jobs (provided, of course, 
that the denazification proceedings did not impinge upon their 
own families or circles of friends). But they did not adopt most 
of the new patterns of democratic behavior fostered by the 
mihtary governments. 

FROM DEMOCRATIZATION TO ANTICOMMUNISM: 
THE REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLICY 

The total picture presented by the OMGUS surveys is therefore 
paradoxical — a population that was, potentially at least, pliable 
and yet did not change dramatically. Social psychologists tell us 
that the moods of entire publics are slow to change. The 
concatenation of traumatic experiences and official pohcy shifts, 
however, can shake all but the most deep-seated aspects of 
political culture. ^^ For Germans, the physical and psychological 
destruction of the lost war was such a trauma; the pohcies 
enunciated by the Alhes and the resurgence of voices suppressed 
during the Nazi period lent a tone to pohtics that Germans had 
not heard for well over a decade. Together, they could have 
meant a great watershed in the course of German history. 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 51 



The existence of a population that was receptive to 
reorientation, if we are to judge from the available survey data, 
enhanced the AlHes' opportunity to help shape German history. 
First of all, respondents in the American Zone were responsive 
to the occupiers: They recognized that the occupation would 
last for some time; they accepted American troops, without, 
however, ignoring their misdeeds; and they were not particu- 
larly hostile toward (although apparently few had great interest 
in) American information programs. Second, these respondents 
were by and large willing to cooperate with fundamental Allied 
policies aimed at eradicating remnants of the Nazi past — pro- 
vided, of course, that these measures did not strike too close to 
home. And, third, the respondents reported finding conditions 
under the occupation tolerable. They seem to have expected 
much worse. Perhaps many of them had believed the all-too- 
credible Nazi propaganda about the Allied intention to imple- 
ment the Morgenthau Plan, which would have reduced Germans 
to shepherds in a disarmed, de-industrialized, and dismembered 
land. This all-in-the-same-boat acceptance nonetheless changed 
as the occupation continued. The cumulation of shortages, the 
influx of refugees who taxed severely Germany's capacity to 
feed and clothe its citizens adequately, and possibly even the 
realization that the military government's bite was far less 
frightening than its bark led to rising grumbUng despite the fact 
that the objective condition of the population (for example, in 
regard to caloric intake) was improving. 

The four wartime AlUes proved unable to reaUze this 
opportunity to test the extent to which they could actually 
change Germany's political culture. Although the Cold War surely 
did not originate in the years from 1945 to 1949, it was during 
this period that it blossomed. And the battleground was, to a 
very large measure, Germany. Disputes among the AHies about 
reparations, boundaries, transit rights, denazification, currency, 
economic and poUtical reconstruction, and numerous smaller 
issues replaced interallied practices and institutions with bitter- 
ness and separate pohtical systems. Here is not the place to 
assay the causes or history of the Cold War. Suffice it to say that, 
as early as the summer of 1945, Germans were feehng its effects. 

LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
AT URBANA- CHAMPAIGN 



52 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



The OMGUS surveys make clear the fact that these 
Germans saw what was happening to their country. They 
increasingly expressed alarm about the breakdown of East-West 
cooperation in Germany. They estimated a diminishing prob- 
ability that the Allies would be able to work together to 
reconstruct the country in its 1937 or even its 1945 borders 
(see Figure 3). And they increasingly began to take sides. As 
Opinion Survey Section analysts wrote in August 1946 (#17): 
"It has been said that the world is becoming polarized toward 
either Russia or toward the United States, that these two 
countries are attracting a decision on the part of other people to 
line up with one or the other great nation. The data indicate 
that such a situation, if true, is further advanced in Germany 
than in countries such as France or Denmark." As the months 
rolled on, and particularly after the Soviet delegate walked out 
of the Allied Control Council meetings in March 1 948 and the 
Soviet imposition of the Berlin blockade three months later, 
German hostility toward the USSR became even more pro- 
nounced. 

Changes in American policy toward occupied Germany 
accompanied the deepening of the Cold War.^^ It became less 
interested in creating a new German society than in establishing 
Germany as a bulwark against communism. This had several 
practical imphcations. Of particular importance was the belief 
that revitalized economic and poHtical institutions needed 
competent staffs (see Figure 13). But many of those whose 
training and abihties made them most desirable had records that 
were, according to current principles of denazification, dubious 
at best. The solution to this dilemma was a relaxation of the 
standards of personnel screening committees as well as the 
exoneration of Germans in wholesale lots from any impUcation 
in Nazi criminal activities. The changing policy also meant 
turning over more functions to German institutions. And it 
meant efforts to win over the German population. 

Better living conditions and greater autonomy as instru- 
ments in the ideological battle over Germany were accompanied 
by heavy barrages of propaganda, aimed both at improving the 
image of the United States and sullying that of the Soviet 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 53 




Fig. 1 3. The Reconstruction of Germany 

Question: "Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion? 

A. Germany herself should bear the responsibility for her reconstruction 
under the supervision of the Allies. 

B. Germany should be occupied by the Allies until she is able to form a 
good democratic government. 

C. The Americans should reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order 
to avoid her becoming a prey to Communism. 

D. The reconstruction of their country should be left to the Germans 
themselves without interference from the Allies." 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 57. 



Union. The "Voice of America," the information centers, and 
the American-controlled mass media saw to this latter task. And 
it is remarkable how receptive AMZON Germans were to 
publications decrying Soviet pohcies (e.g. #89 and 97). To some 
extent, interestingly enough, even the OMGUS surveys served in 



54 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 




Fig. 1 4. Relative Influence of the United States and the Soviet Union 

Question: "Which country will have the greatest influence on world affairs 

in the next ten years?" 

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 47. 



the propaganda battle. In December 1947, for instance, 
interviewers asked a small panel of Berliners why the London 
Conference had broken up (#86). The report, after noting 
diminished morale because of "a feeling that events are 
occurring apart from the German people and in a direction over 
which they have no control," went on to make a pohcy 
recommendation: 

It is suggested that mterpretation of the London Con- 
ference should attempt to make clear to the public what the 
principles are which have guided American diplomats in 
their negotiations during the Conference. . . . These princi- 
ples can be affirmed in such a way as to make room for the 
German people to associate themselves with the mainte- 
nance of such tenets. It might well be possible, thus to 
induce some Germans to consider that, instead of Alhed 
disagreements bringing the Conference to an end, it was 
Russian refusal to accept principles (which everyone else 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 55 




25 

NOV 
1946 



1947 



25 


5 


k 


3 


AUG 


JAN 


JUN 


FEB 




1948 




1949 



Fig. 1 5. The Choice between National Socialism and Communism 

Question: "If you had to choose between Communism and National 
Socialism, under which government would you prefer to live?" 
Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9. 



recognizes as necessary to maintain) which caused adjourn- 
ment. 

It was not difficult to follow this advice. By then Germans 
were quite receptive to anti-Soviet propaganda. A report in 
April 1948 (#\\3) noted that, although AMZON Germans 
"have very strong opinions about Russia and the Russians, their 
factual information about what country is in general at a fairly 
low level." Moreover, "when in doubt, they tend to select the 
'fact' least favorable to Russia." It would seem, then, that 
Western interpretations of Soviet behavior merely activated a 
latent antibolshevism in the German population (see Figure 
14).3o 

The all-out effort to enUst Germans on the side of the 
West in the Cold War, however successful, had its costs. Most 
immediately, as suggested earher, it meant a partial abandon- 
ment of efforts to root out the remnants of Nazism. We do not 
mean to suggest that American occupation authorities were no 
longer concerned with this task. They were, both in their 
emotions and their behavior. It is merely that anti-Nazism had to 
take second place to anticommunism. It must have been with 
considerable ambivalence that these officers read reports show- 
ing that AMZON Germans, asked to choose between a National 



56 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Socialist and a communist form of government, increasingly . 
chose the former (#60, 175; see Figure 15). Were their efforts 
to discredit communism producing a "brown" reaction in 
postwar Germany? 

The OMGUS surveys indicate that the danger of resurgent 
Nazism, viewed with alarm by some observers even today, was 
in fact highly overrated. The bulk of Germans had already 
rejected the National Socialist movement. The movement itself 
had had many faults, its leaders had proved themselves to be 
less than heroic, and both, moreover, had led Germany to 
disaster. Relatively few, perhaps a sixth, seemed to continue 
espousing a complete set of Nazi images and values. 

More ominous was the possibility of recreating those 
conditions that had given rise to the Nazi version of extremism 
in the first place. Some of these were to be sure the 
consequence of external circumstances: resentment about pro- 
visions of the Versailles Treaty, the virtual withdrawal from 
world politics of the Soviet Union and the United States, and 
the world economic crisis that began in 1929. But other 
European countries, too, winners and losers alike, had felt the 
disastrous effects of World War I and subsequent changes in the 
international environment. The events themselves do not 
provide much of an explanation for domestic changes. More 
important were the perspectives of those who had to deal with 
these events — perspectives that found their roots in German 
pohtical culture. Groups with different perspectives, after all, 
can interpret the same set of events and behavior as hostile or 
friendly, as threatening or nonthreatening. This suggests, then, 
that we must pay more attention to domestic conditions. 

Several aspects of pohtical culture are important in this 
regard. Some can be explored through surveying techniques. To 
the extent that we can project postwar German political 
perspectives backwards into an earlier era, it would seem that 
among the conditions prevailing when Nazi extremism emerged 
and seized power were an ethic of passive participation, reliance 
upon administrative rather than political procedures, the pre- 
sence of authoritarians and democrats in the midst of the 
relatively uncommitted majority, a strong strain of anti- 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 57 



Semitism and, more generally, a lack of tolerance of people and 
ideas that were different. Ralf Dahrendorf has pointed to still 
other aspects of pre-Nazi political culture in Germany: a high 
degree of industrial concentration, a low degree of social 
mobility, a social chasm between the elites and the masses, and 
principles of decision making that prevented basic conflicts 
from coming into public discussion.^' Above all, a traditional 
political eUte relied upon these popular orientations and the 
structural rigidity of German Hfe to maintain themselves in 
power. Whatever its evils, and these should never be forgotten 
or underplayed, the Nazi regime under Hitler made great strides 
in destroying this traditional, relatively closed political culture. 

Taking charge of a Germany with discredited pasts — the 
traditional political culture that had led to the breakdown of 
the Weimar Republic, as well as the revolutionary but unsuc- 
cessful politics of the National Socialists — presented the AlHes 
with their unheard-of opportunity to help guide the nation in 
its choice of alternative futures. Coordinated persistence on the 
part of the Allies might have produced extensive cultural 
change. But there was neither coordination nor, in the Western 
zones at least, persistence. As the Cold War descended upon 
Europe, the Soviet Union devoted ever more of its attention to 
the establishment of a loyal satellite in its zone of occupation, 
and the West to the recreation of an anticommunist pohtical 
system modelled upon the Weimar pattern. 

In the American Zone in particular growing anticom- 
munism got in the way of policies aimed at cultural change. 
AMZON residents were caught in the mill. Promised education 
for democracy, they ended up getting pushed off on another 
ideological crusade. Promised democratic procedures, they got 
an Allied occupation interested more in setting up bulwarks 
against communism than a clean sweep of the past, interested 
more in propaganda against the new enemy than in the critical 
self-appraisal and sometimes painful search for the truth that 
accompany democratic processes. Promised new democratic 
leadership, they got a reentrenchment of leaders from the 
discredited Weimar period, together with those too clever or 
lucky enough to avoid entanglement in the webs of either 



58 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Nazism or denazification. The OMGUS survey data summarized 
in this volume cannot, of course, demonstrate conclusively the 
accuracy of these assertions. They nonetheless show that the 
changes toward a more democratic pubhc consciousness initially 
intended by the occupiers did not materialize: On the level of 
individual perspectives and behavior, there were few major 
changes to be noted; on the level of attitudes toward public 
events, a new set of frequently Uberal perspectives merely 
replaced the old set. 

Perhaps the restoration of practices and leaders ambivalent 
toward democracy, as well as the accompanying propagandistic 
distortions, were necessary to protect democracy against a 
communist threat. We do not deny it, although we also fail to 
see as much concrete evidence as was assumed at the time to 
exist. The point here is somewhat different: Having pounded 
anticommunism into receptive Germans, all the while giving 
impetus to the reemergence of ilHberal predispositions, the 
United States and its allies prepared to leave the country to its 
own devices. What was left was for the United States and the 
rest of the world to reap the fruits of this restoration sown in 
the late 1940s. 



NOTES 



Cf. General Lucius D. Clay's stress on their importance in Decision in 
Germany (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1950), p. 283. The British, 
French, and Soviet military governments also sought to create 
organizations to conduct survey research, evidently not too success- 
fully in the Soviet case. Cf. Henry Halpern, "Soviet Attitude Toward 
Public Opinion Research in Germany," Public Opinion Quarterly, 
13:1 (Spring 1949), 117-118. The Soviet Military Government 
viewed American operations as espionage, subsequently infiltrating 
the Opinion Survey Section itself and turning over at least some of its 
findings to the press in East Berhn. On the occupation in the western 
zones, cf. also W. Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of 
Germany (London: Stevens and Sons, 1947); Hajo Holbom, American 
Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington, 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 59 



D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); Carl J. Friedrich et al., American 
Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: 
Rinehart and Co., 1948); Edward H. Litchfield et al., Governing 
Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953); 
John D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in 
Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); 
Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, 
N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1957); W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin 
Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1958); Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of 
Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1959); Raymond Ehy^oxXh, Restoring Democracy 
in Germany: The British Contribution (London: Stevens and Sons; 
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); F. S. V. Donnison, Gvil 
Affairs and Military Government: North-West Europe, 1944-1946 
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961); John Gimbel, A 
German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962); Harry L. Coles 
and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of 
Military History, 1964); and John Gimbel, The American Occupation 
of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1968). For a recent German view, see 
Caspar Schrenck-Notzing, Charakterwaesche: Die amerikanische 
Besatzung in Deutschland und ihre Folgen (Stuttgart: Seewald 
Verlag, 1965). Basic to an understanding of the occupation, of 
course, is some insight into the Nazi period itself. Perhaps the best 
brief introduction is Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, rev. 
ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); in addition to numerous, 
more specific monographs, an excellent body of German documenta- 
tion exists, as catalogued in Gerhard L. Weinberg and the War 
Documentation Project Staff, under the direction of Fritz T. Epstein, 
Guide to Captured German Documents, War Documentation Project, 
Study No. 1, Research Memorandum No. 2, Vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force 
Base, Ala.: Air University, Human Resources Research Institute, 
December 1952); and the series initiated by the American Historical 
Association's Committee for the Study of War Documents, Guides to 
German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va. (Washington, D.C.: 
The National Archives, National Archives and Records Services, 
General Services Administration, 1958- ). 



60 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



The reports summarized in this volume also include five on 
aspects of the American occupation of Austria, particularly Vienna. 
Since they deal primarily with mass communications media, we shall 
not analyze them in this brief introductory section. 

2. For a compilation of the USIA data from France, West Germany, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom, covering the years from 1952 to 
1963, as well as for a series of methodological and substantive articles 
using these data, see Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala, 
Western European Perspectives on International Affairs: Public 
Opinion Studies and Evaluations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1968). 

3. Inquiries should be addressed to: Archives Branch, Washington 
National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409. The files are in 
Box 233-3/5 and 233-5/5 (#1243) at the Washington National 
Records Center's office in Suitland, Maryland. 

4. Elmo C. Wilson, "Report on ICD Opinion Surveys," memorandum 
prepared for Colonel Gordon E. Textor, Director, Information 
Control Division, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), 
4 August 1948 (dittoed), p. 9. 

5. Leo P. Crespi, "The Influence of Military Government Sponsorship in 
German Opinion Polling," International Journal of Opinion and 
Attitude Research, 4:2 (Summer 1950), 167-168. 

6. Ibid. pp. 168-169. 

7. Cf. Aaron M. Bindman, "Interviewing in the Search for 'Truth'," 
Sociological Quarterly, 6:3 (Summer 1965), 281-288. 

8. Inquiries should be addressed to: Archives Branch, Washington 
National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409. The cost is five 
cents per page on 35 mm. microfilm (positive or negative) or 20 cents 
per page for electrostatic (xeroxed) prints. The summaries contained 
in this volume show the number of pages in each report; the total 
number, excluding extraneous material, is about 2,081 pages. 

9. Cf. Report No. 22, "A Study of Attitudes Toward the Reconstruc- 
tion and Rehabilitation of Germany" (25 September 1946). Hence- 
forward the numbers in parentheses, e.g. (#22), will refer to the 
reports summarized in the next section of this volume; report 
numbers prefaced by II refer to Series 2 (HICOG) of the American- 
sponsored surveys of German attitudes, summaries of which will be 
published in due course. 

10. In June 1950, almost half (46%) of a nationwide sample reported 
that their experiences during the occupation had been unpleasant 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 61 



(23%) or very unpleasant (23%); ten per cent recalled that their 
experiences were pleasant, and another 28 per cent did not remember 
noticing anything in particular (the remainder, 16 per cent, had not 
been in Germany). Broken down by occupation zones, those who had 
been in the British Zone were least negative (37 per cent unpleasant, 
16 per cent pleasant, and 47 per cent not noticing), followed by 
residents of the American Zone (49, 15, and 36 per cent, respec- 
tively), the French Zone (65, 7, and 28 per cent, respectively), and 
the Soviet Zone (95, 1, and 4 per cent, respectively). Elisabeth Noelle 
and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen 
Meinung, 1947-1955 (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag fuer 
Demoskopie, 1956), p. 146. 

11. Ibid., p. 74. Among radio listeners in the Federal Republic as a 
whole, the share listening regularly to VOA declined from 22 per cent 
in March 1950 to 14 per cent in March 1955, those listening 
occasionally from 33 to 27 per cent. 

12. In July 1955, only a quarter (27%) of a nationwide sample felt that 
at the time of the currency reform seven years earlier they had been 
undernourished, and two-thirds (67%) denied this. The items they 
reported most often having to purchase on the black market were, 
first, bread, flour, and potatoes, and, second, fats, butter, and cooking 
oil, followed by clothing, meat, sugar, and eggs. Elisabeth Noelle and 
Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 
1957 (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1957), p. 
226. 

13. In February 1953, almost two-thirds (63%) of a nationwide sample 
felt that the refugees had adjusted satisfactorily to life in the Federal 
Republic (with 18 per cent taking the opposite position), but only 36 
per cent felt that enough was currently being done for refugees from 
the German Democratic Republic (with 28 per cent saying that not 
enough was being done). Asked whether the Federal Republic should 
continue to accept refugees from the German Democratic Republic, 
25 per cent were unconditionally positive in their response, 57 per 
cent specified conditions that should be met (such as proof that flight 
had resulted from political persecution), and 15 per cent responded 
negatively. Noelle and Neumann, editoTs, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, pp. 
199-200. 

14. A decade later, in April 1959, 38 per cent of the expellees from the 
Oder-Neisse territories reported that they would definitely return if 
the area were restored to German control, 27 per cent that they 



62 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



would perhaps return, and 30 per cent said that their return was out 
of the question. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, 
Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 1958-1964 (Allensbach and 
Bonn: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1965), p. 505. 

15. Over the course of the next two decades, reunification and economic 
issues vied for top position in Germans' view of the most important 
problem facing their country. As economic prosperity overcame the 
country in the mid-1950s, the reunification question took first place 
with unprecedented consensus (45 per cent in Janaury 1959), but the 
economic crisis that began in 1965 again raised the issue of prosperity 
to first place (62 per cent in January 1967). Ibid., p. 482, Elisabeth 
Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editois, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen 
Meinung, 7965-7967 (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 
1967), p. 387. 

16. Cf. Richard L. Merritt, "West Berlin - Center or Periphery?" in 
Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National 
Research, eds. Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 321-336. 

17. Hitler's image suffered during succeeding years. In January 1950 as 
much as a tenth of a nationwide sample rated Hitler as the statesman 
who had done most for Germany, but in April-May 1967 only two 
per cent did so. In July 1952 a tenth agreed that Hitler was the 
greatest statesman of the century whose true greatness would be 
recognized only later, with another 22 per cent feeling that, although 
he had made a few mistakes. Hitler was nonetheless an excellent 
chief-of-state. The percentage claiming that, except for the war. 
Hitler would have been one of Germany's greatest statesmen declined 
from 48 per cent in May 1955 to 32 per cent in April-May 1967; the 
number denying this assertion rose from 36 to 52 per cent. The 
percentage reporting their willingness to vote again for a man such as 
Hitler dropped from 14 per cent in 1953 to 6 per cent in 1968 
(although in 1965 and 1967 it had been still lower, at four per cent); 
interestingly enough, in 1968 34 per cent of the adherents of the new 
rightist National Democratic Party (NPD) indicated that, if the 
opportunity arose, they would vote for a man like Hitler. Noelle and 
Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, pp. 144-145; and EMNID- 
Institut, Informationen 20:8-9 (August-September 1968), p. A- 18. 

18. Of a nationwide sample of university students in July 1966, 44 per 
cent reported that they could think of something positive about 
Hitler and the Third Reich (with over three-fifths of these mentioning 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 63 



the resolution of Germany's economic crisis of the early 1930s), and 

38 per cent could find nothing good to say. Noelle and Neumann, 
editois, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, p. 368. 

19. Some of these data are from summary sheets not included in the 
OMGUS reports and hence differ slightly from data reported 
elsewhere (e.g. #16). This special collection is to be found in the 
Library of the University of Illinois under the title "Some Results of 
Public Opinion Polls of the German Republic" (q940.9343, G3125s). 

20. Asked in September 1952 about five defendants still serving prison 
sentences, an average of 14 per cent of a nationwide sample thought 
it just that they were still there, with 52 per cent considering it 
unjust. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, p. 202. 
More generally, Germans have grown increasingly impatient with 
discussions of German war crimes: In 1966 well over half (58%) of a 
nationwide sample and 51 per cent of the university students 
questioned thought that the time had come to stop such discussions. 
Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967 pp. 204, 368. An 
indication of the bitterness on this point came in November 1952, 
when 46 per cent reported liking a recent speech containing the 
sentence, "The real war criminals are those who made this unholy 
peace alone, who destroyed entire cities without military reasons, 
who dropped the bombs on Hiroshima, and who are producing new 
atomic bombs" ; 29 per cent did not like the speech, and 25 per cent 
gave no response. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, 
p. 276. 

21. Meanwhile, Soviet military authorities had removed 307,370 and 
excluded 83,108 Germans from jobs; the British had removed 
186,692 and excluded 104,106; and the French had removed and 
excluded 69,068 Germans. Friedmann, The Allied Military Govern- 
ment of Germany, p. 332. 

22. Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, pp. 101-110, 
158-162, 246-252. Cf. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free; and John H. 
Herz, "The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany," Political Science 
Quarterly, 63:4 (December 1948), 569-594. 

23. The independent Institut fuer Demoskopie found still greater 
opposition in August 1948: 14 per cent felt that denazification had 
accomplished its goals (17 per cent in November 1953), contrasted to 

39 per cent who felt that the proceedings had been necessary but 
incorrectly conducted (63 per cent in 1953), and 40 per cent who 
expressed outright opposition (40 per cent in 1953). Asked in 



64 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



September 1951 what the greatest mistake made by the occupiers 
was, denazification ranked seventh (having been mentioned by six per 
cent), right behind the war crimes trials (8%) and well behind the 
response "dismanthng, destruction, and holding down of industry" 
(21%). Noelle and Neumann, editois, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, pp. 142, 
140. 

24. Evidence summarized by Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, 
Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and 
Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 40, suggests that, in the 
mid-1950s, about one in eight Germans was a hardcore Nazi or partial 
sympathizer. Public opinion data from the late 1960s indicate that 
this proportion has dropped by about half. 

25 . For a recent summary of some studies of German perspectives, see 
Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in 
Political Culture and Political Development, eds. Lucian W. Pye and 
Sidney Verba (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 
130-170. See also W. Phillips Davison, "Trends in West German 
Public Opinion, 1946-1956," in West German Leadership and Foreign 
Policy, eds. Hans Speier and W. Philhps Davison (Evanston, 111., and 
White Plains, N.Y.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), pp. 282-304. 

26. Surveys in the early 1950s nonetheless revealed that about a quarter 
of the population (33 per cent of the women and 21 per cent of the 
men), if given a choice, would have preferred a monarchy to any 
other form of government for Germany; Noelle and Neumann, 
Qdiiots, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, p. 132. In the winter of 1962-1963, 18 
per cent were in favor of having a monarch on the British or Swedish 
model; Noelle and Neumann, ediiois, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, p. 137. 

27. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political 
Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), particularly pp. 428-429. Other cross- 
national surveys are to be found in William Buchanan and Hadley 
Cantril, How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), and Merritt and Puchala, 
Western European Perspectives on International Affairs. 

28. See Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on 
National and International Images," in International Behavior: A 
Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 132-187. 

29. More properly speaking, as Gimbel in The American Occupation of 



POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 65 



Germany has pointed out, the conflict among American decision 
makers was resolved in favor of General Clay and others favoring a 
rapid rehabilitation of Germany; the effect from the point of view of 
the outside observer, however, was the same, since the American 
Military Government began to express views that sounded like policy 
changes. 

30. For a graphic indication of the increasing polarity of German images 
of the United States and the Soviet Union, see Richard L. Merritt, 
"Visual Representation of Mutual Friendliness," in Western European 
Perspectives on International Affairs, eds. Merritt and Puchala, pp. 
11 1-141, particularly p. 134. 

31. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New 
York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), who stresses the antiliberal elements 
of Germany's pre-Nazi history. See also David Schoenbaum, Hitler's 
Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (New 
York: Doubleday and Co., 1966). 



PART II 

THE OMGUS SURVEYS 



Report No. 1 (1 March 1946) 



RADIO LISTENING IN GERMANY, WINTER 1946 

Sample: 964 households in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 21 January 1946. (21 pp.) 

Fifty-six per cent of the population in the American Zone 
listened to the radio, either on their own or someone else's set. 
Only 42 per cent of the families interviewed had sets in working 
order. Nearly all sets picked up middle-wave lengths, and 
one-third also received short- and long-wave broadcasts. 

Audience composition differed at different times of the 
day, with the median group Ustening to the radio about two 
hours daily. Among those most frequently tuning in one of the 
three American-sponsored stations, both Radio Munich and 
Radio Stuttgart had audiences that listened for rather long 
periods of time. An appreciable number (37%) restricted their 
daytime hstening to save electricity. The largest audiences were 
during the evening hours from 6 to 10 p.m., but significant 
numbers were also at their radios at 7 a.m. and at noon. 
Listeners with above average-sized families seemed to use the 
radio socially, as the center of the evening at home. Listening 
habits varied with the size of the community: except in Bavaria, 
the larger the community, the more people who listened to the 
radio. 

Most radio hstening occurred among groups with the 
following characteristics: male; aged 18 to 29; twelve or more 
years of education; upper-middle-class status; former member- 
ship in the NSDAP; irregular churchgoing Catholics; profes- 
sionals, government officials, or self-employed; and weekly 
income of 70 RM or more. 

Listeners preferred the American-licensed station in their 
own Land, although they also listened to stations from other 
Laender in AMZON. For the Zone as a whole. Radio Leipzig 
and Radio Berhn ranked fourth and fifth respectively in the 

69 



70 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



competition for listeners, behind Radio Munich, Stuttgart, and 
Frankfurt. 

In regard to the type of program preferred, 65 per cent of 
the respondents hsted musical programs. Second most popular 
were news programs (25%). Differences of taste for types of 
programs were related to sex, age, and education variables. 

Among radio listeners, 65 per cent were confident that the 
radio presented the news more truthfully than did the news- 
papers. A majority of listeners, however, admitted that news- 
papers have the advantage of being able to present more 
complete news. Respondents seemed to feel that news broad- 
casting in English was more complete than that in German, but 
only 1 1 per cent claimed to listen to broadcasts in Enghsh. 
Radio listeners also indicated a preference for personalized news 
presentation. 

Almost two-thirds (63%) of the listeners said that they 
listened to the "Voice of America." Fifty per cent said that 
they heard the program from German stations only; the 
remainder heard it sometimes on German stations, sometimes 
from London or New York. Among radio Usteners, those who 
listened to the "Voice of America" were more likely to be male, 
Protestant, middle or upper class, and to have had only eight 
years of schooHng rather than much more or less. Those who 
listened to the "Voice of America" on German stations were 
also those who most frequently listened to Radio Frankfurt or 
Radio Stuttgart, 



Report No. 2 (March 1946) 



WHO IN GERMANY HAS READ "MEIN KAMPF"? 

Sample: 954 residents of the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 14 February 1946. (3 pp.) 

Almost a quarter (23%) of the adult population in the American 
Zone had read at least part of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Of this 
group, seven per cent had read the entire book. The largest 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 71 



percentage of readers were among the following groups: former 
NSDAP members (18 per cent completely, 28 per cent in part); 
upper social class (14 and 31 per cent, respectively); 12 or more 
years of education (31 and 41 per cent respectively); young 
people under the age of 30 (5 and 22 per cent, respectively); 
men (1 1 and 21 per cent, respectively); prisoners of war (12 and 
24 per cent, respectively); and those preferring the Communist 
Party (13 and 18 per cent, respectively). Religious affiliation 
was not a significant variable for discriminating readers from 
nonreaders. 



Report No. 3 (15 March 1946) 



SOME POLITICAL ATTITUDES PROBED 
ON RECENT SURVEYS 

Sample: from 364 to 996 American Zone residents. 
Interviewing dates: 14 surveys from 26 November 1945 to 
15 March 1946. (9 pp.) 

A third (33%) of the respondents polled in March 1946 
preferred the SPD to other parties then in existence. Asked 
which party they would choose in the event of a merger 
between the SPD and the Communist Party, a third of these 
SPD adherents indicated support for the new party, but 37 
percent said that they would switch either to the CDU (19%) or 
the CSU (18%), and another three per cent thought that they 
would support one of the smaller, right-wing parties in that 
event. 

Regarding pohtical awareness, the number feeling that the 
Germans had learned in recent months how to govern them- 
selves better varied from 61 per cent in January to 47 per cent 
in March. Roughly half felt themselves sufficiently informed 
about political affairs; and somewhat over a third of the 
remainder indicated that, although they were not sufficiently 
informed, they were making an effort to inform themselves. 
Only 15 per cent could name an outstanding German' who, in 



72 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



their opinion, could hold an important position at the Land 
level. 

Regarding political participation, in March only seven per 
cent claimed membership in a poHtical party, although another 
16 per cent indicated their intention to join one. About 
two-thirds (63%) in March wanted to exclude all but three or 
four political parties, and as many as 1 1 per cent wanted to 
exclude all but one. A solid majority, ranging from 60 per cent 
in November 1945 to 72 per cent in March 1946, felt that 
political meetings were desirable. By March as many as 25 per 
cent of the entire population said that they had attended such a 
meeting. Three in five respondents (60%) thought that some 
categories of individuals should not be permitted to enter 
pohtics, as opposed to another fifth (20%) favoring no such 
discrimination: Almost all of those opting for a discriminatory 
policy hsted former NSDAP members or functionaries as the 
most undesirable. Support for the SPD grew and for the 
conservative parties (CDU, CSU, LDP) declined with the 
population size of the town. Of the former NSDAP members, 
somewhat over a quarter (28%) supported leftist parties (SPD, 
KPD) in early 1946, almost twice that number (52%) favored 
conservative parties. 

Those least likely to vote in elections taking place in early 
1946 were individuals without party affiliation (54%), former 
Nazi Party members (58%), men (36%), and persons under the 
age of 30 (45%). Most voters in the January elections were able 
to give a reason for having voted. Vaguely defined issues were 
alluded to by a majority, while a sizable minority said that they 
had voted merely out of a sense of civic duty (35%) or just to 
express an opinion once again (4%). Issues referred to indirectly 
included leadership (23%), reconstruction (12%), interparty 
rivalry (10%), voting against the Communist Party (5%), and 
political reorientation (7%). 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 73 



Report No. 4 (25 March 1946) 



INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF GERMAN FAMILIES 
IN THE AMERICAN ZONE, WINTER 1946 

Sample: 2,448 families in 70 communities in the American 

Zone. 

Interviewing dates: second week in January 1946. (10 pp.) 

In the American Zone, the absolute labor force was at least 
twice as large as the percentage of those actually working. While 
28 per cent of family members interviewed were working, an 
additional 30 per cent were adults capable of working but 
holding no income-producing jobs; another ten per cent were 
incapable of working. Almost two-thirds (63%) of the labor 
force were male. People with jobs were, on the average, almost 
as likely to be over 40 as younger. Most of the workers (77%) 
had no more than 8 years of education. 

The average income of famihes in the Zone was about 35 
RM per week. Almost all of this income came from wages or 
salaries. Nearly 15 per cent of all families interviewed said they 
had no income. Their standard of living, however, approximated 
that of the average German family. This group was most likely 
temporarily dislocated and was living on its savings. Over a third 
(35%) of all families were drawing on savings for necessary 
living expenditures. Although 85 per cent of those with no 
income were using savings for current expenses, this percentage 
decreased as income rose. 

Lowest incomes were reported in small towns and Baden- 
Werttemberg (median family income of 35 RM). Cathohcs were 
slightly better paid than Protestants (41 RM as opposed to 38 
RM). Home owners (40 RM) and the better educated (92 RM) 
received more income than renters (36 RM) or those with only 
7 years of education (46 RM). Former NSDAP members (45 
RM) were relatively well paid compared with those who had no 
Party affiliations (36 RM). The difference in income between 
men and women was not great, nor was it consistently greater 



74 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



for men. Workers between the ages of 30 and 39 tended to 
receive more income (42 RM) than younger (29 RM) or older 
people (39 RM for those aged 40-49, 38 RM for those over 50 
years of age). 

On the average, incomes were higher than expenditures. 
Respondents reported making expenditures only for necessities. 
Even the best paid spent very httle for education, entertain- 
ment, or luxuries. The greater the income, the more money 
spent. The greatest difference between income groups was in 
the amount spent for food; families earning 10-29 RM weekly 
paid about 8 RM for food, whereas those earning 80 RM or 
more weekly spent about 18 RM for food. Rents had hardly 
increased since May 1945 for those in the average renting 
brackets, and were stable for those paying high rents. Home 
owners, who made up 46 per cent of the population, expected 
to spend large sums in 1 946 for the repair of their homes. 



Report No. 5 (1 April 1946) 



SPECIAL POLITICAL SURVEY, WINTER 1946 

Sample: 162 community leaders in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: end of February 1946. (17 pp.) 

The 162 persons questioned in this survey were all community 
leaders — politically alert and sophisticated — living in villages 
and cities throughout AMZON. The majority were over 50 
and mostly of higher socioeconomic groups. The overwhelming 
majority preferred to be personally involved in politics rather 
than leaving politics to others. The dominant impression given 
by the respondents was nonetheless a general disillusionment 
with party pohtics. 

Those who admitted the need for democratic methods and 
democracy in general regarded them only as preparation for the 
mere function of voting without any reference to or indication 
of their appreciation of democratic social attitudes or democ- 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 75 



racy's functioning within a community. When asked what the 
fundamentals of a democratic form of state were, most answered 
from a classical point of view, giving short definitions. A large 
percentage mentioned equality as a fundamental requirement, 
but only two specified racial equahty among other forms 
named. About two in five (43%) of the 162 respondents felt it 
was generally possible to estabhsh democracy in Germany based 
on western democratic principles, a third (34%) felt it was 
generally not possible to do so, and 23 per cent were uncertain. 
Many respondents, fearing a political situation in which there 
would be a number of parties, felt democracy would encourage 
this situation. Accordingly, many felt the number of pohtical 
parties should be limited, especially during the period of 
reconstruction. Many felt the British system should be emu- 
lated, but with a president rather than a monarch. 

When asked if the Military Government could do anything 
to foster democracy, respondents most frequently demanded 
unification, the immediate abolition of the Zone system, and 
the reestablishment of economic prosperity. The next most 
frequent demand was for a humane execution of denazification. 
Many stressed that the occupation itself should be an example 
of democracy. All favored the gradual trend by the Military 
Government to give more power to the Germans themselves; 
almost all, however, felt that the Military Government should 
retain final control and decision. 

Of the 162 respondents, 67 preferred the CSU or the CDU, 
47 the SPD, nine the KPD, seven the LDP and two the Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei which exists in the British Zone. Most of the 
former Nazi Party members preferred the CDU or the CSU. 
Continuity in pre-1933 and postwar political allegiance was 
noticeable mainly among the Social Democrats and, to a lesser 
extent, the Communists. Sixty per cent of those who preferred 
the CSU or the CDU were former members of the Center Party, 
the Bavarian People's Party, or the German National People's 
Party. 

When questioned about responsibility for the Nazi rise to 
power, 90 per cent concentrated on the factors which in their 
view had lead to dictatorship; only about ten per cent gave 



76 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



opinions as to what positive steps could have been taken to 
prevent the Nazi rise to power. Rephes to this question, the 
question of collective guilt of the German people, and the 
responsibihty of the individual to obey his government divided 
sharply according to the party preferences of the respondents. 

These community leaders were sharply divided on the 
possibility that the Nazis or some similar group might emerge 
and attempt to seize power. Nearly all respondents thought that 
such a seizure could not happen while the occupation lasted. 
But the conditions that might favor a Nazi resurgence included 
material difficulties and misery, unjust and harsh occupation 
policy, nationalist reaction, together with division of Germany, 
licensing of reactionary parties, and the problem of homeless 
refugees and unemployed former prisoners of war. Conditions 
hindering such a resurgence included the presence of occupation 
troops, the fact that the Nazi regime and the war taught a lesson 
to everyone, the existence of strong leftist parties, and stricter 
international interdependence and surveillance in the frame- 
work of the new international organization. 

If the Nazis or some similar group attempted to seize 
power, the majority of the respondents felt that civil war would 
follow. A majority also thought that, after the Nazi experience, 
the democratic parties would prevent any development which 
might lead to such a coup. At least half the respondents 
believed that the Allies would immediately intervene, and an 
appreciable minority thought that it would be the duty of an 
international organization to act. About five per cent hoped 
that United States forces would not leave until, in the 
respondents' words, "democracy is safely estabhshed." 

When questioned about the main duties of the state 
toward its citizens and what the respondent expected from his 
government, about 75 per cent said that the satisfaction of 
essentially material needs is the first duty of the state. Only 
about 25 per cent mentioned individual freedom of conscience, 
of expression, of religion, and freedom from secret police. 
Respondents expected Germany to rebuild its cities, renew its 
export trade, provide raw materials, more homes, and better 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 77 



health services. A large percentage of respondents named the 
establishment of friendly international relations as the chief 
demand of the people on their government. On the one hand, 
many felt that the government should not intervene in social 
and economic life; on the other hand, many expected compre- 
hensive social services from cradle to the grave. 



Report No. 6 (20 April 1946) 



LAW NO. 3 

Sample: unspecified (c. 985) in American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: third week in February 1946. (4 pp.) 

Over three-quarters of the sample (76%) had heard of Law No. 
3, which obliged workers to register at the local labor office. 
Approval of the law was almost unanimous: 87 per cent of the 
entire population approved of the law and thought that it 
would facilitate reconstruction, as opposed to only two per cent 
who disapproved of the law or thought that it would hinder 
reconstruction. A firm majority (62%) approved and a quarter 
(25%) disapproved of the provision that workers could not leave 
their presently-held jobs. 

Attitudinal differences among groups within the popula- 
tion indicated that areas where conditions were more difficult 
were also more discontented with the regulation. Bavarians, 
who were best off of all people in the American Zone, were 
more in agreement than those in the other Laender. In the large 
cities of Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich there was a relatively 
lower degree of approval than in other city-sized communities. 
Towns with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 gave the 
highest degree (70%) of approval of the law. 

Seventy per cent of those interviewed allowed that many 



78 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



people who could work did not do so because they could not 
find appropriate positions. Indications of particular group 
worries were found in the fact that more young people (81%) 
than middle-aged (70%) said that many people were looking for 
suitable jobs, and that more residents of the three large cities 
(88%) than those of smaller cities (69%) also thought that many 
were seeking work cut to their interests. 

Among all those working, however, a sohd majority was 
definitely well (63%) or fairly well (23%) satisfied with their 
jobs and only ten per cent expressed dissatisfaction. The 
middle-aged were more satisfied (83%) than were people under 
the age of 30 (73%). Dissatisfaction stemmed largely from the 
fact that respondents were engaged in work for which they had 
not been trained. Some white-collar workers, for instance, 
pointed out that circumstances forced them to accept ordinary 
labor tasks. Others complained that their work was too hard, 
and former Nazi Party members, particularly, said that their 
work was frequently humiliating. Still another complaint was 
that income was too low in view of the high taxes. 

Those who did not work gave various reasons for their lack 
of steady employment. Nearly half (44%) were housewives who 
did not contemplate seeking any job. A quarter (24%) of the 
unemployed reported that they were either unable to work 
because of their age or the state of their health or did not have 
to work because they were already pensioned. One in ten (9%) 
nonworkers said that denazificiation had led to refusals of jobs. 
About the same number (12%) asserted that there was no work 
to be found in their area or that the work they sought could not 
be found. 

A substantial minority (31%) of workers considered that 
they were not working as hard as they had during the war. 
About half (51%) of all those who had worked during the war 
and were still working reported no change in the pressure of 
their work. About a fifth (18%) claimed that the times and 
special hardships encountered made their work more difficult 
than had previously been the case. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 79 



Report No. 7(11 May 1946) 



REACTIONS TO RECENT REVISIONS IN THE 
DENAZIFICATION PROGRAM 

Sample: 992 residents of the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 15 March 1946. (6 pp.) 

Although 59 per cent of those interviewed in AMZON had 
heard of the changes in the denazification program made just 
prior to the survey, only 28 per cent had a reasonable idea of 
what the changes were. Recognition of the provisions of the 
new law was more widespread than recall of the changes 
instituted, yet only 35 per cent were able to recognize these 
changes. 

Only four per cent of those who had heard of the new law 
felt the changes to be for the worse. Over a third (36%) said 
that the law would allow for a better implementation of 
denazification, since it would permit individual treatment and 
punishment. Others viewed the new law with misgivings. 
Criticism from both those satisfied and dissatisfied with the 
denazification program centered about suggestions for more 
discrimination in judgments imposed and regarding each case on 
its individual merits. 

Over half (54%) of the population could give a compar- 
ative estimate of the way denazification was being carried out in 
all four zones. Of the 26 per cent who perceived a difference, 
13 per cent said denazification was best carried out in the 
American Zone, 12 per cent felt it was most rigorous in the 
American Zone. An appreciable minority felt denazification to 
be harshest in the Soviet Zone. 

Well over half (57%) of the adult population said they 
were satisfied with the manner in which denazification was 
being carried out. This figure indicated an increase in satisfac- 
tion over the level expressed in previous surveys. Three in four of 
those who preferred to have the Americans handle the program 
without any German help expected that this situation would 



80 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



produce justice and impartiality. Those who would like to see 
some German assistance while still leaving the main job in the 
hands of the Americans argued that, despite the need for 
cooperation, the responsibility and supervision should be 
American (28%), or that the Germans could not be trusted to 
do a fair and impartial job (22%). Another fifth (20%) frankly 
admitted that the Americans were more just and impartial. 

Satisfaction of former NSDAP members with the new 
program or with denazification generally did not differ mark- 
edly from that of the general population. Respondents with 
relatives who were former Party members, however, criticized 
the denazification program more sharply. 



Report No. 8(1 June 1946) 



REACTIONS TO THE NEW TAX LAWS 

Sample: 99 1 residents of 80 communities in the American 

Zone. 

Interviewing dates: 1 March 1946. (5 pp.) 

Of the 68 per cent of those interviewed in the American Zone 
who had heard of the new tax law, almost all thought that its 
effect would be to raise taxes. There was evidence of a lack of 
knowledge about the new law. More than two in five (43%) 
were unable to guess any amount when asked to estimate their 
taxes. Lower income groups made up a higher percentage of 
those who were uninformed than did higher income groups. 
Income groups varied Uttle in the percentages which agreed that 
the new taxes would make it impossible to meet necessary 
expenses. When grouped by social class, however, there was 
appreciable variation. 

A plurality (43%) cited reparations when asked to account 
for the increase in taxation. Almost three-quarters (72%) saw a 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 81 



justification for the higher taxes. Reasons for favoring the new 
tax law were the prevention of inflation (56%) and the 
economic reconstruction of Germany (61%). 

In commenting on the abolition of the social bonuses paid 
under National Socialism to parents with many children, 62 per 
cent expressed their opposition to the Nazi bonus plan and only 
22 per cent endorsed it. More than half (55%) felt that the new 
law abrogating the bonus system would actually prevent people 
from having as many children as they might have had. As many 
as a third (33%) felt this was the purpose of the new law. Those 
who denied this intent to the law (47%) said, rather, that the 
law was designed to raise money for Germany's reconstruction 
(24%), to give equity to small families (7%), to raise money for 
reparations (4%), or to help prevent inflation (3%). 



Report No. 9 (7 June 1946) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD RELIGION AND THE CHURCH AS 
POLITICAL FACTORS IN GERMAN LIFE 

Sample: 996 persons in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 8 March 1946. (1 1 pp.) 

The survey focuses upon the attitudes of four major groups in 
the AMZON population: regular churchgoing Catholics and 
Protestants, and irregular churchgoing CathoUcs and Protes- 
tants. Some of the characteristics of these groups are important 
in that they shed light on the attitudinal patterns of their 
representatives. Among Catholics, 65 per cent said they 
attended church regularly. Fifty per cent of the Protestants 
claimed regular attendance. Seventy-one per cent of the regular 
churchgoing Catholics preferred the CSU or the CDU. Among 
regular churchgoing Protestants, 38 per cent supported the SPD; 
40 per cent, the two Christian parties (CDU and CSU). The 



82 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



irregular churchgoing members of both faiths were predomi- 
nately SPD supporters. Sixty-three per cent of the LDP 
supporters were irregular churchgoers. More of those who 
regularly attended church (74%) took part in the previous 
elections than nonchurchgoers (59%). 

Former Nazis tended to be nonchurchgoers. Of the regular 
churchgoers interviewed, 12 per cent formerly belonged to the 
NSDAP; 17 per cent of the nonchurchgoers were former 
members. Hence, former NSDAP members, who were not 
allowed to vote, increased disproportionately the size of the 
nonvoting groups reported. Forty-nine per cent of regular 
churchgoing Catholics had seven or less years of education. 
About one-fourth of the other groups were similarly educated. 
Twenty per cent of the regular churchgoers of both faiths had 
attended nine or more years of school, while 28 per cent of the 
irregular churchgoers had been similarly educated. 

Members of each of the two major religious faiths 
generally refrained from criticism of the other church's lack of 
opposition to the Nazis. Criticism that did develop stemmed 
mostly from irregular churchgoers of both faiths. While 70 per 
cent of the regular churchgoing Catholics stated that the Church 
had done its utmost to offer resistance to the National Sociahsts 
during their regime, only 47 per cent of regular churchgoing 
Protestants made a similar claim. Only among regular church- 
going Catholics did a majority believe that the clergy had 
warned them of the dangers of voting for National Sociahsm. 
Among irregular churchgoing Catholics a plurality (35%) stated 
that there were still Nazis among the clergy. Most members of 
the other three groups denied this fact. It appears that a fairly 
large percentage of respondents replied in a prejudiced fashion 
in an attempt to stem criticism of their own church. 

Important groups in the population felt that religion was a 
real force in the reconstruction of Germany. But support of 
religion as a moral force in life was distinguished from support 
of the church when it plays a political role. A plurahty (43%) of 
the entire population believed that the church was taking part 
in political affairs at that time. Seventy per cent, however, felt 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 83 



that the church should be less interested in political affairs. 
Major opposition was also expressed to instruction by the clergy 
in regard to voting in an election or support for particular 
political parties. Support for the reconstitution of another 
Zentrum party was found among 32 per cent of regular 
churchgoing Catholics. As many Catholic women favored as 
opposed the suggested move. But all other characteristic groups 
expressed strong opposition. Underscoring the minimal inter- 
church rivalry found, more members of all groups studied 
thought that Catholics and Protestants would be able to 
cooperate successfully in a "Christian" political party than 
denied this possibility. 

A large majority of the general population felt that the 

military government had given sufficient and appropriate 

support to the church. 



Report No. 10 (21 June 1946) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AS A CAREER FOR THE 
COMING GENERATION IN GERMANY 

Sample: 1,515 adults in the American Zone and the 

American Sector of Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (9 pp.) 

A very large majority (76%) of the German public thought of 
politics as no career for their sons. Two important variations in 
these attitudes occurred within the class structure of the 
society. The very uppercrust was relatively more disposed, and 
the upper-middle class relatively less disposed, toward such a 
career than was the average German. Disillusionment with 
politics was apparent not only among those who participated in 
the Nazi government but also among those groups that closely 
identified themselves with National Socialist aims and ideals. 



84 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



The most important of these latter groups were the returned 
prisoners of war, and the young men and women under 30 years 
of age. Significantly greater respect for pohtics as a worthy 
profession existed among supporters of left-wing political 
parties and among trade union members. 

Important differences were recorded among residents of 
various sized communities. Farmers least favored (5% favored) a 
political career for their sons. Residents of the large cities of 
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich, and of the American Sector 
of Berlin, seem to have overcome political apathy to an 
appreciable degree. 

Comments made by interviewees exemplified the patterns 
of public thinking on this subject. Those not favoring a political 
career for their sons remarked on the crooked nature of politics, 
the belief that it is not a profession, and its demand for 
maturity. Many respondents indicated horror and repugnance at 
the thought of their sons taking up politics. Reasons for 
favoring a political career included taking care of the needs of 
the people, making things better, the need for greater attention 
to pohtics, working for peace, freedom from militarism and 
fascism, and becoming good democrats. 

In contrast to the AMZON population, only 14 per cent of 
which would favor pohtics as a career for their sons (76% 
against), cross-samples of the American population revealed 21 
per cent in favor and 68 per cent against in January 1945, and 
25 per cent in favor and 65 per cent against in the spring of 
1946. Among the British population in January 1945, 25 per 
cent favored and 48 per cent opposed such a career for their 
sons. In the United States the lower class was more inclined 
than the upper class to be favorable; in England the reverse was 
true. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 85 



Report No. 11 (27 June 1946) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD TRADE UNIONS 

Sample: 1,600 adults in the American Zone and in the 

American Sector of Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (11 pp.) 

The general public was divided on whether the Nazis' denial of 
collective bargaining and the right to strike was good or not. 
Thirty-five per cent of the respondents viewed positively the 
Nazi labor policy, asserting that strikes were bad and the 
standard of living had been good. Thirty-eight per cent opposed 
the Nazi policy on the grounds that the workers had lost all 
their rights under the Nazi system. Opinion was also split on the 
German Labor Front's record. Thirty-seven per cent said that 
the DAF did an unsatisfactory job of representing workers' 
interests, while 22 per cent thought it had done a good job 
representing these interests. Some were wilhng to recognize the 
DAF's pohcies on social benefits even though they did not 
think that the DAF satisfactorily represented the workers. More 
people (42%) opposed the reestablishment of collective bargain- 
ing after the occupation than favored it (34%). Most people (71%) 
favored an advisory voice for workers in management, such as 
the Workers Councils (approved by 66 per cent) recently 
authorized by the Allied Control Council provide. Fifty-five per 
cent favored the Military Government's wage fixing pohcy; 24 
per cent opposed it. 

Unionists in the American Zone were oriented toward the 
Western democracies rather than toward the Soviet Union. The 
bulk of leftist sentiment among unionists favored the SPD 
rather than the KPD. Certain authoritarian features of a 
government-controlled economy attracted a surprisingly large 
minority of unionists. Pre-1933 unionists (68%) and current 
unionists (74%) were nonetheless more democratic than the 
population as a whole (49%) in favoring free trade unions with 
collective bargaining rights. 



86 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Nazism made some inroads among the pre-1933 unionists, 
but the compromised unionists tended to remain outside the 
free trade unions now being organized. The new trade unions 
attracted the more democratic of the pre-1933 unionists (for 
example, 56 per cent of pre-1933 unionists active in 1946 
thought the Nazi wage control policy bad). The new generation 
of unionists without pre-1933 experience was not appreciably 
less democratic than the old generation of pre-1933 unionists 
who resumed their union activity. 



Report No. 12 (28 June 1946) 



ATTITUDES OF SOME BAVARIAN SCHOOLCHILDREN 

Sample: 250 schoolchildren between the ages of 12 and 18 
in Regensburg, Welheim, Pirkensee, and Burglengenfeld. 
Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.) 

Although 88 per cent of the children had belonged to Nazi 
youth organizations, only 1 2 per cent were members of a new 
youth organization. Thirty-seven per cent of their parents had 
belonged to the NSDAP, a figure about average for the 
American Zone. Eighty-four per cent of the youth were 
CathoHc. Most (48%) would vote for the CSU if they were old 
enough, 18 per cent for the SPD, and three per cent for the 
KPD. Almost a third (29%), however, said they would not vote 
even if they could. 

Their principal concern was obtaining food. Thirty per 
cent said that the type of aid Germany most needed was food, 
and 26 per cent reported that their greatest wish was for more 
food. They also desired peace and freedom for their brothers 
who were prisoners of war. Their secondary concern were jobs, 
clothing, and shoes. The children seemed to be in good health. 
Reading, sports, and handicrafts provided recreation. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 87 



Almost all the children (98%) claimed to like school. Most 
(66%) thought themselves to be average students. About 
one-third considered themselves to be good students. Only a 
few (3%) admitted that they were bad students. Although they 
were interested in a wide variety of subjects, they liked best 
mathematics, German, geography, history, biology, and English. 
Seventy-four per cent preferred to learn English rather than 
some other foreign language. 

The employment aspirations of the youth were generally 
low. The girls wanted to be saleswomen, dressmakers, clerks, 
teachers, and hairdressers. The boys wished to be bakers, 
electricians, or carpenters. None of the boys wanted to teach. 
More girls (7%) than boys (3%) hoped to become physicians or 
dentists. 

The most common reason given (36%) for Germany's loss 
of the war was the overpowering strength of the enemy. Second 
(30%) was Germany's lack of material. When asked to name the 
three greatest Germans, about ten per cent named Hitler, a 
quarter mentioned monarchs, and a third poets. When ques- 
tioned as to what the respondent would do if he alone knew the 
secret of the atom bomb, the most common answer given (36%) 
was to keep it a secret. Democracy to these youths meant 
freedom for the people (23%) and government by the people 
(10%). Forty-eight per cent, however, had no opinion when 
asked what democracy meant. 

Almost as many (35%) liked the American soldier as 
disliked him (39%). More than half of those who disliked the 
American soldier mentioned his general behavior as a reason. 

Most of the youth expected a good, lasting, or just or wise 
peace from the Allies. Fifty-nine per cent did not expect 
another war soon. Of the 41 per cent who did expect war, most 
thought it would be with the Soviet Union. 



88 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 13 (28 June 1946) 



A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF BOOK READING 

IN GERMANY 

Sample: approximately 1 ,000 adult Germans in the Ameri- 
can Zone. 
Interviewing dates: late February 1946. (5 pp.) 

Over half the sample population (55%) stated that they did not 
read books at all. The remaining 43 per cent read for various 
amounts of time. Eleven per cent read up to two hours a week; 
14 per cent between two and six hours per week. Most readers 
had recently been reading for amusement and diversion. Kitsch, 
sentimental love stories, novels, mysteries, and detective stories 
were most popular. 

Although book readers came from widely diverse back- 
grounds, they were most likely to be from better educated 
circles, the younger adult age groups, and from middle-sized 
cities rather than from very small communities (under 2,000 
inhabitants) or very large cities (over 300,000 inhabitants). 
Almost as many women read as men; men, however, tended to 
read many more hours per week than women. Former Nazis 
read a great deal more than those who had not been Nazis. 
Twenty-two per cent of the readers who were former Nazis read 
eight hours or more weekly, while only eight per cent of those 
who had not been Nazis read this amount. 

Only a very small number (five per cent of the total adult 
population, nine per cent of all book readers) used local 
libraries. Many books were personal loans. The opportunity to 
purchase new books was still very limited. 

Novels, fiction and short stories were by far the most 
popular, both with groups that read up to four hours per week 
(71%) and with those who read over four hours per week. Book 
readers felt that forthcoming books on Germany's problems 
should deal with reconstruction, the future of Germany, and 
Europe. When asked what types of books and authors they 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 89 



would like to see on sale as soon as possible, book readers 
expressed greatest interest in books and authors forbidden 
during the Nazi regime. Second choice comprised new books by 
German writers living in Germany. 



Report No. 14(6 July 1946) 

MAIL TO "STIMME AMERIKAS," FEBRUARY AND MARCH 
1946 



Sample: 3,466 pieces of mail written to the "Voice of 

America." 

Interviewing dates: 29 January 1946 through 1 April 

1946. (10 pp.) 



Over half the mail to the "Voice of America" came from the 
American Zone (52 per cent in February; 54 per cent in March). 
Within AMZON there was an increase in the mail from the 
Bavarian audience (17 per cent in February; 21 per cent in 
March). Proportionate to the population of the three Laender in 
the American Zone, more hsteners living in Hesse wrote to VOA 
than listeners in the other two Laender. During the period of 
this survey, nearly 85 per cent of the population lived in towns 
or villages with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants. At the 
beginning of the survey, 70 per cent of the mail came from 
communities of this size. In later weeks, this percentage 
dropped to about 60 per cent. Although 60 per cent of the 
inhabitants of AMZON were women, well over half of the 
letters written to the "Voice of America" came from men. More 
letters were mailed to VOA on Monday (20%) than on any 
other day of the week. This percentage declined as the week 
progressed, falling to 6 per cent on Sunday. 

In the period considered, a smaller percentage of letters 
raised considerations of personal problems abroad, such as 



90 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



requests for aid in returning prisoners of war from the United 
States, than in earher periods. A large percentage of the mail 
concerned personal problems in Germany (45 per cent in 
February; 38 per cent in March). About an eighth of the mail ( 1 1 
per cent in February; 13 per cent in March) contained denials of 
the war guilt of all the German people or pointed out the guilt 
of specific segments of the population, such as Hitler or the SS. 
About half that number (six per cent in February; seven per 
cent in March) criticized the denazification program. In March, 
there was a sharp increase in mail containing references to the 
reconstruction of Germany (eight per cent in February; 17 per 
cent in March). About a tenth (11 per cent in February; nine 
per cent in March) of the letters requested information about 
leaving Germany. 

The letters contained very few critical remarks. Such 
criticism as there was concerned the commentators, the time at 
which broadcasts took place, and a dishke for the jazz music 
broadcast. The commentators remained the most popular 
feature mentioned in this period. Second most popular were 
discussions and speeches. About two per cent requested more 
material about hfe in the United States or reported liking VOA 
for its presentation of various aspects of American life. 



Report No. 14A (8 July 1946) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EXPULSION OF 
GERMAN NATIONALS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 

Sample: 964 persons in the American Zone (nine per cent 
of whom identified themselves as evacuees). 
Interviewing dates: 1 1 March 1946. (16 pp.) 

Although 60 per cent of the evacuees expected to get along 
with the resident German population, only 50 per cent of 
the resident population had a similar expectation. Even this 
group made reservations. For example, the resident Germans 
thought that the evacuees would get along if they were decent, 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 91 



or if they did their part and cooperated. A quarter (25%) of 
both the evacuees and the resident Germans did not expect to 
get along. More members of the higher social classes had met 
with evacuees than had members of the lower social classes. 
More former NSDAP members (48%) had developed conversa- 
tional contacts with evacuees than nonmembers of the Party 
(32%). 

The population of the American Zone was basically 
unaware of the mass migrational character of the movement of 
evacuees. Only 34 per cent thought that at least one million 
evacuees would come to the American Zone, and 42 per cent 
were unable to suggest any number at all. 

Most people projected responsibility for the move upon 
groups other than the general German population. One-half 
(51%) blamed the Allies for a policy of hatred and revenge; 29 
per cent blamed the Nazis and their misdeeds; and 25 per cent 
of those questioned were unable to judge who or what was 
responsible for the evacuations. More people (48%) felt the 
Allies should be held fully, or at least partly, responsible for the 
care of the evacuees than accepted the problem as a responsi- 
bility of the German nation or communities (40%). Almost half 
(46%) of the residents of Hesse were ready to accept the 
responsibihty for the evacuees themselves. In the other two 
Laender, there were more who wanted to escape the responsi- 
bihty (45%) than were willing to accept it (37%). In general, 
Protestants, the better educated, former NSDAP members, the 
higher social classes, and residents of the largest cities demon- 
strated a greater sense of responsibihty for the evacuees. There 
was greatest resistance to German efforts to care for evacuees in 
cities of between 100,000 and 250,000 population. Four-fifths 
(81%) were ready to give economic equality to the evacuees, 
but only 74 per cent were willing to give political equality. 
Primary opposition to giving pohtical equality stemmed from 
supporters of the CSU. A sohd majority of all those questioned 
despaired of finding a solution for the lack of food (71%) and 
housing (64%), but only a third (35%) thought the matter of 
jobs to be insoluble. 



92 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



A large majority (72%) felt that the evacuations were not 
justified. Those most likely to support the policy (14 per cent 
of the whole population) were SPD supporters (18%), irregular 
churchgoers (18%), nonmembers of the NSDAP (16%), the 
lower classes (17%), residents of the larger cities (25%), and 
inhabitants of Hesse (19%). 



Report No. 15 (27 July 1946) 



RELATIVE EFFECTS OF FOOD SCARCITY 
IN TWO COUNTRIES 

Sample: a representative sample of 992 (March), 1 ,5 1 5 
(April), and 1 ,698 (May) adults in the American Zone and, 
in May only, in the American Sector of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: 15 March 1946; 15 April 1946; and 8 
May 1946. (3 pp.) 

In the American Zone, 61 per cent of the respondents stated 
in March 1946 that they were not getting enough food to 
be able to work efficiently. There was a cut in rations which 
took effect in AMZON on 1 April 1946. After this cut, 72 per 
cent of the population reported insufficient food. In May 1946, 
70 per cent reported insufficient food. Eighty-eight per cent of 
the Berhn respondents, questioned for the first time in May, 
reported food scarcity. Within the American Zone, an even 
larger percentage (93%) of the residents of towns between 
100,000 and 250,000 reported such hardship. Eighty-five per 
cent complained of scarcity in towns between 50,000 and 
100,000 population and in the large cities of Frankfurt, 
Stuttgart, and Munich. The percentage reporting scarcity 
dechned to 75 per cent in communities from 2,000 to 50,000 
and to 60 per cent in villages under 2,000 population. 

In England, a survey in late November 1945 and another in 
March 1946 produced identical results: Exactly half the people 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 93 



questioned said that they felt they were not getting enough 
food to be able to work efficiently; and almost as many (47%) 
said that they were procuring sufficient food. 



Report No. 16 (7 August 1946) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 

Sample: summary of eight surveys, with sample sizes rang- 
ing from 331 in November 1945 to 2,969 in August 1946. 
Interviewing dates: not specified; relevant surveys from 26 
October 1945 to 9 August 1946. (6 pp.) 



The results of a survey shortly after the International Military 
Tribunal convened in November 1945 revealed that, in the 
intervening few weeks, 65 per cent of the German people had 
learned something from the proceedings. In later polls the 
percentage of people having gained some information rose to 87 
per cent. When asked at the time of the survey what they had 
learned, 29 per cent reported first learning about the concentra- 
tion camps. At the time of the second survey, 57 per cent 
reported first learning of the concentration camps. In this 
second survey, 30 per cent of the respondents said they first 
learned of the annihilation of the Jews from the Trials. No one 
on the first survey reported having gained this knowledge. 

The number of respondents beUeving that the Nazis would 
receive a fair trial never dropped below 75 per cent. The average 
for the eight surveys showed the belief by 80 per cent that the 
Nazi leaders would receive a fair trial; four per cent thought 
that the trial would not be fair, and 16 per cent held no 
opinion. 

A majority of the population felt that the war leaders on 
trial were guilty. Seventy per cent thought all to be guilty. 
Among the nine per cent who named someone they considered 



94 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



to be not guilty, Hess was mentioned most frequently. Sixty per 
cent of the respondents felt that the indictment of whole 
organizations — such as the Reich Cabinet, the leadership corps 
of the Nazi Party, the SS, the SA, the Gestapo, and the General 
Staff and High Command of the Army - was justified. A 
quarter (25%) saw no justification for such an indictment. 

Nearly half the respondents believed that the accused 
would receive the death sentence. The sampled group split 
sharply on the question of whether all defendants would receive 
the same punishment. Over a third (37%) thought that they 
would; and nearly all of these thought that the punishment would 
be death. Almost half (46%) felt that the punishment would vary 
according to the individual defendant. 

Seventy per cent thought that there were others guilty of 
war crimes in addition to the 21 then on trial. Respondents 
most frequently named Nazi Party members and lesser leaders 
as being guilty. Almost 60 per cent felt that those guilty should 
be charged after the Nuremberg Trials, but a similar percentage 
did not know which of these groups would be charged. And 
although they expected further trials to be held at the 
conclusion of the trial of the 21 major defendants, 82 per cent 
of the people did not know that the political leaders then in 
prison camps were expected to be tried. 

The series of surveys showed that a majority of the readers 
found newspaper reports of the Trials to be complete and 
trustworthy. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 95 



Report No. 17 (8 August 1946) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP IN GERMANY COMPARED WITH 
ATTITUDES IN SEVEN OTHER COUNTRIES 

Sample: 1 ,5 1 5 residents of the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (5 pp.) 



A solid majority (58%) thought that the United States would 
chiefly influence world history in the coming decade. About 
one in 20 more (60%) was ready to assume that the United 
States and Britain would act together as one power. Only about 
one in ten AMZON Germans (11%) looked to the Soviet Union 
as the most important country in the ten years to come, but a 
small group (6%) could not distinguish between the relative 
strengths of the United States and Russia. Only a very tiny 
proportion (2%) held that Britain was the country which would 
influence future world decisions. About one in seven respon- 
dents (15%) was unable to express a judgment on this matter. 

The reasons given in support of the replies emphasized the 
fundamental distinction made by Germans when they thought 
of the future reorganization of their own country under the 
direction of the Allies. Practically half of those thinking that 
America would dominate the world scene, for instance, held 
that its great economic strength, rich resources, and great stocks 
of food would place America in the supreme position. About 
one in five thought that its political ideology and leadership 
directed toward peaceful ends would carry America forward in 
a dominant role. Only about one in seven referred to the 
military might of the United States - its army and navy, and 
the atomic bomb. 

By way of contrast, nearly six in ten of those who thought 
that the Soviet Union would occupy the leadership position 
referred to the revolutionary drive of Bolshevism. Another one 
in seven spoke respectfully about the ideological leadership and 



96 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



need for peace which would determine Soviet behavior in the 
future. 

Britain's force, said most people who chose this nation, lay 
in her political strength. Some also mentioned Britain's naval 
and military power as well as the overseas economic resources 
of the British Empire. 

The rankings by eight countries seeing the United States 
exerting future leadership were: the United States (63%), 
AMZON Germany (58%), Austria (50%), Sweden (50%), Great 
Britain (48%), France (43%), Canada (36%), and Denmark 
(21%). The rank orders for countries envisioning future Soviet 
leadership were: France (41%), Great Britain (31%), Austria 
(26%), the United States (24%), Canada (24%), Sweden (21%), 
Denmark (19%), and AMZON Germany (11%). Only Austrians 
and Canadians (19%) saw the future importance of Britain to be 
high, followed by the British (14%), Danes (9%), Swedes (8%), 
Americans (5%), French (4%), and AMZON Germans (2%). 



Report No. 18(14 August 1946) 



A STUDY OF FOOD CONSUMPTION AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARD RATIONING AND GENERAL HEALTH OF THE 
GERMAN POPULATION 

Sample: 1,698 interviews (1,504 in the American Zone 

and 194 in the British and American Sectors of Berhn) 

plus 526 additional cases to build up the sample to permit 

more detailed breakdowns, making a total of 2,224 

respondents. 

Interviewing dates: 8 May 1946. (53 pp.) 

Two-fifths (41%) of the AMZON respondents and a fifth (22%) 
of the Berhners beheved that food rations were largest in the 
American Zone; 29 per cent of the AMZON Germans and 16 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 97 



per cent of the Berliners felt rations to be largest in the British 
Zone. A fifth (22%) of the AMZON sample and a third (32%) of 
the Berliners saw residents of the Soviet Zone getting the 
smallest rations. Almost nine in ten (89%) of the respondents in 
the American Zone, but only 37 per cent of the Berliners, said 
that the food rationcard system was fair. Respondents in Berhn 
aimed their complaints about the rationcard system at those 
who they thought obtained more food than they deserved 
rather than at actual food shortages. Respondents in both 
AMZON (41%) and Berlin (31%) nonetheless blamed an actual 
shortage of food for the food reduction of 1 April 1946. A 
majority of the Berliners (61%) but only a minority of the 
AMZON residents (37%) felt that the food situation would 
improve. More generally, not a single BerUner and only 12 per 
cent of the AMZON respondents indicated satisfaction with the 
food ration, although 21 per cent in Berlin and 24 per cent in 
the American Zone reported that their rations were adequate. 

AMZON residents, on the whole, ate much better than did 
BerUners. Bread and potatoes led the hst of foods eaten in the 
American Zone in the 24 hours immediately preceding the 
interview, while most Berliners had had cereal and bread. 
Greater food scarcity in Berlin was demonstrated by the fact 
that Berhners (25%) received substitutes for unavailable ra- 
tioned food items more frequently than did residents of 
AMZON (12%), whereas more of the latter (25%) than of the 
Berliners (5%) had received special food rations in the week 
preceding the interview. 

To supplement their food ration, 40 per cent of the 
AMZON respondents had homemade preserves as did only 1 1 
per cent of the Berhn respondents. Over half (53%) of the 
Berlin respondents and 21 per cent of those in AMZON said 
that they were able to obtain food in addition to the rationed 
items purchased at the store. In Berhn, 15 per cent said they 
obtained their supplementary food on the black market. The 
median interval at which both Berhners and residents of 
AMZON obtained supplementary food is, for the majority, one 
meal for one person per week. About a sixth (18 per cent in 



98 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



AMZON; 15 per cent in Berlin) went to the country to obtain 
supplemental food. Only 1 1 per cent of the AMZON and 12 per 
cent of the Berliners ate in restaurants. Eight per cent in 
AMZON and ten per cent in Berlin indicated that they gave 
food away, most often to members of the immediate family or 
relatives. Considering all additional sources, 80 per cent of those 
interviewed in the American Zone and 90 per cent of the Berhn 
sample were able to obtain some food in addition to the 
authorized ration. 

Every respondent interviewed in Berlin said that a black 
market existed in that city. In the American Zone, 43 per cent 
of the respondents reported the existence of a black market in 
their community, 29 per cent said that there was no black 
market in their community, and 28 per cent did not know 
whether or not a black market existed. Substantial majorities 
(56 per cent in AMZON, 82 per cent in Berlin) blamed the 
black market for shortages in food, clothing, shoes, and tobacco 
as well as other items. Even larger majorities (67 per cent in 
AMZON; 91 per cent in Berlin) believed that the black market 
exerted an unfavorable influence on economic conditions. The 
respondents directed their complaints particularly at farmers 
who, they felt, were keeping their produce from the open 
market. Over three in five (63 per cent in AMZON; 62 per cent 
in Berlin) perceived the authorities to be doing everything 
possible to eliminate the black market. 

Regarding general health, 66 per cent of the AMZON 
respondents and 76 per cent of the Berlin respondents reported 
having lost weight between January 1946 and the time of the 
interview. In the American Zone, the median number of 
kilograms lost was four to five; in Berlin, six to ten. Seven- 
tenths (71%) of the AMZON respondents and 88 per cent of the 
Berhners said that they did not get enough food to work 
efficiently. Over a quarter (30 per cent in AMZON; 26 per cent 
in Berlin) had suffered at least one cold in the month prior to 
the time of the interview. 

Regarding prospective supplementary food sources, 50 per 
cent of the AMZON and 3 1 per cent of the Berhn respondents 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 99 



expected to make preserves during the coming summer. Sixty 
per cent in AMZON and 24 per cent in Berlin planned to have a 
garden that summer. Most respondents (92 per cent in AMZON; 
91 per cent in Berhn) did not expect to receive food parcels 
from friends or relatives outside Germany. 



Report No. 19 (19 August 1946) 



BASIC ATTITUDES EXPLORED BY THE 
"GERMAN ATTITUDE SCALE" 

Sample: 1,470 persons in the American Zone, 182 in the 
American Sector of Berhn, 295 youths aged 17 to 27 in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden, 84 political prisoners to be detained 
in camp, 95 political prisoners to be released, and 214 
Marburg University students. 
Interviewing dates: not specified. (55 pp.) 

The questionnaire used in this survey comprised eight sets of 
questions (with a total of 110 items), each of which probed 
attitudes in a generally defined area. Eleven scales focused on: 
family, women, and children; ethics and justice (social responsi- 
bihty); anti-Semitism; projection of guilt; future of Germany 
(supervised responsibility); flattery (questions to which respon- 
dents could give answers flattering to the occupation powers; 
replies providing a test of the sincerity of the individual's 
responses); war and mihtarism; and four aspects of government, 
democracy, authority — the necessity of pohtical information 
and interest, independent thinking as a value, the falhbihty of 
leadership, and independence and rights of others. 

On the average, about three in ten AMZON Germans 
replied in the democratic direction on all eleven scales. An 
additional third answered in a democratic direction on all but 



100 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



one question within each scale. Those most likely to give 
democratic responses were Hessians, residents of cities over 
100,000 in population, those with more than 12 years of 
schooUng, those between 50 and 59 years of age, men, married 
persons, SPD supporters, those who had a professional occupa- 
tion, middle income groups, pohtical prisoners, and the Marburg 
students. Those who were usually undemocratic were residents 
of towns under 10,000 in population, those with less than seven 
years of schooUng, those who had a former member of the 
NSDAP in the family, those under the age of 20, women, the 
widowed, those with no party preference, farmers, low income 
groups, and youth in Wuerttemberg-Baden. 



Report No. 20 (27 August 1946) 



PRELIMINARY STUDY OF MOTION PICTURE 
ATTENDANCE AND ATTITUDES 

Sample: in the American Zone, 331 respondents in 
November 1945, 414 in December, 964 and 993 in 
January 1946, and 985 in February 1946. 
Interviewing dates: 19 November 1945, 1 December 1945, 
21 January 1946, 31 January 1946, 21 February 1946. 
(28 pp.) 

In the period covered by this series of surveys, between 23 
and 45 per cent of the respondents reported attending the 
movies. When asked in February 1946 how often they had been 
to the movies since the beginning of the occupation, most 
(17%) had been to the movies from one to five times. Most 
(16%) walked to the movies. The respondents who did not 
attend the movies were also asked in February what their 
reasons were: Most (26%) said that there were no movies in 
their town; 20 per cent indicated that they had no time; and 13 
per cent had no interest in the movies. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 101 



Of the 23 per cent who attended movies at the time of the 
February 1946 survey, about half (12%) felt that the films were 
good or very good. Seven per cent gave answers ranging from 
"all right" to "awful." Among moviegoers in the February 
survey, 94 per cent stated they would like to see an old German 
film again, as did 55 per cent of the nonmoviegoers. The two 
main reasons for wanting to see an old German film were: a 
preference for films emphasizing things German, that is, 
German films made more sense, were more beautiful, or were 
more personal; and because of the language, and particularly a 
dislike of subtitles. 

Of the 23 per cent who went to the movies at the time of 
the February 1946 survey, 18 per cent had seen the newsreel Die 
Welt im Film {The World in Film). Most (11%) thought the 
newsreel good, all right, or interesting. Most (10%) gave as the 
main reason for liking the film the fact that it brought news 
from the outside. 

Only 12 per cent of the 31 January 1946 respondents in 
Bavaria (less than one third of the moviegoers in this Land) had 
seen the concentration camp film Todesmuehlen {Mills of 
Death). Nineteen per cent of all Bavarians interviewed (70 per 
cent of the Bavarian moviegoers who had not seen the film) said 
they would not have been deterred from going to the movies if 
they had known ahead of time that a concentration camp film 
was to be shown. Twelve per cent in Bavaria would not go to 
the movies if they knew that such a film was being shown. Most 
of those who saw the film (11%) thought the film an accurate 
account of conditions in concentration camps; and most (9%) 
said they had learned something from the film. 

Of the American films seen by Germans, they liked 
Madame Curie best and Todesmuehlen least. The old German 
film which respondents would most like to see again was Die 
Goldene Stadt {The Golden City). 



102 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 21 (25 September 1946) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD LICENSED NEWSPAPERS IN SOME 
AMERICAN OCCUPIED AREAS 

Sample: 8,029 adults in the American Zone and West Ber- 
lin. 
Interviewing dates: last three weeks of June 1946. (13 pp.) 

This survey examined the attitudes toward 33 American-licensed 
newspapers on the part of residents in the cities where the 
newspapers were published; appendices appear in Report No. 
34 of 28 December 1946. 

The more education a person had, the more likely he was 
to read newspapers: In Bavaria, 27 per cent of those with less 
than seven years of schooling said that they did not read papers 
and 1 5 per cent of this group in Wuerttemberg-Baden were in 
the same category; only four per cent of those with 12 or more 
years of schooling, however, said that they did not read 
newspapers. Very few men (5%) did not do so, whereas nearly 
three times as many women did not. Those able to name a 
political party that they preferred were more likely to read 
newspapers than were those who could not choose a party. 
Those under 20 and those over 70 had the least number of 
readers in their ranks, although in Hesse it was only the very old 
who were nonreaders; Hessians under the age of 20 claimed to 
read papers as frequently as their parents. 

An average of 49 per cent felt that their local paper was 
either "very good" or "good." Greatest dissatisfaction was 
shown by the residents of Hesse, usually a fairly critical 
population on any issue. There was only a slight positive 
correlation between disapproval of the German press and the 
feeling that it was hampered by American censorship. There was 
some indication that dissatisfaction rested upon the fact that 
the newspapers did not contain all that the readers were 
interested in, although many indicated recognition of shortages 
in newsprint, equipment, and personnel. The tetrachoric cor- 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 103 



relations between proportions liking the paper and approving of 
the local government administration showed a positive coef- 
ficient in every instance except West Berlin and Fulda, which 
showed no relationship between the two variables. In Bavaria 
there was a strong relationship between the charges that a paper 
propagandized and that it gave preference to a pohtical party; 
this tendency was less strong in the other two Laender. 

A large majority (77%) of newspaper readers preferred 
papers with no political party domination. Bavarian feeUngs 
were above average on this issue, with 80 per cent saying that 
they were opposed to party papers; these data may have 
reflected the overrepresentation of SPD editors in Bavaria, 
considering the relative strength of this party in the Land. 

Based on a weighted scale of replies to questions con- 
cerning news coverage, the combined sources of all readers in 
AMZON suggested that 34 per cent rated their own paper as 
"good," 27 per cent rated it "fair," 21 per cent rated it "poor," 
and about the same proportion (18%) rated it "very good." 



Report No. 22 (25 September 1946) 



A STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION 
OF GERMANY 

Sample: 1,192 interviews - 993 in the American Zone 
and 199 in the American Sector of Berhn. 
Interviewing dates: first half of April 1946. (57 pp.) 



Of those who could estimate how long the Americans would 
continue to occupy Germany (62 per cent in AMZON; 90 per 
cent in Berhn), the majority (37 per cent in AMZON; 55 per 
cent in Berlin) expected it to last ten years or more. Most 
respondents (22 per cent in AMZON; 26 per cent in Berlin) 



104 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



estimated that the reconstruction of Germany would take from 
20 to 30 years; an almost equally large number (20 per cent in 
AMZON; 22 per cent in Berlin) thought that it would take 50 
years or more. The bulk (72%) of the West Berlin respondents 
reported that the reconstruction in the American Zone had 
gone more quickly than they had expected. Respondents in the 
American Zone were divided; 41 per cent said that reconstruc- 
tion had gone more quickly than they had expected as opposed 
to 40 per cent who thought that it had gone more slowly. The 
majority of respondents in both the American Zone and Berlin 
(56 and 73 per cent, respectively) were optimistic about the 
possibility of reconstruction being accomplished with some 
degree of speed and energy. Two-fifths (42%) of the AMZON 
respondents and a third (34%) in Berlin had heard disturbing 
rumors: Disturbing them most (34 per cent in AMZON; 20 per 
cent in Berlin) was the rumor that there would be another war. 

Seventy per cent of the AMZON respondents and 83 per 
cent of the Berlin respondents believed that reconstruction 
could best be accomplished through "hard work." Most (56 per 
cent in AMZON; 62 per cent in Berlin) saw the greatest 
handicap to reconstruction to be the lack of building and raw 
materials. Over a third (35%) of the respondents in the American 
Zone and 42 per cent in Berhn thought the SPD to be the party 
best able to carry out the reconstruction of Germany. 

Most respondents (60 per cent in AMZON; 90 per cent in 
Berhn) thought that the Americans had furthered the recovery 
and reconstruction of Germany. Over six in ten (63%) of the 
respondents in Berhn said that the main way in which the 
Americans had helped the recovery of Germany was by bringing 
in food and improving food conditions. AMZON respondents 
were more likely to stress American interest and aid in general 
(23%) than food (1 1%). About half (49 per cent in AMZON; 55 
per cent in Berhn), looking toward the future, said that the 
Americans could help Germany most by bringing in food; large 
numbers of respondents (49 per cent in AMZON; 47 per cent in 
Berlin) also mentioned supplying materials and equipment. 

Most respondents in both the American Zone and Berhn 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 105 



(48 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively) did not expect the 
four occupying powers to cooperate successfully in the recon- 
struction of Germany. A quarter (24%) of the AMZON 
residents and almost twice as many Berliners (44%) perceived 
the Soviet Union as uncooperative; 13 per cent in the American 
Zone and five per cent in Berhn mentioned both the Soviet 
Union and France. Around two-thirds (59 per cent in AMZON; 
70 per cent in Berlin) did not feel that occupation by foreign 
powers was a national humiliation for Germany. Whereas 60 per 
cent of the respondents in the American Zone and 77 per cent 
in Berhn felt it was just that the Alhes first help the Allied 
nations, an appreciable minority (25 per cent in AMZON; 20 
per cent in Berhn) thought Germany should be aided first. 

Three-quarters (74%) of the AMZON respondents and 70 
per cent in Berlin denied that all Germans were responsible for 
the war. Most (56 per cent in AMZON; 59 per cent in Berlin) 
said that the Nazi regime had begun the war and hence had to 
bear the responsibihty for it. As many as 41 per cent of the 
respondents in the American Zone and 47 per cent in Berlin 
denied their own guilt by such statements as "We couldn't do 
anything about it; The httle people had no say; What could we 
do; The leaders are the guilty ones." A majority (53 per cent in 
AMZON; 65 per cent in Berlin) did not think that the individual 
should always obey without question the orders of his state; 
many (40 per cent in AMZON; 35 per cent in Berlin), however, 
did approve of such obedience. 

Roughly half (55 per cent in AMZON; 44 per cent in 
Berlin) felt that National Socialism was a good idea badly 
carried out. Almost all (87 per cent in AMZON; 91 per cent in 
Berlin) indicated that they stopped trusting Hitler by the end of 
the war; most of these (35 per cent in AMZON; 51 per cent in 
Berlin) reported never having had any faith in Hitler. Over a 
third (36%) of AMZON residents and 28 per cent of the 
Berhners reported having accepted the prewar view that 
territories with considerable German minorities should be 
reincorporated into Germany. A minority (14 per cent in 
AMZON; three per cent in Berlin) coninued to agree with the 



106 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



prewar statement that international Jewry alone would profit 
from the war. About an eighth (14 per cent in AMZON; 12 per 
cent in Berlin) still felt the Nordic race to be superior to all 
others. 



Report No. 23 (22 October 1946) 



THE VIENNESE NEWSPAPERS: AN OPINION 
RESEARCH STUDY 

Sample: about 500 persons in the American Sector of 

Vienna. 

Interviewing dates: first days of September 1946. (16 pp.) 

The poll showed that Vienna was very largely (85%) a Cathohc 
city. It was also a two party community, with the SPOe 
{Sozialistische Partei Oesteneichs) and the OeVP {Oester- 
reichische Volkspartei) amassing the support of a very large 
proportion (93%) of voters with stated preferences. 

More than nine in ten (92%) Viennese living in the 
American Sector reported reading newspapers, with readership 
being broadly defined as having read at least one paper during 
the previous two weeks. The most widely read paper was the 
United States sponsored Wiener Kurier (13%) and a solid 
majority (60%) also liked it best of all the available newspapers. 
Only 42 per cent of the readers of Neues Oesterreich liked that 
paper the best, and only the Weltpresse approached the Wiener 
Kurier in popularity. Among the five most popular newspapers, 
no paper was strongly disliked by an appreciable proportion of 
the population. 

There were no significant differences between those who 
thought National Socialism a bad idea and those who thought it 
a good idea badly carried out in relation to their preference for 
the Wiener Kurier. As for group differences, Protestants were 
slightly more apt to like it than Cathohcs, there were no age 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 107 



differentiations, and, as might be expected, laborers and 
apprentices preferred the Arbeiter Zeitung; there was Uttle 
distinction to be made along social class lines, again suggesting 
its broad general appeal. 

In a multiple factor rating scale designed to show readers' 
opinions on coverage of 1 1 different types of news items in the 
five most popular newspapers, it became clear that the Wiener 
Kurier was publicly recognized as emphasizing news about the 
Americans and the United States rather than the new responsi- 
bilities of the Austrians. According to the same scale, the 
Weltpresse satisfied its readers, more than others satisfied theirs, 
in the coverage given foreign affairs. 



Report No. 24 (22 October 1946) 



MANNHEIM ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGRO TROOPS 

Sample: 226 Mannheim adults (over 18 years of age). 
Interviewing dates: 27 September 1946. (7 pp.) 

Nearly two-thirds (64%) of the respondents reported having no 
personal relations with American soldiers. A fifth (20%) 
reported some relationship with white soldiers, eight per cent 
with Negro soldiers, and eight per cent with both. Although 
eight per cent said that they or some member of their family 
had had a pleasant experience with a Negro, 13 per cent 
reported an unpleasant experience; and a few (2%) told of both 
pleasant and unpleasant experiences. When asked about the 
behavior of Negro soldiers, a substantial number (36%) said that 
the Negroes were friendlier toward the German populace than 
white troops and only 16 per cent said they were less friendly. 
Most respondents (45%) reported that they were definitely 
not afraid of the Negroes in Mannheim, as opposed to 15 per 
cent who expressed fears. When asked if the Negroes were 
inferior to the white race, 38 per cent of those who responded 



108 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



positively were also afraid of the Negroes, whereas only 21 per 
cent of those who answered negatively were afraid of them. 

The bulk (70%) of the respondents felt that the conduct of 
the Negro had been good. Of these, however, almost half (33 
per cent of the total sample) noted exceptions; and an 
additional 17 per cent of the sample thought the Negroes' 
behavior to be improper. As many as four in five of those 
noting exceptions or improper behavior could point to specific 
examples: The most common complaints were murder, rape, 
mistreatment of citizens, mishandling women and girls (24%); 
and drunken irresponsibihty (13%). More young people under 
30 (68%) reported the behavior of Negroes not always decent 
than did those over 30 (46%). 



Report No. 25 (8 November 1946) 



GERMAN KNOWLEDGE ABOUT AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARD INFLATION 

Sample: summaries of six surveys from 14 January to 7 
June 1946; in the American Zone, 972 respondents in 
January, 954 in February, 991 in March, 1,501 in April, 
1,504 in May, and 1,486 in June; in West Berlin, 199 in 
April, 194 in May, and 196 in June. 

Interviewing dates: 14 January, 14 February, 1 March, 5 
April, 8 May, and 7 June 1946. (47 pp.) 

In AMZON, the percentage believing prices would go up 
increased from 30 per cent in January 1946 to 56 per cent in 
February, dropped to 40 per cent in May, and increased to 50 
per cent in June. In Berlin, 25 per cent in both May and June 
1946 felt that prices would go up; and 27 per cent in May and 
41 per cent in June thought that prices would go down. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 109 



Only in April did a majority (54%) of AMZON respon- 
dents think that the Reichsmark would be worth as much in six 
months as it was at the time of the interview. In Berlin, 
however, a substantial majority in each survey (75 per cent in 
April, 58 per cent in May, 63 per cent in June) expected no 
such inflation. 

In June, only 27 per cent of the AMZON respondents were 
able to select the correct statement, given a choice of three, 
defining the cause of inflation; even fewer in Berlin (14%) 
selected the correct statement. In June, 36 per cent in the 
American Zone and 41 per cent in Berlin believed there was a 
possibility of inflation. At that time 85 per cent of the 
respondents in the American Zone and 93 per cent in Berhn 
said that the American and German authorities really wanted to 
prevent inflation, and 79 per cent in the American Zone and 94 
per cent in Berlin thought them able to do so. A substantial 
majority (54 per cent in AMZON; 72 per cent in Berlin) 
indicated that the MiHtary Government and the Civil Adminis- 
tration were in the position to keep prices stable. An even 
greater majority (82 per cent in AMZON; 91 per cent in Berlin) 
was confident that the Military and Civil Governments would 
actually do their best to hold prices at the existing level. 



110/ PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 26 (13 November 1946) 



INFORMATION ABOUT THE LAND CONSTITUTIONS AND 
THE INTENTION TO VOTE IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS 

Sample: 2,987 persons in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: first two weeks in September 1946. (6 
PP-) 

Only 19 per cent of the respondents knew that a Landtag 
election or a constitutional vote was to be held late in the fall. 
About a quarter (22%) knew that constitutional assemblies were 
meeting at the time of the interview; and not many more (27%) 
knew what the task of the constitutional assemblies was. 
Among respondents who reported an interest in poUtics, 50 per 
cent could state what the purpose of the coming elections was. 
Of those who expected to vote in the coming elections, 28 per 
cent were aware of the purpose of the election, whereas among 
those who did not expect to vote, only 18 per cent knew their 
purpose. 

Almost eight in ten (78%) of the general population 
expected to vote in the coming elections, including 86 per cent 
of those who expressed an interest in pohtics. The highest 
percentage of those expecting to vote were those with no 
association with the NSDAP, either through personal member- 
ship or membership in the family (82%); seven or less years of 
education (83%); upper socioeconomic status (84%); and those 
belonging to a political party (97%). The KPD had the highest 
percentage of expected voters (89%), followed by the CSU 
(88%), CDU (87%), LDP (86%), and SPD (85%). Place of 
residence seemed to have slight effect on expectations of voting. 
Sex did not make a significant difference in voting expectations, 
except that incapacitated women (73%) were less likely to 
express an expectation to vote than were women capable of 
working (78%). 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS /111 



Report No. 27 (13 November 1946) 



GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN GERMANY: 
FREQUENCIES OF GROUP CONTACTS 

Sample: 2,987 persons in the American Zone; 404 persons 
in the American and British Sectors of Berhn. 
Interviewing dates: first two weeks in September 1946. (8 

pp.) 

Two-thirds (66%) in the American Zone had no relations 
with the American forces. A fifth (20%) reported having talked 
with an American and 14 per cent had come to know an 
American "well" or "fairly well." In West Berlin, 80 per cent 
had no relationship, 13 per cent said they had talked with an 
American, and seven per cent claimed a closer relationship. 
Persons most likely to have had contacts with American soldiers 
were professionals (66%), LDP supporters (48%), those having a 
telephone (47%), former NSDAP members (45%), those ex- 
pressing an interest in pohtics (45%), and former soldiers (44%). 

Perhaps the most important variable determining interac- 
tion between Germans and Americans was socioeconomic 
status. The higher the socioeconomic status of the respondent, 
the greater the likeUhood that he had established a relationship 
with an American. Over half (55%) of upper-class respondents 
had contacts with Americans, as did only 1 5 per cent of those 
living on government relief. Over half (54%) of those with 1 2 or 
more years of education had contacts with an American, as did 
only 29 per cent of those with seven or less years of education. 
Professionals (66%), businessmen (46%), and white-collar workers 
(52%) were more likely to have contacts with Americans than 
were other occupational groups. 

More men (42%) than women (32%) had developed some 
relationship with an American. The younger people were more 
likely to have had contact with an American: Almost three men 
in five (59%) under 20 had contact with an American - a 
percentage that decreased steadily with age. Women showed the 
same basic pattern, except that among the youngest women 



112 /PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



(those 20 or less) 30 per cent had contact with an American 
whereas 43 per cent of women in their twenties had such 
contact. 

Rural-urban and regional differences probably indicated 
the distribution of troops, as well as variant activity by area. 
Hessians reported the most contacts (42%), followed by 
Bavarians (36%), and residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden (28%). 
Residents in small and medium-sized towns had a greater level 
of contacts than did residents of larger towns. 

The difference between churchgoing and nonchurchgoing 
persons was far greater than the difference between Cathohcs 
and Protestants. A third (34%) of regular churchgoing Catholics 
and 29 per cent of regular churchgoing Protestants reported 
contacts with Americans; 41 per cent of Catholics and 38 per 
cent of Protestants who were not regular churchgoers reported 
such relationships. 



Report No. 28 (14 November 1946) 



AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE ANY 
CHANGES IN ATTITUDES OF NATIVE GERMANS 
TOWARD THE EXPELLEES IN WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN 

Sample: 624 persons (8.5 per cent of whom had lived in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden for less than one year, 9.5 per cent 
for a period not exceeding four years, 82 per cent for more 
than five years). 
Interviewing dates: 13 September 1946. (10 pp.) 

From the point of view of the expellees, there was a decrease 
from 75 per cent in March 1946 to 60 per cent in September in 
the number expressing satisfaction with their reception in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden (Cf. Report No. 14A of 8 July 1946). 
Two-fifths of those who were dissatisfied with their reception 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 113 



Stated that, instead of regarding them as Germans, the natives 
considered them to be human beings of inferior value, 
foreigners, or even beggars. As many as seven in ten expressed a 
desire to return to their original homes. Asked about the 
greatest problem that they had faced since coming to the 
American Zone, 35 per cent mentioned housing, 20 per cent the 
lack of work, and another 20 per cent clothing. Asked what 
problems they anticipated in view of the fact that winter was 
approaching, nearly half (43%) mentioned housing, 39 per cent 
clothing and shoes, 31 per cent work, and 24 per cent food. 
(Native residents shared this ranking of problems, with 61 per 
cent pointing to housing, 50 per cent to food and clothing, and 
a smaller percentage to the lack of work.) 

From the point of view of the native residents of 
Wuerttemberg-Baden, opinions on the expellees were divided. 
The population was generally convinced that Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary were not justified in expelling these people (75 per 
cent in March, 84 per cent in September). Indeed, in Septem- 
ber, 28 per cent of the sample considered the expellees to be 
foreigners, as opposed to 49 per cent willing to recognize them 
as German citizens. (Among those with more than eight years of 
education, the share viewing the expellees as foreigners rose to 
42 per cent; and 38 per cent of the middle-class respondents 
held the same view.) Majorities (83 per cent in March, 74 per 
cent in September) were nonetheless willing to grant the 
expellees full participation in politics, although the more highly 
educated and better off citizens were somewhat more incUned 
to limit these rights. Two-fifths (40%) of the 1 7 per cent of the 
total sample who, in September, expressed a desire for 
limitations of the expellees' political rights also indicated that 
the expellees were not Germans and did not think as Germans. 

The residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden were increasingly 
unwilhng to assume responsibiUty for the care of the expellees: 
The number stating that Germans alone should care for them 
dropped from 39 per cent in March to 27 per cent in 
September; those giving responsibihty to the countries which 
expelled them rose from seven to 36 per cent; the number 



114/ PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



mentioning international organizations remained roughly con- 
stant (15 per cent in March, 16 per cent in September); and the 
share mentioning the Americans or the Western Allies, with or 
without a German contribution, dropped from 23 to six per 
cent. Those with the highest level of education were least likely 
to assign responsibility to Germany. Three-quarters of the 
native residents (73%) and five-sixths of the expellees (83%) felt 
that the American authorities were doing all they could to assist 
German officials who were trying to solve the expellee problem. 
Again, the highly educated and those of middle class status or 
above were most incUned to disagree. Almost four in five of the 
natives (78%) felt that the expellees were a burden on the 
financial and economic status of the American Zone — an 
attitude stronger among the well educated and the middle and 
upper classes — as opposed to only 1 3 per cent who saw the 
expellees exerting a favorable influence on the AMZON 
economy. 



Report No. 29 (21 November 1946) 



THE TREND OF CARES AND WORRIES IN GERMANY 

Sample: summary of seven surveys in the American Zone 

between May and October 1946, with sample sizes of 

1,427 in May, 1,485 and 1,524 in June, 1,536 in July, 

2,969 m August, 2,985 in September, and 2,983 in 

October. 

Interviewing dates: 8 May, 7 June, late June, 1 July, 9 

August, early September, and 4 October 1946. (8 pp.) 

Between May 1946 and October 1946 there was a shift toward 
greater material distress among the concerns of the general 
population. The concerns mentioned in May in order of 
frequency were lack of food (34%), anxiety over prisoners of 
war and missing persons (18%), and general insecurity (9%). The 
concerns mentioned in October in order of frequency were lack 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 15 



of food (36%), lack of clothing and shoes (23%), unemploy- 
ment (22%), anxiety over prisoners of war and missing persons 
(15%), housing and furnishing problems (9%), and lack of 
implements of production (7%). 

Comparing the three Laender, residents of Wuerttemberg- 
Baden reported difficulties, particularly regarding food, more 
frequently than did residents of Bavaria or Hesse. Even rural 
areas (under 2,000 population) in Wuerttemberg-Baden re- 
ported greater concern over food than rural areas in Bavaria and 
Hesse, but, in all three Laender, lack of food was mentioned by 
increasing percentages of the population as the size of the 
community increased. More people in smaller villages and towns 
reported lack of clothing and shoes than in larger cities. Worry 
about missing prisoners of war and other missing people was 
centered in the rural areas. Lack of housing and furnishings was 
more widespread in the large cities than in towns and villages. 



Report No. 30 (14 December 1946) 



RADIO LISTENING IN VIENNA 

Sample: 1 ,496 persons living in the British and American 

Sectors of Vienna. 

Interviewing dates: not specified. (16 pp.) 

A large majority of the population (73%) listened to the radio. 
Radio listeners were likely to be men, better educated, younger, 
from upper and middle classes, and from higher occupational 
status positions. 

Among listeners, 46 per cent said radio was their chief 
source of news, as opposed to 51 per cent who cited 
newspapers. More radio listeners (85%) read newspapers than 
did nonlisteners (77%). Although about as many listeners (42%) 
considered radio more accurate than newspapers as believed the 



116/ PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



opposite (43%), a large majority of listeners (67%) felt that 
newspapers gave more complete news. A majority of listeners 
(56%) did not think that radio programs contained too much 
propaganda; a large majority (64%), however, felt that radio was 
censored. The largest percentages of those who felt both that 
radio was censored and contained too much propaganda were 
those with 12 or more years of education (28%) or under 30 
(28%), as well as owners of a radio in good condition (23%). 

The median number of listeners per radio was 2.15. 
Whereas 57 per cent of those with less than seven years of 
schooling and 49 per cent of those in the lower social classes 
listened in groups of one or two other people, only 40 per cent 
of those with college education and 33 per cent of those in the 
upper-middle class listened in groups of this size. Within the 
upper class, listening was an individual function or an activity of 
a rather large group. Larger Ustening groups were found among 
young people. 

Radio listening was well dispersed throughout the week 
days. Sixty per cent of the listening audience listened two or 
more hours a day, and 26 per cent listened from one to two 
hours a day. Those who listened two or more hours were more 
likely to have nine or more years of education (61%), to be 
under 30 (70%), and women (64%). Three-quarters (74%) said 
that they did not restrict their listening to save electricity. 

As many (44%) would like to hear more American 
programs if they could be well received as would not like to 
hear these programs. A majority of those with 1 2 or more years 
of education (59%), of upper-middle (71%) and upper (62%) 
classes, half of those under 30, half of those with nine to 1 1 
years of education, and almost half (48%) of the men, however, 
would like to hear more programs from America. 

A quarter (23%) reported hearing the "Voice of America." 
A majority (60%) of the VOA listeners felt that the program 
offered just the right amount of political news, and 1 7 per cent 
thought it offered too little news. Most (32%) liked best the 
news portion of VOA. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 117 



Report No. 31 (14 December 1946) 



THE STANDARD OF LIVING 

Sample: 1 ,485 persons in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 7 June 1946. (7 pp.) 

Although 36 per cent knew that the four powers had 
announced plans for the allocation of German industry, 53 per 
cent were not aware of it and as many as 1 1 per cent stated that 
there had been no announcement. Seven in ten (71%) stated 
that Germany's industry was being reduced to do away with 
war industries. Close to an absolute majority (49%) felt that the 
limits were more severe than they should be, as opposed to 
seven per cent who thought them not severe enough and 44 per 
cent who expressed no opinion. A substantial number (44%) 
felt that the Allies were not justified in placing these limits on 
German industry, in contrast to 29 per cent who felt the limits 
justified. 

Almost half (45%) of all the respondents and 59 per cent 
of the informed respondents felt that under the new plan the 
German people would have a worse living standard than the 
average European country (excluding England and the Soviet 
Union). Almost half (48%) saw no justification for the 
reduction in standard of living, as opposed to 30 per cent who 
felt it just and 22 per cent who withheld judgment. A quarter 
(26%) of all the respondents (over half of those who felt that 
the reduced living standard was not justified) saw such 
inhumanity to man as a frightful thing. A smaller group, 18 per 
cent of the total number of respondents, felt the reductions 
unfair because they were personally innocent. 

Whereas 64 per cent of those who thought the limitation 
of industry unjust and 61 per cent of those who thought the 
reduction in the standard of living unjust also felt that the 
German civil government was in some way to blame for the 
food situation in Germany, 41 per cent and 46 per cent, 
respectively, saw the German civil government in no way 
responsible for it. Slightly larger percentages - 69 per cent of 



118 /PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



those perceiving unjust industrial limitations and 67 per cent 
perceiving unjust reductions in the standard of living — attached 
some blame to the Military Government for the food situation, 
an appreciable minority (36 and 41 per cent, respectively) did 
not. Half (52%) of both dissatisfied groups felt that National 
Socialism was a good idea but badly carried out. Half (50%) of 
those who felt the limitations just and 44 per cent of those who 
felt the reductions just also saw some truth to the statement 
that the German people were responsible for the war because 
they allowed a government to come to power which intended to 
bring war upon the world. 

When asked about the probable duration of the Allied 
industrial program, 41 per cent could give time estimates: Most 
of these (17%) foresaw a period from four to eleven years, but 
almost as many (15%) expected a shorter duration. Half (53%) 
stated various factors that might influence the duration of the 
plans, of which the most frequently named (16%) was that the 
restrictions would last "until the economic situation is better; 
until work and food for all men are available; until trade is 
reestablished in the world; until the world situation is cleared 
up." As many as 30 per cent of the sample had no idea how 
long the Allied industrial program would remain in effect. 



Report No. 32 (10 December 1946) 



INCOME, EXPENDITURES, AND CURRENCY HOLDINGS 
OF THE GERMAN POPULATION AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARD GENERAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 

Sample: 1,524 respondents in the American Zone, 198 in 

West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 1 July 1946. (70 pp.) 

About three-quarters (69 per cent in AMZON; 74 per cent in 
West BerUn) reported having at least one bank account. In West 
Berhn, however, 63 per cent of the respondents reported their 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 19 



bank accounts to be frozen, as did only .2 per cent in the 
American Zone. Savings accounts outnumbered checking 
accounts by a ratio of almost four to one in the American Zone 
and five to one in West Berlin. Half (53%) of the AMZON 
Germans and eight per cent in West Berlin had at least RM 
1,000 in their checking accounts: The median account holdings 
were RM 2,575 in the American Zone and RM 2,325 in West 
Berlin. Between January and July 1946 there had been a slight 
increase (.3%) in total number of accounts in the American 
Zone and an increase of almost three per cent in Berlin. The 
median holdings, however, decreased in AMZON (from RM 
2,725 to RM 2,575) while rising in West Berlin (from RM 1,700 
to RM 2,325). Those whose accounts decreased generally gave 
living expenses as the reason. 

About three-quarters (78 per cent in AMZON; 72 per cent 
in West Berhn) reported having at least RM 50 cash in addition 
to their funds in bank accounts. The median amount on hand 
was RM 160 in the American Zone and RM 165 in West Berlin. 

The median monthly income from all sources was RM 1 70 
in AMZON (on the basis of reports by 86 per cent of the 
respondents) and RM 251 in West Berhn (with 93 per cent 
reporting). Reported median income rose as the size of the city 
increased - from RM 137 in communities with less than 2,000 
inhabitants to RM 266 in cities with a population of a quarter 
of a million or more. 

The median family expenditure per month was RM 152 in 
the American Zone and RM 267 in West Berlin. Most income 
was spent for food, followed by building repairs, rent, clothing, 
utilities, insurance premiums, and fuel. Median family expend- 
itures increased with city size, from RM 117 in the smallest 
(under 2,000) to RM 220 in the largest (over 250,000). About a 
third (32 per cent in AMZON; 39 per cent in West Berlin) said 
that their family's total income was not high enough to cover 
necessary living expenses; a quarter (23%) of the AMZON 
respondents reported having to make up the difference from 
their savings. 

Only minorities (39 per cent in AMZON; 25 per cent in 



120 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



West Berlin) had life insurance policies. Most of the policy 
holders (34 per cent in AMZON; 18 per cent in West Berhn) had 
their premiums paid up. The median amount for which 
respondents were insured in the American Zone was RM 2,700; 
in West Berlin, RM 1,180. 

Almost all respondents (88 per cent in AMZON; 97 per 
cent in West Berlin) saw the black market influencing the 
economic situation. The bulk (66 per cent in AMZON; 83 per 
cent in West Berlin) held black market dealers responsible for 
the increase in the volume of money in circulation. 

Only minorities of 36 per cent in the American Zone and 
40 per cent in West Berlin felt that a new currency was needed. 
Those who did not see a need for currency reform (52 per cent 
in AMZON; 40 per cent in West Berlin) were questioned about 
freezing bank accounts as a means of reform. Most (28 per cent 
in AMZON; 32 per cent in West Berlin) advocated freezing bank 
accounts over a certain amount, but an appreciable minority (4 
and 10 per cent, respectively) disapproved of such a move. On 
the question of timing most (44 per cent in AMZON; 45 per 
cent in West Berlin) thought that the monetary adjustment 
should take place immediately. 

Most (46%) of the AMZON respondents and a majority 
(51%) in West Berlin would have preferred to have any money 
reserve in the form of goods. Second and third choices in the 
American Zone were bank accounts (29%) and cash (8%), and, 
in West Berlin, cash (25%) and bank accounts (20%). 

Substantial numbers (38 per cent in AMZON; 72 per cent 
in West Berlin) had claims against the former Reich government 
but, of those with such claims, 29 and 43 per cent, respectively, 
expected no compensation. The most frequent claim was for 
war damages and bombing (23 per cent in AMZON; 43 per cent 
in West Berlin), the median of which were RM 4,900 in the 
American Zone and RM 6,300 in West Berlin. (In addition, 39 
per cent of the West Berhners had claims for frozen bank 
accounts, the median being RM 2,700.) Although 40 per cent in 
the American Zone and 8 1 per cent in West Berlin had suffered 
property damage during the war, three and 16 per cent, 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 121 



respectively, wanted no compensation; and only six and eight 
per cent, respectively, felt that they should be compensated for 
all war damage. 

Seven in ten (72%) of the AMZON respondents felt that 
those who had not suffered war losses should be asked to help 
those who had. Almost all respondents (95 per cent in AMZON; 
90 per cent in West Berlin) said that people who had an average 
income during the war or were in a position to save substanti- 
ally should be asked to help those less fortunate. Two-thirds 
(63%) of the AMZON respondents and 43 per cent in West 
Berlin mentioned war casualties as the group which should 
receive such aid, followed by those who were bombed out, 
refugees, expellees, dependents of war casualties, political 
persecutees, and Jews. A quarter (24%) in AMZON and 3 1 per 
cent in West Berhn said all of these groups should receive aid. 



Report No. 33 (18 December 1946) 



THE TREND OF PUBLIC REACTIONS TO THE 
NUREMBERG TRIALS 

Sample: 2,983 respondents in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 4 October 1946. (5 pp.) 

There was a decline in interest in the trials beginning in late 
February 1946 and continuing through March and into April. 
Readership interest in newspaper accounts of the trials 
increased when it was announced in August 1 946 that the trials 
would soon be completed. After the sentencing, public interest 
in the trials was almost as great as when the trials were getting 
under way: Ninety-three per cent of the population claimed to 
have heard what the verdicts were. 

Most people were satisfied that the news reports of the 
trials had been complete and trustworthy. Those who were not 



122 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



satisfied criticized the news for its incompleteness rather than 
for inaccuracy. 

There was widespread feehng that the defendants were 
receiving a fair and orderly trial. When the verdicts were 
announced in October 1946, just as many agreed that the trial 
was fair and orderly as had anticipated a year previously that 
the defendants would receive a fair trial. 

Seven in ten (71%) felt that the current defendants were 
not the only guilty ones. After the verdicts, just as many (43%) 
thought that lesser leaders should be brought to trial as thought 
it was sufficient to have the higher leaders punished. Three in 
four (77%) felt that a heavier burden of guilt for the Hitler 
regime lay on NSDAP officeholders than on those who did not 
hold office. One-third thought pre-1937 Party members carried 
greater guilt for Party actions. Only 18 per cent felt post- 1937 
joiners more blameworthy. One-third held there was no 
difference in degree of guilt between the two groups. 

The bulk of AMZON Germans (92%) rejected the idea of 
collective war guilt. A majority (51%), however, felt that the 
Germans, because of their support of Hitler's government, were 
at least partly responsible for its actions. 

In August 1946 only about half felt all defendants to be 
guilty, whereas in December 1945 and in March 1946, 70 per 
cent had said this. After the sentences were announced, 60 per 
cent reported feeling none of the verdicts to be too harsh. 

Majorities (57 per cent in November 1945, 60 per cent in 
January 1946; and 59 per cent in October 1946) favored the 
indictment of whole organizations, such as the SA, SS, and the 
General Staff. Although a considerable minority opposed 
indicting these organizations, few opposed indicting the Gesta- 
po, the Reich cabinet, and the leadership corps of the NSDAP. 

After the verdicts were announced, when asked what they 
had learned from the trial, 30 per cent pointed out the dangers 
of dictatorship and one-sided politics, and said caution was 
needed in the election of future statesmen. A quarter (25%) said 
that the lesson of the trials was to maintain peace. Only a few 
(6%) spoke in negative terms: that there is no justice, that only 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 123 



Germans get punished, that human rights were violated, that 
pohtics should be avoided. And over a third (34%) gave no 
articulate reply as to the lesson of the trials. Half (50%) said 
they had become more aware of the inhumanity of the 
concentration camps. 



Report No. 34 (28 December 1946) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD LICENSED NEWSPAPERS 
IN SOME AMERICAN OCCUPIED AREAS 

Sample: 8,029 persons. 

Interviewing dates: last three weeks in June 1946. (1 1 pp.) 

This report consists solely of appendices to Report No. 21 of 25 
September 1946. 



Report No. 35 (5 January 1947) 
ATTITUDES OF TRADE UNION MEMBERS 

Sample: 527 members of trade unions in the American 
Zone and British and American Sectors of Berhn. 
Interviewing dates: not specified (c. first two weeks of 
November 1946). (14 pp.) 



This survey is primarily concerned with three groups of trade 
union members: rejoiners, that is, those who had been members 
of unions before 1933 and had since rejoined (37%); new- 
comers, those who did not belong to a trade union before 1 933 
but had recently become members (27%); and abstainers, those 
who were members of a trade union before 1933 but had not 
renewed their membership (36%). The group of newcomers, 
when compared with others, was both younger and better 



124 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



educated, and more likely to be women, Catholics and 
Bavarians. Despite the fact that the newcomers were more 
conservative than the rejoiners, 59 per cent of them favored 
leftist political parties. The newcomers' primary reason for 
joining a union was inducement by fellow workers (48%), 
followed by the desire to obtain better wages and working 
conditions (39%). 

Almost all (94 per cent of the rejoiners; 84 per cent of the 
newcomers; 91 per cent of the abstainers) favored extending the 
base of union activities throughout all of Germany. About 80 
per cent found nothing strongly objectionable to a central 
organization of trade unions in Germany. Most favored broadly 
based vertical unions. Most (69 per cent of the rejoiners; 75 per 
cent of the newcomers; 70 per cent of the abstainers) favored a 
single common union rather than industrial unions. Whereas a 
majority (55%) suggested democratic procedures for settling 
differences of opinion on how a union should be organized, 45 
per cent could not explain or express democratic procedures. 
On only one of three questions — the form of organization 
which is permissible — concerning basic information about union 
rights in Germany did a majority answer correctly (61 per cent 
of the newcomers; 62 per cent of the rejoiners; 44 per cent of 
the abstainers). 

Most (49 per cent of respondents) felt that collective 
bargaining to secure higher wages and better living conditions 
for workers was the most important activity of a trade union. 
Second most important (16%) was preventing rearmament, 
followed closely by securing workers' representation in the 
management of business and industry (15%), and educating 
union members and youth on a democratic basis (14%). A 
majority (58%) thought that the estabhshment of free bargain- 
ing for wages and hours would greatly help the unions. A 
somewhat smaller percentage (33%) stressed the establishment 
by law of certain standards for wages and hours as a means to 
help the unions. 

Only among the rejoiners did a majority (56%) feel that 
the leaders of the local unions did a good job, as opposed to a 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 125 



fairly good or a bad job. While most (41%) of the newcomers 
felt the local leaders did a good job, 30 per cent felt they did a 
fairly good job and 28 per cent had no opinion. A majority 
(62%) of the abstainers had no opinion. 

A majority (68 per cent of the rejoiners; 58 per cent of the 
newcomers; 62 per cent of the abstainers) felt that the actions 
of the Military Government had helped the growth of trade 
unions. Almost two-thirds (64%) of all groups also thought that 
attendance by local Military Government officials at union 
meetings would substantially help the unions. Eight in ten 
(81%) felt that the church should not exert an influence in 
union affairs, as did 72 per cent with regard to poUtical parties. 



Report No. 36 (1 1 January 1947) 



THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND SOCIAL CLASSES 

Sample: 1,485 persons in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 1 June 1946. (5 pp.) 

Respondents classified themselves as belonging to one of 
four classes: upper (2%), middle (45%), working (51%), and 
lower (2%). Interviewers then ranked the respondents according 
to a socioeconomic scale: upper (1%), middle (41%), working 
(55%), and lower (3%). At the lower end of the scale there was 
high correspondence between interviewers' ratings and self-class- 
ification. Only 30 per cent of those who said they were upper 
class were also ranked "upper" by the interviewer, however, and 
60 per cent of the self-reported "middle class" received such a 
rating from the interviewers. Nearly all the remainder were 
downgraded in the interviewers' ratings. 

Those self-perceived members of the middle class whom 
the interviewers downgraded (16%) differed markedly in some 
aspects from those seen by themselves and the interviewers as 



126 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



middle class (27%). The former group contained more women 
and more Bavarians than did the latter. Members of the former 
group more frequently were employed at skilled or semi-skilled 
jobs, and many were unemployed. The latter group were largely 
white-collar workers, professionals, independent businessmen, 
and government employees. This group was better educated. It 
also contained more former members of the NSDAP. Among 
the attitudinal differences between the two groups, the sharpest 
was in regard to political interest: Whereas 1 1 per cent of those 
who were ranked lower by the interviewer were interested in 
politics, 26 per cent of those who were ranked middle by the 
interviewer were interested in politics. The former group was 
more inchned to blame the German civil government and the 
Military Government for food shortages, to perceive denazifica- 
tion as too harsh, to deny any collective guilt on the part of the 
German people for the Nazi accession to power, and to think 
that the Allied imposition on controls of German industry was 
justified. 



Report No. 37 (13 January 1947) 



OPINIONS OF NEWSPAPER READERS 

Sample: 3,423 persons in the American Zone and the 

American and British sectors of Berhn. 

Interviewing dates: first two weeks of November 1946. (3 

PP) 

Although West Berliners were more frequently newspaper 
readers (91%) than were residents of the three Laender in the 
American Zone, they did not differ greatly from residents of 
large cities in the American Zone. Wuerttemberg-Baden had the 
highest percentage (85%) of newspaper readers of the three 
Laender, followed by 83 per cent in Bavaria and 79 per cent in 
Hesse. Even in the smaller towns and villages of Wuerttemberg- 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 127 



Baden there were more who read newspapers (in villages under 
1,000, 14 per cent nonreaders; and in towns from 2,000 to 
5,000, 18 per cent nonreaders; in Hesse, 30 and 30 per cent, 
respectively; in Bavaria, 20 and 19 per cent respectively). 

Almost half (48%) of the AMZON respondents (51 per 
cent in Bavaria; 45 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden; 38 per cent 
in Hesse) and a majority (71%) in West Berlin rated their 
newspapers "good" or "very good." In cities from 10,000 to 
100,000 in population, respondents tended to consider their 
newspapers only "fair." 

A large majority (77%) in West Berlin did not feel that the 
local government influenced their newspapers. In the three 
Laender, 48 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 54 percent in 
Hesse, and 60 percent in Bavaria made a similar claim. In 
contrast, only 1 1 per cent in West Berlin, 14 per cent in Bavaria, 
17 per cent in Hesse, and 21 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden 
felt that the local government did influence the newspapers. 
Almost three in ten (29%) of those who rated their newspapers 
"poor" saw them as politically dominated. Of those who 
complained about the political domination of the press, about 
half thought that the newspapers were not sufficiently critical 
of the local government. 



Report No. 38 (14 January 1947) 



A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF CHANGES IN JOB STATUS 

Sample: 2,860 respondents in the American Zone and 406 

in West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 14 October 1946. (18 pp.) 

With few exceptions, changes in occupational status have been 
in a downward direction. Those strata of society which cater to 
its fundamental needs (such as for food, housing, and clothing) 
were relatively unaffected by the defeat or the occupation. 



128 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Such crises hit more severely those groups catering to the more 
speciahzed demands of society. 

Recovery from the downgrading experienced by the more 
specialized occupational groups was perceived to be dependent 
upon the length of stay of the Allies in Germany, the 
amelioration of the denazification program, the energy of any 
future government of Germany, the reconstruction of basic and 
consumer goods industries, and so forth. 

In only one occupational classification, that of former 
government officials, did more than half change their occupa- 
tion in the postwar period: In the American Zone, only 40 per 
cent remained in their former occupation as did only 29 per 
cent in West Berlin; as many as a quarter of the former officials 
of the American Zone had become unskilled workers ( 1 9%) or 
clerks (7%). Levels of stability over time were considerably 
higher in other AMZON occupational groups: farmers (86%); 
independent businessmen (77%); unskilled workers (74%); 
independent craftsmen (70%); clerks (59%); semiskilled workers 
(54%); professionals (53%); and skilled workers (50%). 



Report No. 39 (14 January 1947) 



REACTIONS TO AND PENETRATION OF INFORMATION 
MEDIA IN VIENNA 

Sample: 1 ,499 persons in the American and British Sectors 

of Vienna. 

Interviewing dates: latter part of November 1946. (9 pp.) 

Most of the respondents paid attention to one or another of the 
information media. Four-fifths (80%) listened to the radio. The 
same proportion reported reading a newspaper regularly, and an 
additional 17 per cent said they read a paper occasionally. The 
most widely read paper (52%) was the Wiener Kurier. Well over 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 129 



half (57%) said that they went to the movies. And almost half 
(45%) had heard the Vienna Philharmonic within the past year: 
39 per cent on the radio; 1 1 per cent at a concert; and five per 
cent did both. 

When questioned about denazification of films and of the 
Vienna Philharmonic, 52 per cent thought that films should be 
shown even though the actors appearing in them were former 
members of the NSDAP or aUied organizations. Almost the 
same 52 percent also supported the continuation of former 
NSDAP members in the Vienna Philharmonic. 

Practically the entire adult population (99%) of Vienna 
could be reached through the combined impact of newspaper 
reading, listening to the radio, attendance at movies and at 
concerts. The most popular single activity was newspaper 
reading. Eleven per cent reported reading newspapers regularly 
but doing nothing else. When two media activities were enjoyed, 
they were usually radio listening and newspaper reading (27%). 
The most popular combination of three media was radio- 
movies-newspaper (41%), Only six per cent participated in all 
four activities. 

Different groups exhibited different characteristics regard- 
ing media participation. Whereas 44 per cent of the men 
listened to the radio, read a paper, and went to the movies, only 
38 per cent of the women did all three. Over a quarter (28%) of 
those high in socioeconomic status participated in all four 
activities or in combinations of any three except the paper- 
movie-radio grouping. The better educated and the younger 
groups participated in more media activities than did the poorly 
educated or older groups. Older but better educated people, 
however, participated in more media activities than did the 
young but poorly educated. 

Media participation was also related to attitudinal charac- 
teristics. Seven in ten (70%) of those who participated in all 
four media activities or attended concerts in addition to 
participating in two of the other three activities opposed most 
strenuously denazification of the Vienna Philharmonic and 64 
per cent approved most strongly the showing of films in which 



130 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



former NSDAP members appeared. These groups consisted 
largely of the upper class, the better educated, and the young. 
Eight in ten (79%) of this group who had an opinion said that 
the Allies had hindered Austrian reconstruction. 



Report No. 40 (21 January 1947) 



AUSTRIAN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES AND ATTITUDES 
TOWARD ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 

Sample: 1 ,499 persons in the American and British Sectors 

of Vienna. 

Interviewing dates: latter part of November 1946. (12 pp.) 

Responses to an initial question concerning the person's greatest 
care and worry indicated that the Viennese were not much 
better off than Germans with respect to the number of prob- 
lems facing them. Only one in a hundred Viennese said that 
he had no problems; for 54 per cent food was the greatest 
problem. Significant minorities were concerned primarily about 
former NSDAP membership (25%), fuel (19%), clothing and 
shoes (18%), unemployment (11%), and housing (10%), etc. 
Although food was a major concern, a large majority (67%) felt 
that the rationcard system was being handled fairly, and nearly 
everybody (88%) said that the stores usually had the things they 
came for when they had the necessary coupons; the largest 
problem was getting potatoes. The margin of adequate winter 
clothing was very slim for over half the population. A bare 
majority said that they had enough such clothing and about the 
same number claimed to have only one pair of shoes, which in 
many cases were not heavy enough to withstand the rigors of 
the winter months. Those most frequently saying that they had 
enough clothing for the winter were craftsmen (73%), inde- 
pendent businessmen (72%), and managers and officials (63%). 
At the bottom of the hst were semi-skilled workers (37%). 

Not a single respondent denied the existence of a black 
market and 83 per cent said that it was widespread and serious. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 31 



People who thought that the authorities were not doing 
everything possible to eliminate the black market also believed 
strongly that it was widespread and serious, or was responsible 
for shortages of goods, or adversely affected the economy. In 
contrast, those who felt that the authorities were doing all they 
could tended to take a more sanguine view of the entire black 
market situation. 

In response to a question concerning trade, a greater 
number of people (61%) spoke of the importance of imports 
than mentioned exports (51%). Although pohtical party affilia- 
tion did not seem to affect a respondent's views on these 
matters, other group differences were evident. A soUd majority 
(61%) of the college educated said that both imports and 
exports were very important but only 22 per cent of those with 
seven years or less schoohng did so. More of the upper classes 
(67%) maintained the great importance of both aspects of trade 
than did members of the poorest groups (37%); the poorer 
elements in the population spoke more insistently for imports 
than for exports. 

Almost everyone (98%) had heard of the Vienna Fair, and 
a very large proportion of these (86%) thought that it was a 
good idea. Most of the objections to the Fair centered on the 
complaint that it was all for foreign trade and not for purchases 
by private Viennese citizens. 



Report No. 41 (15 January 1947) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 

Sample: 3,022 respondents in the American Zone and 401 
in the American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: first part of November 1946. (25 pp.) 

From July 1946 to November 1946 monthly family incomes 
declined RM 20 in the American Zone and RM 30 in West 
Berhn. In November 1946 the median family monthly income 



132 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



was RM 129 in the American Zone and RM 199 in Berlin. Of 
the three Laender in the American Zone, Wuerttemberg-Baden 
reported the highest median monthly income (RM 150), 
followed by Bavaria (RM 123) and Hesse (RM 120). Highest 
monthly incomes were reported by professionals and business- 
men (RM 287), residents of cities of 250,000 or more in 
population (RM 188), those with more than 11 years of 
education (RM 177), men (RM 153), and those between 40 and 
49 (RM 148). 

In November 1946, 39 per cent of the respondents in the 
American Zone said that their family's total income was not 
sufficient to cover necessary living expenses, as did 48 per cent 
in West Berhn. These percentages were the highest recorded 
since surveying began in November 1945. Among the three 
Laender of the American Zone, more respondents in Hesse 
(41%) reported insufficient income than in Bavaria (39%) or 
Wuerttemberg-Baden (37%). The highest percentages reporting 
insufficient income were residents of cities between 100,000 
and 249,999 in population (46%), unskilled laborers (53%), 
those with 12 or more years of education (46%), women (41%), 
those between 30 and 39 (48%), and those with no income 
(86%). 

A substantial number (26%) of AMZON respondents relied 
on their savings to meet necessary expenses. Many West 
Berliners (18%) relied on barter and the sale of personal 
property, and only ten per cent fell back upon their savings. It 
should be noted, however, that an increasing percentage said 
that they could not buy everything they needed (seven per cent 
in AMZON; 13 per cent in West BerUn). 

Half (52%) of the respondents in both the American Zone 
and West Berlin felt that there were some taxes which should be 
lowered or which were not fairly apportioned. In general, the 
higher the income, the greater was the objection to current 
taxes, except among the three Laender of the American Zone. 
Half (52%) of the respondents in Bavaria, where incomes tended 
to be lower, said taxes were not fairly apportioned or should be 
lowered, in contrast to 49 per cent of the respondents in 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 133 



Wuerttemberg-Baden and 44 per cent in Hesse who made a 
similar claim. Respondents in the American Zone objected most 
to taxes on tobacco (25%) and alcohol and luxury items (16%). 
Respondents in West Berlin objected most to taxes on wages 
and community taxes (23%) and to income and personal 
property taxes (14%). 

Confidence in the continued value of the Reichsmark had 
declined since April 1946. A substantial portion (43%) of the 
AMZON and West Berhn respondents did not think the 
Reichsmark would be worth as much six months later as it was 
in November 1946. Half (50%) of the respondents in West 
Berlin, however, expected no such inflationary trend. As far as 
confidence in the Reichsmark as compared to Allied miUtary 
money was concerned, most people (55 per cent in AMZON; 46 
per cent in West Berlin) found no difference between the two 
currencies. 

The respondents were optimistic about economic condi- 
tions in the next six months: 45 per cent of the AMZON 
respondents and 5 1 per cent in West Berlin felt that economic 
conditions would improve in the next six months; 22 and 18 
per cent, respectively, expected no change, and 24 and 13 per 
cent, respectively, expected a deterioration of economic condi- 
tions. 



134 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 42 (5 February 1947) 



THE TREND OF RUMORS 



Sample: trend results from four surveys in 1946, with 954 
respondents in the American Zone in February, 964 in the 
American and British Sectors of Berlin in March, and 3,022 
persons in the American Zone and 401 in the American 
and British Sectors of Berlin in November. 
Interviewing dates: 14 February, 22 March, 29 March, and 
early November 1946. (13 pp.) 



There was a fluctuation in the percentages hearing disturbing 
rumors during 1946. In February, 33 per cent heard disturbing 
rumors; in March, 38 per cent; in April, 43 per cent, and in 
November, 25 per cent. Among the three Laender of the 
American Zone, the percentages hearing rumors in Hesse were 
consistently lower than those in Bavaria or Wuerttemberg- 
Baden. There was also considerable and inconsistent variation in 
the incidence of rumors among different-sized communities. 

Perhaps the most significant rumor was that of a war 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the 
American Zone, in February, 30 per cent of the reported 
rumors concerned war (reported by 10 per cent of the 
population). In March, 85 per cent and in April, 80 per cent of 
the reported rumors concerned war (reported by 33 and 34 per 
cent, respectively, of the population). By November 1946, only 
55 per cent of the reported rumors concerned war. In West 
Berlin, however, these percentages increased between April and 
November 1946. In April, 60 per cent of the reported rumors 
concerned war and in November, 65 per cent (reported by 20 
per cent of the population). 

A persistent rumor throughout 1 946 in the American Zone 
was that the Soviet Union would take over more of Germany. 
In November this rumor took the form that the Soviet Union 
would move into the American Zone. At its height in November 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 135 



1946, it accounted for eight per cent of the reported rumors 
and was reported by two per cent of the AMZON population. 

Other common rumors were that the Reichsmark would be 
revalued; there would be smaller food rations; there would be a 
housing shortage caused by American requisitions; and there 
would be housing shortages caused by the influx of evacuees. 

According to the November 1946 survey, different groups 
in the AMZON population were more Ukely to hear rumors. 
The likelihood of hearing a rumor increased if the respondent 
was under the age of 40 (27%), in a professional or academic 
occupation (37%), highly educated (43%), and a newspaper 
reader (27%) rather than a nonreader (16%), or if he had an 
interest in pohtics (36%) and felt himself sufficiently informed 
about politics (32%). 



Report No. 43 (5 February 1947) 



READERSHIP OF "HEUTE," "AMERIKANISCHE RUND- 
SCHAU," AND "NEUE AUSLESE" 

Sample: 3,022 respondents in the American Zone and 401 
in the American and British Sectors of BerUn. 
Interviewing dates: first two weeks of November 1946. (10 
PP) 

The total readership of Heute, Amerikanische Rundschau, and 
Neue Auslese constituted more than half of all magazine readers 
at the time of the survey. One-seventh (14%) of the respondents 
were magazine readers. The combined readership of the three 
American-sponsored magazines was nine per cent of this 1 4 per 
cent. The total readership of each in the American Zone was as 
follows: Heute, eight per cent; Neue Auslese, four per cent; and 
Amerikanische Rundschau, three per cent. Higher socio- 
economic status and better educated groups were more likely to 
read one of the three magazines. Of those who reported 



136 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



thinking about politics, 74 per cent read one of these 
magazines. Eight in ten (81%) of the readers felt themselves 
sufficiently informed about present day affairs. 

Group differences, however, existed among readers of the 
three magazines. Heute had a broader based readership. Those 
with seven years of education or less (1 1%), the less well to do, 
that is, with a monthly income between RM 90 and RM 190 
(24%), Bavarians (40%), and women (35%) read Heute. 
Amerikanische Rundschau readers, by way of contrast, com- 
prised a greater share of those with 12 or more years of 
education (38%), of those with a monthly income of RM 390 or 
more (28%), and of respondents aged 50 and older (25%). Neue 
Auslese had the highest portion of readers with 12 or more years 
of education (42%), professionals, businessmen, officials, and 
white-collar workers (78%), and those with a monthly income 
of RM 390 or more (30%). 

Circulation figures alone do not give the complete picture 
of the coverage of the magazine, since more than two people 
read each copy {Heute, 2.9; Rundschau, 23; Auslese, 2.5). A 
majority bought the magazine at newsstands. A majority also 
felt the price of the magazine was fair. 

When asked about the quahty of the magazines, most 
reported finding them good {Heute, 56 per cent; Rundschau, 61 
per cent; Auslese, 48 per cent). Half (49%) were unable either 
to point to any inadequacies of the magazines or to voice a 
specific criticism. Of those who did specify needed improve- 
ments, the largest number (13%) wanted more articles about 
conditions in the United States. When asked directly, 32 per 
cent did not think that the magazines presented enough detailed 
articles about the United States to enable the reader to form an 
objective picture of conditions there. A majority of readers, 
however, did feel enough coverage was given to American affairs 
{Heute, 66 per cent; Rundschau, 64 per cent ; Auslese, 58 per 
cent). 

The majority of the readers (68%) approved the "tone" of 
the three magazines. When questioned directly, most readers 
{Heute, 41 per cent; Rundschau, 51 per cent; Auslese, 52 per 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 137 



cent) nonetheless felt that the point of view taken in the 
magazine was foreign. 

Only a minority (20%) thought that the magazines should 
be under German control. A larger proportion (36%) advocated 
publication by the occupation forces, and almost as many 
(34%) sought joint United States-German pubhcation. 



Report No. 44 (6 February 1947) 



OPINIONS OF GERMAN COMMUNITY LEADERS ON 
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Sample: 188 persons in the American Zone and West 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: first two weeks of November 1946. (8 

pp.) 

The 188 persons who were selected and interviewed as 
community leaders exhibited the following characteristics: 
Almost all (185) were men. Half (51%) were Catholics; 42 per 
cent, Protestants. Half were between 44 and 59 years of age, the 
median being 49 years. Four in ten (41%) had college training 
but a large minority (29%) had seven or less years of education. 
Over half (56%) were employers; 12 per cent were farmers; and 
a quarter (27%) worked for the German government. As a 
group, these leaders had shifted rather sharply away from some 
former occupation for which they had been trained to other 
positions. 

Less than half (45%) reported membership in a poUtical 
party; the remainder (55%) said that they did not belong to a 
party. Of those who were members, 55 per cent preferred 
parties of the right and center; 45 per cent, parties of the left. A 
fifth of those who claimed no party membership said that they 
wanted nothing to do with poUtics anymore. These individuals 



138 /PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



tended to be older than the group as a whole, the median age 
being 54; more of them were well educated and professionally 
trained than the entire group of community leaders; and nearly 
two-thirds lived in Bavaria. 

A large percentage of all the community leaders defended 
the German people as a whole from the charge that large 
numbers of Germans wanted Germany to rule the world in 
1938. As many as three-fourths said that less than 25 per cent 
of the German people had such desires; and half said ten per 
cent or less. Two-thirds (66%) of the community leaders said 
that those few who had desires for German supremacy had 
learned their lesson from the war. Almost a third (31%), 
however, thought that those who desired supremacy would try 
again. 

When asked to recall the two most important events which 
had occurred since the end of the war, 40 per cent named the 
Nuremberg Trials and 30 per cent named Secretary of State 
James Byrnes' speech of 4 September 1946 in Stuttgart. 
Although nine in ten (91%) said that the Nuremberg Trials had, 
as one of its most important results, set up an international legal 
basis for trying those who commit crimes against humanity or 
against peace, 30 per cent also pointed out that aggressors in 
other countries were not being charged under the laws applied 
at Nuremberg. Asked what steps they felt were necessary 
immediately and in the long run to implement Secretary 
Byrnes' ennunciated poHcy of a lasting peace, 55 per cent of the 
immediate proposals were economic in nature, and 33 per cent 
said that what was most needed was increased cooperation 
among the Allies; for the long run, the response most frequently 
given (29%) was that such cooperation was a basic necessity. 

Almost half (45%) of the community leaders reported no 
change in their attitude toward the United States in the past 
year; over a third (37%), however, reported a friendUer attitude, 
and 17 per cent reported a less friendly attitude. Most (64%) 
also reported no change in their attitude toward Great Britain, 
with 28 per cent saying their attitude was more, and six per 
cent less, friendly. France and the Soviet Union were less well 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 39 



regarded than they had been. Almost half (45%) reported no 
change in their attitude toward France, but 39 per cent said 
that they felt less friendly as opposed to 1 1 per cent who were 
friendlier. Most (54%) felt less friendly toward the Soviet 
Union; only three per cent reported more friendhness and 37 
per cent no change. The community leaders were evenly spUt on 
the question of whether there would be another war within the 
next 25-30 years (47 per cent on each side, and the remaining 6 
per cent undecided). 

Three-quarters expected the United States to occupy 
Germany for ten years if not more, a fourth for 20 years or 
longer. Whatever their guesses, however, 76 per cent felt that 
the United States should stay that length of time. A majority 
(55%) felt the United States would have the greatest influence 
upon world affairs in the next ten years as opposed to 1 5 per 
cent who mentioned the Soviet Union and 21 per cent who 
mentioned both. Three-quarters (77%) considered economic 
unification more important than political as a first step toward 
achieving complete unification of the Zones. 

Very large majorities favored central government for all 
European countries (82%) and active participation by Germany 
in world affairs (85%). As a first step in the direction of a 
united Europe, the response most frequently given (24%) stated 
that Germany should ally herself with western European 
countries. Of those who mentioned specific countries, most 
(33%) named France, followed by Great Britain (20%), Belgium 
(16%), the Netherlands (16%), Austria (13%), and Switzerland 
(10%). 



140 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 45 (17 February 1947) 



RADIO LISTENING IN THE AMERICAN ZONE 
AND IN BERLIN 

Sample: 2,861 respondents in the American Zone and 407 
in the American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: 14 October 1946. (13 pp.) 

Over half (51%) of the adult population in the American Zone 
and 67 per cent in West Berhn were radio listeners. More men 
(56 per cent in AMZON; 76 per cent in West Berlin) than 
women (44 and 66 per cent, respectively) were listeners. 
Listening increased with educational level: Whereas 46 per cent 
of those with seven or less years of education in the American 
Zone and 60 per cent in West Berlin were listeners, 66 and 79 
per cent, respectively, of those with 12 or more years of 
education were hsteners. The percentage of listeners also 
increased with community size. Four in ten residents of 
AMZON communities with less than 2,000 in population were 
listeners; 72 per cent listened in communities of 250,000 or 
more. Fewer older people Hstened. The lowest percentages of 
listeners were found in those 60 and over in the American Zone 
(43%) and in those between 50 and 59 in West Berlin (60%). 
Among occupational groups in AMZON, farmers listened least 
(33%), and more employers (69%) than employees (55%) 
listened. In West Berlin, more employees (70%) listened than 
employers (67%). 

Half (50%) of the listeners claimed to have no favorite day 
for listening. Among listeners who did prefer certain days, 
AMZON listeners named Sunday (42%) and Saturday (22%) 
most frequently, as did West Berliners. The most popular time 
for listening was 8:00 p.m.: 70 per cent in the American Zone 
and in West Berhn hstened at that hour. 

The government of each Land controls its own radio 
station and there are no independently owned stations. In each 
Land the most frequently heard station was that of the Land's 
major metropolis: In Bavaria, 79 per cent listened to Munich; in 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 41 



Hesse, 70 per cent listened to Frankfurt; in Wuerttem berg- 
Baden, 93 per cent listened to Stuttgart. Nine in ten listeners in 
each Land listened to these stations because of their good 
reception. In West Berhn, 67 per cent listened to the Soviet 
station, again largely because of clearer reception. Of all the 
Laender stations, Stuttgart had the largest audience outside the 
territory of its own Land. Of stations outside the American 
Zone, Leipzig was the only one with a significant secondary 
audience: 22 per cent in Bavaria, 15 per cent in Hesse, and eight 
per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden sometimes tuned in Leipzig. 

Laender residents tended to consider their local station 
best: 62 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden liked Stuttgart best; 
57 per cent in Bavaria, Munich; 41 per cent in Hesse, Frankfurt; 
40 per cent in West Berhn, (Soviet) Berlin. Most of the radio 
audience (75 per cent in Bavaria and Hesse; 87 per cent in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden; 62 per cent in West Berlin) found it 
difficult to name the station they liked least. When asked 
directly what station in the American Zone had the best 
programs, respondents in Wuerttemberg-Baden (79%) and 
Bavaria (70%) favored their local Land station. In Hesse, a 
relatively large number (27%) was unable to decide, while 38 
per cent said Frankfurt had the best programs. Almost 
three-quarters (72%) in the American Zone and 85 per cent in 
West Berlin preferred musical programs. Large majorities in the 
American Zone (86%) and West Berlin (87%) wanted half or 
more of all radio time devoted to music. 

Whereas a majority (51%) in the American Zone preferred 
factual news reporting, the majority in West Berlin (61%) 
preferred news commentaries. In the American Zone, slightly 
more (41%) favored impersonal than personalized reporting 
(37%); in West Berhn, the majority (51%) favored personalized 
reporting. Radio listeners (55%) tended to think that radio gave 
the most accurate news, but that newspapers gave more 
complete news. In the American Zone, 66 per cent did not 
think that radio programs contained too much propaganda; in 
West Berlin, however, 58 per cent thought the opposite. A 
majority in both the American Zone (64%) and West Berhn 
(72%) felt that there was radio censorship. 



142 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Three-quarters (75%) in the American Zone heard 5r/mme 
Amerikas ("Voice of America"), but only a third (33%) heard it 
in West Berhn. In the American Zone, most (26%) liked VGA's 
news best. Second most popular (24%) were the commentaries. 
In West Berlin, most (16%) liked the commentaries best while 
1 1 per cent preferred the news on VOA. 



Report No. 46 (19 February 1947) 



ARMY AID TO GERMAN YOUTH ACTIVITIES 
EVALUATED BY GERMAN ADULTS 

Sample: 3,008 adults (those over 18) in the American 

Zone and 399 in the American and British Sectors of 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 25 November 1946. (15 pp.) 

A majority (55%) of the general population reported having 
heard of the United States Army Youth Program. Certain 
groups of the population, however, were more likely to have 
heard about the program than others: those with 12 or more 
years of education (84%), men (67%), residents of the four 
largest cities of the American Zone (68%), and those with 
children (57%). Although a majority in each Land knew about 
the program, more Bavarians (58%) claimed such knowledge 
than residents of Hesse (51%) or Wuerttemberg-Baden (52%). 

Reported participation in the Army Youth Program was 
not widespread. Only seven per cent of all parents and 1 1 per 
cent of parents who knew about the program said that their 
children had taken part in these activities. Areas with highest 
participation were towns with between 5,000 and 10,000 in 
population (14%); 13 per cent in West Berlin reported participa- 
tion by their children. 

Although few parents said that their children were taking 
part in the Army program, parents generally did not object to 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 143 



participation. Almost all (94%) of the parents who had heard of 
the program and who thought that the program was designed to 
teach the American way of hfe, and 88 per cent of the parents 
who had heard of the program but thought that their main 
purpose was to keep children off the streets would have 
permitted their children to participate. Even among parents 
whose children had not yet participated in the program, 84 per 
cent said they would give permission to participate. 

Those who knew about the Army program most often 
approved the program. Among those who had not heard of the 
program, only 37 per cent approved, while 68 per cent of those 
who had heard of the program approved of it. Three-quarters 
(77%) of those parents whose children had participated 
approved of the Army Youth Program. 

Respondents had varied images of the program's goals: The 
largest number (37%) spoke of a democratic education for 
youth, 1 2 per cent about understanding other peoples, 1 1 per 
cent of freeing the youth from Nazi spirit and political 
education, and 1 1 per cent of the development of friendship 
and trust for Americans and the occupation troops. Among 
parents whose children had participated in the Army sponsored 
program, 43 per cent felt the goal of the program to be 
democratic education. 

Asked directly what they thought the most important part 
of the program was — teaching youth about the American way 
of life, giving them something to do in their spare time, or 
keeping them off the streets — the largest number (41%) said 
that keeping the youth off the streets was most important, 26 
per cent teaching the American way of life, and 19 per cent 
occupation in spare time. Responses in West Berlin were 56, 20, 
and 15 per cent, respectively. 



144 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 47 (20 February 1947) 



OPINIONS ON THE EXPELLEE PROBLEM 

Sample: 3,417 persons in the American Zone and the 

American and British Sectors of Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: last two weeks in November 1946. (8 

PP-) 



Among those interviewed in the American Zone, seven per cent 
were expellees (5 per cent from Czechoslovakia, 1 per cent from 
Hungary, 1 per cent from Poland). Almost all (89%) of these 
expellees, except the Hungarians, considered themselves to be 
Germans, 84 per cent of them nonetheless wanted to return to 
their homeland, 64 per cent emphatically. Although a majority 
of the expellees (72%) in November 1946 were satisfied with 
the treatment they had received from the native AMZON 
population, this percentage had declined from March 1946 
(78%). A majority (53%) also felt that the Laender governments 
were not doing all they could to ease the expellees' problems. 

In November 1946, 50 per cent of the native AMZON 
population thought the expellees would get along with the 
native Germans, as opposed to 36 per cent who expected no 
such cooperation. (Both figures had increased since March 
1946.) Six in ten native Germans thought that the Laender 
governments were handhng the expellee problem satisfactorily. 
Even though a majority of the native Germans (55 per cent in 
AMZON; 65 per cent in West Berlin) considered the expellees 
German citizens, these figures were considerably below the 88 
per cent of the expellees who considered themselves Germans. 
Nine in ten (91%) of the native Germans expected the expellees 
to return to their homelands when and if given a chance to do 
so. 

A large majority of both the native Germans (90%) and the 
expellees (97%) saw no justification for the expulsion from 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. A substantial majority (59%) of 
the expellees and minorities of the native Germans (46 per cent 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 145 



in AMZON; 31 per cent in West Berlin) thought that the state 
expelling these people should be responsible for their care. In 
contrast, 20 per cent of the expellees, 28 per cent of the native 
AMZON Germans, and 48 per cent of the West Berliners felt the 
German government to be responsible for caring for the 
expellees. A ninth (11%) of the expellees, 14 per cent of the 
native AMZON Germans, and 19 per cent of the West Berliners 
thought that the responsibility lay with the Allies. 



Report No. 48 (5 March 1947)) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FREEDOM OF SPEECH 

Sample: 3,008 persons in the American Zone and 399 in 
the American and British Sectors of BerUn. 
Interviewing dates: 25 November to 10 December 1946 
(21 pp.) 

To test attitudes toward freedom of speech, respondents were 
asked three questions: Should the German people have com- 
plete, freedom of speech? Should trade union members be 
permitted to speak on the radio? Should members of the 
Communist Party be permitted to speak on radio? A majority 
of AMZON respondents answered the questions affirmatively 
(77, 71, and 55 per cent, respectively). Relatively large 
percentages denied complete freedom of speech for the German 
people and access to the radio for members of the Communist 
Party (14 and 26 per cent, respectively), but only six per cent 
said that union leaders should not be permitted to speak on 
radio. 

Among various population groups, men were more affir- 
mative, as were members of the KPD in AMZON and the SPD 
and SED in West Berlin, members of the upper and middle 
classes in AMZON and of the lower class in West Berlin, former 
members of the NSDAP, the well educated, AMZON Protes- 



146 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



tants and West Berlin Protestants, and younger people. There 
were also differences among the three Laender: In Bavaria, 76 
per cent favored complete freedom of speech, 72 per cent radio 
access for union leaders, and 54 per cent radio access for 
communists; in Hesse the percentages were 78, 71, and 61 per 
cent, respectively; and in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 77, 68, and 52 
per cent respectively. 



Report No. 49 (3 March 1947) 



ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE AMERICAN ZONE 

Sample: 3,006 persons in the American Zone and 409 in 

West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: last two weeks in December 1946. (19 

PP-) 

Nationalistic sentiment and racism had been shown in earlier 
surveys to provide a convenient base for anti-Semitism. With an 
increase in nationalistic feeling and racism, there was more 
anti-Semitic expression in the American Zone. This survey used 
a Guttmann scale, based on eight questions bearing directly or 
indirectly on attitudes toward Jews. It distinguished among five 
groups: those with little bias (20%), nationalists (19%), racists 
(22%), anti-Semites (21%), and intense anti-Semites (18%). 

Different population groups exhibited different amounts 
of bias. West Berlin was comparatively less biased, with 45 per 
cent classified as racists, anti-Semites, and intense anti-Semites. 
Among the Laender, Bavaria had fewest in this biased category 
(59%), followed by Hesse (63%), and Wuerttemberg-Baden 
(65%). When examined by party preference, those supporting 
the KPD were least likely to be in the three biased groups 
(43%). Bias decreased as education increased: 63 per cent of 
those with seven years of education, compared to 48 per cent of 
those with 1 2 years or more of education fell into the biased 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 147 



groups. Those of upper middle or higher socioeconomic status 
(53%) were less biased than other groups. Professionals were less 
biased (48%) than other occupational groups. Catholics (61%) 
were less biased than Protestants (69%); those of both faiths 
who attended church irregularly (60 per cent Catholics, 57 per 
cent Protestants), however, were less biased than regular 
churchgoers. Women were markedly more biased than men: 
Considering only men and women able to work, 50 per cent of 
the former and 67 per cent of the latter were classified as 
racists, anti-Semites, and intense anti-Semites. 

Frustration did not seem to play a role in bias. The most 
intensely anti-Semitic groups were not more seriously troubled 
by day-to-day difficulties than was the least biased group. A 
certain amount of apathy did characterize more biased groups. 
Only 12 per cent of the intense anti-Semites read magazines and 
less than half (46%) listened to the radio. As the level of bias 
increased, the proportion of those who knew how denazi- 
fication was being carried out declined (from 66 per cent among 
those with little bias to 42 per cent among the intense 
anti-Semites), as did those who agreed that research had shown 
that the Germans tortured and murdered millions of helpless 
Europeans (from 72 to 41 per cent, respectively). 

Criticism of the Allies also increased with the level of bias. 
On the question of AUied limitations on the number and types 
of industries that Germany could have in the future, the 
percentage thinking the pohcy just declined (from 17 per cent 
among those with little bias to 5 per cent among the intense 
anti-Semites), although the percentage declaring it unjust 
remained roughly constant (72 and 74 per cent, respectively). 
The percentage satisfied with the way in which denazification 
was being carried out declined from 35 to 28 per cent, 
respectively. 

Differences were more marked on questions of general 
orientation. The percentage saying that National Socialism was 
a bad idea rather than a good idea badly carried out declined 
from 5 1 per cent among the least biased to 27 per cent among 
the intense anti-Semites. Similarly, the proportion denying that 



148 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



it was a national humiliation for Germany to be occupied by 
foreign powers declined from 67 per cent among the least 
biased to 43 per cent among the intense anti-Semites. 



Report No. 50 (20 March 1947) 



A PILOT STUDY ON DISPLACED PERSONS 

Sample: 298 displaced persons in Hesse and Bavaria. 
Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.) 

Nine per cent of the displaced persons claimed to be stateless or 
uncertain of their country of origin. The remainder represented 
25 nationalities of which the largest single group (12%) was 
Polish. Most were men (62%) and under 30 years of age (48%); 
40 per cent reported having gone to Germany in 1 944 or later. 
When asked why they had come to Germany, the most frequent 
response was "deported" (19%), followed by "forced to come" 
(16%) and "brought to Germany by German government" or its 
agencies (14%). Three in five (61%) did not plan on remaining 
in Germany, but only 34 per cent of these people intended to 
return to their homelands, and 53 per cent hoped to move to 
another country (most particularly, the United States). Most of 
those who did not plan to return to their homelands were from 
eastern Europe: Almost half (49%) of the displaced persons 
mentioned that Soviet occupation of their homeland was the 
reason for not returning. The largest single group (38%) was 
comprised of skilled workers; 15 per cent were professional 
people. When questioned about making their living in the 
future, 47 per cent said they planned to work in the occupation 
for which they were trained; 30 per cent said they would be 
workers, do anything, or work where needed. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 49 



Report No. 51 (2 April 1947) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE GUILT IN THE 
AMERICAN ZONE OF GERMANY 

Sample:3,005 persons in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: last two weeks of December 1946. (16 
pp.) 

Respondents in the American Zone were asked seven questions 
to ascertain their acceptance or rejection of collective guilt for 
the events of the Nazi era. Scores were computed by totaling 
the percentages rejecting each of the seven questions. Those 
scoring zero accepted responsibility on all seven questions; 
those scoring seven rejected collective responsibility on all seven 
questions. The median score for the total AMZON population 
was 3.8. On the whole, there were only slight variations among 
population groups in their acceptance or rejection of collective 
guilt. Those most likely to reject guilt were residents of 
Wuerttemberg-Baden (3.82), the less well-educated (3.83), those 
aged 30 to 39 (3.85) or 60 years of age or older (3.92), women 
(3.96), Protestants (3.88), the lowest socioeconomic (3.85) and 
income (3.90) groups. Intensely anti-Semitic respondents were 
particularly likely to reject any collective guilt. 

On specific questions: 63 per cent felt that the German 
people were at least partly to blame for acts of the Hitler regime 
because they had supported that regime; 28 per cent felt that 
the Germans were to blame for the outbreak of World War II; 
68 per cent stated that the harshness of the Versailles Treaty 
did not give the German people the right to start another war, 
but 52 per cent said the Versailles Treaty was a cause of the 
war, 46 per cent denied that Germany had attacked Poland to 
protect Germans living there; 56 per cent felt that Germany 
often found itself in a difficult situation because other people 
had no understanding of Germany; 83 per cent beheved that 
both sides in World War II committed many crimes against 
humanity and peace; and 59 per cent agreed that Germany had 
tortured and murdered millions of helpless Europeans. 



150 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 52 (27 March 1947) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD FOOD, FUEL, AND BUILDING 
MATERIALS CONDITIONS 

Sample: 3,022 respondents in the American Zone and 401 
in the British and American Sectors of West Berlin in the 
survey of October-November 1946; in the November- 
December 1946 survey, 3,008 respondents in the American 
Zone and 399 in the British and American Sectors of Berlin; 
and, in January 1947, 3,011 in the American Zone and 
about 400 in West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 28 October to 15 November 1946 (or 
building materials); 28 November to 10 December 1946 
(on food and fuel); and January 1946. (45 pp.) 

With the increase in the food ration from 1,250 to 1,550 
calories per day came improvements in the reported health and 
morale of the German population: Two-fifths (42%) of AMZON 
Germans said that they felt "somewhat" better; 46 per cent in 
the American Zone and 20 per cent in West Berlin in November 
1946 reported having sufficient food to do good work 
(compared to 28 and nine per cent, respectively, in May 1946). 

There was still considerable complaint. Residents in large 
cities felt that equalizing the ration of all people regardless of 
whether they lived in a small town or in a large city was unfair: 
Two-thirds (68%) of the West Berliners disapproved of the 
equalization, whereas, in the American Zone as a whole, 66 per 
cent approved; in AMZON cities with between 100,000 and 
249,999, however, 47 per cent disapproved. 

The food situation in West Berlin and Wuerttemberg-Baden 
was more critical than anywhere else in the American-controlled 
areas: Four-fifths (81%) in West Berlin and 57 per cent in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden said that they got along only "poorly" 
with the food ration; 48 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden 
reported not feeUng any better since the food ration was 
increased; and 78 per cent in West Berlin and 62 per cent in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden claimed not to have enough food to 
enable them to do good work. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 51 



Farmers, being the source of supply, offered few com- 
plaints and indicated the highest degree of satisfaction with the 
food ration. A third (34%) of the farmers said that they got by 
"well" with the food ration and 56 per cent said they "managed 
to get by." In contrast, only eight and 29 per cent, respectively, 
of those in professional or business occupations made the same 
claim. Almost two-thirds (63%) of this group said they got by 
"poorly" whereas only ten per cent of the farmers gave this 
answer. Following farmers in degree of satisfaction with the 
food rations were artisans and master craftsmen: Nine per cent 
of this group got along "well" and 42 per cent "managed to get 
by." 

Fuel did not appear to offer as great a problem as food at 
the time of the study, even though it was the height of winter. 
In November 1946, only six per cent of the AMZON population 
said that fuel was their greatest care or worry; in January 1947, 
only 12 per cent reported fuel to be of major concern. Fuel was 
a more important problem in Berlin: In January 1947 as many 
as 36 per cent mentioned it as their major concern, as 
contrasted to 18 per cent in November-December 1946. 

Respondents felt nearly unanimously (87 per cent in 
AMZON; 94 per cent in West Berlin) that it was more urgent to 
repair buildings then in use than to allocate available building 
materials for the reconstruction of heavily bombed cities. Large 
percentages (39 per cent in AMZON; 62 per cent in West BerUn) 
felt that the distribution of available building materials was 
unjustly handled. When asked why they believed it unjust, 23 
and 17 per cent, respectively, said that materials could be 
obtained only in return for other goods and that, therefore, 
those in a position to barter got everything; in West Berhn, 27 
per cent felt that there was unnecessary building and repairing 
of churches and businesses. Of the 33 per cent in the American 
Zone and 13 per cent Berlin who owned property, 13 and six 
per cent, respectively, said that they had not been able to get 
through legal channels the materials necessary to keep their 
buildings in repair or to rebuild them. 



152 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 53 (8 April 1947) 



MAGAZINE READING IN THE AMERICAN ZONE 

Sample: 3,005 interviews in the American Zone and 409 in 
the British and American Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: last two weeks in December 1946. (14 
pp.) 

A minority (18%) in the American Zone read magazines. In 
Berlin more (42%) read magazines. About half (44 per cent in 
AMZON; 57 per cent in West Berhn) said that they did not read 
because they had no interest or time. An equal percentage of 
AMZON Germans (44%) said they had no opportunity to get 
magazines; 37 per cent in West Berlin said they could not afford 
magazines. About three-quarters (70 per cent in AMZON; 75 
per cent in West Berlin) felt that magazines were better at the 
time of the survey than they had been in the preceding 12 
years. 

The combined readership of the American-sponsored 
magazines Heute, Neue Auslese, and Amerikanishe Rundschau 
in both the American Zone and West Berlin was nine per cent. 
In the American Zone, 15 per cent read one of these three 
magazines; in West Berlin, however, more (22%) read the 
Soviet-licensed Neue Illustrierte Zeitung and only 13 per cent 
read the American-licensed Sie. AMZON Germans with more 
education, Cathohcs, older people, and those of higher socio- 
economic status were more likely than others to read Ameri- 
can-licensed magazines. Amerikanische Rundschau tended to 
appeal to an upper-middle class, older, and more highly edu- 
cated audience; Neue Auslese more to middle than to lower 
socioeconomic status groups; and Heute, although it had a more 
general appeal, to women, Cathohcs, and lower middle or lower 
socioeconomic status groups. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 153 



Report No. 54 (8 April 1947) 



VIENNESE REACTIONS TO NEW DENAZIFICATION LAWS 

Sample: 1,502 persons in the American and British Sectors 

of Vienna. 

Interviewing dates: December 1946. (7 pp.) 

This survey was taken shortly after the pubHcation of new 
denazification regulations. Almost all (85%) of the respondents 
had heard of the changes. Of these informed respondents, a 
plurality (44 per cent of the entire sample) could not say 
whether or not they liked the law in its new form. Of those 
with opinions, most (24 per cent of the entire sample) 
disapproved of it, 14 per cent approved, and three per cent 
agreed partly with it. Of those who answered that they either 
agreed or partly agreed, most (56 per cent and 82 per cent of 
the respective subsamples) stated that the harsher punishment of 
those seriously charged was what they liked about the change in 
the law. Most of those who answered that they did not like the 
new law or only partly liked it (27 per cent and 80 per cent of 
the respective subsamples) gave as their reason the belief that 
the punishment for lesser charges was too harsh. The groups 
most disapproving of the newly defined denazification law were 
the better educated, middle and upper classes, upper-income 
groups, men, and supporters of the Austrian Communist Party. 
About three-quarters (74%) of those who thought that National 
Socialism was a good idea badly carried out also disapproved of 
the new form. 



154 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 55 (15 April 1947) 



PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD DENAZIFICATION 

Sample: 3,005 adults in the American Zone and 409 in 
West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: ten-day periods in the months of 
December 1946, January and February 1947. (10 pp.) 

Educational background, and perhaps even more importantly, 
direct interest in the proceedings affected knowledge about the 
denazification program. Those in higher socioeconomic groups 
(64%), the better educated (73%), as well as former NSDAP 
members (62%) were much more likely than others to know 
about how denazification was carried out, and much more 
likely to have heard or read about General Lucius Clay's speech 
to the Laenderrat criticizing the way in which denazification 
was being carried out. A fifth (21%) were so uninterested or so 
unaffected by denazification that they held no discernible 
attitude toward denazification. The general public favored, by a 
small plurality (36%), the then-current plan, in which Germans 
carried out denazification under American scrutiny. Nearly as 
many (30%), however, would have liked to see the Americans 
assume full responsibility for the program. 

Nearly half (47%) of the people had heard or read about 
General Clay's speech to the Laenderrat. Probably because the 
speech was given in Stuttgart, residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden 
(56%) were more likely to have heard about it than were 
Bavarians (45%), Hessians (45%), or West Berliners (37%). Most 
(72%) of those who had heard about General Clay's speech 
thought the remarks justified; but few (13%) had observed any 
change in denazification methods in the first weeks following 
the speech. 

Results of ten separate sampUngs since November 1945 
showed that the percentage satisfied with denazification had 
declined about 15 per cent, whereas the percentage dissatisfied 
or expressing no opinion had increased in size. About as many 
(34%) said in December 1946 that they were satisfied with the 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 155 



way denazification was being carried out as were dissatisfied 
(32%). About 14 per cent thought the Spruchkammer rulings 
too lenient. A quarter (25%) would have differentiated more 
clearly between Activists and Followers, between guilty and not 
guilty. A seventh (14%) would have punished Activists more 
strictly. 

In the American Zone, a majority (62%) opposed both 
noting former NSDAP membership on identification cards and 
keeping former NSDAP members from their former jobs. 
Former NSDAP members were all but unanimous in opposing 
these measures. 



Report No. 56 (26 April 1947) 



GERMAN CHILDREN APPRAISE THE YOUTH PROGRAM 

Sample: 1,021 boys and girls ranging in age from ten to 

18 years living in Frankfurt, Kassel, Heidelberg, and 

Munich. 

Interviewing dates: early March 1947. (16 pp.) 

Large proportions of the youth (an average of 45 per cent in the 
four cities) stated that they had not heard anything about the 
American Youth Program. Only a small percentage (12%) 
claimed to have heard a great deal about the program. Few 
(11%) said that they had actually taken part in the program, 
and most of those who had attended not only had attended 
infrequently but also stated that the meetings were either fairly 
well or very well led (10%). 

Of those children who had an opinion (48%), most (30%) 
felt the program to be a very good idea. When asked what their 
main reason for taking part in the program was, the most 
frequent response (40%) was "to get candy and food." This was 
followed by "a chance for sports and games" (26%), "to show 
our former enemies what Germans really are" (23%), and "to 



156 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



learn English" (17%). Twenty-seven per cent stated their belief 
that German boys and girls attended because they really 
enjoyed the program rather than because they had nothing else 
to do or to keep warm (7%). Respondents tended to think that 
it was a good idea for boys and girls to take part in the program 
(41%), as opposed to nine per cent who categorically rejected 
this idea. 

The children who participated showed greater interest in 
sports, hiking and trips offered by the Youth Program than in 
more sedentary or "educational" activities. When asked about 
improvements in the program, there were major differences 
among the cities: Most who had an opinion in Frankfurt (37%) 
suggested helping youth get more food, clothing and shoes; in 
Heidelberg 47 per cent suggested more sports opportunities and 
obtaining more sports equipment. To ascertain whether the 
respondents were aware of some of the broader purposes of the 
program, they were asked to rate the need for the program in 
certain specific areas: social development, education, vocational 
choice, religion, music and art, sports and games, democratic 
experiences, and German and world problems. Except for 
religion, the children rated the program "very necessary" in 
each of these areas. 

Most of the youth who had an opinion on the subject 
(22%) stated they received either a little better or a much better 
idea of democracy from the youth activities; only four per cent 
denied this, A large majority of those with opinions believed 
that the Youth Program contributed fairly much (17%) or very 
much (17%) to the preservation of peace; only 12 per cent 
thought that it contributed httle or nothing. A majority 
expected that German youth would learn a great deal (32%) or 
something (24%) about the United States and its aims through 
this Youth Program. 

Asked what Americans gained through participation in the 
program, 33 per cent mentioned a chance to learn the problems 
and needs of Germany, and 28 per cent responded with the 
opportunity to "learn really to know Germans." Of those with 
opinions (46%) half (23%) thought that the Americans who 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 157 



participated did so because they enjoyed it and only four per 
cent thought that the Americans had been ordered to partici- 
pate; the remainder gave both responses. The bulk of the 
respondents believed that German boys and girls would get to 
know American soldiers either well (31%) or somewhat better 
(23%) through the program. Most of these young people clearly 
had a very good (23%) or fairly good (39%) opinion of 
American soldiers, and a very good (30%) or fairly good (47%) 
opinion of the American people. Only a minority knew some 
Americans in Germany very well (16%), or fairly well (12%); 
the bulk either knew none but had spoken with some (29%) or 
had never spoken with Americans (37%). 



Report No. 57 (29 April 1947) 



READERSHIP AND POPULARITY OF THE FRANKFURT 
NEWSPAPERS 

Sample: 300 adult Frankfurt residents. 
Interviewing dates: third week in April 1947. (9 pp.) 

More Frankfurt residents read the Frankfurter Rundschau 
(35%) than the Neue Presse (17%). Readers of the Neue Presse 
were better educated than Rundschau readers, had a higher 
income, were more likely to have been associated with the Nazi 
Party, and less likely to belong to a postwar political party. 
There was a slight tendency for more Neue Presse readers (16%) 
to say they would not read the Rundschau than Rundschau 
readers (6%) to say they would not read the Neue Presse. Half 
of the Neue Presse readers (8%) who objected to reading the 
Rundschau stated that they felt the Rundschau too biased or 
politically distasteful. Rundschau readers were aware of the bias 
of their paper, criticizing it particularly for its political bias and 
lack of coverage of cultural affairs. When asked which topics 



158 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



they would like to see more about in their papers, more Neue 
Presse readers (24%) than Rundschau readers (18%) wanted 
more news of Frankfurt; in contrast, more Rundschau readers 
(37%) than Neue Presse readers (32%) wanted more news of 
Germany. 



Report No. 58(1 May 1947) 



CONFIDENCE IN NEWS IN PRESENT-DAY GERMANY 

Sample: 3,400 adults in the American Zone and the 
American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: unspecified. (9 pp.) 

A large majority in both the American Zone (74%) and in West 
Berlin (85%) considered the news at the time of the survey to 
be more trustworthy than news during the war. The more one 
was incUned to suspect the postwar news, the greater the 
sympathy for the idea of National Socialism: Of the four per 
cent who thought postwar news was less accurate, 89 per cent 
thought National SociaHsm was a good idea badly carried out, 
as did only 5 1 per cent of those reporting postwar news to be 
more accurate. When questioned as to the accuracy of the 
postwar news, 46 per cent said that all or most of it was 
truthful, 27 per cent thought about half of it truthful, and nine 
per cent said that little of the postwar news was truthful. A 
majority (55%) felt that little of the wartime news was truthful. 
Those holding wartime news to be more accurate than or just as 
accurate as postwar news contained proportionately larger 
numbers of young, well-educated, and prosperous people. 

Comparing the radio and newspapers, 37 per cent of 
AMZON Germans thought them equal in bringing the most 
trustworthy news; 24 per cent were more inchned to rely on 
the radio and eight per cent the newspapers. In West Berhn, 
however, most (32%) considered newspapers more trustworthy, 
with 26 per cent relying more on the radio and 19 per cent 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 159 



finding them equally trustworthy. Most in both the American 
Zone (43%) and West Berhn (59%) said newspapers brought 
more complete news. 



Report No. 59 (10 May 1947) 



EXPECTATIONS REGARDING REPARATIONS 

Sample: 2,998 persons living in the American Zone and 
401 in the American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: February 1947. (6 pp.) 

There were almost no discernible population differences con- 
cerning reparations, although West Berliners, as usual, displayed 
more sophistication and had a heightened degree of awareness 
of various facets of the problem as compared with AMZON 
residents. In addition, West Berliners tended to be somewhat 
more optimistic regarding Germany's future while at the same 
time appreciating even more fully than the people in AMZON 
that the Russians were prepared to insist on stiff reparations. 

Almost all people (82%) believed that a higher reparations 
bill would be submitted to the German people following World 
War II than had been submitted after World War I. A large 
majority also expected that it would take a very long time to 
pay off these reparations: Only 13 per cent in West Berlin and 
ten per cent in AMZON estimated a period under 20 years. 
Large majorities estimated that the payments would generally 
be accomplished by means of goods or through production (30 
per cent in AMZON; 48 per cent in West Berlin). Fewer believed 
that they would be paid by the removal of factories and 
machines (14 and 13 per cent, respectively). A plurality of 
AMZON respondents (44 per cent as opposed to 33 per cent in 
West Berlin) considered that both types of payments would be 
made. 

Nearly all Germans (74 per cent in AMZON; 84 per cent in 
West Berlin) thought that the Soviet Union would demand the 



160 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



heaviest reparations; half the AMZON Germans (50%) and 39 
per cent of the West Berliners thought that France would make 
the highest demands (multiple responses were permitted). Al- 
though in an earlier survey (January 1947) 71 per cent of the 
AMZON Germans indicated optimism regarding their personal 
future, a solid majority of 56 per cent said in February that an 
improvement in the standard of living was not possible while 
Germany was paying off the reparations. 



Report No. 60 (April 1947) 

TRENDS IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION 

Sample: the number of respondents varied from 365 in the 
first survey to 3,500 interviewed in April 1947; the total 
number of persons interviewed was more than 75,000 in 
the American Zone and in the American and British 
Sectors of Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: from 26 October 1945 to 7 April 1947 
during which time forty complete studies of the American 
Zone were made as well as an additional 23 surveys of 
smaller size and in limited areas. (43 pp.) 

This report summarizes in graphic form major trends of 
German opinion in the American occupied areas, covering seven 
major issues: economic affairs, food, the occupation, Nurem- 
berg Trials, media, politics, and reorientation. 

Economic Affairs. The proportion of the population who 
said that their incomes were adequate remained constant 
between November 1945 and July 1946 but then began to 
decline. General opinion that prices would rise increased sharply 
between January and June 1946; half the population believed 
that anti-inflationary measures would not succeed. In December 
1945 nearly eight in ten people thought that conditions would 
improve within six months whereas in April 1947 only 45 per 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 161 



cent held this view. Confidence in the continued value of the 
Reichsmark suffered a constant decline after April 1946, when 
54 per cent had such confidence; by October 1946, 43 per cent 
thought that its value would drop. Confidence in both AUied 
money and the German Reichsmark dechned between April and 
October 1946, with over half saying that they saw no difference 
between the two. 

Food. Although there was extensive complaining about 
the rationing of food, almost everyone agreed that the ration 
card system was being handled justly, with only a slight decrease 
between November 1945 and May 1946 from 93 to 88 per cent. 
Belief that the food ration was larger in some zones than in 
others gained less support in May 1946 (47%) than it did in 
March (60%). Between November 1945 and April 1947 people 
spoke of being worried about food more than about any other 
matter. Urban residents were three times as likely to mention it 
as were rural people; the latter, in turn, were twice as Hkely to 
complain about the lack of clothing and shoes as were city 
dwellers. 

The Occupation. In November 1945, 70 per cent of those 
interviewed in AMZON said that the American occupation 
forces had furthered the reconstruction of Germany; by 
September 1946 this proportion had shrunk to 44 per cent of 
the population. At the same time there was a steady increase in 
the size of the group without an opinion on the issue and, in the 
last two surveys, there was a sharp increase in the proportion 
saying that the Americans were hindering that reconstruction. 

Nuremberg Trials. A heavy majority of about eight in ten 
persons felt that the trials were conducted justly. Readership of 
newspaper reports concerning the trials declined from a high of 
eight in ten persons in January 1946 to 65 per cent in March 
1946, and then rose once again to the original figure on the day 
following publication of the verdicts. As the trials progressed, 
waning confidence in the completeness and trustworthiness in 
the newspaper reports was displayed; nonetheless, even at the 



162 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



lowest point, seven in ten people were satisfied with the 
integrity and detail of the reports. 

Media. The number of regular newspaper readers among 
AMZON residents declined 13 percentage points between 
January and October 1946, when it reached 63 per cent. Three 
surveys conducted between January and December 1946 
revealed that slightly more than one-half of the population were 
radio listeners. 

Politics. Claimed political interest rose gradually between 
October 1945 and June 1946 and then dropped off sharply, 
following the conclusion of general elections. The proportion of 
people considering poHtical meetings to be worthwhile rose 
from 60 to 72 per cent between November 1945 and March 
1946. In AMZON, until mid-summer 1946, the CDU/CSU 
enjoyed about 40 per cent plurality of membership or pref- 
erence over other parties, with the SPD in second place, favored 
by about 30 per cent. Later studies revealed that while the SPD 
did not make any substantial gain, the CDU/CSU suffered a loss 
of about ten per cent of its following, with most of the 
defectors saying that they no longer favored any party. Less 
than one in ten supported the LDP/DVP and between two and 
three per cent favored the KPD. In Bavaria, the CSU was the 
foremost party (about 40 per cent); the SPD was second with 
about three in ten; about one- fourth of the people preferred no 
party; the KPD and the LDP each held about five per cent of 
the population; and the WAV claimed three to four per cent. In 
Berlin, from a low point of 36 per cent in the spring of 1946, 
the SPD increased its following to 68 per cent by December 
1946; less than two in ten expressed a preference for the CDU; 
and very few people indicated that they had no party 
preference. 

Reorientation. Although about 35 per cent of the popu- 
lation felt that the occupation was a humiliation, about 55 per 
cent did not think so. In the course of eleven surveys made 
between November 1945 and December 1946, an average of 47 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 163 



per cent of the people thought that National Socialism was a 
good idea, badly carried out; 41 per cent said that it was a bad 
idea; 12 per cent held no opinion. The percentage of persons 
indicating satisfaction with the denazification process decreased 
from 57 per cent in March 1946 to 34 per cent in December 
1946. The proportion of the German population indicating a 
preference for neither communism nor National Socialism rose 
from 22 per cent to 66 per cent between November 1945 and 
November 1946. Those favoring communism decreased in 
number, those favoring National Socialism remained constant, 
and a considerable decrease was noted in the number of those 
holding no opinion. About seven in ten said that the Germans 
were not responsible for the war. Approximately one in three 
people indicated that they were troubled by rumors, with the 
most frequently heard rumor being that of an impending war 
with the Soviet Union. Only half the respondents said that they 
considered themselves sufficiently well informed about political 
events. A majority of AMZON residents felt that the best way 
to achieve the reconstruction of Germany was through "hard 
work." Between ten and 15 per cent hoped for a new strong 
Fuehrer and/or the rebirth of the old national spirit. 



Report No. 61 (12 June 1947) 



SOME ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SCHOOL SYSTEM 
IN WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN 

Sample: 650 people representing a cross-section of adults 

in Wuerttemberg-Baden. 

Interviewing dates: first three weeks of May 1947. (6 pp.) 

A solid majority (62%) of the public in the Land of Wuerttem- 
berg-Baden expressed satisfaction with the ability of the 
schools, under normal conditions, to fulfill the needs of German 
youth. Only a minority (30%), however, felt that school 
children could receive training equal to their abiUties, 44 per 



164 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



cent felt such complete training depended on the financial and 
social position of the parents. 

A large majority (71%) supported the idea of school 
boards elected in each Kreis (county). A large majority of those 
supporting such elections was firmly convinced that economic 
bias operated to deny some children the training that their 
talents would seem to demand. Leadership groups - the well- 
educated, men, residents of large towns and cities — were more 
dissatisfied with the school system than were the poorly 
educated, the women, or small town and village residents. 
Catholics were less informed and had less interest in public 
school matters, possibly because they relied more heavily upon 
private institutions. 



Report No. 62 (14 June 1947) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD A PEACE TREATY 
AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE MOSCOW 
CONFERENCE 

Sample: 600 people living in Hesse, Wuerttemberg-Baden, 
and West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: during the last week in April and the 
first week in May 1947. (8 pp.) 

Most people knew that a conference had been held among the 
Allies and that it had broken up. Asked about the latest news 
they had heard concerning the conference, replies varied from 
the simple statement that it had ended (31 per cent in West 
Berlin; 28 per cent in Hesse; 24 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden) 
to more specific replies such as reference to Secretary of State 
Marshall's radio address upon his return home, or reports on the 
disunity of the Allies. 

Not surprisingly, majority opinion held that the con- 
ference had accomplished nothing. A few took a more sanguine 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 65 



view, pointing out positive measures helpful to Germany or 
suggesting that at least Allied differences were finally out in the 
open. Those interviewed tended to blame the Soviet Union for 
the lack of results at the Moscow Conference (49 per cent in 
West Berlin; 31 per cent in Hesse; 41 per cent in Wuerttem- 
berg-Baden). About half this number spoke of disunity among 
the Allies as the reason. 

Although many people believed that a delay in signing a 
treaty would mean milder terms (58 per cent in West Berlin; 39 
per cent in Hesse; 42 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden), 
majority opinion favored an immediate treaty (65 per cent in 
West Berlin; 57 per cent in Hesse; 52 per cent in Wuerttem- 
berg-Baden). Only in West Berlin did a majority (57%) think 
that a treaty would be signed by the summer of 1948. In Hesse 
and Wuerttemberg-Baden majorities either thought that it 
would take more than two years to complete a treaty or had no 
idea how long it would take. Most Germans had a good idea of 
what they thought ought to be included in the treaty. 
Uppermost in their minds were economic reconstruction, bound- 
aries—especially to the east— the return of prisoners of war, 
reparations, disarmament, form of government. Whatever the 
terms of the treaty, those interviewed were certain that the mere 
fact of settlement would lead to improved conditions in Germany 
(85 per cent in West Berhn; 74 per cent in Hesse; 79 per cent in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden). 

A great number of Germans agreed that there were two 
major problems facing the Alhes: Allied unity or disunity and 
the problem of food. Aside from the treaty, majorities in West 
Berlin (55%), Hesse (63%), and Wuerttemberg-Baden (68%) 
considered food to be the most important problem facing 
Germany itself. Economic reconstruction followed in second 
place. 



166 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 63 (8 August 1947) 



GERMAN OPINION TOWARD THE PROSPECTIVE PEACE 
TREATY 

Sample: 2,986 respondents in the American Zone and in 
the American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: June 1947. (10 pp.) 

A majority of the public, looking back at the Moscow 
Conference, condemned the Russians for obstructionism. A 
fourth of those questioned felt that the Conference definitively 
outlined the separate points of view held by the Allies or, at 
least, were conducted with good will on all sides. 

A very large majority of AMZON Germans (82%) thought 
that a peace treaty would mean an improvement in Germany's 
situation. This feeling was so general throughout the population 
that there were no significant differences among any of the 
major population groups. Among those who credited the United 
States with giving aid to German reconstruction, however, an 
even larger majority (88%) looked forward to an improvement 
in their lot after a peace treaty. Those denying the existence of 
such aid were less apt (76%) to expect improvements. 

About half (49%) the people did not expect that the Allies 
would complete a peace treaty by the summer of 1948, 
although a large minority (35%) did believe that Allied unity on 
the matter would be achieved by then. Those expecting 
agreement tended to be drawn from the broad masses of the 
population, whereas critics and skeptics were much more often 
upper class, well-educated men, or former NSDAP members. 

The most important thing hoped for by all population 
groups was a revival of German trade and commerce. Higher 
socioeconomic status groups suggested, as the next in impor- 
tance, provision for widened national boundaries, a unified 
democratic government, and relief from financial difficulties, 
including reparations payments. Lower socioeconomic status 
groups spoke in more simple terms, stressing the return of 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 167 



prisoners of war, relief from the burden imposed by the 
presence of evacuees, and an improvement of the food 
situation. 



Report No. 64 (25 August 1947) 



TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FOOD SITUATION 

Sample: a cross-section of the adult population in the 

American Zone and in the American and British Sectors of 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: from several surveys made between 

February 1946 and June 1947. (7 pp.) 

In the course of the year, the German public became 
increasingly skeptical about the amount of food that the United 
States sent to Germany. Whereas in July 1946, 73 per cent 
believed the American claim that they were providing a fifth of 
the total food supply, by June 1947 only 49 per cent believed 
this claim. Relatively more Bavarians were skeptical of the claim 
than residents of either Hesse or Wuerttemberg-Baden. Support 
for the claim tended to come more from among men, the better 
educated, the self-styled upper class, and former Nazi Party 
members. 

In June 1947, regular newspaper readers were more likely 
(52%) than occasional readers and nonreaders (45 per cent 
each) to believe that America's imports amounted to a fifth of 
the Zone's food. Fewer nonreaders, however, than readers denied 
the claim. Proportionately as many urban as rural people 
reportedly beheved the American claim although the number of 
denials increased with city size: 45 per cent of the residents of 
large cities in contrast to 33 per cent in small villages rejected 
the claim. Some of these opinions evidently resulted from the 
fact that urban residents had a harder time getting food than 



168 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



did rural residents. In fact, in June 1947, when 64 per cent of 
the people in rural areas said that they had enough food to get 
along, only 22 per cent of the urban dwellers could make this 
claim. And when the question was refined still further to 
whether or not they had enough food to do their work well, the 
figures for the two groups went down even further, to 50 per 
cent for rural residents and nine per cent for urban dwellers. 

Despite dissatisfaction with the food supply, AMZON 
residents felt that they were the best fed in the four zones. In 
June 1947, 41 per cent of AMZON Germans thought that the 
rations were smallest in the Soviet Zone, 28 per cent mentioned 
the French Zone, 18 per cent saia the British Zone. Interest- 
ingly enough, West Berliners placed the French Zone at the top 
of the list with 40 per cent and the Soviet Zone second with 3 1 
per cent. 



Report No. 65 (27 September 1947) 



ATTITUDES OF BAVARIANS TOWARD LORITZ' DISMISSAL 

Sample: 1 ,6 1 4 Bavarians. 

Interviewing dates: between 14 July and 4 August 1947. 

(4 pp.) 

This survey was made to test reactions to the dismissal of Alfred 
Loritz from his positions as Denazification Minister in Bavaria 
and leader of the WAV. 

A sohd majority (69%) had heard of the affair and most of 
these (63%) knew that both posts were involved in the ouster. 
Nearly four in ten (38%) felt that the post of Denazification 
Minister was of greater concern to the pubUc and had an opinion 
on this move whereas only 24 per cent were ready to judge his 
removal from the party leadership. 

Those best informed about Loritz' dismissal from these 
posts tended to come from among former NSDAP members, 
men, upper classes, and the well educated. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 169 



Very few respondents opposed the dismissals: Only five 
per cent thought that he ought to have remained as Denazifica- 
tion Minister, as opposed to 33 per cent who favored the 
dismissal; and four per cent favored his continuance as party 
leader, with 20 per cent against it and 32 per cent not 
interested. 



Report No. 66 (27 September 1947) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 

Sample: 3,400 adults living in the American Zone and in 
the American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: not specified. (5 pp.) 

Most German adults living in the American Zone (78%) and in 
the American and British Sectors of Berlin (66%) were either 
uninformed or misinformed on whether corporal punishment 
was permitted in German schools. (Although there was no 
directive against such punishment, in practice it did not exist in 
AMZON schools.) 

Large majorities (65%) in AMZON and a smaller majority 
of 51 per cent in West Berhn approved granting teachers the 
right to whip or beat "very disobedient and very unruly 
children." Significantly, however, those who opposed (30%) 
tended to hold their opinion more strongly than proponents: 54 
per cent of the former group in AMZON said that their feeling 
was very strong whereas only 48 per cent of those favoring 
corporal punishment said that their opinion was very strong; 
comparable figures in West Berlin were 61 and 46 per cent, 
respectively. 

Parents gave high approval to corporal punishment in the 
schools regardless of whether their children were in or out of 
school (between 62 and 69 per cent). Only three groups in the 
AMZON population failed to register majority approval of the 
proposal to permit corporal punishment: the highly educated, 



170 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



communist party affiliates, and those with no church affiliation. 
Among CDU/CSU followers, those with seven years or less of 
schooling, women, Catholics, those who were never affiliated 
with the NSDAP, and small town people there were more 
proponents of corporal punishment than among their counter- 
part groups. 



Report No. 67 (10 October 1947) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL 
LEADERSHIP 

Sample: an unspecified number of adults in the American 

Zone. 

Interviewing dates: August 1947. (2 pp.) 

A large number of AMZON Germans (70%) thought that the 
United States would have the greatest intluence on world events 
in the following ten years. The Soviet Union took a poor second 
place with 13 per cent. No other country received any 
significant mention. Comparison with results from the same 
question when it was asked one year earlier showed that in the 
interim more Germans had become convinced that the United 
States would exert a predominant influence. 

Of those who thought that the United States would have a 
dominant role, 78 per cent thought that this influence would be 
for peace. Of those who had chosen the Soviet Union for the 
dominant position, 88 per cent felt it would result in war. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 71 



Report No. 68 (10 October 1947) 



TRENDS IN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATIONAL SOCIALISM 

Sample: unspecified number, representing a cross-section 
of the adults in the American Zone and the American and 
British Sectors of Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: between November 1945 and August 
1947. (5 pp.) 

Despite fluctuations, the percentage of Germans describing 
National Socialism as a good idea badly carried out remained at 
a fairly high number - starting at 53 per cent in November 
1945, dipping to a low of 42 per cent in July 1946, and rising 
again to 55 per cent by August 1947. Those regarding it as a bad 
idea rose from 41 per cent in November 1945 to 48 per cent in 
July 1946 but dropped once more to 35 per cent in August 1947. 
Another way of describing this trend is to say that, in the 
period from November 1945 to July 1946, the average number 
of people who thought National Socialism basically a good idea 
was 48 per cent; between December 1946 and August 1947 it 
was 52 per cent. 

In July 1947, opinions on this issue were related to 
attitudes toward democracy, individual liberty as against 
economic security, and the responsibility of Hitler and his 
advisers for his acts. People who tended to excuse National 
Sociahsm were most ready to pick flaws in the working of 
democracy (42%), to choose security (70%) rather than hberty 
(22%), and to throw the blame for Hitler's acts on his advisers 
(32%) rather than on Hitler himself (25%), with another 37 per 
cent blaming both. 

In August 1947, the population groups containing the 
largest proportion of persons describing National Sociahsm as a 
good idea badly carried out were persons with eight years of 
education (60%), those under 30 (68%), Protestants (64%), 
LDP/DVP party adherents (68%). More West Berliners (62%) 
held this view than Hessians (61%), residents of Wuerttemberg- 



172 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Baden (60%), and Bavarians (50%); Bavarians led the list of 
those who rejected Nazism as a bad idea (38%), followed by 
West Berliners and Hessians (33%), and residents of Wuerttem- 
berg-Baden(31%). 



Report No. 69 (16 October 1947) 



GERMAN OPINIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION 
OF EUROPE 

Sample: 3,400 people living in the American Zone and the 
American and British Sectors of Berhn. 
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (5 pp.) 

This report deals with German reactions to two issues involved 
in the possible organization of Europe: a "United States of 
Europe," and the Marshall Plan. 

On many issues of the day, the German people were 
apathetic, resigned, or persistently deluded. On some issues, 
however, such as turning to the west for economic and world 
leadership, their opinions were crystallized in positive direc- 
tions. Regarding intra-European matters, their orientation was 
also largely western. 

Asked to select from a checklist of 23 countries those 
which they thought should become part of a European nation, 
majorities of varying degrees voted to include each of the 
countries named except the Soviet Union, for which 38 per cent 
of the AMZON respondents voted. 

In this climate of opinion the Marshall Plan could not fail 
to elicit high approval. In August 1947, however, knowledge of 
the plan was neither extensive nor definite. Only 47 per cent 
claimed to have heard of it, and the amount of information held 
by about half of this group was extremely shaky. Not 
unexpectedly, educational background had a great deal to do 
with the level of information. After a brief description of the 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 73 



plan, all those interviewe4 were asked whether they thought it 
would solve Europe's economic difficulties; a large majority in 
AMZON (78%) and even more West Berliners (88%) thought it 
would. Separate population groups did not differ significantly 
in their estimation of the possibihties of working out Secretary of 
State Marshall's proposal. There was nonetheless one telling 
factor that differentiated those expressing confidence in the 
plan from those who did not. Among the confident, 75 per cent 
were convinced that the United States would have the greatest 
influence on world affairs during the next decade and only 12 
per cent thought that the Soviet Union would play this 
dominant role. Those expressing skepticism about the Marshall 
Plan were much more likely than the confident to believe that 
the Soviet role would be dominant (27%) and less often 
expected American leadership (58%). 



Report No. 70 (17 October 1947) 



GERMAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE REASONS FOR THE 
FOOD SHORTAGE 

Sample: 3,008 respondents from the American Zone in 
November 1946 and 3,007 in July 1947; 399 and 400, 
respectively, in West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: November 1946; July 1947. (6 pp.) 

In May 1946, immediately following the reduction in rations 
for the general public, 41 per cent of the AMZON Germans said 
that they thought food shortages in Germany and throughout 
the world had necessitated the cut; 27 per cent thought that 
poor crops and insufficient stocks were responsible. 

By November 1946, 46 per cent of the respondents 
attributed the situation to overpopulation through the arrival of 
DPs, evacuees, and "foreigners." This percentage held through 
midsummer 1947. Two significant changes, however, did take 



174 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



place between November 1946 and July 1947. Whereas at the 
earlier date 22 per cent felt that the lost war was responsible for 
the bad food situation, only ten per cent gave this as the reason 
in July 1947. More, however, had come to blame the black 
market: Instead of eight per cent making this charge, as was the 
case in 1946, 26 per cent considered this reason pertinent in the 
summer of 1947. 

Both of these changes were reflected in West Berlin 
thinking, too, but in addition the summer poll showed 37 per 
cent accusing the occupying powers (read "Russians") with 
taking away too much; only 18 per cent had made a similar 
charge a year ear her. 



Report No. 71 (17 October 1947) 



BERLIN: SYMBOL OF A NATIONAL STATE 

Sample: 3,400 adults from the American Zone and the 
American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (4 pp.) 

This report summarizes German opinion on Berlin as the 
capital. Among West Berliners there was virtually unanimous 
agreement (93%) that Berlin ought to be the capital. In 
AMZON, however, opinion was rather differentiated. Hessians, 
with 70 per cent, were most in favor of Berlin as capital, 
the residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden followed with 58 per 
cent, and the Bavarians trailed behind with 52 per cent. In 
small towns and villages in AMZON the number of people 
withholding opinions was larger than in towns and cities, 
although Hessian villages tended to display more structured 
thinking than rural residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden and 
Bavaria. Thus in communities with less than 10,000 residents, 
72 per cent of the Hessians favored Berlin as the capital city, 59 
per cent of those in Wuerttemberg-Baden, and only 49 per cent 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 75 



of the Bavarians. In medium-sized towns, the largest amount of 
support for Berhn as capital city came from Hesse (63%). In 
both Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden, residents of these 
medium-sized towns were more favorably disposed toward 
Berhn (59 and 61 per cent, respectively) than their large city 
counterparts (58 and 53 per cent, respectively). 

In sum, the particularism of Bavarian villages had more 
influence than local civic pride among city dwellers in negating 
national feehngs, whereas in Hesse national pride in the villages 
induced more centrist thinking than was evident in the cities. In 
Wuerttemberg-Baden, community pride in the large cities acted 
as a damper to national feelings when compared with centrist 
dispositions in the smaller towns. 

About half (47%) of those not in favor of Berlin as capital 
said they would prefer Frankfurt; Munich was the next most 
popular choice (32%). 



Report No. 72 (November 1947) 



A REPORT ON GERMAN MORALE 

Sample: a representative sample of about 3,000 people 
from the American Zone and about 400 persons from the 
American and British Sectors of Berhn. 
Interviewing dates: first half of May 1947. (47 pp.) 

The report deals chiefly with four broad attitudinal areas which 
were thought to be basic elements in German morale: (1) 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the aims and practices of the 
Nazi regime; (2) awareness of and interest in public affairs; (3) 
voluntary participation in political and community hfe; and (4) 
optimistic or pessimistic outlook regarding the future. Participa- 
tion and awareness were most closely related but attitudes 
toward Nazism were found to be the variable showing the 
closest relation to all the others, suggesting that a good index to 



176 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



low morale is disposition toward the aims and practices of 
National Socialism. 

Those dissatisfied with Nazism tended to be more liberal, 
more tolerant, and more optimistic, whereas those who were 
satisfied with it tended to show the opposite traits. People who 
were aware tended to have a coldly reaUstic but pessimistic 
outlook on Hfe; the unaware displayed greater optimism. Those 
in the former group were in general the better educated, city 
dwellers, business and professional people, communists, former 
soldiers, and NSDAP members. The least aware were in general 
from the lower class, women, farmers, the least educated, and 
the elderly. 

Very few Germans participated in community life to any 
appreciable extent; those that did had characteristics and 
attitudes similar to those of the "aware" group described above. 
Confidence in the future did not vary with any population 
dimensions except education: Those with the best education 
were the least confident. Those under thirty exhibited a 
pessimism that went far beyond that of any other population 
group. The upper social classes were better informed than the 
lower and tended also to be more pessimistic. There were 
indications that wealthy people were more afraid of com- 
munism than the lower class respondents and, therefore, if 
forced to choose, would tend to select National Socialism over 
communism. 

Each political party showed a characteristic pattern of 
responses distinguishing it from the others. SPD affiliates 
appeared relatively optimistic and relatively satisfied with the 
way in which the occupation powers were working. CDU/CSU 
followers were found to be the least well informed, whereas 
LDP/DVP supporters were among the best informed. WAV 
voters showed the greatest sympathy with the aims of National 
Socialism. 

The final section of the report is an appendix containing 
the questions asked together with the breakdown of responses 
by AMZON Germans. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 177 



Report No. 73 (28 October 1947) 



A GUIDE TO SOME PROPAGANDA PROBLEMS 

Sample: a representative sample of 500 adults in West 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: unspecified. (1 1 pp.) 

Four types of statements on 14 topics were used: One set was 
unfavorable to the United States, another was phrased favor- 
ably, the third presented alternative propositions in as fair and 
objective a manner as possible, and the fourth was unfavorable 
to the United States with the source of the charge given as the 
Soviet Union. 

The average number giving favorable responses to the 
"objective" or "balanced" questions was 75 per cent. This 
figure moved up only three percentage points to 78 per cent in 
response to the statements with a pro-American bias but moved 
down ten percentage points to 65 per cent in response to 
anti-American propositions. When these anti-American proposi- 
tions were identified as Russian-sponsored, the average moved 
up to 81 per cent. 

The claim presented in one question that imperialistic aims 
underlay United States foreign policy had real plausibility to 
the Germans unless presented as a Soviet claim. Statements 
deahng with capitalistic domination of America were parti- 
cularly disadvantageous to the United States; counterclaims to 
these did not relieve the effectiveness of such charges. At least 
one "favorable" overstatement, regarding the treatment of 
Negroes in the United States, elicited a more negative response 
(with 58 per cent of the sample responding in a pro- American 
fashion) than the comparable "unfavorable" (77%) and 
"balanced" (81%) statement. 

Asked after the interview (which included 15 or more 
additional questions) to recall the one or two statements which 
first came to mind, people tended to recall unfavorable rather 
than compUmentary statements about the United States. 
Generally best remembered were statements about the treat- 



178 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



ment of Negroes, followed by the charge that a third of 
America's population was ill-fed, ill-housed, and ill-clothed, 
allegations that the United States was determined to dominate 
the world, or that American society was composed of money- 
grabbing people. 



Report No. 74 (27 October 1947) 



ATTITUDES OF AMZON GERMANS TOWARD 
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 

Sample: more than 3,400 Germans in the American Zone 
and in the American and British Sectors of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: August 1947. (17 pp.) 

Although a majority of AMZON Germans (59 per cent as 
contrasted to 44 per cent in West Berlin) said that they did not 
know enough about what was happening politically, 78 per cent 
(73 per cent in West BerUn) did not want to know more and 64 
per cent (45 per cent in West Berlin) never thought about 
politics, preferring to leave that to others. Most (61%) would 
not take any effective measures to protest an unpopular 
poUtical measure and 96 per cent said that they had never 
written to an official about a political matter. Nonetheless, 
more were inclined to hold officials responsible for government 
than to put the responsibility on the electorate. 

More people thought a democratic republic to be the most 
probable form of government for Germany (40%), preferred it 
(56%), and thought it best for the German economy (47%) than 
any other kind. Regardless of the form of government, however, 
six in ten AMZON residents and 89 per cent of the West 
Berhners preferred that that government have its headquarters in 
Berlin. 

AMZON and West Berlin Germans not only claimed 
preference for a democratic republican form of government, but 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 1 79 



they were also unable, or unwilling, to criticize the idea of 
democracy to any important extent. In contrast, 71 per cent in 
AMZON and 57 per cent in West Berlin did not hesitate to say 
that communism was entirely bad. Small, well-informed groups, 
however, did specify faults in democracy and point out good 
aspects of communism. 

Despite the claimed preference for democracy, when 
forced to choose between a government guaranteeing liberty 
and one providing economic security, 62 per cent selected the 
latter and 26 per cent the former. Moreover, less than half 
(44%) of the AMZON Germans and half (50%) of the West 
Berliners felt that the Germans were capable of running a 
democratic government at that time, with corruption and 
disunity cited as the primary reasons. Further, almost four in 
ten could not mention any way in which democracy could help 
their country. 

Considering the avowed disinterest in political matters and 
the confusion attending their thinking about government, the 
Germans were fairly well informed about politics. 



Report No. 75 (28 October 1947) 



WHAT BERLINERS EXPECT FROM THE LONDON 
CONFERENCE 

Sample: 254 people from the borough of Neukoelln in 

West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: between 12 and 21 October 1947. (7 

pp.) 

If the Berliners of Neukoelln had had their way, the Allies 
would have agreed on a peace treaty for Germany at the 
London Conference and they would have agreed to reconstitute 
Germany as a political and economic unit. As a second best 
solution, they hoped for free economic exchange between 



180 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



zones. Hopes and actual expectations, however, were quite 
different. Only 14 per cent believed that the Conference would 
result in a treaty, although 60 per cent thought there would be 
agreement at least on some points. One in four (24%) felt that 
there would be no agreement whatsoever, and about the same 
number (23%) thought that there would never be agreement 
among the Allies on a peace treaty. In fact, a plurality (32%) 
expected that the result of the Conference would be a Germany 
divided into two autonomous areas. At the same time, such a 
division was what they feared most as a possible outcome. 

If a split came, 74 per cent predicted that the United 
States would remain in Berlin. If the Americans were to have 
left, however, 59 per cent said that they too would have wanted 
to go. 

Of those familiar with the Marshall Plan (69%), a majority 
hoped to see it carried out. A plurality (41%) believed that the 
United States had political aims in suggesting the plan and quite 
a few (23%) thought it was primarily to secure profits for 
Americans. A sixth (16%) expected the United States to profit 
more from the Marshall Plan, nine per cent Europe, and 40 per 
cent expected both to profit equally. 



Report No. 76 (29 October 1947) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FOUR OCCUPYING 
POWERS 

Sample: an unspecified number of respondents in the 

American Zone and in the American and British Sectors of 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: spring and summer of 1947. (4 pp.) 

AMZON Germans were not convinced that the Allies or the 
United States were doing all they could to rebuild Germany, 
although more of them were ready to acknowledge American 
than Allied help. Thus 44 per cent of the AMZON Germans (as 
contrasted to 74 per cent in West Berlin) said that the United 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 181 



States had furthered the rebuilding of Germany, whereas only 
31 per cent (47 per cent in West BerUn) admitted such help 
from the AUies. Equally noteworthy is the fact that 33 per cent 
(16 per cent in West Berlin) claimed that the United States had 
hindered reconstruction; 43 per cent (45 per cent in West Berlin) 
made the same charge against the Allies. 

AMZON Germans were strongly convinced (70%) that the 
United States would wield the most influence in world affairs 
during the next ten years, and 55 per cent of the total 
population felt that this influence would be directed toward 
peace. Of the 13 per cent who thought such world influence 
would be wielded by the Soviet Union, most (11%) thought it 
would lead to war. 

Of the four Allies, the Germans most trusted the United 
States to treat Germany fairly (63%); 45 per cent placed much 
trust in the British, only four per cent in the French, and none 
in the Russians. An overwhelming number of AMZON Germans 
(84%) would have picked the United States as an occupying 
power if history could have been turned back. AMZON Germans 
were also firm in their opinion that they were better off than 
people in any of the other three zones. 



Report No. 77 (5 November 1947) 



OPINIONS ON THE PRESS IN THE AMERICAN ZONE OF 
GERMANY 

Sample: approximately 3,400 people living in the Ameri- 
can Zone and in the American and British Sectors of 
Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: July 1947. (13 pp.) 

Almost half (47%) of the AMZON respondents felt that there 
was a free press in AMZON; in West Berhn the figure was as 
high as 66 per cent. Over two-thirds (68%) of those who read 
the Neue Zeitung, which was published by the American 
authorities, considered this paper to be free. 



182 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Six out of ten (60%) of those interviewed did not think 
that German editors were permitted to print everything they- 
considered to be correct and two-thirds (64%) felt that they 
ought to be allowed to do so. 

About one in ten (6 per cent in AMZON; 12 per cent in 
West Berlin) preferred a party press to an independent press 
although a large number of people (27 and 42 per cent, 
respectively) were willing to have poUtical parties publish 
newspapers if independent papers continued to be published as 
well. Much of the sentiment against the party press reflected the 
negative attitudes toward poHtical parties generally. At the same 
time there was a great deal of misinformation about the party 
press; over half of those living in AMZON did not know that 
existing papers were independently edited. Among the informed 
respondents, there was more sentiment in favor of an in- 
dependent press than among the uninformed. 



Report No. 78 (6 November 1947) 



BAVARIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NEWSPAPERS 

Sample: 1,613 adults representing a cross-section of the 

population in Bavaria. 

Interviewing dates: August 1947. (4 pp.) 

Half the people in Bavaria (53%) claimed to be regular 
newspaper readers, as compared with 55 per cent who had made 
the same claim one month earher in AMZON. Not unex- 
pectedly, regular readers tended to be the well-educated, from 
the upper social classes, men, and former NSDAP members. 
Among former NSDAP members, 76 per cent claimed regular 
readership, in contrast to 50 per cent of the nonaffiliates. 

About three-fifths of the Bavarians questioned felt that the 
newspapers carried enough Bavarian as well as community news 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 183 



items. Almost a fifth, liowever, wished there were more of both. 
Regular readers were more Ukely than occasional readers to say 
that the papers they were reading were good, although 48 per 
cent of them thought that they were only fair. 



Report No. 79 (22 November 1947) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN CAPITALISM 

Sample: about 2,250 residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden and 

Bavaria, and an unspecified number of respondents in West 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: between 15 September and 15 October 

1947. (7 pp.) 

The heart of the questionnaire was comprised of fourteen 
questions, each one of which had been cast into four different 
forms for presentation to four separate but comparable cross- 
sections of the people. One set was phrased unfavorably to 
America; a second preceded each of these statements with an 
identification of the source of the charge as Russian; a third 
presented alternative propositions on the fourteen topics; and 
the fourth presented favorably phrased propositions in as fair 
and objective a sense as possible. 

The average of the favorable responses to all 56 questions 
was 59 per cent in the two southern Laender and 75 per cent in 
West BerUn. The average percentage of favorable responses 
varied with the wording of the question - from unfavorable 
statements with the source identified (64 per cent in Bavaria 
and Wuerttemberg-Baden), to statements favorable to the 
United States (63%), to objective or balanced statements (59%), 
to statements unfavorable to the United States (49%). 

In addition to a simple reply to the questions asked, 
respondents were requested to indicate the strength of their 



184 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



feelings on the various topics. No fewer than seven in ten 
persons were favorably disposed toward the United States on 
the issue of national capitalism. Scarcely more than one in ten 
held the opposite view. Both groups, however, held their 
opinions with a high degree of intensity. The most significant 
characteristic of the people who were firmly and favorably 
disposed toward the United States and the Americans was their 
high educational level. In addition, the majority of the group 
were men of rather high socioeconomic status. There were 
relatively few regular churchgoing Catholics, 95 per cent of 
them read newspapers, and about six in ten sometimes listened 
to the radio. The people on the other side of the fence - those 
who were firmly and unfavorably disposed toward the United 
States and to Americans — were markedly average in their 
educational background; they were mainly women; 52 per cent 
of them might be classified as upper lower socioeconomic 
status; and they tended to be nonchurchgoing Protestants. The 
in-between group - those open to persuasion by one or the 
other point of view — comprised primarily people with only 
seven years or less of schooUng, more than six in ten were 
women, nearly half attended Catholic services regularly, more 
than seven in ten came from the lowest socioeconomic group, 
and nearly half lived in villages with fewer than 2,000 
population. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 185 



Report No. 80 (26 November 1947) 



OPINIONS ON DENAZIFICATION 

Sample: a random selection of 300 names from the 
Meldebogen files of former NSDAP members as well as 
3,000 people representing a cross-section of the American 
Zone population. 
Interviewing dates: September 1947. (9 pp.) 

This report on the impact of the denazification program deals 
with three groups: former party members (PGs) whose 
Meldebogen were still on active file, those who during the 
interview admitted former affiliation with the NSDAP, and 
those who claimed no connection with the Nazi party and were 
not affected by the Law of National Liberation. 

Among the Meldebogen group and the claimed PGs, about 
four in ten had not yet been cleared. The members of the two 
groups differed from each other to a certain extent, but, as 
compared with the population as a whole, they were more alike 
than different. Each group contained more well-educated people, 
more upper middle-class people, more former soldiers, and more 
men than did the nonaffected public; they also contained more 
apolitical people. 

Although many more former PGs than other Germans lost 
their jobs temporarily after 1945, only about eight per cent 
were still unemployed in September 1947. Almost all of the 
former PGs who had new jobs thought they were worse than 
their former ones. 

There was no clear-cut division on whether the purpose of 
denazification was to remove National Socialist influence from 
pubUc life or to restore followers to their old jobs. Large 
majorities in both groups, as compared with only 56 per cent of 
the general pubUc, knew that the denazification procedures 
were conducted by Germans under Allied supervision. Those 
not affected by the procedures gave majority approval to 
denazification in principle, but majority disapproval to its 
methods. 



186 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



A majority of former PGs felt that denazification had had 
a greater impact on the economic life than on the political Hfe 
of Germany; those not affected who had opinions on the matter 
tended to divide evenly on the two aspects. 

The most frequently mentioned result of denazification 
was the lack of capable officials and businessmen. 



Report No. 81 (3 December 1947) 



GERMAN REACTIONS TO EXPELLEES AND DP'S 

Sample: a cross-section of native residents and expellees in 
the American Zone. 

Interviewing dates: March 1946, November 1946, June 
1947, and September 1947. (9 pp.) 

Expellees and native Germans were almost unanimous in the 
belief that the expulsions were unjustified. Dissatisfaction 
among both groups increased, with seven per cent of the 
expellees saying in March 1 946 that they were not satisifed with 
the way they had been treated and 45 per cent expressing this 
view by September 1947; among native residents, in March 
1946 a fourth (25%) predicted that the expellees would not get 
along with the native population and in September 1947 almost 
half (46%) made this prediction. Six out of ten native Germans 
(59%) considered the expellees to be German citizens; they 
were also the respondents most Ukely to think that the 
expellees would adjust to their new surroundings. 

A vast majority of the expellees (85%) would go back to 
the place of their birth if they had a chance; nine out of ten 
native residents (91%) also felt that the expellees would go 
home if they could. 

Two-thirds (66%) of AMZON residents predicted that the 
displaced persons would not be able to get along with the native 
population, and as few as three per cent of those interviewed 
considered the DPs to be German citizens. About one in seven 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 187 



(25%) thought that Germany should be responsible for the 
support of the DPs, with one-third (32%) placing this responsi- 
bility at the door of the DPs' native country. 



Report No. 82 (8 December 1947) 

GERMAN SENTIMENT FOR PEACE AND ECONOMIC 
SECURITY 

Sample: in the course of three surveys, 1,470, 3,005, and 
3,004 interviews were conducted in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: 26 April 1946, 10 December 1946, and 
4 August 1947.(5 pp.) 

Large and sohd majorities of the public consistently rejected 
many of the propositions, presented to them in the interviews, 
expressing a basic inclination toward the values of militarism or 
war. At the same time, more than half the public did not deny 
the idea of racial superiority with its implication of a right to 
rule. The three statements with which respondents most 
frequently agreed were: "The human spirit is not glorified by 
war alone" (96%); "War does not pay" (94%); and "A civilian is 
not less worthy than a soldier" (90%). (Complete wordings and 
results appear in an appendix in the report.) 

Reaction to the propositions suggests that the German 
public saw only a partial or indirect relationship between the 
actions of their government and themselves. Probably still more 
basic to this problem is the German outlook on individual 
rights. Asked to choose between a government that provides 
economic security and one which guarantees civil hberties, the 
majority (62%) preferred the former and many fewer (26%) 
chose the latter. Asked which was the most important of the 
basic freedoms, 31 percent mentioned commercial freedom, 22 
per cent chose religious freedom, 1 9 per cent free elections, and 
only 14 per cent free speech. 



188 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 83 (9 December 1947) 



NEWSPAPER READERSHIP AND NEWSCAST LISTENING 

Sample: more than 1,500 Bavarian adults and over 600 

adults from Wuerttemberg-Baden, as well as 500 West 

Berliners. 

Interviewing dates: latter part of September 1947. (10 pp.) 

More than half of the people interviewed in Bavaria (53%) 
and Wuerttemberg-Baden (58%) considered themselves to be 
regular newspaper readers; in West Berlin nearly three-fourths 
(73%) made this claim. The most widely read paper in West 
Berlin was the British licensed Telegraf, followed by the 
American hcensed Tagesspiegel. 

A fourth (25%) of the people in Bavaria and Wuerttem- 
berg-Baden (and 31 per cent in West Berlin) said that they 
listened to radio newscasts regularly. In both areas 90 per cent 
or more of the respondents Ustened to the local station. In West 
Berlin, Radio Berlin had 47 per cent of this audience, followed 
by RIAS with 38 per cent. 

Those who considered themselves regular newspaper 
readers or radio Usteners were generally inclined to think that 
the news they were getting was more rehable than what had 
been available during the war. Nonetheless, more than a quarter 
apparently felt that there had been Uttle change. 

Regular readers and listeners were also more inclined than 
others to assert an interest in political matters. Neither 
newspaper reading nor radio listening, however, appeared to 
influence opinions on the intention of the Allies regarding 
Germany; only about two in ten of all groups felt that the Allies 
would unite Germany. 

Not unexpectedly, the more educated, men, urban resi- 
dents, and those of higher socioeconomic status were more 
likely than their counterparts to read newspapers and Hsten to 
radio newscasts. In September 1947, only seven per cent of the 
Bavarian respondents and 13 per cent of the people in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden said that they read newspapers from other 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS/ 189 



zones. More than eight in ten of those out-of-zone newspaper 
readers claimed preference for AMZON papers. The readers 
themselves possessed, for the most part, those characteristics 
usually associated with the most alert, best informed population 
groups. 



Report No. 84 (17 December 1947) 



WHO ARE THE EXPELLEES AND WHAT DO THEY THINK? 

Sample: 466 expellees and 2,373 native Germans in the 

American Zone. 

Interviewing dates: September 1947. (10 pp.) 

According to the October 1946 German census - one year 
before this survey was made— 16.2 per cent of the AMZON 
population came from former German territories; 8.3 per cent 
from Czechoslovakia, 4.3 per cent from territories east of the 
Oder-Neisse, 1.8 per cent from southeastern Europe, and 1.8 
per cent from other foreign countries. This report compares the 
socioeconomic characteristics and attitudes of these expellees 
with those of the native residents of the regions to which they 
had moved. 

The expellees were rather similar to the native population, 
both in their socioeconomic characteristics and in their atti- 
tudes. Six out of ten expellees (60%) were living in small towns 
of under 2,000 population and as few as five per cent lived in 
cities of over 100,000; for native AMZON residents the figures 
were 49 and 22 per cent, respectively. The age distribution of 
both groups was about the same, as was their education. 

The economic situation of the expellees, however, was 
considerably worse than that of the native residents. A third 
(34%) of the expellees received less than 70 Reichsniarks a 
month as compared to 19 per cent of the native population. 
Conversely, as few as 1 5 per cent of the new arrivals had 



190 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



monthly incomes above RM 200, whereas 34 per cent of the 
native Germans received this sum every month. The work status 
of expellees followed about the same pattern as that of the 
native Germans, except that few expellees were tradesmen and 
farmers and twice as many were working as unskilled laborers. 
Only 18 per cent of them were unemployed, and of these only 
three per cent were employable. 

About three-fourths (72%) of the new arrivals were 
Catholics, whereas only 52 per cent of the native population 
was Catholic. Twenty-six per cent of the expellees and 45 per 
cent of the native Germans were Protestants. Native Germans 
tended to go to church more regularly than the newcomers. 

Over half of the expellees (54%) as compared to 41 per 
cent of the native Germans said either that they favored none of 
the existing parties or that they had not yet decided which one 
they preferred. Among those who did express a party 
preference, about the same number of expellees (28%) and 
native Germans (27%) chose the SPD. 

Whereas 66 per cent of the native population claimed that 
they did not get enough to eat, 80 per cent of the expellees 
made this claim. Their greatest worry, however, was simply the 
fact of being an evacuee coupled with the desire to return to 
their homes. 

Close to 80 per cent of both expellees and native Germans 
lacked confidence in Allied reconstruction efforts. And the 
same number of new arrivals and native residents (41%) felt that 
local officials were working primarily for their own benefit. In 
addition, four out of ten expellees and long-time residents did 
not consider it worthwhile to hold political meetings. If forced 
to choose between communism or National Socialism, as few as 
two per cent of the expellees and four per cent of the native 
Germans chose communism. Almost the same number (37 and 
38 per cent, respectively) felt that National Socialism was a bad 
idea; whereas 52 per cent of the native population thought it 
was a good idea badly carried out, 46 per cent of the expellees 
held this viewpoint. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 191 



Report No. 85 (17 December 1947) 



SUMMARY OF TRENDS OF GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION 

Sample: not specified. 

Interviewing dates: between November 1945 and late 

1947. (6 pp.) 

Food. In November 1945, 20 per cent of the population 
mentioned food as their chief source of concern. This figure 
held, on the average, until March 1946 when it rose to 30 per 
cent — following a cut in food rations — and then to 40 per cent 
where it remained until February 1947; by the end of 1947 it 
had risen still higher, to 50 per cent. In Berlin the situation was 
consistently worse, with the figures rising from 52 per cent in 
March 1946 to a high of 74 per cent in July 1947, just before 
the harvest, and then back down to 57 per cent at the end of 
the year, following the harvest. 

Fuel. Concern about fuel closely followed seasonal needs, 
dropping almost to nothing in the summer, rising sharply in 
September, and with the peak in February. In AMZON, 
however, this peak was 1 4 per cent whereas in Berlin during the 
same winter the figure was 41 per cent. 

Other Worries. Mentions of clothing and shoe shortages 
rose, with eight per cent citing this in 1945 but 35 per cent 
concerned about it by 1947. The percentage concerned about 
prisoners of war decreased. Financial worries increased slightly. 

Politics. In the fall of 1945, 69 per cent of the 
population held pohtical meetings to be desirable but, by 
August 1947, the number responding in this way had dropped 
to 45 per cent. Local government officials did not maintain the 
confidence of the people: Whereas in August 1946, 42 per cent 
thought they were doing their jobs well, only half as many 



192 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



(22%) gave them the same credit in October 1947. In 1945, 62 
per cent said that they felt these officials were working for the 
good of the community, but by late 1947 only 45 per cent felt 
that this was the case. The number feehng that the jobs were 
being done for selfish reasons rose from 1 2 to 42 per cent. 

Loss of confidence in the Americans also occurred. In 
August 1947, 44 per cent of the people said that they thought 
the United States was helping in the reconstruction of 
Germany; in November 1945, however, this positive attitude 
had been expressed by 70 per cent of the people. Confidence in 
Allied cooperation deteriorated radically as well: In January 
1946, 15 per cent were pessimistic on this count; by the fall of 
1947 the figure had risen to 70 per cent. 

Confidence in news sources also dechned, from a high of 
75 per cent reporting daily in January 1946 that they read a 
newspaper to 55 per cent saying they did so in the fall of 1947. 

Concomitant with the loss of confidence in the Allies was 
a consistent reduction in the number of persons who would 
choose communism over National Socialism if forced to pick 
one: In the fall of 1945, 35 per cent of the people said that 
they would take communism; in late 1947 only four per cent 
made this choice. Those saying "neither" tripled during this 
time from 22 to 66 per cent. 

One figure that remained constant was the number of 
people (62%) who said they preferred economic security to 
guarantees of certain civil hberties. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 193 



Report No. 86 (17 December 1947) 



SUMMARY OF REACTIONS TO END OF LONDON 
CONFERENCE 

Sample: 188 West Berliners. 

Interviewing dates: 16 December 1947. (3 pp.) 

The interviews were conducted covertly on the streets of West 
Berlin following the conclusion of the London Conference. Two 
out of three (65%) had already heard about the end of the 
Conference. Many more (40%) blamed the Soviet Union for the 
breakup of the Conference than blamed the United States (1%). 
A plurality, however, spoke in terms of allotting some respon- 
sibihty to both sides (42%), although even these people put 
primary blame on the Soviets for the outcome. 

A large majority expected greater difficulties for Germany 
following the Conference. One in three persons (32%) beheved 
that Germany would eventually be divided into two parts. 
Another one in four (26%) felt that there would be no change 
in the current state of affairs. About 1 5 per cent thought the 
situation would deteriorate, possibly into war. About the same 
number (14%) suggested that a new conference might be called. 

Of those who felt that Germany would be spHt, 63 per 
cent expected no change in Berlin's status, 1 6 per cent thought 
that the Western Allies would leave and that the Soviets would 
take over the entire city, and 13 per cent thought that the city 
would also be split. 

The morale of the general public did not seem noticeably 
affected by the results of the Conference although there were 
indications that the people felt that events were taking place 
over which they had no control. The report ends with the 
suggestion that the Germans might be induced to see that it was 
the Russian refusal to accept principles rather than Allied 
disagreement that caused adjournment. 



194 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 87 (9 January 1948) 



THE TREND OF GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ALLIED 
COOPERATION 

Sample: an unspecified number comprising a representative 
sample of Germans in the American Zone and West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: 25 July 1946, 5 June 1947, 25 August 
1947, and 15 September 1947. (3 pp.) 

The failure of the Foreign Ministers' Conference in London was 
widely interpreted as responsible for the gloomy outlook of the 
German people toward Allied cooperation. The data from the 
present study indicated, however, that the pessimism could not 
be attributed solely or even chiefly to the failure of that 
conference, since the attitude had been apparent six months 
before it took place. 

In July 1946, a solid majority reportedly believed that the 
Allies would work together toward the unification of Germany. 
One year later, in the summer of 1947, a sohd majority denied 
that the Allies would work together toward this end. Only in 
West Berlin were there more - but only a very few more — 
optimists in September (27%) than there had been in August 
1947 (21%). Within the Laender, fewer Hessians tended to 
expect cooperation than did residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden 
or Bavaria; in fact, Bavarians were almost as optimistic as West 
Berhners. 

Throughout the period under consideration, there was a 
marked difference in response between educational groups. 
Consistently, the best educated people were more dubious 
about Allied cooperation. The pessimists tended to be those 
who claimed to think about political affairs and claimed to be 
newspaper readers. Significantly, more of the optimists 
appeared ready to accept broad German responsibihty for the 
war. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 195 



Report No. 88 (20 January 1948) 



GERMAN OPINION ON THE PEOPLE'S PART IN 
POLITICAL AFFAIRS 

Sample: a cross-section of over 3,400 Germans living in the 
American Zone and West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: October 1947. (9 pp.) 

Opinion was divided on the issue of whether or not an increased 
interest in politics would help in the reconstruction of 
Germany: 41 per cent said it would help and 46 per cent felt it 
would not. Significantly, former members of the Nazi Party 
(48%) and people with 12 years or more schooling (51%) were 
more likely than others to deny the usefulness of an interest in 
politics. Of those who said that poUtical activity would be of no 
help, 1 1 per cent said that they had lost confidence in politics 
and ten per cent said that working directly on the problems of 
reconstruction would be worth far more. 

Seven in ten AMZON Germans (70%) would reportedly 
turn down a reasonable poUtical office if they were offered one. 
In contrast to this, 82 per cent expressed a willingness to work 
an hour longer every day for the reconstruction of their 
country. 

According to a third (34%) of the AMZON population and 
almost a half of the West Berliners (46%), the individual could 
not influence the activities of the political parties. About 
two-thirds of the AMZON respondents (63%) and 78 per cent 
of the West Berliners, however, felt that in the future the people 
ought to have more influence on political activities. 



196 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 89 (22 January 1948) 



RECEPTION OF THE PAMPHLET "OFFEN GESAGT" 

Sample: 1 40 persons in the American Sector of Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: not specified. (8 pp.) 

Several pamphlets were published and sold to the German 
public in fairly large numbers as an overt orientation operation 
of Military Government. This is the first study made of such a 
pamphlet and concerns Off en Gesagt (Speaking Frankly) by 
former Secretary of State James Byrnes. The respondents were 
chosen to represent three specific groups: age groupings, social 
status groupings, and men and women. 

Slightly more than half (56%) of the people tested read the 
pamphlet from beginning to end. The pamphlet appealed most 
strongly to people in middle status positions: those with nine to 
eleven years of education (63%), those between 30 and 45 years 
of age (59%), and those from the lower-middle class (55%) as well 
as the upper and upper-middle class (57%); also, many more 
men (59%) than women (39%) found it very interesting. 

Although young people and women were not as keenly 
interested as the middle-aged and men, both the young and the 
women claimed as frequently as their counterpart groups that 
they had learned something from the booklet. Among those 
who claimed to have learned something, 21 per cent mentioned 
details about the Yalta Conference, 19 per cent mentioned 
Allied disagreements with a negative emphasis upon the Soviet 
Union, and 16 per cent cited the Berlin-Moscow pact indicating 
that Hitler's meeting with Molotov showed the latter's unrea- 
sonable attitude. 

Practically all respondents (93%) said that the translation 
was good and half (49%) of the respondents felt that stylisti- 
cally it was clear and understandable. Two in three (66%) said 
that they would have bought the pamphlet on the newsstand if 
they had seen it there. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 197 



Report No. 90 (23 January 1948) 



GERMAN OPINIONS ON SOCIALIZATION OF INDUSTRY 

Sample: unspecified number of respondents in the Ameri- 
can Zone and West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: November 1947. (8 pp.) 

The survey attempted to get at attitudes toward the socializa- 
tion or nationalization (Verstaatlichung) of industry. 

Four in ten AMZON respondents (41%) and 50 per cent of 
the West Berliners felt that the workers would not be better off 
if industry were socialized; only 30 per cent in AMZON and 36 
per cent in West BerUn said that they would be better off. There 
was more support for the socialization of heavy industry (49 
per cent in AMZON and 57 per cent in West Berhn). 

When asked whether the responsibihty of German indus- 
triaUsts for World War II was very great, great, or slight, 51 per 
cent of the people in AMZON said that it was very great or 
great. Two-thirds of those people who thought workers would 
be better off under socialization as well as two-thirds of those 
who favored socialization in part or in total also placed heavy 
blame on the industrialists. 

No population or geographical groups favored total 
socialization of industry in significant numbers. Tending to 
approve the socialization of heavy industry only were adherents 
of the SPD, independent businessmen, officials, skilled laborers, 
and the middle classes. Opponents of any socialization at all 
were found in largest numbers among LDP/DVP sympathizers, 
people from upper socioeconomic levels, and the highly 
educated. 



198 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Comparison of opinions on socialization of industry with 
those on the workers' lot under such a regime showed some 
interesting results. Not surprisingly, people opposed to any or 
all socialization were almost completely agreed (89%) that it 
would not be a good thing for the worker. Similarly, advocates 
of complete socialization rallied in equal numbers (87%) to the 
claim that it would be a good thing for the worker. In contrast, 
the group favoring partial socialization (30 per cent in AMZON) 
did not fall clearly into either extreme. As many of them 
claimed the workers would be badly off under socialization 
(45%) as claimed they would gain from it (41%). 



Report No. 91 (24 January 1948) 



GERMAN CONCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN BARTERING 
AND BLACK MARKETEERING 

Sample: not specified, in the American Zone and West 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: not specified (5 pp.) 

Three out of ten AMZON Germans (30%) thought that there 
were Americans in Germany who were enriching themselves 
through barter activities; in West Berlin the figure was 48 per 
cent. A similar proportion in AMZON (29%) felt that the 
United States occupation troops were using German food 
supplies; but in West Berlin only five per cent thought this to be 
true. A somewhat larger number (36 per cent in AMZON and 
30 per cent in West Berlin) reported hearing that Americans 
wasted or destroyed food. 

A close relationship was found between attitudes on black 
marketeering and alleged American barter and food practices. In 
AMZON, 71 per cent of the population said that black 
marketeering was being practiced in their communities and 73 
per cent felt that the German officials were not doing all they 
could to stop it. Of those who thought that there was a great 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 199 



deal of black marketeering going on in their community, 49 per 
cent said that Americans were enriching themselves in Germany 
by bartering; of those who said that there was no black market, 
only 15 per cent said that the Americans were gaining from 
barter. 

A large number of persons who knew Americans (42%) 
said that the Americans were enriching themselves, but only 26 
per cent of those who did not know any Americans felt this to 
be true. 

Better-educated groups and upper-class groups tended 
more frequently than their counterparts to think that Ameri- 
cans gained from barter. Otherwise there were no marked 
differences among the various population groups in attitudes on 
these matters. 



Report No. 92 (9 February 1948) 



READERS OF "MEIN KAMPF" 

Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone and West 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: November 1947. (4 pp.) 

Two in ten AMZON Germans (19%) admitted having read all or 
part of Mein Kampf. People who had read it in the greatest 
numbers were those considered to be among the book reading 
public, the well educated, professional and businessmen, and 
those in the upper and upper-middle socioeconomic levels. More 
men than women had read it, as well as more men who had 
been in military service than those who had not. About the 
same number of people in all age groups had read the book. 

Among former NSDAP members, 72 per cent of those who 
had read Mein Kampf but only 50 per cent of the nonreaders 
said that every person has certain inalienable rights; among 
those who had not belonged to the party, 64 per cent of those 
who had read it and 43 per cent of those who had not felt that 
there were such rights. 



200 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 93 (1 1 February 1948) 



"THE CREAM OF THE CROP" TWO YEARS LATER 

Sample: 78 former prisoners of war who had attended a 
course on democracy at Fort Getty and who filled out a 
mailed questionnaire. 
Interviewing dates: spring 1947. (15 pp.) 

At the end of the war, a group of specially selected German 
prisoners of war in the United States was sent to a school at 
Fort Getty to learn about democracy and the principles for 
which the United States stands. They were later released in 
Germany with no special provision having been made for their 
future. Some maintained contact with each other and with their 
former teachers. Not surprisingly, the proportion of profes- 
sional people and white collar workers among the group was 
very high (73%) and their poHtical attitudes differed consider- 
ably from the picture presented by the population as a whole. 

The Fort Getty respondents said that, on their return to 
Germany, they were more impressed by the chaotic state in the 
mental attitudes of the people than by the physical and material 
conditions. Nearly half of them mentioned widespread corrup- 
tion, low levels of both morals and morale. 

Four in ten said that the length of the occupation would 
depend on what happened in the international arena; one in ten 
felt it would last until there was a functioning democracy in 
Germany. Four in ten thought it should last until democracy 
was established in the country. On the future of Germany, less 
than a fifth thought the country would recover regardless of 
outside help and an equal number were completely pessimistic. 

Seven out of ten considered the general economic, political, 
and social conditions to be the greatest obstacle to the democra- 
tization of Germany. Half of all respondents accused the Germans 
of pohtical apathy, intolerance, and lack of a genuine concept 
of freedom. Three out of ten were severely critical of the 
denazification process and many felt that this hindered the 
education of the German population to democratic ways. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 201 



Nearly a fourth of the respondents (23%) were members of 
one of the political parties, whereas only about five per cent of 
the general public claimed membership. Over a third (35%) 
preferred the SPD, one in seven belonged to the LDP/DVP, and 
one in ten to the CDU/CSU. The third of the respondents who 
had disclaimed preference for any party said that the parties 
pursued self-centered policies, inspired Uttle confidence, were 
old-fashioned, and many blamed them for Hitler's rise to power. 

Quite a large number refused to make predictions concern- 
ing their own futures but half of all respondents were rather 
confident and considered their prospects good. One point worth 
noting was the concern expressed by many over whether or not 
to take an active part in politics. Siding with any poUtical party 
was considered dangerous, but a strict neutrality was also 
thought to be disadvantageous. 

Three-fourths of the group had already thought about 
emigrating. Four in ten had decided not to leave, an equal 
number said that they did hope to emigrate, and another two in 
ten said they would consider it if the economic or political 
situation in Germany turned out to be hopeless. 

Less than half claimed to be sufficiently well-informed on 
current events. One-fourth mentioned the lack of newspapers, 
radio sets, and preoccupation with burdens of daily hfe. 

Significantly, 64 per cent of the group was employed at 
the time of the questionnaire in some sort of government work. 
The Fort Getty certificate proved to be helpful to four out of 
ten in obtaining such work. A fifth had never made use of the 
certificate. Nine per cent were white-collar workers and 
professionals, and five per cent worked in private business. 



202 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 94 (24 February 1948) 



CONTACTS BETWEEN GERMANS AND AMERICANS 

Sample: a representative sample of people in the American 

Zone and West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: November 1947. (16 pp.) 

About a quarter of AMZON Germans (27%) and West Berliners 
(25%) said that they had become acquainted with Americans 
after the war. Most of these contacts were made by chance or 
through professional and work channels, and most of the 
acquaintanceships remained extremely casual. Germans who 
knew Americans tended to be predominantly from the upper 
socioeconomic and educational strata; more men and younger 
people than women and older people had American acquain- 
tances. Very few people ( 1 2%) had received gift packages from 
Americans; recipients were more likely to be residents of 
medium-size cities than those of large cities or rural areas. 

Although knowing Americans appeared to have little 
influence on general attitudes and opinions, it did affect 
opinions relating to Americans in Germany. Of those who knew 
Americans, 63 per cent said that German employees were well 
treated by the Americans, whereas among those who did not 
know Americans only 52 per cent felt this to be true. On 
certain issues, such as American wastefulness and negligence 
regarding property, people who knew Americans were more 
critical than those who did not. 

More significantly, personal relationships with Americans 
did not affect views on certain basic issues. Among those under 
40 years of age with nine or more years of education. National 
Socialism was a good idea badly carried out for a sizable 
majority of both those who knew Americans (68%) and those 
who did not {10%). In both groups, just over 40 per cent felt 
that the Germans were responsible for Hitler's rise to power and 
about a fourth said they were to blame for his staying in power. 

A third of the AMZON Germans thought that the United 
States occupation troops were more popular then than they had 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 203 



been a year earlier, another third said the popularity level was 
the same, and 22 per cent felt it had diminished. Those who 
said that they were more popular also held generally more 
favorable attitudes towards Americans. Those who said that the 
Americans had become less popular than formerly were also 
more prone to attitudes consistent with Nazism; 53 per cent felt 
that some races are more fit to rule than others. 

More West BerUners than AMZON Germans thought that 
the Americans had gained in popularity. The same was true of 
men, people with eight years of education, and older people, 
whereas the young and those with nine to eleven years of 
education tended toward the belief that the Americans were less 
popular. 



Report No. 95 (25 February 1948) 



APPRAISAL OF THE CONTENT OF EDUCATION AND 
EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES 

Sample: 45 1 adults in West Berlin and 223 in Stuttgart, all 

1 8 years of age and over. 

Interviewing dates: January 1948. (8 pp.) 

The outlook toward educational problems in themselves did not 
differ markedly between the two cities. More people in West 
Berlin (55%) than in Stuttgart (18%) expressed concern about 
the lack of clothing and shoes for the children. Shortage of 
buildings, however, concerned the respondents in Stuttgart 
(43%) more than it did those in West Berhn ( 1 6%). 

Nearly everyone in both communities (90%) supported the 
teaching of religion in the schools and large majorities (60%) 
felt that such instruction should be compulsory. In Stuttgart, 
however, 63 per cent felt it ought to be handled by clerics 
whereas in West Berhn only 37 per cent favored clerics as 
contrasted with 47 per cent who felt school teachers should give 
religious instruction. 



204 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Only minorities supported beating of students as a basic 
right of teachers (under 30 per cent). Large majorities in West 
Berlin (86%) and Stuttgart (85%) favored the formation of a 
school board in every city. Few West Berhners (24%) and 
Stuttgart residents (14%) thought that the dismissal of teachers 
who were former NSDAP members had had favorable effects 
upon the educational system. 

In both cities, residents gave as the chief aim of general 
education "a comprehensive general education" (37 per cent in 
West Berlin and 52 per cent in Stuttgart); for West Berliners the 
second most important goal was discipline (28%) whereas in 
Stuttgart it was training for a future job (20%). The educational 
philosophy of various groupings showed a primary emphasis 
upon order and conduct, with a fairly heavy vote for vocational 
training among the old, the lower class, and those with eight 
years or less education. The youth of Germany, however, those 
with nine or more years of education, and the upper and 
middle-class members overwhelmingly selected the other two 
objectives — a rounded education and the development of 
independent thinking. 

About half (49 per cent in West Berlin and 5 1 per cent in 
Stuttgart) the public said that the failure to teach history would 
have very serious effects. Teaching of history was considered 
least important by those who regarded vocational training as the 
prime aim of education (57%) and most important by those 
who considered critical thinking the main objective (55%). 
Asked why history was not being taught at the time of the 
survey, the bulk of those who had opinions pointed to a general 
confusion in the poUtical situation, a revision in the conception 
of history, or the fact that the AlHes and the "experts" 
disagreed on matters of interpretation (48 per cent in West 
Berlin; 31 per cent in Stuttgart). About a fifth of the total 
sample (22 and 21 per cent, respectively) responded that 
nothing more dared be said about militarism or Nazism. Only 
eight and four per cent, respectively, thought it necessary or a 
good idea to remove the influence of miUtaristic and Nazi ideas. 
Ten per cent in West Berlin and 26 per cent in Stuttgart had no 
opinion on this question. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 205 



Report No. 96 (3 March 1948) 



GERMAN YOUTH VERSUS ADULTS ON QUESTIONS OF 
DEMOCRACY 

Sample: 1,000 adults and 2,000 young people from the 

American Zone and samples from both groups in West 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: December 1947. (5 pp.) 

German youth and adults gave an edge to democratic principles 
when they were asked to choose between a democratic and an 
authoritarian way of forming a new club. Of the AMZON young 
people between 13 and 25 years old, 57 per cent thought that 
the leader should be chosen by majority vote, as compared to 
40 per cent who would have the leader appointed. About the 
same number of adults (54%) were in the same democratic 
camp. Young people between the ages of 13 and 25 who lived 
in cities were the most democratic, and boys and men over 16 
voted for majority rule considerably more often than girls and 
women. Youngsters belonging to youth clubs that elected their 
leaders supported democratic principles (71%) to a greater 
extent than members of clubs that appointed their leaders 
(49%). Youngsters and adults who might be considered politi- 
cally informed were more likely to choose the democratic 
alternative than were those who were uninformed. Although in 
general those who kept up with current events were also most 
likely to favor electing their leader, mass media did not seem to 
affect the opinion of those between ten and 17 as much as the 
older groups. 



206 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 97 (3 March 1948) 



BERLIN REACTIONS TO NAGY'S PAMPHLET 
"MACHTRAUB IN UNGARN" 

Sample: 149 people from the American Sector of Berlin 
(controlled for age, social status, and sex only). 
Interviewing dates: not specified. (7 pp.) 

Machtraub in Ungarn {Power Grab in Hungary) by Ferenc Nagy, 
like Secretary of State James Byrnes' volume, Offen Gesagt 
{Speaking Frankly), was published and sold to the German 
public as an overt orientation operation of the Military 
Government (cf. Report No. 89). 

Unlike Offen Gesagt, whose appeal was concentrated in 
middle status, middle-aged, and slightly above average educa- 
tional groups, Nagy's booklet evoked interest among all groups. 
The least interested seemed to be those under 30 (39%), the 
well educated (54%), and women (49%). Lower interest among 
the more sophisticated seemed to be attributable to the 
sensational character of the pamphlet. 

About 75 per cent of those given the booklet actually read 
it through from cover to cover. Within the individual groups, 
those who had finished it were predominantly in the age group 
from 46 to 60 (80%), those with a high school education (78%), 
men (84%), and people of lower middle-class status (78%). Only 
59 per cent of the respondents reported recommending it to 
someone else; for the Byrnes book the figure had been 71 per 
cent. 

While 70 per cent of the respondents claimed to have 
learned something from Offen Gesagt, only 48 per cent made 
the same claim for Machtraub. Many more women (57%) than 
men (39%) felt they had come upon some new fact. More 
persons under 30 (53%) admitted having learned something 
than the middle-aged (44%) or the old (49%). Pressed to 
indicate what it was they had learned, most (54%) of these 
people referred to the "crass brutahty" of the Russians. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 207 



A very large majority (84%) of those who read the 
pamphlet thought it good rather than fair (11%) or poor (2%). 
Only three per cent expressed no opinion. 

Practically everyone (87%) thought the presentation of the 
facts to be fair rather than one-sided. Poorly educated people 
and those under 30 v^ere slightly more likely to criticize the 
factual presentation than was any other group. 

Technically, there were almost no objections to the 
booklet. Nearly all approved the style of writing and the 
translation. To some, the cover seemed to smack of sensa- 
tionalism, but relatively few sharply rejected the cover on this 
ground. Almost no one (5%) said that the price was beyond 
their means. 



Report No. 98 (6 March 1948) 



GOVERNMENT BY POLITICIANS, EXPERTS, OR THE 
PEOPLE? 

Sample: a cross-section of residents in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: November 1947. (4 pp.) 

An overwhelming majority was in favor of the popular 
determination of policy as opposed to its determination either 
by poHticians or experts. 

Those most strongly opposed to both politicians and 
experts were members of poUtical parties; they appeared most 
consistently in favor of determination of policy by the people. 
Educated people appeared to differentiate sharply between the 
two choices: When they could choose between poUticians and 
the people, they rejected the former emphatically (13%) in 
favor of the people (85%), but when the choice was between 
the people and the experts, the vote for the former dropped 
below the average for the entire population; almost three out of 



208 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



ten (29%) educated people preferred experts rather than the 
people. 

When asked whether they thought some human rights to 
be inalienable, or whether the state had a right to suspend any 
rights when necessary, those who had voted for rule by the 
people tended also to vote for the inviolability of human rights 
(52%), while the others tended to vote for their suspension 
when necessary (46%). Similarly, when questioned about racial 
theory, those who thought that the experts should determine 
policy also tended to think that some races were more fit to 
rule than others (48%). 



Report No. 99 (5 March 1948) 



A REPORT ON GERMAN YOUTH 

Sample: 1,996 respondents between ages of 10 and 25 
from the American Zone and 341 from West Berlin; and 
1,171 over the age of 26 from the American Zone and 
West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: late December 1947. (17 pp.) 

The purpose of the study was to analyze three aspects of 
German youth: the membership, organization, and activities of 
youth clubs; club members contrasted with nonmembers as to 
interests, activities, attitudes, and group activities; young 
Germans contrasted with older Germans regarding interests and 
activities. 

In AMZON, 15 per cent of the younger sample claimed 
membership in youth groups; in West Berlin the figure was 1 1 
per cent. City youth were more likely to belong than were rural 
youth. Most members (78%) went to the club at least once a 
week. In most areas, the majority of clubs had either a special 
room or club house. Over half the members said that their clubs 
had no financial support and only a third in AMZON (37 per 
cent in West Berlin) reported paying dues. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 209 



Positions of leadership were limited among AMZON club 
members as a whole. Only seven per cent held any office. In 
West Berlin 17 per cent held some office. Older members 
tended to hold office more often than younger members. 
Office-holders tended to be male (68%), from the middle class 
(68%). A majority, both in AMZON (51%) and West Berlin 
(53%), said that their leaders were appointed by outsiders. 

Few AMZON club members (11%) but as many as 32 per 
cent in West Berlin complained about the lack of good 
leadership and discipline and the fact that groups of different 
ages were in the same room. 

Of those club members who had also belonged to the 
Hitler Youth, 63 per cent contrasted the militarism of the 
earher group with the freedom and democracy of the new. The 
most popular activities in the Hitler Youth had been social 
activities (36%) followed by sports and games (32%). The most 
disliked aspect was the militarism of the organization (43%). 

Club members, although more likely than nonmembers to 
read youth magazines and other publications and to Usten to 
the radio, were not better informed on such matters as world 
leaders or the name of their local mayor. Attitudes toward 
democratic and ethical values did not differ greatly between 
members and nonmembers. Both groups selected similar figures 
as the greatest German: Goethe and Schiller ranked first, 
nonpoUtical figures came second, nationaUst or military figures 
third; almost half gave no reply. Club members appeared to 
come from a relatively higher socioeconomic level than non- 
members and were more often regular churchgoers. Members 
and nonmembers did not differ with respect to the occupation 
of the head of the family. 

Among all age groups, the most read sections of the 
newspapers were the local news and the advertisements. A 
majority of radio listeners preferred musical programs. Older 
people liked news and commentaries more than did the 
younger. Large majorities of all age groups did not like to 
attend lectures. Leisure-time activities were fairly similar in all 
age groups, with handicrafts and studying, writing, and reading 
mentioned most frequently. 



210 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 

Report No. 100 (March 1948) 



TRENDS IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION 

Sample: the number of respondents varied from 365 in the 
first survey to 4,000 interviewed in January 1948; the 
total number of persons interviewed was over 1 6 million in 
the American Zone and West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: from 26 October 1945 to 5 January 
1948 during which time more than fifty full-scale surveys 
were conducted. (43 pp.) 

This report summarizes in graphic form major trends of German 
opinion in the American occupied areas, and covers seven major 
issues: reorientation, politics, media, the occupation, economic 
affairs, food, and expellees. 

Reorientation. In 1947 surveys an average of 52 per cent 
accepted National Socialism as a good idea badly carried out; 
this was a rise of five percentage points over the previous year 
but only two points higher than it had been in 1945. If forced 
to choose between communism and National Socialism, "a 
plurality preferred the former in 1945, most people rejected 
both in 1946, and by 1947, although the "neither" category 
remained large, more chose National Socialism, and almost no 
one picked communism. Two years after the war's end, the 
number of Germans wilHng to assume responsibihty for their 
country's part in bringing on the war continued a downward 
trend. About four in ten AMZON Germans felt that some races 
are more fit to rule than others. 

Whereas before January 1948 over half the public had 
accepted the right of communists to speak on the radio, after 
this date only a Uttle more than a third did so. From the outset, 
large majorities of AMZON Germans said that, if they had to 
choose, they would prefer a government guaranteeing jobs 
rather than one that promoted personal liberty. 

Politics. The number of Germans who claimed to be 
informed about politics continued to drop after 1947 and the 
number of people who did not wish to see their sons enter 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 21 1 



politics remained at over 75 per cent. In all surveys, about a 
third of the people said that they thought about pohtics, with 
the rest leaving this task to "the others." In early 1947 a high of 
72 per cent said that they thought pohtical meetings were of 
value, but by the end of that year the figure had dropped to 45 
per cent; in early 1948 it had again risen, but only to 58 per 
cent. Confidence in the motives of local German officials 
showed a definite downward trend; disenchantment with the 
performance of these officials was also growing. 

Throughout AMZON, the CDU/CSU lost half the popular 
support it had enjoyed in the fall of 1945. Meanwhile the 
LDP/DVP gained, particularly in Wuerttemberg-Baden. At the 
same time, the number of people Uking none of the parties 
tripled. 

Media. Regular newspaper readership declined between 
early 1946 and the spring of 1947, levehng off at about half 
the AMZON population; in West Berlin about three-quarters 
claimed to be regular readers. In January 1948, 56 per cent of 
the AMZON population were regular or occasional radio 
hsteners; more than four in ten consistently claimed to be 
nonUsteners. In January 1948 only 47 per cent felt that they 
were getting more accurate news coverage than during the war; 
the "no opinion" replies rose sharply from 22 per cent in 
January 1947 to 49 per cent in January 1948. In early 1946, 50 
per cent of the AMZON public felt that newspaper coverage was 
more complete than that given on the radio; by January 1948 
the two were given equal ratings. 

The Occupation. Confidence in Allied efforts to rebuild 
Germany dropped from 43 per cent in September 1946 to only 
three in ten by January 1948. Confidence in American efforts 
to rebuild Germany, which had dropped from 70 to 44 per cent 
between 1945 and 1947, rose to 55 per cent in January 1948, 
possibly because of the Marshall Plan. No more than a third ever 
felt that the four powers would cooperate in rebuilding 
Germany; in early 1948, in fact, less than one in ten held this 
view. 



212 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Between January 1946 and January 1948, there was a 
sharp increase in pessimism regarding a united Germany as an 
end product of the occupation, from 7 1 per cent saying that the 
Allies would cooperate to 80 per cent saying that they would 
not. 

Ever increasing numbers of Germans said that the United 
States would be the most influential country in the world 
throughout the next ten years and that this influence would be 
toward peace. Almost all who named the Soviet Union saw war 
as a result. Majority opinion continued to hold that the 
Americans ought to reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in 
order to prevent its falling prey to communism. 

Economic Affairs. In January 1946, 67 per cent of the 
AMZON population said that their family incomes were 
sufficient to meet necessary expenses; two years later, however, 
only 57 per cent did so. Large majorities in West Berhn claimed 
that they could not meet living costs. There was no discernible 
trend on opinions concerning the direction which prices would 
take. Fluctuations also marked the trend in opinions on the 
future conditions in AMZON. On the whole, between January 
1946 and June 1947 about as many people thought that the 
Reichsmark would not maintain its value as thought it would. 

Increasingly large numbers of AMZON residents had come 
to the conclusion that a local black market existed and was 
serious. In February 1946, 51 per cent thought that there was 
no black market but by January 1948, 71 per cent recognized 
there was; similarly, at the earlier date only 1 5 per cent felt that 
it was serious, but by the later date 47 per cent thought so. At 
the same time, confidence in official efforts to stop the black 
market decreased sharply, although in early 1948 the trend 
seemed to be on the upswing once again. 

Food. Increasing numbers of people cited food as their 
chief source of concern, having risen from only 17 per cent in 
AMZON in 1945 to 53 per cent in 1948. Clothing and shoes 
followed in importance and the percentage mentioning them 
had also increased. Majority opinion in AMZON continued to 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 213 



hold that the ration card system was being handled fairly, 
although the number thinking so had decreased sharply from 93 
per cent in late 1945 to 64 per cent in January 1948. Majorities, 
often large ones, maintained that they did not get enough food 
to do their jobs well; in West Berlin the figure was as high as 
eight in ten. 

Expellees. By January 1948, as many as 93 per cent of 
the Germans held the opinion that the expulsions had been 
unjustified. Both expellees and native residents were almost 
unanimous in feeUng that the expellees would hke to return to 
their homelands. As in the previous year, about half of the 
AMZON population said that the expellees would get along well 
with the local residents and about four in ten said that they 
would not; Hessians were most optimistic on this score, the 
residents of Wuerttemberg-Baden the most pessimistic. The 
expellees themselves were less satisfied in January 1948 with 
their reception in Germany than they had been in the fall of 
1946. 



Report No. 101 (24 March 1948) 



GERMAN YOUTH AND ADULTS VIEW 
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY 

Sample: 1,000 adults and 2,000 young people in the 
American Zone and West Berhn. 

Interviewing dates: late December 1947 and early January 
1948. (7 pp.) 

Few German youngsters between 10 and 12 considered an 
individual member of a club responsible for the actions of other 
club members. When asked if a boy should help pay for a 
window broken by other members of his club while he was not 
present, about a fourth (23%) of the children between 10 and 
1 2 thought he should help pay, while over half of those 



214 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



between 13 and 25 and 38 per cent of those 26 years old and 
over supported such group responsibiUty. In Bavaria, Hesse, and 
Wuerttemberg-Baden, youth and adults tended to have about 
the same idea on this question. The size of town that children 
between 10 and 12 lived in seemed to have Uttle or no effect on 
their attitudes although those between 13 and 25 who lived in 
large cities were considerably more conscious of the group spirit 
than the same age group living in small towns. Of the children 
who had belonged to one of the Hitler youth groups, 48 per 
cent thought the boy ought to help pay for the window. 

In considering what a young boy should do whose club 
friends have decided to steal a lamp, respondents between the 
ages of 18 and 25 as well as adults — especially West Ber- 
liners — were most Ukely to recommend that the boy take some 
positive steps registering his disapproval. Those who advocated 
such action were from the middle socioeconomic groups, 
former members of the Hitler youth groups, the more highly 
educated, and those who kept up with current events. Children 
of ten and eleven were least hkely to say that, if they were the 
young boy in question, they would go as far as to leave the 
club, try to prevent others from stealing, or tell someone about 
the plan. 

The next and final sketch continued the previous one, with 
the young boy accompanying his friends in the theft of the 
lamp and the entire group being caught. Since he had opposed 
the action, was the young boy to blame or not? In AMZON, 80 
per cent of the children between 10 and 17, 85 per cent of 
those between 18 and 25, and 79 per cent of the adults 
considered him guilty. In West Berlin, young people between 
the ages of 18 and 25 almost unanimously (97%) gave the 
verdict guilty, while 81 per cent of those between 10 and 17 
and 87 per cent of the adults gave the same verdict. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 215 



Report No. 102 (24 March 1948) 



PATRONAGE OF U.S. INFORMATION CENTERS 

Sample: an unspecified number of adults in the American 
Zone, West Berhn, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (3 pp.) 

One out of every 1 00 adult Germans in the American Zone said 
he had visited an Amerika Haus (United States Information 
Center). In West Berlin the figure was slightly higher with two 
out of every 1 00, and in Bremen it was as high as three out of 
100. 

Knowledge of what the centers had to offer was not very 
extensive, either. More than nine out of ten in AMZON claimed 
to know nothing about them, in West Berlin 89 per cent 
disclaimed any such knowledge, and in Bremen the figure was 
78 per cent. 

People living in cities were both more likely to have heard 
about the information centers and to have visited one. Even in 
the largest cities (250,000 and over), however, knowledge of 
them was only at the eight per cent level and a mere one per 
cent had visited one. 

When people were asked about the Amerika Haus nearest 
them it turned out that the best known were those in 
Heidelberg (14%), Wuerzburg (11%), Darmstadt (8%), Bamberg 
(8%), and Regensburg (7%). 

Although very few AMZON residents frequented informa- 
tion centers, those who did represented the leadership groups, 
those with higher levels of education, men, and readers of 
foreign periodicals. 



216 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 103 (24 March 1948) 



READERSHIP OF POLITICAL BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS 

Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: February 1948. (3 pp.) 

The purpose of the report was to ascertain the readership of five 
political books or pamphlets: Der SS-Staat by Eugen Kogon 
(read by 2.4 per cent of the sample), Offen Gesagt by James 
Byrnes (2.0%), Hinter dem eisernen Vorhang (2.9%), Machtraub 
in Ungarn by Ferenc Nagy (0.5%), and Marshall stellt klar 
(0.1%). Readership was extremely limited, with more men 
having read them than women. And compared with the 
population as a whole, the readers tended to be better educated, 
city dwellers from the upper socioeconomic levels. 



Report No. 104 (24 March 1948) 

THE MARSHALL PLAN IN PROSPECT 

Sample: 3,003 adults in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (5 pp.) 

In August 1947 nearly half (41%) of a representative cross- 
section of adults in the American Zone said that they had heard 
of the Marshall Plan. By March 1948, six months later, 69 per 
cent claimed to know about it. Among those who had heard of 
it, 75 per cent were in favor of it and 85 per cent thought that 
it would have a favorable effect upon living conditions. About 
twice as many people thought that the chances for success were 
poor (13%) or nonexistent (1%) as believed the chances were 
very high (6%); most people thought they were only high (36%) 
or just fair (32%). 

Many people in AMZON (53%) felt that American aid 
would not be sufficient; in West Berlin the figure was even 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 217 



higher, at 59 per cent. Women (27%) were less confident of the 
sufficiency of American aid than men (35%), the young less so 
than the old. People whose education or status was low tended, 
also, to be slightly more pessimistic than those with more educa- 
tion or higher status. 

Among those who had heard of the Marshall Plan, 80 per 
cent felt it had been set up to help keep western Europe from 
turning communist; the second most frequently chosen reason 
(44%) was America's sincere desire to help Europe; 29 per cent 
thought it was to ensure allies in case of war with the Soviet 
Union; and about the same number (25%) said it was a way for 
the United States to dump goods resulting from overproduction. 
The percentages of young people who accepted American inten- 
tions as sincere (37%) was smaller than it was among the middle- 
aged (45%) or among those over 50 (51%). Attitudes of confi- 
dence that the plan would be carried out were strongly related 
to the belief in the sincerity of American motives. 



Report No. 105 (27 March 1948) 



INTERNATIONALISM IN GERMANY 

Sample: 3,750 people 18 years of age or older in the 

American Zone, West Berhn, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: first three weeks of March 1948. (7 

pp.) 

Half (49%) of the people interviewed had heard of plans to 
create a Western European Union; those with more than twelve 
years of education were much more likely to have heard of it 
(94%) as was true of those with upper- and upper-middle-class 
status (85%). 

Almost no one opposed the idea of such a union and 
confidence in its realization was fairly high. Nonetheless, 
obstacles were known to exist. Only one in 20 (5%) saw no 



218 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



obstacles, while about 35 per cent gave no response. Of those 
who thought the chances for realization of such a union were 
very high, 48 per cent cited the Soviet Union and communism 
as possible difficulties, another 1 6 per cent mentioned national- 
ism. Of those who thought the chances were poor or even nil, 
35 per cent mentioned the Soviet Union and communism, 41 
per cent cited nationalism, and 14 per cent could give no 
reason. 

While a soHd majority (59%) of the general public and even 
more West Berliners (66%) believed that there would be another 
world war within a generation, a large number of people (45%) 
thought that a Western European Union would decrease the 
possibilities of such a war. Only 13 per cent felt the union 
would increase the possibilities for war. Significantly, of the 
small percentage of persons (3%) who opposed the idea of a 
Western European Union, two-thirds (65%) thought that it 
would either increase or not affect the chances for a third world 
war. 

Practically the same people who knew about the Western 
European Union also knew about the United Nations. But 
confidence that the UN could secure peace was markedly lower 
than was confidence in the possibiHty of realizing a Western 
European Union. Only about a third (35%) of the people who 
had ever heard of the UN granted that it had a fair or better 
than fair chance of ensuring peace. In contrast, 45 per cent of 
all the people beUeved that a Western European Union would 
decrease the chances of war, if not prevent one. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 219 



Report No. 106 (27 March 1948) 



THE RADIO AUDIENCE IN AMZON, 
BERLIN, AND BREMEN 

Sample: 3,700 respondents in the American Zone, West 
Berlin, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: the last three weeks of February 1948. 
(9 pp.) 

More than half (52%) of AMZON adults listened to newscasts 
regularly or occasionally. This audience comprised 67 per cent 
of the sample in West Berlin and 76 per cent in Bremen. The 
metropohtan station in each Land virtually monopolized the 
audience in its area. Radio Stuttgart had more listeners outside 
the borders of the Land than any of the other Laender stations 
and Radio Leipzig had the largest audience of any station 
outside the American Zone. Whereas Radio Berlin was the most 
popular station (47%) in West Berlin in September 1947 and 
RIAS was a close second (37%), by February 1948 the situation 
had reversed itself: RIAS had 57 per cent of the audience and 
Radio Berhn had only 31 per cent. Only in West Berlin was 
there an important fraction that had tuned out because a 
broadcast was considered untrue (36%) while 26 per cent had 
done so when they thought that a program was bad. 

More hsteners (31%) than nonlisteners (18%) favored a 
government whose aim was to protect freedom of elections, 
speech, and press, although both listeners (62%) as well as 
nonUsteners (69%) favored a government whose aim was peace 
and order. 

Exactly half of those who listened to news on the radio 
(50%) felt that the news they were getting was more accurate 
than what they had heard during the war. The main source of 
poUtical information for newscast hsteners was the radio (66%), 
while for nonlisteners it was newspapers (61%). 

Newscast listeners tended to be of higher socioeconomic 
status (72%) than nonhsteners (28%), and to have more 
education (66%) than nonlisteners (34%). Men (59%) were more 



220 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



likely to listen than women (47%), city people more than rural 
people, and the younger more than the older. 

About a fourth of the AMZON radio audience had listened 
to the Military Government's Thursday evening broadcasts, 
although only ten per cent of the entire AMZON population 
had done so. People who had listened and were also able to 
describe the programs accurately gave strong majority approval 
(68%). 

Three-fourths of the AMZON radio audience listened to 
the "Voice of America" broadcasts. Regular VOA listeners 
differed from radio listeners in general, and even more so from 
nonlisteners, in their attitudes toward various issues: 64 per 
cent of them thought the news was more accurate at the time 
than it had been during the war, 39 per cent would hope for a 
government guaranteeing civil Hberties as against one whose 
chief concern was peace and order, and 6 1 per cent felt that the 
exercise of the right to criticize the government would not 
endanger the peace and order of the state. Regular VOA 
listeners were also the ones who made a point of turning on that 
station, as compared with listeners to other stations who 
claimed indifference as to whether or not they turned on any 
particular station. 



Report No. 107 (29 March 1948) 



PUBLIC RECEPTION OF THE BIZONAL ADMINISTRATION 

Sample: 3,000 in the American Zone, 500 in West Berhn, 
and in the third part of the study 3 1 6 people in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: 6 October 1947; 5 January 1948; and 
the first weeks of March 1948. (5 pp.) 

The report presents a summary analysis of attitudes toward the 
Bizonal administration. In October 1947 only about a third 
(31%) of the AMZON public had heard of the Bizonal Council, 
which by that time had been in operation for some months. By 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 221 



January 1948, an additional ten per cent claimed to know of 
the new organization. And two months later the number had 
risen sharply to six in ten. 

Between October 1 947 and January 1 948 confidence that 
Bizonia would improve Uving conditions dropped from 73 per 
cent to 53 per cent. In March 1948, 44 per cent said that 
conditions had been unfavorably affected, while only 36 per 
cent said that they were better. Indeed, at this time, only 20 per 
cent were satisfied with the work of the Bizonal Economic 
Council, whereas 64 per cent expressed dissatisfaction. Half of 
the dissatisfied commented that nothing was getting done. 

Not unexpectedly, the more alert, the better educated, and 
the more sophisticated members of society were those most 
likely to be informed about the existence of a Bizonal 
administration. Almost all (96%) of the college educated adults 
but less than half (47%) of those with only seven years of 
schooling could claim in March to have heard of Bizonia. Again, 
more men (78%) than women (46%) said they were informed. 
The well educated also tended to be somewhat more dissatisfied 
(70%) than the poorly educated (60%). 

In March 1948, when asked whether they thought Bizonia 
would aid or impede the unification of all four zones, a 
pluraUty (39%) in AMZON and still more in West Berlin (47%) 
and Bremen (46%) felt that Bizonia increased the possibihty of 
four-zone unity. Among those who knew of Bizonia, 43 per 
cent thought that it would help and 28 per cent felt that it 
would impede unification; a third (33%) of those who had not 
previously heard of Bizonia responded, when informed of the 
plan, that it would help, and half that many (16%) thought it 
would impede reunification. 



222 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 108 (29 March 1948) 



MAGAZINE READERS 

Sample: more than 3,700 adults in the American Zone, 
West Berlin, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: during the last three weeks of February 
1948. (5 pp.) 

About a quarter (24%) of the AMZON Germans 18 years of age 
and over claimed to be magazine readers. This represented an 
increase since December 1 946 when the figure had been 1 8 per 
cent. The three overt American publications, Heute, Neue 
Auslese, and Amerikanische Rundschau, were mentioned more 
frequently by AMZON readers than any other single magazine. 
In West BerUn, which had a greater ratio of magazine readers in 
the first place (42%), the pubHcation Sie was more popular 
(13%) than Heute (8%), and the BqiUyi Illustrierte had the same 
number of readers (8%) as Heute. 

Very few Germans (nine per cent in AMZON; seven per 
cent in West Berlin; 12 per cent in Bremen) appeared to read 
foreign magazines. Those who did read primarily American and 
British periodicals. 

As is usually the case, magazine readers, although they 
constituted only a minority of the sample, tended to be people 
of superior socioeconomic status and educational attainment. 
They were more hkely than nonreaders to choose civil liberties 
over the maintenance of law and order, if a choice was required: 
35 per cent of the readers chose a government whose aim is to 
preserve freedom of elections, speech and press, while only 21 
per cent of the nonreaders made this choice; a government 
whose main aim is to maintain peace and order was the choice 
of 56 per cent of the readers and 69 per cent of the nonreaders. 

Of those who were magazine readers, 84 per cent were 
regular newspaper readers, 72 per cent Ustened to newscasts on 
the radio regularly or occasionally, 16 per cent had recently 
read political books or pamphlets (in contrast to six per cent of 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 223 



the total public), and 12 per cent had visited United States 
information centers one or more times (whereas only five per 
cent of the general pubUc had done so). 



Report No. 109 (5 April 1948) 

THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN TRAVEL ON 
KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES 

Sample: not specified (595 respondents on the linguistic 

question). 

Interviewing dates: March 1948. (4 pp.) 

A fifth (20%) of the AMZON pubUc claimed to know at least 
one foreign language, with Enghsh and French as the most fre- 
quently mentioned. Knowledge of a foreign language was almost 
entirely a matter of schooling. 

Two-fifths (40%) of the adult population in AMZON had 
been in a foreign country. Not unexpectedly, many more men 
(65%) than women (20%) had had this experience. Those who 
had been outside Germany tended to be better informed than 
those who had not, and they also differed somewhat in their 
attitudes, but not greatly. Of the men who had been in a foreign 
country, 76 per cent had heard of the United Nations, whereas 
among those who had never left Germany only 63 per cent had 
heard of it. Among the women who had been outside of 
Germany 50 per cent had heard of the UN; among those women 
who had not travelled abroad the figure dropped to 28 per cent. 
On the question of the formation of a Western European Union, 
80 per cent of the men who had travelled abroad and 72 per 
cent of those who had not were in favor; 61 per cent of the 
women who had been outside of Germany and 42 per cent of 
those who had not were for the idea. 



224 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 1 10 (15 April 1948) 



BREMEN ATTITUDES COMPARED WITH 
BERLIN AND AMZON 

Sample: not specified. 

Interviewing dates: not specified. (16 pp.) 

Following January 1948, the city of Bremen was included in all 
surveys. This report details results found in Bremen on a 
number of trend questions previously described in Report No. 
100. Munich, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart are the "major AMZON 
cities" mentioned in the report. 

Bremen residents expressed somewhat more confidence in 
future economic conditions in AMZON (49%) than did AMZON 
residents themselves (42 per cent in the major cities) but less 
than West BerUners (64%). More people in Bremen (45%) than 
in other places thought that prices would go up. 

Bremen residents evidenced greater awareness (69%) of the 
Bizonal Council in Frankfurt and far greater approval of it 
(85%) than others in Germany. They were also more inclined to 
expect local advantages from Bizonia. 

Residents of Bremen mentioned anxieties over food, 
particularly, but also over clothing and housing more frequently 
than other Germans. And although 86 per cent said they were 
not getting enough food to work efficiently, a strong majority 
(75%) approved the handUng of the ration card system. 

As in other German cities, nine out of ten people in 
Bremen said there was a large or very large black market 
operating in the city and 84 per cent felt that the local German 
authorities were not doing enough to stop it. 

The people of Bremen showed about the same level of 
interest in pohtics as West Berliners, but very few were in favor 
of a poUtical career for their sons. Bremen opinion was divided 
on whether local officials were more concerned with the welfare 
of the people (48%) than with their own interests (51%) 
whereas the residents of West Berlin, Munich, and Nuremberg 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 225 



inclined more toward the less favorable view of local officials. 

Like West Berliners — and unlike AMZON residents — 
people in Bremen gave majority preference (59%) to a strong 
central government with headquarters in West Berlin. 

Almost three-fourths of the Bremen residents (72%) said 
that they thought National Socialism was a good idea badly 
carried out. This was a higher degree of favor than was found in 
West Berlin (62%) and markedly higher than in AMZON (54%). 
When asked what they would do if they had to choose between 
communism and National Socialism, almost two-thirds of the 
Bremen respondents said they would take neither; the same 
held true in AMZON. 

Only half of the Bremen residents considered the Germans 
capable of democratic self-government, with the main reason 
given being that the people would not accept majority rule. 

As in AMZON and West Berlin, a large majority of 
Bremen residents said that the news in Germany was more 
truthful than it had been during the war. Three-fourths of 
Bremen adults claimed to be regular newspaper readers, as was 
true in West Berlin and AMZON cities. 

Bremen respondents, hke others throughout Germany, 
thought in overwhelming numbers that the four occupation 
powers were not working together successfully to reconstruct 
Germany or to unify it. In fact, more people felt that the Allies 
had hindered reconstruction than felt they had furthered it. 
More Bremen than AMZON respondents, but fewer than West 
Berliners, nonetheless asserted that the United States had 
furthered German reconstruction. And three-fourths of the 
Bremen residents, as compared to half the West Berliners and 
AMZON population, felt that the behavior of the American 
occupation troops had improved since the end of the war. 



226 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. Ill (9 April 1948) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BAVARIAN PARTY 

Sample: a cross-section of more than 1,600 adult Bavar- 
ians. 
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (3 pp.) 

Half a year before this survey was made, the Bayernpartei 
(Bavarian Party) entered the poUtical arena in Bavaria express- 
ing separatist, anti-Prussian sentiments and calhng for a rise in 
the Bavarian standard of living as well as the ouster of 
non-Bavarians from the Land. 

In the survey almost half (47%) had some judgment - fa- 
vorable or unfavorable — to make about the party; even more 
people (53%), however, withheld judgment, either because they 
did not know anything about it or because they had not yet 
made up their minds. Those who did have something to say 
were a majority of those with nine or more years of education, 
men, people who did not attend church regularly, those in the 
middle and upper social levels, city people, businessmen, and 
officials. 

Among those who had an opinion about the party, 34 per 
cent spoke favorably of it, 66 per cent made derogatory 
remarks. Emphasis was put on the fact that it called for Bavarian 
autonomy and that it defended Bavarian particularism. Some 
said that they were attracted by the call to oust expellees and 
DPs from Bavaria. 

About two-fifths of small town and rural people were 
likely to be for the Bayernpartei as against somewhat more than 
one-fifth from towns with more than 5,000 population. Five 
out of ten regular Catholic churchgoers, three out of ten 
irregular CathoHc churchgoers, and one out of ten Protestants 
saw good points in the party. Practically none of the expellees 
or refugees had anything good to say about it, while four out of 
ten of the native Bavarians did. Among occupational groups, 
only the farmers — with six out of ten — showed a majority in 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 227 



favor. While less than two out of ten of those who preferred 
either the SPD, KPD, or LDP and a Uke number of those 
without party preferences saw good points in the Bayernpartei, 
four out of ten CSU sympathizers (44%) did so. Few people 
(15%) with eight years or more schooHng considered the party 
favorably, but a slight majority (53%) of those with only seven 
years or less schooling spoke well of it. Since Catholics, people 
with httle education, farmers, rural people, and CSU followers 
were the groups that predominated in Bavaria, it seemed safe to 
conclude that the Bayernpartei was best received among 
"typical" Bavarians. 



Report No. 1 1 2 ( 1 2 April 1 948) 



REACTIONS TO A FOREIGN POLICY PAMPHLET 

Sample: 155 persons in the American Zone and 156 

persons in West BerUn. 

Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.) 

The study follows the same pattern described in two previous 
reports, Nos. 89 and 97, concerning the pamphlets Off en Gesagt 
(Speaking Frankly) by Byrnes and Machtraub in Ungarn 
{Power Grab in Hungary) by Nagy. The pamphlet under discus- 
sion here was Aspekte der Gegenwaertigen Aussenpolitik 
{Aspects of Present American Foreign Policy), published by the 
United States Department of State. 

The pamphlet Aspekte had relatively less appeal than 
either Machtraub or Offen Gesagt. In West Berhn only 41 per 
cent had read it through completely as compared with 75 and 
56 per cent for the other two. And, again in West Berlin, only 
26 per cent found it very interesting while 57 and 49 per cent 
had described the previous two pamphlets in this way. 

More than half the readers (58 per cent in Berlin and 55 
per cent in AMZON) claimed not to have learned anything from 



228 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



the pamphlet. On the question of whether Aspekte presented a 
one-sided or fair picture of American policy, the majority (72 
per cent in West Berhn and 55 per cent in AMZON) thought 
that it stated the American case fairly, while 22 per cent in West 
BerUn and 35 per cent in AMZON felt that it was one-sided. 
Almost everyone (95 per cent in West Berlin and 91 per cent in 
AMZON) thought the translation good. The presentation also 
won majority approval, although quite a few people found it 
boring. Most people found the cover good and most of those 
who did not like it said that it was too American. 



Report No. 1 1 3 ( 1 5 April 1 948) 



AMZON ATTITUDES AND INFORMATION ABOUT RUSSIA 

Sample: a representative sample of Germans living in the 

American Zone. 

Interviewing dates: February 1948. (6 pp.) 

Very few people in AMZON (2%) and only 1 1 per cent in West 
Berlin reported thinking that Soviet policy was determined to a 
large extent by the will of the people; about the same small 
number (2 and 4 per cent, respectively) believed that all the 
people got along well in the Soviet Union. The groups most 
frequently mentioned as able to get along were the party leaders 
(50 per cent in AMZON), government officials (29%), party 
members (21%), industrialists and managers (14%), and the 
upper classes (12%). Very few (9 per cent in AMZON; 14 per 
cent in West Berlin) mentioned the workers. 

Although the AMZON Germans had very strong opinions 
about the Soviet Union and its people, their factual information 
about the country was in general at a fairly low level. In 
AMZON, 78 per cent said that Russians may not own 
automobiles, 85 per cent said the same about factories, 75 per 
cent about apartment houses, and 57 per cent about radios. On 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 229 



the question of literacy, 3 1 per cent said that less than half the 
Russians could read and write, 36 per cent placed the figure at 
about half, and only 22 per cent said most or all could do so. 
Group breakdowns of score groups ranging from the least 
informed to most informed revealed that those who were well 
informed about the Soviet Union were in general also those who 
were well informed about anything else. 

There was no clear relation between information about the 
Soviet Union and the beUef that the government was oriented 
by and for the people. People who had been in the Soviet Union 
within the past few years seemed almost unanimously to give a 
negative picture of the country. 



Report No. 1 14 (23 April 1948) 



GERMANS ASSAY THEIR FREEDOMS 

Sample: a cross-section of over 3,500 Germans living in 
the American Zone and West Berhn. 
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (9 pp.) 

When asked if they felt they had five rights and freedoms — pro- 
tection from the police, the right to express their opinions, to 
choose a job, to vote in an election, and to own a business — over 
half of the AMZON (51%) and West Berlin (54%) respondents 
answered that they had all five rights to a satisfactory degree. 
Of the 40 per cent who said they did not have all these rights, 
the largest number mentioned the right to choose a job as the one 
they did not have to a satisfactory degree. In AMZON, the next 
most frequent concern was about free speech. In West Berlin, 
1 5 per cent mentioned the right to vote in free elections. 

A majority (69%) of those with 12 years or more of 
education as compared with 36 per cent of those with eight 
years or less schoohng said that they did not have certain rights 
to a satisfactory degree. Those who felt their rights to be 



230 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



restricted were asked if they expected greater freedom in ten 
years: Of this group a good majority in AMZON and even more 
West Beriiners were optimistic about the future with regard to 
freedoms. 

Asked which two of the hsted freedoms they considered 
most important, people mentioned free speech (55 per cent in 
AMZON; 68 per cent in West Berhn) and free elections (51 and 
60 per cent, respectively) more often than the right to choose 
their own jobs (41 and 43 per cent, respectively), to own a 
business (25 and 12 per cent, respectively), or to be protected 
from the police (8 and 13 per cent, respectively). 

Three-fourths (75%) of the AMZON Germans and 79 per 
cent of the West Beriiners said that the Russians were not free 
to express their opinions without fear of punishment, and over 
half (56 and 57 per cent, respectively) felt that this was also 
true of the Czechs. Seven out of ten (68 and 69 per cent, 
respectively) said that Russians were not able to vote in fair and 
free elections, and as many (69 and 74 per cent, respectively) 
said that Russians could not own a private business. 

Well-educated people in AMZON were almost unanimous 
(97%) in saying that free speech did not exist to a satisfactory 
degree in some countries as compared to 78 per cent of those 
with eight years or less schoohng. Seven out of eight (86%) of 
the well-educated, but only half (51%) of those with little 
education, said that the people in Czechoslovakia could not 
express their opinions freely. 



Report No. 1 14A (1 1 May 1948) 



GERMANS ASSAY THEIR FREEDOMS 

Sample: over 300 people in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: March 1948. (3 pp.) 

The report compares attitudes of Bremen residents with those 
of people living in West Berhn and AMZON, as described in 
Report No. 114. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 231 



Asked if they felt they had five rights and freedoms - pro- 
tection from the police, the right to express their opinions, to 
choose a job, to vote in an election, and to own a business — 69 
per cent of the residents of Bremen said they did not have all 
these rights to a satisfactory degree. This was considerably more 
dissatisfaction than was found in either AMZON or West BerUn. 
Over half of those living in Bremen (58%) thought they did not 
have the right to work at any job they chose, an attitude which 
was twice as prevalent in Bremen as in AMZON. 

When asked which of the five listed freedoms they 
considered most important, more Bremen residents (58%) 
emphasized the right to work at any job they chose than did the 
West Berliners (43%) or AMZON residents (41%). 

Bremen residents were slightly more often skeptical of the 
degree of freedom found in the Soviet Union than were West 
Berliners or AMZON residents; 86 per cent said that the 
Russians could not express their opinions without fear of 
punishment, while 78 per cent said that they could not vote in a 
fair and free election. 



Report No. 1 15 (26 April 1948) 



THE "ADVERTISING PILLAR" AS AN 
INFORMATION MEDIUM 

Sample: a cross-section of 240 West Berliners. 
Interviewing dates: 19 April 1948. (3 pp.) 

About a quarter of the population could be considered regular 
and attentive readers of the notices on the pillars (Litfass- 
saeulen). Forty per cent said they never looked at or read them 
while 60 per cent said they did. Of the latter group, 40 per cent 
had not looked at one during the previous week, ten per cent 
said they only glanced at them, and 26 per cent had looked at 
one or more pillars during the week as well as spent some time 
reading them. In the last mentioned group there were more men 



232 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



than women, more people under 40 than over, and more upper- 
and middle-class people than lower-class people. 

Eight in ten said they read notices about theaters, 
concerts, and the like; two in ten read the lost and found ads, 
notices of robberies, rewards for apprehension of criminals, etc.; 
and smaller proportions of respondents read notices about 
sports events, official notices, ads for missing persons, etc. 

For half of the people who read the notices, some action 
resulted, such as going to the theater or attending a sports 
event. 



Report No. 116 (28 April 1948) 



THE MOVING PICTURE AUDIENCE IN AMZON 

Sample: a cross-section of more than 3,700 adults in the 
American Zone, West Berhn, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: February 1948. (4 pp.) 

In AMZON, 28 per cent of the people 18 years and over 
attended a movie once a month or more often; this regular 
moviegoing audience was larger in Bremen (40%) and larger still 
in West Berhn (54%). 

More people living in medium-size cities than in very large 
cities or in small towns were regular moviegoers. The regular 
movie audience was drawn largely from higher socioeconomic 
groups (38 per cent in AMZON), the well educated (45%), the 
young (56%), unmarried people (44%), and from among 
white-collar workers (51%). 

Most moviegoers (88 per cent in AMZON) said they had 
seen the newsreel Welt im Film. Of these, 65 per cent expressed 
satisfaction with it. 25 per cent were dissatisfied with it, and 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 233 



nine per cent withheld judgment. Criticism centered around the 
view that the newsreel tended to be superficial or frivolous, 
ignoring the serious aspects of life in Germany at that time. 



Report No. 1 17 (27 April 1948) 



BERLINERS VIEW THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN SITUATION 

Sample: a cross-section of 260 West Berliners. 
Interviewing dates: 12 to 21 April 1948. (5 pp.) 

Concerning the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, 80 per cent 
of the respondents said they had heard that a new government 
had taken over in that country. The 20 per cent who had not 
heard about it consisted almost entirely of poorly educated 
women from the lower socioeconomic levels. A large majority 
(80%) of the informed were of the opinion that the change was 
the result of foreign pressure. Three-fourths (75%) of the 
informed believed that the consequences of the coup were not 
favorable to the Czechoslovakian people. People who thought 
that the Czechs had benefited from the change were more 
inchned (65%) than those who took the contrary view (41%) to 
think that the same thing was possible in Berlin. 

A small majority held that the events in Prague could not 
be repeated in Berlin, although 44 per cent of those who knew 
what had happened thought a similar coup was possible. More 
than half of those who thought it possible, however, believed it 
would not actually occur. 

Among newspaper readers, more occasional readers (22%) 
than regular readers (11%) thought that the change in govern- 
ment in Prague had been carried out democratically and that 
the Czech people had gained from the change, although in both 



234 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



groups majorities held the opposite view. A majority of the 
occasional newspaper readers (58%) held that a similar coup was 
possible in BerUn; 56 pei cent of the regular readers said it was 
not possible. 

A similar study made in April 1 948 in the Austrian cities 
of Linz and Salzburg revealed more extensive knowledge 
concerning the change in Czechoslovakian government, with 96 
per cent of the people in Linz and 85 per cent of those in 
Salzburg knowing of the coup. In Linz 77 per cent of the 
people and in Salzburg 67 per cent felt that the change resulted 
from foreign pressure. More Linz residents (69%) than Salz- 
burgers (57%) or Berliners (60%) felt the change not to be to 
the advantage of the Czech people. About one in ten, both in 
Linz and Salzburg, thought that a similar coup was possible in 
Austria, although 67 per cent in Linz and 51 per cent in 
Salzburg thought it not possible. About half of those who 
believed it to be possible, however, did not personally expect 
such a coup. 



Report No. 118(3 May 1948) 



NEWSPAPER READERSHIP 

Sample: a cross-section of over 3,000 residents in the 

American Zone, 513 West Berliners, and 235 residents of 

Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: February 1948. (5 pp.) 

In AMZON, 64 per cent reported reading newspapers regularly; 
over three-fourths of the West Berlin and Bremen residents (76 
per cent and 79 per cent, respectively) made the same claim. 

Throughout AMZON, as well as in Bremen, people said 
that they read their local paper or papers most frequently. The 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 235 



American-licensed Neue Zeitung had a readership of over 
one-fourth of the AMZON population as well as of 17 per cent 
of the people in Bremen. Relatively large proportions of the 
Neue Zeitung readers preferred it to their local paper, such as in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden where 27 per cent read it and 24 per cent 
preferred it. More people in the higher socioeconomic groups, 
more professional and business men, more of the better 
educated, and more evacuees were counted among Neue 
Zeitung readers than people in other groups. 

In West Berlin, the British-licensed Telegraf was the most 
widely read and best-hked paper, with more than six out of ten 
(64%) saying they read it and four out of ten saying they liked 
it best. The next most popular paper was the American-licensed 
Tagesspiegel with 38 per cent saying they read it and 17 per 
cent saying they preferred it. Six out of ten West Berliners 
(60%) read only western-Hcensed newspapers, and fewer than 
one in ten (7%) read only Soviet-hcensed papers; the remainder 
(33%) read both western- and Soviet-licensed newspapers. 
Almost all of the well-educated people (89%) and 71 per cent of 
those in the higher socioeconomic group said they read only 
western-licensed papers. Fully a third of the people on the 
lowest rungs of the economic ladder — 33 per cent of those of 
"lower lower" socioeconomic status and 37 per cent of the 
"upper lower" group — said that they read Soviet-licensed 
papers exclusively. 



236 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 1 19 (10 May 1948) 



CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF THE MASS MEDIA 

Sample: about 3,000 persons residing in 225 communities 

in the American Zone. 

Interviewing dates: February 1948. (7 pp.) 

This report presents the overall picture growing out of a large- 
scale study on mass media (cf. Reports #102, 103, 106, 113, 
116, 118). The interrelationships of three composite sets of 
scaled questions were examined, measuring (1) participation or 
nonparticipation in the audience of at least six major media of 
mass communication, (2) attitudes toward the United States, 
Americans, and aspects of American policy toward government 
and economics, and (3) information about the Soviet Union. 

One in eight people (12%) seemed to have no source of 
topical information at all, except perhaps conversations. An- 
other one in six (17%) indicated that no source of information 
reached him with any regularity. The number of audiences 
within which AMZON Germans participated was strikingly 
related to attitudes toward the American way of Hfe. Regardless 
of social class, the more sources of information which an 
AMZON German had, the more likely he was to be favorably 
disposed toward American policies in government or economics, 
ways of life, and activities. Similarly, regardless of social class, 
the better informed Germans consistently were more often 
favorably disposed toward the United States than were the 
poorly informed. Regardless of the information level, however, 
people with most sources of information proved better disposed 
toward American policies than those who participated in few or 
no audiences. 

A consistent relationship was also found between levels of 
information about the Soviet Union and attitudes toward 
American capitaUstic hfe. Again, regardless of social class, those 
who could give the most correct answers to a set of factual 
questions about the Soviet Union more frequently displayed 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 237 



favorable attitudes toward American capitalism. Those with 
relatively httle factual knowledge about Russia, by way of 
contrast, appeared more often less favorable toward the 
American system. 



Report No. 120 (20 May 1948) 

GERMAN OPINIONS ON DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME 

Sample: an unspecified number of respondents in the 
American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: April 1948, (3 pp.) 



The German people were generally in favor of daylight saving 
time (54 per cent in AMZON; 75 per cent in West Berlin; 63 per 
cent in Bremen). The two groups most opposed to the idea were 
the farmers and residents of towns with less than 1,000 
residents. Of the farmers, 40 per cent were against daylight 
saving time, 31 per cent were for it, and 29 per cent expressed 
no opinion. Among people living in small towns, 29 per cent 
were opposed, 37 per cent were in favor, and 35 per cent had 
no opinion on the matter. 

People who did not Uke the idea of putting their clocks 
ahead gave a variety of reasons, the most frequently mentioned 
of which was that they would be deprived of much needed 
sleep. Others said it was bad because people did not have 
enough food to carry them through such a long day. 

Men tended to be more favorable (57%) than women 
(51%). Trade union members were also more favorable than the 
general pubhc (59%). Other differences were not great except, 
as the West BerHn and Bremen attitudes indicated, large city 
dwellers tended to be most favorable to daylight saving time. 
Among occupational groups, those who worked indoors — of- 
fice workers, professional and business men — gave more fre- 
quent approval than others. 



238 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



These findings compared with those of a Gallup poll made 
in the United States in April 1948. There, too, a majority 
agreed to daylight saving time; farmers were the only people 
who were largely opposed to it. Indeed, more American farmers 
were opposed, and also more positive in their opposition, than 
were German farmers. City dwellers in the United States, as in 
Germany, were most favorable to the change. 



Report No. 121 (19 May 1948) 



UNIFORMITY OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES 
IN AMZON COMMUNITIES 

Sample: data from October 1946 census of the German 
population. (4 pp.) 

The report gives an analysis of some of the data gathered in the 
October 1 946 census to ascertain the percentage of Catholics in 
each community or city. A basic table at the end of the report 
shows the number of towns of under 5,000 population within 
each administrative district containing a certain percentage of 
persons who claimed adherence to the CathoHc church. 

Practically all the towns (97%) within the American Zone 
contained less than 5,000 residents. This figure was consistently 
high for each administrative district but was lowest in Baden 
(92%) and highest in Schwaben and Unterfranken (99%). The 
percentage of the total population represented in this set of 
communities was, however, much more variable. Throughout 
the entire Zone a majority of the population (56%) lived in 
towns under 5,000. But in Baden less than half the people 
(42%) lived in these smaller communities, while in Unterfranken 
a large majority (78%) was found in towns of this size. 

It is particularly striking that a great number of towns 
(71%) fall at the extremes; they were either very largely 
Catholic or very largely non-Catholic. Of 10,355 towns with 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 239 



under 5,000 residents, 2,299 (22%) had zero to 20 per cent 
Catholic population, while 5,008 (49%) had 81 to 100 percent 
Catholic population. 

Heavily Protestant towns were concentrated in Wuerttem- 
berg (59 per cent of which had Catholic populations of less than 
a fifth and 80 per cent of which had Catholic populations of 
less than a half), Kassell (51 and 82 per cent, respectively), 
Darmstadt (30 and 88 per cent respectively), Wiesbaden (36 and 
78 per cent, respectively) and Mittelfranken (21 and 73 per 
cent, respectively). Heavily Catholic towns were in Oberbayern 
(94 per cent of which had Catholic populations of more than 
four-fifths and 100 per cent of which had Catholic populations 
of more than a half), Niederbayern (93 and 100 per cent, 
respectively), Schwaben (88 and 94 per cent, respectively), 
Oberpfalz (87 and 95 per cent, respectively), and Unterfranken 
(75 and 81 per cent, respectively). Of Oberfranken's small 
towns, 31 per cent were predominantly Protestant and 33 per 
cent were predominantly CathoUc. In Baden, 14 per cent of the 
small towns were predominantly Protestant and 44 per cent 
predominantly CathoUc. 



Report No. 122 (22 May 1948) 

PREJUDICE AND ANTI-SEMITISM 

Sample: a cross-section of persons 15 years of age and 
older in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: April 1948. (11 pp.) 



This study was a repeat of a survey made in December 1 946 (cf . 
Report No. 49). Its purpose was to ascertain whether there 
existed a general anti-Semitism among the German people and, 
if so, to measure both the spread and its incidence within 
certain groups of the population. One historical note should be 
borne in mind: Whereas in 1933 there were about 503,000 Jews 



240 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



in Germany (0.8 per cent of the total population), in 1948 
there were less than 20,000. 

A comparison of the two detailed studies on anti-Semitism 
made in December 1946 and April 1948 revealed that overt 
anti-Semitism had not increased during the year. Indeed, it had 
decreased slightly, from 21 per cent to 19 per cent for 
anti-Semites and 18 per cent to 14 per cent for intense 
anti-Semites. 

However, at the same time, racist attitudes — the basis of 
anti-Semitism — had increased sharply, from 22 per cent to 26 
per cent. 

An objective estimate of population divisions (overcoming 
possible objections to the wording of the questions) showed 
that about two in ten persons were clearly anti-Semitic, about 
three in ten were indifferent or unconcerned, and just over half 
could be termed "not anti-Semitic." Group differences paral- 
leled those found in the earlier report: women, the poorly 
educated, and rural persons were more likely to be anti-Semitic 
than men, the well-educated, or city dwellers. More detailed 
analysis, however, revealed that locale was even more important 
than education in shaping outlooks on this issue. Examination 
of the Regierungsbezirke (administrative districts) showed that 
in Wuerttemberg, for instance, there was more prejudice 
(gradient score of 129 per cent on a scale ranging from per 
cent equalling the total absence of prejudice to 100 per cent 
equalling absolute anti-Semitism) than in Baden (gradient score 
of 103 per cent). 

Knowledge reduces prejudice. However, parents of German 
youth were more frequently carriers of prejudice than childless 
couples. Germans between the ages of 15 and 19 showed more 
anti-Semitism than other age groups. Trade union members 
were less often anti-Semitic than nonmembers. Expellees from 
the East did not differ from natives of an area in their degrees 
of prejudice. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 241 



Report No. 123 (25 May 1948) 



REACTIONS TO THE VOLKSKONGRESS PETITION 
IN BERLIN AND DARMSTADT 

Sample: representative cross-sections of over 450 adults in 
West Berlin and almost 200 in Darmstadt. 
Interviewing dates: May 1948. (5 pp.) 

As had been expected, almost everyone (96%) in both West 
Berlin and Darmstadt hoped that Germany would again be 
united. However, people did not want this unity at any price. 
Most people (78 per cent in West Berlin and 87 per cent in 
Darmstadt) said that they would not sign a petition if they 
knew it came from a communist organization. Likewise, most 
people (78 per cent in West Berlin and 85 per cent in 
Darmstadt) said that they would not favor uniting Germany if 
union could only be achieved under Soviet influence. And in 
Darmstadt, almost eight in ten (78%) favored the establishment 
of a provisional government for western Germany, although in 
West Berlin only 49 per cent did. 

A petition for German unity under the auspices of the 
Volkskongress had some appeal, especially in Darmstadt where 
fewer people than in West Berlin had heard or read anything 
about the council. People who had heard of the Volkskongress 
(80 per cent in West Berlin and 5 1 per cent in Darmstadt) were 
much less inclined to sign its petition (32 per cent in West 
Berlin and 53 per cent in Darmstadt) than those who had not 
heard of it (44 per cent in West Berlin and 62 per cent in 
Darmstadt). By the same token, regular newspaper readers were 
more skeptical of the Volkskongress' efforts (30 per cent in 
West Berlin and 53 per cent in Darmstadt) than were nonreaders 
(53 per cent in West Berhn and 76 per cent in Darmstadt). 

Both in West Berlin and in Darmstadt women, older 
people, those from the lower socioeconomic groups, nonreaders 
of newspapers, and people opposed to the creation of a 
provisional west German goverment were more likely than their 
counterpart groups to say that they would sign a petition 



242 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Sponsored by the Volkskongress. Interestingly enough, however, 
many of those who said they would sign such a petition also 
favored a provisional government (29 per cent in West Berhn 
and 62 per cent in Darmstadt); evidently they wanted unifica- 
tion but were ready to accept separation. 

Men, those from the middle class, regular newspaper 
readers, those who would not sign a petition circulated under 
communist auspices, and those who opposed unification if it 
meant Soviet leadership were more favorable toward a pro- 
visional government in the west than were their opposite 
numbers. Those most strongly opposed were the KPD/SED 
sympathizers, those who would sign a communist-sponsored 
petition, and those wilhng to see a united Germany under 
Soviet leadership. 



Report No. 124(1 June 1948) 



SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE 
IN THE AMERICAN ZONE AND IN BERLIN 
(BRITISH AND AMERICAN SECTORS) 

Sample: 14,973 respondents in the American Zone, and 
1,999 in West Berlin, comprising the combined total of 
respondents in several surveys. 
Interviewing dates: 15 February to 8 July 1947. (41 pp.) 

The report comprises 34 tables cross-tabulating the AMZON 
and West Berlin population according to education, social 
status, age, religion, occupation, monthly income, former 
NSDAP membership, current party membership, political party 
preference, and size of community. An appendix compares the 
sample data with data from the census of 29 October 1946; 
another appendix shows religious affiliation and church atten- 
dance broken down by the sex, education, and social status of 
the respondents. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 243 



Report No. 125 (22 June 1948) 



BERLIN RADIO LISTENERS APPRAISE 
"AMERICAN VOICES" 

Sample: a cross-section of West Berlin residents. 
Interviewing dates: during the last two weeks of May 1948. 
(3 pp.) 

In this study an attempt was made to gather evidence about the 
desirability of using as radio announcers persons with clearly 
marked American accents or those with no accent at all. 

Assuming that the speaker made himself understood, there 
was no strong sentiment favoring the use of an American 
accent. In fact, among all Usteners — those who had heard an 
American on radio as well as those who had not — almost as 
many favored a voice without an accent (35%) as said they 
favored German spoken with an American accent (37%); the 
remainder (28%) indicated no preference between the two. 

A surprisingly large percentage (62%) said they had heard 
an American speaking on the radio while about 1 5 per cent said 
they had never heard one. Half of those who preferred an 
accented voice said that this was one way of knowing that the 
speaker really was an American; most of the others expressing 
this preference said it sounded nicer. 



Report No. 126 (29 June 1948) 

RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOLS 

Sample: 3,007 people 15 years and older in the American 
Zone, 5 1 1 in West Berlin, and 3 1 5 in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: April 1948. (6 pp.) 

Almost everyone (96 per cent in AMZON; 92 per cent in West 
Berlin; 93 per cent in Bremen) favored religious instruction in 
the elementary schools (Volksschulen). In AMZON, 71 per cent 



244 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



felt that it ought to be obUgatory. Even in West Berlin, 5 1 per 
cent of the population wanted compulsory instruction in 
religion. Only in Bremen was a majority (54%) in favor of such 
instruction on a voluntary basis. 

Opinions differed along regional lines on who should give 
religious instruction. In Bavaria, 87 per cent voted for the 
clergy, as did 75 per cent in Wuerttemberg-Baden. In Hesse, 
however, almost as many (38%) favored classroom teachers as 
favored the clergy (43%). In West Berlin, 49 per cent voted for 
teachers, while in Bremen a majority of 62 per cent favored 
teachers. 

Only a minority, however, supported the idea of confes- 
sional schools (28 per cent in AMZON; 26 per cent in West 
Berlin; 30 per cent in Bremen). Of those in the American Zone 
who did favor confessional schools, equal numbers (13%) were 
opposed and in favor of having common schools as well. 

There were mixed reactions to the question of financial aid 
to schools whose curricula were determined by the church. 
Bavaria split evenly on the question. A small majority in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden (53%) and a larger one in Hesse (59%) 
were opposed to such aid from the state. In West Berlin and 
Bremen the opposition was even greater (73 per cent and 70 per 
cent, respectively). 



Report No. 127(8 July 1948) 



SOME OPINIONS ON THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN 

Sample: 200 people living in the Neukoelln district of West 

Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: first two weeks of May 1948. (4 pp.) 

In late April 1948 three students who had played an active part 
in University affairs were dismissed from the University of 
Berhn for allegedly defaming the Institute and its head. This 
survey was made in order to measure Berhn reactions to the 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 245 



underlying issues of the matter, as well as to related problems. 

Slightly more than half of the respondents (53%) knew 
that the University was located in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. 
Only four out of ten claimed to have heard of the expulsions, 
and of these only 14 per cent said that the students had been 
engaged in anticommunist or anti-Soviet activities; 63 per cent 
had a general idea of why they had been expelled; and 16 per 
cent could give no reason at all. Those who did give a reason 
were overwhelmingly (85%) opposed to the dismissals. Whether 
or not the respondents knew anything about the case of the 
three students, however, most of them were of the opinion that 
students should have the right to criticize University affairs. 
Those opposed to the right to criticize based their beUef on 
three arguments: that students ought to confine themselves to 
studying, that public criticism only harms the University's 
reputation, and that students are too immature to offer 
criticism. 

Seven in ten people thought it would be a good idea to 
establish another university in West Berlin. Two-thirds of those 
in favor of this idea said that there was no freedom of opinion 
or security at the University in the Soviet Sector. Six out of ten 
of the minority opposing the idea argued that setting up another 
institution would simply widen the East-West split. 

Concerning the question of selecting university students, 
the largest number (67%) chose as a criterion the abiUty to 
think independently. The possession of knowledge was the 
second most frequently cited value (46%), pohtical background 
was mentioned by only six per cent, and the traditional German 
test of university admission - social status — was accorded 
fourth place with four per cent. 



246 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 128(8 July 1948) 



A PILOT STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE JOINT 
EXPORT-IMPORT AGENCY 

Sample: 187 adults living in West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: not specified. (3 pp.) 

Only 36 per cent of the West Berliners questioned claimed to 
have heard or read anything about the Joint Export-Import 
Agency (JEIA) and half of these were either unable to describe 
its functions or described them vaguely or incorrectly. Few who 
had heard or read of the Agency felt able to pass judgment on 
its work. By the same token, only 22 per cent of the total 
number of those interviewed could suggest any specific im- 
provements. 

Almost half of the "informed" group (15 per cent of the 
total) agreed that an exchange of goods with foreign countries 
was a good thing, but an equal number withheld judgment on 
the matter. The main reason given for advocating exports was 
that Germany would receive food and raw materials in return. 

A plurahty (45%) favored German control of the Agency, 
although a large minority (26%) felt that the trade program 
would be worse off if run by German experts. The latter based 
their statements primarily on German disunity. 



Report No. 129 (19 July 1948) 

REACTIONS OF A PANEL OF READERS TO THE 
PAMPHLET "MIT VEREINTEN KRAEFTEN" 

Sample: 155 people in American Zone cities and 88 in 

West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.) 

Mit Vereinten Kraeften {With United Force) was one of a series 
of pamphlets issued by the Mihtary Government. The purpose 
of the study was not to predict general readership, but rather to 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 247 



explore the reactions of various kinds of people who had been 
exposed to the pamphlet. 

Mit Vereinten Kraeften appeared to be less popular than 
the three previously published pamphlets. As few as 35 per cent 
in AMZON said that they had read it in its entirety, whereas as 
many as 77 per cent had read all of Machtraub in Ungarn 
(Power Grab in Hungary); about two-thirds claimed to have 
read Offen Gesagt (Speaking Frankly), and almost half had read 
Aspekte der Gegenwaertigen Amerikanischen Aussenpolitik 
(^Aspects of Present American Policy). As was true in the case of 
the other pamphlets, men, those in the upper socioeconomic 
group, and the better-educated were more Ukely to read Mit 
Vereinten Kraeften than were their counterpart groups. 

Of those who had read the pamphlet, 57 per cent in 
AMZON thought the whole thing was interesting, 51 per cent 
thought that in general it was good, 41 per cent had 
recommended it to friends or relatives, and 54 per cent said 
they would be willing to pay 50 Pfennig for it if they saw it on 
the newsstand. 

Less than two-thirds of those interviewed in AMZON 
(63%) thought that Mit Vereinten Kraeften gave a clear picture 
of the facts, and over half (54%) said they had not learned 
anything new from it. 

Technical appraisal of the pamphlet was generally favor- 
able. Nine out of ten said it was well translated, most liked the 
style in which it was written, and considered the cover 
attractive. 



248 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 130(23 July 1948) 



BERLIN REACTIONS TO THE AIR LIFT AND 
THE WESTERN POWERS 

Sample: 300 people in West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 19, 20, and 21 July 1948, one month 

after suspension of land traffic to the city. (8 pp.) 

Almost unanimously (98%), West Berhners said that the 
Western Powers were doing the right thing by staying in Berhn. 
In fact, 100 per cent of those with nine or more years of 
education said the West should remain. 

Confidence that the Americans would in fact stay had 
risen in the course of the previous nine months. In October 
1947, 74 per cent thought that they would stay; by July 1948, 
the figure had risen to 89 per cent. 

Five out of six West Berhners (84%) expressed confidence 
that the air hft could supply enough food to maintain current 
rations. Almost half (48%) said, however, that they personally 
had not been making out as well with food during the previous 
few weeks. Of these, 28 per cent blamed their worsening food 
situation on the blockade and 1 1 per cent blamed the currency 
reform. Opinion was divided on whether or not the air lift could 
keep the city going through the winter. Those with nine or 
more years of education were more skeptical of the possibilities 
of maintaining hfe in West Berhn (61 per cent said no, 38 per 
cent yes) than those with less education (47 per cent no, 49 per 
cent yes). Most of those interviewed (86%) predicted that the 
blockade would not last through the winter. 

Three-fourths (77%) said that the Western Powers were 
doing their utmost to relieve the distressed condition of West 
Berlin. Of those who felt that the Western Powers could do 
more (22%), 14 per cent suggested the use of more planes, five 
per cent said that the blockade should be hfted by force; men 
and those with more education advocated force more often 
than women and those with less education. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 249 



Of those interviewed, 82 per cent thought that the Western 
Powers had gone up in the estimation of the German people; 
the same number thought the Soviets had lost popularity. 

A pluraUty of those interviewed (43%) thought that the 
Americans were more interested in strengthening their power 
than in the welfare of West Berliners. 

In August 1947, 42 per cent of the West Berliners 
predicted war within a decade; in April 1948, 66 per cent felt 
this way; and by July 1948 the figure had risen to 82 per cent. 
Almost three-fourths (73%) thought the Berlin situation serious 
enough that it in itself could cause a war in the near future. 
Again, those with more education tended to be more pessi- 
mistic. 



Report No. 131 (4 August 1948) 



GERMANS VIEW THE SIX POWER CONFERENCE 
PROPOSALS 

Sample: 500 people in the American Zone, 100 in Bremen, 

and 100 in West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: early July 1948. (6 pp.) 

The study showed widespread ignorance of the Six Power 
Conference held in London and a lack of enthusiasm for the 
proposals among those who claimed to be informed about 
them. 

Although BerUn had not been included in the plan, a 
majority of "informed" people, even in West Berlin itself (65%), 
thought that it had been; and vast majorities in AMZON (84%) 
and Bremen (90%) and half the respondents in West Berlin, 
regardless of whether or not they knew about the specific 
London proposal, felt that the city ought to be included. 

There was general agreement among respondents on the 
practicabihty of setting up a western German government 



250 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



although there was still strong sentiment in favor of a single 
united Germany governed from Berlin. If, however, people were 
asked to choose between a western German government and a 
united communist Germany, then the overwhelming majority 
opted for the former. 

Relatively few people knew that any proposals regarding 
the Ruhr had been made at London. Of those who knew about 
the proposal for international control of this region, three in ten 
favored it and two-thirds were opposed. 

Large majorities (72 per cent in AMZON and 79 per cent 
in Berlin) regarded the addition of the French Zone to the 
Bizonal organization as a step toward the unification of 
Germany. 



Report No. 132 (10 August 1948) 



SOME ASPECTS OF MORALE IN BERLIN 

Sample: 284 adults in West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 22, 23, and 24 July 1948. (7 pp.) 

A large majority of West Berliners (63%) expressed confidence 
in their own abihty to withstand further rigors imposed by the 
blockade. Men and women did not differ markedly in their 
expressed capacity to endure. Persons with nine or more years 
of education, however, had greater confidence than those with 
less. 

Opinions were more divided on the question of how long 
the population could withstand the imposed restrictions. Men 
and the better educated were more inclined to be optimistic 
than their counterpart groups, should the blockade last for a 
long time or even indefinitely. 

Almost unanimously (92%), West Berhners said that even 
though the Russians had announced their willingness to take over 
the food supply of the city, the Americans would have to 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 251 



continue the airlift; 40 per cent said they had no confidence in 
the Russians, that they did not keep their word. An almost 
equal number (38%) said it would be physically impossible for 
the Soviets to feed all of Berlin, and ten per cent linked the 
Soviet food plan with political ambitions. 

Most respondents had negative reasons to explain the 
Soviet offer of food: 42 per cent thought it was propaganda, 25 
per cent thought that the USSR wanted to draw West Berhn to 
their side, and 14 per cent felt it was in order to get rid of the 
Americans. 

Seven out of eight West Berliners (86%) thought that their 
own lives would be affected if the Americans were to leave West 
Berlin. About half expressed a basic fear of the Russians; one in 
six (17%) mentioned political consequences. 



Report No. 133 (10 August 1948) 



REACTIONS TOWARD CURRENCY REFORM IN THE 
U.S. ZONE OF GERMANY 

Sample: 500 people in the American Zone and 100 in 

Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: 21 to 25 July 1948. (1 1 pp.) 

One month after the currency reform, the per capita cash on 
hand reported by respondents was DM 22.41 in AMZON and 
DM 21.39 in Bremen. One-half of the AMZON respondents 
asserted that their food supply had increased during the 
previous weeks and almost eight in ten made this claim in 
Bremen. 

Almost everyone (90 per cent in AMZON and 96 per cent 
in Bremen) thought that the currency reform had been 
necessary and 53 per cent even felt it should have come sooner. 
In AMZON only a third of the respondents were satisfied with 
all the regulations implementing it, with the most frequent 



252 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



criticism concerning the effect of the ten to one conversion rate 
on small savings accounts. 

Three in ten (31%) in AMZON reported expecting another 
currency reform and half of these expected it to come within 
one or two years. SUghtly more than half thought that the new 
Mark would retain its value during the coming year. Well over 
half (58%) of the AMZON residents as well as 66 per cent of 
Bremen residents expected to be better off during this time 
period. Men and women shared similar expectations regarding 
the future effects of the currency reform, but the better 
educated and upper socioeconomic groups were more inclined 
than their counterparts to take an optimistic view. Seven in ten 
AMZON residents expected to buy more of certain goods than 
before, with clothing and shoes heading the list. Four in ten in 
AMZON (38%) and a fourth in Bremen (23%) said, however, 
that they planned to cut down on purchases of certain items. 

A fairly large majority (71 per cent in AMZON and 73 per 
cent in Bremen) felt that the currency reform would cut down 
the extent of the black market. Moreover, the proportion 
thinking a local black market existed dropped sharply from 48 
per cent who said it was a serious problem in June to 16 per 
cent in July. 

Huge majorities felt that the currency reform would 
increase unemployment, as was indeed the case. Equally large 
majorities were wiUing to work more to earn more, but large 
fractions felt that there would be httle chance to do so. 

Attitudes toward the currency reform were closely related 
to the adequacy of the food supplies at the time. People who 
said that their rations had improved tended also to think that 
the reform had been necessary, it should have come earlier, the 
new Mark would retain its value, they would be better off 
during the coming year because of the reform, it would reduce 
the black market, and they would increase their purchases of 
certain items. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 253 



Report No. 134 (2 September 1948) 



SOME TRENDS IN BERLIN MORALE WITH SIDELIGHTS 
ON RECREATION 

Sample: a representative sample of 300 people living in 
West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 19 August 1948, two months after 
suspension of land traffic to West Berlin. (5 pp.) 

The second month of the Berlin blockade saw an outstanding 
increase in long term confidence in the air lift. Whereas in late 
July a majority of Berliners (52%) believed that the Western 
Powers could not maintain Ufe in the city through the winter by 
air hft alone, by August almost eight out of ten Berliners (77%) 
thought it would be possible to do so. The greatest rise in 
confidence was among the more educated Berliners — the opin- 
ion leaders. In July, only a minority of 38 per cent of the better 
educated felt that the air lift could cope with the winter; in 
August a very large majority (82%) felt this way. 

By August 69 per cent of the West Berhners believed that 
the Western Powers were doing their utmost to relieve distressed 
conditions in the city (as opposed to 77 per cent in July). But, 
at the same time, slightly more Berhners in August (29%) than 
in July (22%) also felt that more could be done. 

A majority of West Berliners (58%) felt that the blockade 
had not appreciably reduced their opportunities for recreation. 
A majority (60%), however, thought it would be a good idea if, 
in the circumstances, the Mihtary Government helped increase 
recreational possibilities. One in five (21%) nonetheless felt such 
assistance would be a bad idea since there were more serious 
matters to attend to. 



254 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 135 (13 September 1948) 



RADIO LISTENING IN BERLIN SINCE THE BLOCKADE 

Sample: an unspecified number; a representative cross- 
section of adults in West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (5 pp.) 

RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) had by far the largest 
share (80%) of the West Berlin radio audience and was also the 
most popular (80%), thus continuing the gains noted in 
February 1948 (Report No. 106). The proportion of radio 
Usteners to the total BerHn population decreased slightly since 
February, no doubt as a result of the cuts in electricity: 61 per 
cent of the population claimed to Hsten to the radio in August 
as compared with 67 per cent in February. 

The three most popular Ustening periods were from 9:00 
a.HL to noon (26%), in the afternoon (31%), and evening until 
midnight (38%). 

Three-fifths (59%) of the radio audience listened regularly 
or occasionally to the RIAS program "Varady funkt da- 
zwischen, "which satirized the current Berhn pohtical scene with 
special reference to the East. Eight in ten (80%) of the people 
who hstened to the Varady broadcasts found them very good or 
good. Their reahsm as well as their humorous irony were the 
two most frequently mentioned characteristics. 

Seven in ten of the radio audience — or 45 per cent of the 
total adult population — claimed to hear "Voice of America" 
broadcasts and six per cent of all listeners volunteered the 
information that these were their favorite broadcasts. 

Men and women differed somewhat on the kinds of radio 
programs they preferred, although in general their tastes were 
similar. Women liked musical and variety programs best of all 
(73%), followed by newscasts (54%), discussions and talks 
(27%), and news commentaries (17%). With men, newscasts 
were the top favorite (65%), musical programs followed as a 
close second (60%), and discussions and commentaries were 
equally popular (about 30%). 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 255 



Report No. 136 (21 September 1948) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD A GOVERNMENT 
FOR WESTERN GERMANY 

Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone, 511 in 
West Berlin, and 329 in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (7 pp.) 

In AMZON 70 per cent of the residents favored setting up a 
provisional government for western Germany while only about 
one in eight (12%) was against the proposal. In West Berlin, 74 
per cent were in favor, while 23 per cent — almost twice as 
many as in any other area — were opposed and very few (3%) 
were undecided. In Bremen, 79 per cent favored and 13 per 
cent opposed the idea. 

More than half of those supporting the new government 
(39 per cent in AMZON, 35 per cent in West Berlin, 56 per cent 
in Bremen) did so because they thought Germany needed a 
government of her own. Significantly, more West BerUners 
(13%) than residents of AMZON or Bremen regarded the new 
government as a move toward unification. 

Most (6 per cent in AMZON, 1 2 per cent in West Berhn) of 
those opposing the formation of a West German government did 
so because they considered a united government essential for 
Germany. 

Asked whether they thought that a provisional West 
German government should control foreign trade or whether 
the Western Powers ought to continue in this field, 5 1 per cent 
of AMZON residents, 69 per cent of those living in Bremen, and 
52 per cent of the West Berliners responded that they 
considered foreign trade within the domain of the German 
government. Those with higher education and socioeconomic 
status were more likely to hold this opinion than were those 
with less education and of lower socioeconomic status. 

Although a majority believed that the new government 
should control foreign trade, 65 per cent in AMZON, 72 per 
cent in Bremen, and 85 per cent in West Berlin felt that the 



256 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Western Powers would keep Germany's interests in mind were 
they to retain control over foreign policy. 

About half of the respondents (47 per cent in AMZON, 5 1 
per cent in West Berlin, 53 per cent in Bremen) thought that a 
new western German government would widen the East-West 
split of Germany, with the percentage thinking that it would 
have Uttle influence varying from a third (33%) in AMZON to 
38 per cent in Bremen, to almost half (46%) in West Berlin. 
Those who felt it would widen the spht were more likely to be 
men, the well educated, and those of higher socioeconomic 
status. 



Report No. 137 (21 September 1948) 



THE MUNICH MOVIE AUDIENCE 

Sample: a representative cross-section of 302 residents of 

Munich, 1 5 years of age and over. 

Interviewing dates: 29 and 30 July 1948. (4 pp.) 

Two-fifths of the residents of Munich were regular moviegoers 
by their own estimate. The same proportion said they went less 
than once a month and 21 per cent claimed never to attend a 
film. 

The Munich movie audience was drawn largely from the 
15-24 age group: Two-thirds (65%) of this age group were 
regular moviegoers, the other third went irregularly. Educa- 
tional differences appeared to be as important a factor as age in 
marking the moviegoer: Although only a third (33%) of the 
poorly educated were regular moviegoers, two-thirds (61%) of 
the well educated were. Socioeconomic status was also related 
to movie going: Half (51%) of those of higher socioeconomic 
status went to the cinema as compared with one-third (34%) of 
those of relatively lower status. 

Every third moviegoer (36%) voted for musicals as the 
preferred type of full-length film; historical films were second 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 257 



with 22 per cent, and no one said that he preferred war films. 
When asked what hypothetical film title they found most 
attractive, 33 per cent chose "'Bauernhochzeif (The Farmer's 
Wedding); this was followed by "Abenteuer im DschungeV 
(Jungle Adventure) with 16 per cent. 

The ten most popular films of that period included six of 
American origin, with Gaslight heading the list (15 votes). Of 
the total hst of movies named, the number of German titles 
mentioned as favorites exceeded that of any other country, 
although the largest number of votes indicating favorite films 
went to those made in the United States. Despite this 
popularity of American films, over two-thirds (69%) of the 
respondents expressed a general preference for German over 
American films; nearly a quarter (23%) gave qualified answers, 
five per cent had no preference, and only three per cent 
indicated a preference for American over German films. 



Report No. 138 (17 September 1948) 



NEWSPAPER READING IN BERLIN SINCE CURRENCY 
REFORM AND THE BLOCKADE 

Sample: a representative cross-section of 300 residents of 

West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: latter part of August 1 948. (4 pp.) 

In West Berlin, 72 per cent claimed to read a newspaper 
regularly and 14 per cent said they read one occasionally; this 
represented a slight drop since March 1948 when the question 
had also been posed. In August, 83 per cent of the men and 
only 66 per cent of the women were regular readers. 

The British-licensed Telegraf continued to be the most 
widely read and popular newspaper in West Berhn with almost 
six in ten (57%) of the total public reading it and over a third 
(36%) preferring it. The American-licensed Tagesspiegel re- 
mained in second place both in readership (32%) and preference 



258 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



(22%). Neither newspaper, however, gained in popularity or 
readership since the spring; the same was true for the Soviet- and 
French-licensed papers. 

People who read one or more newspapers published in 
West BerUn were asked whether they paid for their papers in 
West or East Marks. Six in ten (62%) replied West Marks, 2 1 per 
cent said East Marks, and ten per cent said that they sometimes 
paid with one currency and sometimes with the other. 

Of the 37 per cent of those who cut down on their 
purchases of newspapers after the currency reform, 1 4 per cent 
had stopped reading the Telegraf, nine per cent the Tages- 
spiegel. The main reason given for cutting down on newspaper 
purchases was the lack of money, specifically a lack of West 
Marks. 

Newspapers seemed to have an adequate "pass along" rate, 
with an average of 2.38 people reading each copy of a paper, 
and with most (80%) of the exchanges going on between 
members of a family. 



Report No. 139 (22 September 1948) 

CHIEF CARES AND WORRIES SINCE THE CURRENCY 
REFORM 

Sample: not specified. 

Interviewing dates: nine surveys taken between February 

and August 1948. (5 pp.) 

During the spring of 1948, the cares and worries of the German 
people were much the same as they had been the first time this 
question was asked in the first survey. In June 1948, however, 
when the Western Powers introduced the currency reform, a 
change occurred in the German situation and consequently in 
the cares and worries expressed by the public. 

Before the currency reform, the most frequently reported 
chief worry had always been food. Indeed, during the winter 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 259 



and spring of 1948, over half the people in AMZON, two- 
thirds in Beriin, and three-fourths in Bremen mentioned food 
among their chief cares and worries. After the currency re- 
form, however, the picture changed markedly in AMZON and 
Bremen, while in West Berlin, where the blockade was instituted 
along with the currency reform, the food situation remained 
serious and 47 per cent of the population was still seriously 
concerned with it. 

During the winter and spring of 1948 clothing and shoes 
ranked second as an expressed worry, with about four in ten 
AMZON adults mentioning it. But after the currency reform 
this figure dropped and by August only eight per cent thought 
it important enough to mention. In Berlin, however, the drop 
was only from 32 per cent to 14 per cent. 

Fuel was a less pervasive worry but one which showed the 
same tendency as food and clothing. In Berlin, after dropping to 
its usual summer low of one or two per cent in late spring, it 
rose again to one in ten during August. 

Although worries over basic necessities tended to decrease 
after the currency reform to nearly manageable proportions, 
anxiety over the means of obtaining them skyrocketed. By 
midsummer, half the AMZON population (48%) said that they 
had no means of livelihood and by August this figure had risen 
to 59 per cent. 

In all the surveys, a small group of people in AMZON (less 
than 5%) mentioned concern about the future in general. In 
West Berlin, however, it rose from about five per cent to 1 3 per 
cent in mid-April, dropped again in May and then rose again, 
remaining relatively high (10% to 14%) during June, July, and 
August. 

Most of the other kinds of cares and worries remained 
fairly constant: anxiety about prisoners of war and missing 
persons (6-9%), loss of housing (8-14%), Nazi Party membership 
(0-2%), health (3-6%), evacuee difficulties (8-9%). The number 
claiming to have no worry varied from one to five per cent of 
the AMZON sample. 



260 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 140 (24 September 1948) 



OPINIONS ON THE PROPOSED WITHDRAWAL OF THE 
FOUR OCCUPYING POWERS 

Sample: an unspecified number; a representative sample of 
residents of the American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (4 pp.) 

The proposal by the Soviet Union calling for the withdrawal 
from Germany of all four occupying powers was greeted with 
mixed feelings by many Germans. On the one hand, they 
favored the idea of the withdrawal but, on the other hand, they 
were dubious of the proposal since it emanated from the 
Russians. In AMZON 39 per cent said they would like to see the 
proposal carried out while 49 per cent were distrustful of it. 
The lack of enthusiasm for the proposal was most marked in 
Bavaria, where over half (54%) rejected it. 

Throughout AMZON, those with more education and 
higher economic status were less ready to accept the suggestion. 
In West Berlin and Bremen, however, people tended to be more 
favorably disposed toward the proposal than in AMZON. In 
both cities, half the people (51 and 52 per cent, respectively) 
hoped it would be carried out. 

In AMZON, respondents who perceived that the Amer- 
icans had hindered the reconstruction of Germany were more 
likely to favor (58%) than to oppose (35%) the Soviet proposal; 
those for and against the formation of a West German govern- 
ment (54 and 53 per cent respectively) were almost equally 
against the Soviet idea; and persons who thought that the forma- 
tion of a West German government would have no influence on 
the East-West split were more likely to oppose the idea (58%) 
than were those who thought that the establishment of such a 
government would widen this split (51%). 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 261 



Report No. 141 (4 October 1948) 



BERLIN ATTITUDES ON THE AIR LIFT: 
FURTHER TRENDS 

Sample: 300 people in West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: 16 and 17 September 1948, three 

months after suspension of land traffic to Berlin. (3 pp.) 

While in July only 45 per cent of the Berlin population thought 
the Western Powers would be able to bring in enough supplies 
by air to maintain life in the city, by September this figure had 
risen to 85 per cent. At the same time, indications were that the 
accompUshments of the air lift had brought some West Berliners 
to the belief that Western capabilities were limitless. In July, 77 
per cent had felt the West was doing its utmost and only 22 per 
cent thought they could do more; by September, 66 per cent 
thought they were doing their utmost and 32 per cent felt they 
could do more. 

Confidence in the fact that the Americans would stay in 
Berlin as long as they stayed in Germany remained high and 
constant between July and September (87-89%); a year earlier, 
however, the figure had been appreciably lower (74%). 

Despite the restrictions and hardships caused by the 
blockade. West Berliners were almost unanimous (88%) in 
saying that they preferred things as they were rather than a 
united city under the control of the communist-dominated 
Socialist Unity Party (4%). 



262 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 142 (5 October 1948) 



ATTITUDES TOWARD JEIA 

Sample: a representative sample of residents of the 
American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: latter part of July 1948. (3 pp.) 

Only 30 per cent of AMZON residents claimed to have heard or 
read something about the Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA). 
In Bremen the figure was twice as high (59%), while less than a 
fourth (24%) of the West Berliners said they had heard of it. 

Of those who had heard of JEIA, half knew that it 
regulated both German exports and imports. Only half of the 
informed respondents in AMZON and Bremen and a third of 
the informed West Berliners could evaluate its work. Most of 
those with opinions thought that it functioned well or fairly well. 



Report No. 143 (14 October 1948) 



GOVERNMENT OR ADMINISTRATION FOR 
WESTERN GERMANY? 

Sample: 1,500 people in the American Zone, 250 in West 
Berlin, and 162 in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (6 pp.) 

To the majority of AMZON respondents (58%) it made no 
difference whether the proposed provisional western German 
organization was called a "government" or an "administration." 
Of those who did express a preference, more people favored, 
especially in Bavaria (27%), the label "government" as proposed 
by the Western Powers. Only in Berhn was a majority (56%) 
even concerned about drawing this distinction, and then the 
respondents split evenly in their support of the two terms. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 263 



More men than women felt it was important to decide 
between the rival conceptions; the same was true of those with 
higher educational and socioeconomic levels. 

Of those favoring the notion of "government" rather than 
"administration," the majority in AMZON (66%), Berlin (73%), 
and Bremen (63%) referred to what they considered to be 
desirable implications of greater power, responsibiUty and 
prestige. For the smaller group of people who favored the term 
"administration," the reasons were more diversified although 
the greatest number (40%) explained that, as long as Germany 
was controlled by the Western Powers, one could not speak of a 
government. 

In addition to the usual questions, this survey contained a 
series of 1 2 questions designed to yield a scale of confidence in 
the Western Powers and support for the term "government." 
Those with the least confidence in the West most favored the 
"administration" label. 



Report No. 144 (26 October 1948) 



U.S. ZONE GERMANS VIEW THE AIR LIFT 

Sample: 500 American Zone residents in July and 3,000 in 
August; 300 West Berliners in July and 51 1 in August; 107 
people from Bremen in July and 320 in August. 
Interviewing dates: July and August 1948. (5 pp.) 

The number of AMZON residents who expected the Americans 
to stay in BerUn increased from 59 per cent in July to 71 per 
cent in August. In West Berlin itself, the vast majority of 
respondents thought they would stay although the figures did 
decrease from 89 per cent in July to 87 per cent in August. In 
all three areas, in AMZON, Bremen, and Berhn, respondents 
were almost unanimous in saying that the Western Powers were 
doing the right thing by staying in Berlin; this opinion did not 



264 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



vary significantly in the July and August surveys. Although 
most people agreed that the Western Powers should remain in 
Berlin, they had different reasons for feeling this way: Almost 
half (45%) of the AMZON residents and over half (56%) of 
those Uving in Bremen felt that if the West withdrew at that 
time it would mean a victory for communism. In West BerUn, 
by way of contrast, 58 per cent mentioned drastic personal 
implications for the Berliners. 

Almost nine out of ten AMZON Germans (88%) as 
compared to 75 per cent in West Berhn thought that the West 
was putting all of its might into the air hft. Nonetheless, 
although 84 per cent of the Berliners said that the air lift would 
in the future supply West Berlin with enough food to maintain 
rations at their then-current level, only 56 per cent of the 
AMZON Germans expressed such confidence. 

Most Germans, especially West Berliners (82%), felt that 
the prestige of the Western Powers had gone up as a result of 
the air Uft, and conversely that Soviet prestige had gone down. 

In August 1947, 44 per cent of the AMZON residents 
predicted war within the next decade. By April 1948 an even 50 
per cent held this expectation. And in the summer of 1948, 67 
per cent said they expected war; in West Berlin the figure was as 
high as 82 per cent. In fact, 73 per cent of West Berlin 
respondents felt that the situation at that time was serious 
enough to cause a war within the near future; in AMZON only 
59 per cent thought this to be true. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 265 



Report No. 145 (1 November 1948) 



THE "AMERIKA HAUS" IN FIVE GERMAN CITIES 

Sample: a random sample of 300 adults from each of five 
cities: West Berlin, Bremen, Frankfurt, Nuremberg, and 
Stuttgart, as well as Munich as presented in an appendix. 
Interviewing dates: last two weeks of September 1948. (19 
PP) 

The report consists of three parts: a general discussion of the 
five cities, the summary of a similar study done in Munich in 
late July 1 948, and a series of 20 tables giving detailed statistics 
from each of the five cities. 

Majorities ranging from 52 per cent in West Berlin to 74 
per cent in Nuremberg knew that there was an Amerika Haus in 
their city, and four in ten of the total adult population in each 
of the five cities could mention specific things offered there. 

Asked how they had found out about the Amerika Haus, 
most people mentioned newspapers, although the radio and 
conversations with others were also frequently mentioned. A 
comparison with a survey made in March 1948 showed that 
knowledge of Amerika Haus offerings had increased approxi- 
mately fourfold. 

In each of the cities, the most frequent visitors to Amerika 
Haus programs were the better-educated groups, particularly 
community and opinion leaders. And in all cities except West 
Berlin and Nuremberg, about twice as many men as women said 
they had visited one. 

In Munich, 26 per cent of the respondents could name 
offerings of their city's Amerika Haus, a smaller proportion 
than in any of the other cities studied. The most frequently 
Usted facihties of the center were the hbraries and books (65%). 
Only four per cent said that they had actually been in the 
Amerika Haus there. 

As in the other cities, majority opinion (56%) viewed the 
purpose of the Amerika Haus to be giving visitors the 
opportunity to take part in various activities and to read books 
from the United States and other countries. 



266 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 146 (13 November 1948) 



THE PROBLEM OF CLEANLINESS IN 
PRESENT-DAY GERMANY 

Sample: a representative sample of 1,500 people in the 
American Zone, 242 in West Berlin, and 160 in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: August 1948. (11 pp.) 

In their own eyes the Germans ranked first in prewar standards 
of cleanUness as compared with the peoples of the four 
occupying powers. Asked about Germany's international ranking 
in cleanliness under current conditions, 23 per cent of AMZON 
residents and 26 per cent in Bremen still placed German 
standards first. 

West Berliners (and it should be remembered that the 
study was made during the blockade) were least satisfied with 
the level of cleanliness which they were able to achieve (69%); 
men and people from the upper and upper-middle classes were 
also less satisfied than their counterpart groups. 

When asked whether the inability to keep sufficiently 
clean had any effect on their character, 83 per cent of the West 
Berliners and 80 per cent of the Bremen residents replied in the 
affirmative. The most frequently mentioned effect (67%) was a 
feeling of inferiority and irritability. Questioned specifically 
about soap supphes, 76 per cent of the West Berliners, 74 per 
cent of the Bremen residents, and 50 per cent of the AMZON 
residents said that they managed poorly with the amount of 
soap at their disposal. This was true despite the fact that large 
proportions in both West Berlin (79%) and Bremen (77%) said 
that they supplemented their soap ration through outside 
sources. In fact, the largest proportion of West Berhn and 
Bremen respondents felt that three times as much soap as they 
currently were getting was needed as a minimum supply. 

In West Berhn, 39 per cent of the respondents said that 
they were never able to take a bath or shower, but a further 23 
per cent said that they did so once a week. In AMZON, without 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 267 



the handicaps of the blockade, fully three out of ten still 
maintained that they could never take a bath and 43 per cent 
said they did so once a week. 

The problem of soap aside, the most irritating difficulty on 
the score of cleanhness reported in AMZON and in Bremen was 
the lack of sufficient clothing. In West Berlin it was the lack of 
fuel. 



Report No. 147 (17 November 1948) 



HOW BERLINERS EXPECT AND WANT THE CRISIS 
SETTLED: WITH THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS 

Sample: a representative sample of 400 people living in 

West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: middle of October 1948. (8 pp.) 

Four months after the suspension of land traffic to West Berlin, 
residents of the city expressed little hope that the crisis would 
be settled in a desirable way. Most (46%) expected only further 
disagreement and quite a few (27%) thought that the city would 
be divided into East and West Berlin. What they hoped for was 
that the Four Powers would agree peacefully and return to Four 
Power administration of the city (39%); a quarter hoped that 
the Soviets would leave Berlin with only the West remaining; 
and 24 per cent said that they would like all four occupying 
countries to leave. 

If the West Berhners had been in a position to decide how 
the Western Powers should settle the Berlin problem, 58 per 
cent would have used more force against the Soviet Union than 
the West was doing. The intensity of this feeling was shown by 
the fact that 46 per cent of the respondents wanted the West to 
take active steps even if it meant war; 50 per cent said a war 
should be avoided even if it meant that the blockade would 
continue. Larger numbers of men, young people, the well 



268 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



educated, and those in the upper and middle economic levels 
than their counterpart groups considered breaking the blockade 
more important than avoiding war. Those whose morale was 
low enough to want to leave Berlin were more likely to say that 
the West should break the blockade (55%) than were those with 
higher morale who wanted to stay in the city (43%). 

A large majority of Berliners (83%) considered the 
Americans to be in a superior mihtary position and felt that the 
United States would win in case war did come. 

Almost unanimously (95 per cent; in July the figure had 
been 98 per cent) West Berhners thought that the West was 
doing the right thing by staying in Berhn and about nine in ten 
thought that they would continue to stay. The large majority of 
West Berliners (65%) thought that the Western powers were 
doing their utmost to reUeve distressed conditions in the city. A 
growing minority, however, (from 22 per cent in July to 34 per 
cent in October) felt that the West could do more. Asked what 
they could use more of, 14 per cent mentioned food and, with 
the approach of winter, 1 2 per cent said coal and solid fuel. 



Report No. 148 (30 November 1948) 



RADIO BREMEN EVALUATED BY BREMEN LISTENERS 

Sample: 167 persons randomly selected from a listing of 

radio owners in Bremen as contained in the Deutsche Post 

file. 

Interviewing dates: early September 1948. (5 pp.) 

Nine out of ten radio-owners (89%) said that they were regular 
listeners. On an average, three people hstened to each set. A vast 
majority (96%) reported listening to the radio in the evening. 
Every single person interviewed claimed to hsten to Radio 
Bremen, with the Nord-West Deutscher Rundfunk being the 
second most popular station (63%). 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 269 



Most people (87%) preferred news broadcasts with light 
music a close second (69%). Although the great majority of 
Bremen radio-owners (80%) were satisfied with Radio Bremen 
programs, about two in ten said that they would like some 
programs cut down or eliminated altogether so that others 
could be lengthened. 

Over half (54%) of the respondents felt that the radio 
stations ought to be independently owned; only 22 per cent 
preferred state ownership. Those wanting independent owner- 
ship were most inclined to think that state ownership precluded 
really free expression of opinion (34%), private initiative 
produced better programs (17%), or only independent radio 
could be unpoUtical (3%). Proponents of state ownership most 
frequently cited the need either for financial assistance (1 1%) or 
for governmental supervision (8%). 



Report No. 149 (10 December 1948) 



TRENDS AND PRESENT ATTITUDES 
ON THE MARSHALL PLAN 

Sample: approximately 3,000 cases in the American Zone, 
500 in West Berlin, and 300 in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: 17 September 1948, with reference to 
four other surveys between 4 August 1947 and 2 August 
1948. (11 pp.) 

For a previous report on reactions to the Marshall Plan, see 
Report No. 104, 24 March 1948. 

By September 1948 awareness of the Marshall Plan had 
spread to the point where fully nine out of ten in Berlin (90%) 
and Bremen (91%) said they had heard or read something about 
the European Recovery Program and as many as three out of 
four in AMZON (76%). Ignorance of the Marshall Plan in 
AMZON was most concentrated among the lowest socio- 



270 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



economic level where 44 per cent were still unaware of the 
European Aid Program. 

From the outset the majority reaction to the plan was one 
of approval (74 per cent in favor, 3 per cent against). In 
AMZON, this approval was greatest among residents of Wuert- 
temberg-Baden (87%), men (82%), the higher educated (82%), 
older (79%), and economically better situated (87%), and those 
living in larger cities. Increasing numbers of Germans viewed the 
American motives in promulgating the Marshall Plan in a 
favorable light, as a sincere desire to help Europe get back on its 
feet (51 per cent in September 1948). Prevention of commun- 
ism, however, was the most frequently cited motive in all five 
surveys (74%), The upper socioeconomic levels saw more 
materialistic motivations in American support of the Marshall 
Plan than did the lower levels, but it was also the former group 
that was most favorably disposed to the Plan, Youth was less 
sold on it and more suspicious of American motives than their 
elders. 

Although extremely few Germans (3%) thought that the 
United States would withdraw its support completely, there was 
a certain degree of pessimism concerning the continuing 
adequacy of American aid to Europe. AMZON and Bremen 
respondents seemed to be less confident of the continued 
sufficiency of American aid specifically to Germany than they 
were of the sufficiency of such aid to Europe in general. In 
Berlin, however, where the air lift was in progress, there was 
more widespread confidence in America's wilUngness to con- 
tinue aiding Germany. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 271 



Report No. 150(15 December 1948) 



ATTITUDES AND RESOURCES OF BERLINERS AS THEY 
LOOK FORWARD TO A BLOCKADED WINTER 

Sample: representative sample of 400 persons living in 

West Berlin. 

Interviewing dates: mid-October 1948. (12 pp.) 

In October, 71 per cent of the Berlin population thought that 
the blockade would last through the winter, while in July only 
ten per cent had thought so. 

Similarly, opinions reversed on the potentiahties of the air 
lift. In July, 52 per cent felt that the Western Powers would not 
be able to maintain hfe in Berlin through the winter and 45 per 
cent thought they could; by August, 19 per cent felt they could 
not do so and 77 per cent thought they could; and in October, 
ten per cent responded negatively while 89 per cent felt it could 
be done. 

Along with the belief that the blockade would last through 
the winter, most Berhners expected Uttle help with their heating 
problem. A majority (55%) thought they would get enough 
heating material to survive, 12 per cent thought they would get 
enough to be fairly comfortable, and 33 per cent expected to 
get none. Over half (54%) had no heating material in the house 
at the time of the interview and about one-third (32%) had no 
candles or lamps to light their homes during those times when 
the electricity would be turned off. Among those lacking both 
heat and light — as compared with the group having both — 
there were more old people, women, those with little edu- 
cation, and those in the lower socioeconomic group. Over 
half (54%) of this deprived group felt that the West could do 
more to help the distressed conditions in Berlin. Surprisingly, 
however, their outlook on the general situation in the city was 
somewhat more optimistic in that fewer expected war, and 
more thought the big four would come to an agreement about 
the BerUn situation. 



272 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



The financial status of almost all Berliners was grave. 
Although, on the average, families had about as many East 
Marks as they needed, they lacked 85 West Marks in order to 
make ends meet. In addition, over half (55%) of the families 
with no way of heating or lighting their homes also reported 
having no West Marks whatever in their previous month's 
income. 

About two-thirds (61%) of the Berliners reported that 
their mood was the same at the time of the interview as it had 
been before the blockade; one-quarter (25%) said it was worse, 
eight per cent said much worse, and, interestingly enough, six 
per cent said their morale had improved. Less than a third 
(30%) said they would want to leave Berhn if given the 
opportunity, as compared with 43 per cent who felt this way in 
July. 



Report No. 151 (18 December 1948) 



SECURITY VERSUS FREEDOM IN BLOCKADED BERLIN 

Sample: unspecified. 

Interviewing dates: summary of seven surveys made 

between February 1947 and November 1948. (4 pp.) 

Until June 1948 there had been a slight trend toward an 
increased vote for "freedom" and a decreased vote for 
"economic security" in response to a question designed to 
measure their relative importance. In general, however, a clear 
majority of about six out of ten preferred "freedom." In 
November 1 948 a definite change in the majority point of view 
took place: Over half (54%) told Military Government inter- 
viewers that they preferred a government which assured 
"freedom" to one which provides "economic security." These 
findings were all the more significant in view of the fact that 
they occurred at a time when the economic security of the 
Berliners had, if anything, been decreasing. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 273 



Report No. 152 (24 January 1949) 



AMZON VIEWS ITS CIVIL SERVICE 

I. Religion and Party Membership as a Factor in Government 
Employment 

Sample: approximately 1 ,500 cases in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (7 pp.) 

More than half (55%) of the Germans in AMZON said that 
members of SPD and CDU/CSU were equally well-quaUfied to 
hold government jobs; an even greater majority (75%) felt this 
was true of Catholics and Protestants. Of the few who did claim 
there was a difference, relatively more felt that SPD members 
were better quahfied (15%) than members of the CDU/CSU 
(8%); and in Bavaria more people considered Catholics better 
equipped (14%) than Protestants (6%). Pluralities in all three 
Laender felt that members of both leading parties enjoyed an 
equal chance for government work, although in Bavaria 23 per 
cent felt that CDU/CSU members had a better chance. 
Majorities said that government jobs were also equally available 
to members of the two faiths. Again, however, Bavarians noted 
that they felt it was easier for the dominant faith there, the 
Catholics, to obtain such positions. 

Although considerably more people believed that non- 
members of political parties were better qualified for govern- 
ment jobs (35 per cent, as opposed to 7 per cent who said that 
party members were better quahfied, and 43 per cent who said 
that it made no difference), it was felt that party members could 
in fact obtain them more easily. 

Opinion was evenly divided on whether or not government 
workers should be allowed to work actively for a pohtical party 
(36 per cent in favor, 38 per cent against) but there was also a 
fairly large fraction of people (22%) with "no opinion" on the 
subject. 



274 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 153 (26 January 1949) 



BOOK READING IN THE U. S. ZONE, BERLIN, 
AND BREMEN 

Sample: 3,000 adults in the American Zone, 500 in West 

Berlin, and 300 in Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: October 1948. (9 pp.) 

In AMZON half (50%) the adult population claimed to be book 
readers; in Bremen and Berlin almost two-thirds (64%) made 
this claim. Residents of cities were more likely than small town 
and rural people to read books. Men, white-collar workers, and 
younger people were more likely to be book readers. 

Entertaining literature and novels were far more popular 
than classics or nonfiction. The books most frequently men- 
tioned were the Bible (71%) and the Prayer Book (27%), 
followed by the works of Goethe ( 1 9 per cent mentioning his 
Faust and 26 per cent listing other titles). 

Half (45%) of the readers read fewer books then than 
before the war. 

The currency reform did not greatly affect the overall 
availability of books since, on the one hand, it increased the 
number of books published although, on the other hand, it 
decreased the amount of money available to buy or rent them. 



Report No. 154 (3 February 1949) 
OPINIONS ON THE "NEUE ZEITUNG" 

Sample: 1 ,500 adults in the American Zone, 250 in West 

Berlin, and 150 in Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: December 1948. (10 pp.) 

Claimed readership of the Neue Zeitung was largest in Berlin 
where 20 per cent said they read it regularly, smallest in Bremen 
where only four per cent claimed regular readership; in AMZON 
ten per cent were regular readers, with proportionately more 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 275 

readers in Wuerttemberg-Baden than in the other Laender. 
Sizable fractions had either stopped reading the paper or read it 
less frequently than before. Although the most frequently cited 
reason for no longer seeing the paper was lack of money, the 
absence of local news was probably as important a reason. 

Large majorities of present and former readers (63%) said 
they liked the paper "well," and another large fraction (27%) 
said "moderately well"; very few of these respondents (3%) 
claimed not to like it at all. Few people recognized any change 
in the paper. Wide news coverage, the political news, and the 
literary and art features were most frequently cited as praise- 
worthy. But over one in ten (11%) criticized the literary and art 
features for being expressionist and too modern. Only bare 
majorities (51%) in AMZON called the paper "impartial" in its 
poUtical reporting, as opposed to 22 per cent who thought the 
paper "one-sided." 



Report No. 155 (3 February 1949) 

THE TOWN HALL MEETING IN REILINGEN 

Sample: 400 Reilingen residents between the ages of 15 
and 50, selected from current ration card lists. 
Interviewing dates: 25 September 1948. (9 pp.) 

The survey is based on the first town hall meeting held in 
Reilingen, a typical small town in Wuerttemberg-Baden, on 15 
September 1948. The town had at that time a population of 
3,500, with most residents being small farmers, many of whom 
worked in nearby factories. 

Ten days after the meeting, 19 per cent said they had 
attended, 68 per cent said they had heard of it but not 
attended, and only 13 per cent had neither attended nor heard 
of it. A large majority (78%) of the informed respondents felt 
that public forums of this kind were useful. Almost all of the 
Reilingen population approved the idea of future town hall 
meetings. Of those who had attended or heard about the first 



276 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



one, 95 per cent expressed such approval; of those who had not 
heard about it, 82 per cent thought it would be a good idea. If 
another meeting were held, more than three times as many 
people (63%) said they would attend than had been at the first 
one. Only a minuscule one per cent claimed they had no inten- 
tion of going a second time. 

Almost all (97%) of the respondents who took part in the 
Reilingen meeting felt that participation by Americans was 
desirable. 

Just over half (52%) of the audience either had no 
criticisms to make of the meeting or could not or did not wish 
to articulate adverse comments. The criticisms that were made 
were directed primarily at the MiUtary Government officials. 

Four out of ten of those actually present at the Reilingen 
meeting claimed they had learned something new and interest- 
ing. Of even greater significance is the fact that just as many of 
those who knew of but had not attended the meeting also 
claimed to have learned something from it. Finally, although 
only one of three people interviewed before the meeting could 
name the Landrat, three out of four could identify him after 
the meeting. 



Report No. 156 (9 February 1949) 



AMZON VIEWS ITS CIVIL SERVICE 

II. Men versus Women in Public Employ 

Sample: 1,500 respondents in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (5 pp.) 

Both a majority of men (61%) and a majority of women (56%) 
felt that men were basically better quahfied for government 
jobs. Only a third (34%) felt there was no difference. About 
two-thirds (64%) of men and women in AMZON agreed that it 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 277 



was easier at the time of the interview for men to obtain 
positions with the government than for women. More than a 
third (37%) felt that a woman did not have the same 
opportunity for government work even when she had the same 
abihties. Significantly enough, however, fully two-thirds (67%) 
of the group holding this last opinion approved of such a state 
of affairs. 



Report No. 157 (3 February 1949) 



OPINIONS ON THE WORK STOPPAGE IN BAVARIA 

Sample: 1 ,600 residents of Bavaria. 

Interviewing dates: late November and early December 

1948. (5 pp.) 

The report concerns the work stoppage in Bavaria on 12 
November 1948. One-tenth (9%) of the respondents said that 
they themselves had participated in the demonstration while 1 2 
per cent said that a member of their immediate family had done 
likewise. Support for the strikes came chiefly from men, those 
under thirty, and from urban dwellers. Only two per cent 
claimed that the stoppage affected their daily routine. 

Asked whether such work stoppages were right or wrong, 
nearly two-thirds (64%) disapproved of them, 16 per cent 
approved, seven per cent had mixed feelings, and 13 per cent 
withheld judgment. Of those approving, most argued that it was 
an effective way to protest the high cost of living. The most 
frequently heard argument against the stoppages was that they 
were useless, did not accomplish anything. 



278 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 158 (4 February 1949) 



BREMEN VIEWS THE PICTURAMA "AMERICA TODAY" 

Sample: 188 write-in questionnaires. 
Interviewing dates: 24 January 1948. (12 pp.) 

Bremen audience reaction to the picturama /I menca Today was 
overwhelmingly (96%) favorable, and 97 per cent would 
recommend it to friends. A third (34%) of the audience 
reported that their opinions of the United States became more 
favorable as a result of the program, while a majority (60%) 
maintained that their attitudes remained the same. Two-thirds 
(65%) thought the pictures and commentary equally interesting; 
a third (32%) preferred the pictures. PluraUties among 
university-educated people felt that the presentation of certain 
topics, such as American foreign relations and black Americans, 
was neither very impressive nor very realistic. Many respondents 
wrote on the questionnaire additional comments, the most 
frequent of which was that the program was crammed too full. 



Report No. 159(11 February 1949) 

BAVARIAN REACTIONS TO TOWN HALL MEETINGS 
AND PUBLIC FORUMS 

Sample: cross-section of Bavarian population with 1,608 
respondents in 108 communities and towns, as well as 
mayors and deputy mayors in each community selected. 
Interviewing dates: late October 1948. (10 pp.) 

About one in four (27%) of the people in Bavaria (excluding 
Munich and Nuremberg) claimed to have heard of public 
forums, town hall meetings, or similar assemblies. Only six per 
cent said they had taken part in such a meeting, with four times 
as many men as women making this claim. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 279 



Over three-quarters (78%) of those who knew about the 
meetings approved them; approval was higher among those who 
had attended one than among those who had only heard of 
them. 

Mayors' views on the meetings were divided. Among those 
from towns where no assemblies had been held, on the one 
hand, twice as many expressed negative views as positive 
opinions on their value. On the other hand, five times as many 
mayors of towns where meetings had been held made favorable 
rather than unfavorable comments. 

Meetings without MiUtary Government sponsorship had 
taken place in about 1 5 per cent of the localities included in the 
sample. It appeared that the Military Government sponsored 
meetings in larger towns and cities more frequently than in 
smaller villages. 



Report No. 160 (23 February 1949) 



GERMANS CONSIDER THE WITHDRAWAL 
OF THE OCCUPYING POWERS 

Sample: a representative sample of 1,500 adults in the 
American Zone, 250 in West Berlin, and 1 50 in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: August and November 1948. (6 pp.) 

The report stems from the Soviet proposal that all occupying 
powers withdraw from Germany. In November almost six in ten 
AMZON residents (57%) as compared with 49 per cent in 
August rejected this proposal. A third (34%) still saw virtue in 
the idea but the trend appeared to be toward rejection. A 
breakdown of replies of different groups in the population 
shows that people with university training or of higher 
socioeconomic status disapproved with greater frequency than 
others. 

The inference that acceptance of the proposal arose in part 
from a failure to note some of its implications received strong 



280 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



support from replies to a further question concerning its effects 
on German security. Of the 65 per cent of respondents in 
AMZON who felt that Germany would not be in a politically 
secure position if the occupying powers withdrew, most feared 
civil war and chaos; they also mentioned the fear of Soviet 
aggression. 

When questioned as to Soviet motives in making the 
proposal, only one per cent in AMZON had something nice to 
say about the Russians. By far the most common (65%) reason 
given was that it was a Soviet scheme to get control of 
Germany. Asked then whether any of the occupying powers 
would misuse this plan to gain greater influence in Germany, 65 
per cent in AMZON mentioned the Russians and four per cent 
pointed to the Western Powers. 



Report No. 161 (24 February 1949) 



SOME GERMAN OPINIONS ON OCCUPATION COSTS 

Sample: 1,500 adults in the American Zone, 250 in West 

Berlin, and 150 in Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: December 1948. (6 pp.) 

There was widespread ignorance of the German share of 
American occupation costs. Less than a quarter (22%) in 
Bremen, 39 per cent in Berlin, and 43 per cent in AMZON were 
unable even to hazard a guess as to the German share. Of the 
Germans who did give estimates, almost four out of ten (38%) 
in AMZON, and in Bremen a full majority of 61 per cent 
thought that the Germans were paying substantially all of these 
costs; in Berlin the proportion was not so large, but still an 
appreciable 29 per cent. 

Breakdowns of the major population groups show first 
that those people who usually had fewer opinions on other 
subjects hkewise had fewer opinions on the subject of occupa- 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 281 



tion costs. The breakdowns also reveal that the groups who 
were usually best informed — men, the well-educated, those 
with higher socioeconomic status, and city-dwellers — definitely 
tended more often than did their counterparts to make the 
larger estimates. 

Only one AMZON respondent in ten suggested that 
occupation costs were a major cause of the difficulties which 
the Laender had in balancing their budgets. This suggests that 
there was little support for the view of the German officials 
who pointed to occupation costs as the major problem 
regarding Laender finances. 



Report No. 162 (4 March 1949) 



CHARACTERISTICS OF NATIVES AND REFUGEES 
IN AMZON IN 1948 

Sample: varies from as low as 1,500 to a maximum of 

6,000. 

Interviewing dates: during summer and fall of 1948. (6 

pp.) 

The report consists of seven tables showing differences between 
refugees and nonrefugees in AMZON. In general, the middle- 
aged population groups were overrepresented among the 
refugees; they were more inclined to support the SPD than were 
natives; their occupational and educational status was lower, as 
was their income; they had a higher rate of unemployment, 
were more Catholic, and lived in smaller towns than the natives. 



282 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 163 (7 March 1949) 



SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE 
IN BAVARIA, HESSE, AND WUERTTEMBERG-BADEN 

Sample: 8,056 in Bavaria, 3,643 in Hesse, and 3,274 in 
Wuerttemberg-Baden . 

Interviewing Dates: between 15 February 1947 and 8 July 
1947. (45 pp.) 

The report consists of 34 tables cross-tabulating demographic 
variables of the populations in Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg- 
Baden. The variables included are: sex, age, education, occupa- 
tion, size of community, monthly income, social status, 
religion, former NSDAP membership, present party member- 
ship, and poHtical party preference. A detailed explanation of 
sampling procedures as well as a definition of the various terms 
used throughout the report precedes the presentation of the 
data. 



Report No. 164 (2 April 1949) 

AMZON VIEWS ITS CIVIL SERVICE 

III. Prestige Value of Government Work 

Sample: approximately 1,500 cases in the American Zone. 
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (7 pp.) 

Fifteen per cent of AMZON adults claim that they were at 
that time or had at one time been employed by the government. 
Of the remaining 85 per cent, very few had ever considered 
doing so. 

The prestige value of working for the government was not 
particularly high in AMZON. It was generally lowest among the 
better-educated and among the young; highest among those 
with less education and those over 50 years of age. Given a 
choice between a position with the government and an 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 283 



equivalent one in private industry, 31 per cent preferred 
government work, 16 per cent did not care which, and 48 per 
cent opted clearly for private industry. The chief argument in 
favor of private industry was freedom from bureaucracy, that 
for government work was security and pensions. Finally, more 
people (47%) preferred to see their sons work for the 
government than wanted to do so themselves. 

Nearly four out of ten (37%) felt that some government 
offices were overstaffed. Those most frequently mentioned 
were the ration board, housing, and employment offices. These 
were also the offices mentioned most often by the 25 per cent 
of the population who felt that some offices could be 
eliminated entirely. On both questions, the young, the better- 
educated, and former government employees were more 
inclined to say that some offices could be reduced or abolished. 



Report No. 165 (22 April 1949) 



OPINION ON FUSION IN WUERTTEMBERG AND BADEN 

Sample: about 600 respondents in Wuerttemberg-Baden. 
Interviewing dates: autumn 1948. (7 pp.) 

A plurality of people (46%) in both Wuerttemberg and Baden 
hoped for unification of the three Laender of Wuerttemberg- 
Baden, Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern, and Suedbaden. About a 
quarter (27%) felt that the entire territory should be divided 
into two Laender: Wuerttemberg and Baden, a return to prewar 
political boundaries. Only six per cent preferred the existing 
situation. The two groups most favorably disposed to unifica- 
tion were the better-educated (69%) and former members of the 
NSDAP (73%). 

Almost all respondents who favored change also felt that 
the change ought to be made immediately. However, about 
one-half of the original number withdrew their support for 



284 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



change when it was suggested that this might mean a rise in 
taxes. Those who did not withdraw their support were primarily 
the higher-educated, men, and older people. 

Although most people were unable to name any specific 
hindrance to unification, three such hindrances cited most 
frequently were: traditional differences, disunity among 
Laender governments, and differences among the occupying 
powers. 



Report No. 166 (25 April 1949) 



PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD POSTWAR GERMAN POLICE 

I. General Appraisals 

Sample: a cross-section of 1 ,900 residents of the American 
Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: December 1948. (9 pp.) 

Nearly two-thirds (64%) of the people in AMZON seemed 
reasonably well-satisfied with the German pohce force with 
regard to its primary function of maintaining order and 
security; the figures were higher in Berlin (71%) and Bremen 
(70%), and somewhat lower in Bavaria (61%). A pluraUty (47%) 
of AMZON respondents also thought that the poUce force 
provided as much security and order as in former times, 
although a large minority (37%) expressed the opposite view. 
Among those who thought the police force better in a prior era, 
the Nazi period was the one most frequently cited in this 
connection. 

In AMZON 45 per cent thought the police should not have 
more authority. When the 31 per cent who would like the 
police to have more power in certain areas were asked to be 
specific, they most frequently mentioned the black market and 
control over displaced persons. Only four per cent in AMZON 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 285 



named areas in which they felt the pohce had too much power 
at that time. 

Six in ten AMZON respondents (59%) did not want 
members of the police force to take an active part in political 
hfe. More than half (55%) felt that policemen should not run 
for public office. 

Only a relatively small proportion (17%) of the respon- 
dents in AMZON thought that the members of the police force 
came primarily from certain groups in the population. A strong 
majority also felt that the police force should draw its members 
evenly from all parts of the population. 

When asked whether they thought the local pohce should 
be under the mayor of the town or under the Ministry of the 
Interior, Bavaria and Wuerttemberg-Baden residents (38 and 40 
per cent, respectively) favored decentralized control at the town 
level; in Bremen and Hesse, a plurality (22 and 21 per cent, 
respectively) favored control at the Land level. High "no opinion" 
figures show that the issue is not particularly salient for the 
respondents. 



Report No. 167 (25 April 1949) 



PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD POSTWAR GERMAN POLICE 

II. Awareness of Civil Rights versus Police Powers 

Sample: a cross-section of 1 ,900 residents in the American 

Zone, Berlin, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: December 1948. (10 pp.) 



Only one person in twenty (5%) in AMZON and Bremen (one in 
12 in Berhn) was aware of the fact that the new postwar 
constitution of their Laender or cities provided certain protec- 
tions for the individual against the arbitrary use of power by the 
police. Still fewer could name a specific measure designed to 



286 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



protect civil rights. Large majorities nonetheless had a sensible 
proposal as to what they would do if they felt that the police 
had violated their rights. 

About six people in ten in AMZON (62 per cent, as 
contrasted with 69 and 72 per cent in Berlin and Bremen 
respectively) were aware that an off-duty policeman is "just 
another citizen" with no particular authority. 

Over three-quarters (77%) of the AMZON respondents 
thought that the police had a right to search a private dwelling 
without a warrant, merely on suspicion that a suspect might be 
there. When asked about a hypothetical case in which a 
policeman levied an on-the-spot fine, only 44 per cent in 
AMZON knew he had exceeded his authority. Over half (54%) 
the AMZON respondents, however, were aware of a suspect's 
right to be brought before a judge within a reasonable amount 
of time after his arrest. Even more people (55%) were aware 
that a police chief has no right to break up a peaceful public 
meeting on the grounds that he doesn't Uke the sentiments 
being expressed. Finally about six in ten (59%) were aware 
that a police chief has no authorization to precensor newspaper 
editorials of which he disapproves. 



Report No. 168 (27 April 1949) 



WEST BERLIN'S REACTION TO A SINGLE CURRENCY 

Sample: a cross-section of 300 West Berliners. 
Interviewing dates: 29-30 March 1949, ten days after the 
announcement that the East Mark would cease to be legal 
tender in the western sectors of Berlin. (7 pp.) 

Eight in ten respondents (81%) felt that it was basically 
necessary to make the West Mark the only legal tender in West 
Berlin. Of those who thought it unnecessary, most cited the 
personal disadvantages they suffered. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 287 



Six in ten (62%) thought the conversion was carried out 
justly. Among those who felt it was unjustly carried out, 15 per 
cent thought the rate of exchange was too low. 

Two-thirds (68%) of West BerUn's residents thought that 
they personally would be better off as a result of the currency 
change. More people could think of certain groups within the 
population that might be worse off as a result of the change 
than could think of groups that might profit from it. Those who 
had to cross into the Soviet Sector to work were considered by 
most to be the hardest hit. 

The majority (59%) of respondents thought that the 
conversion would have little influence on the east-west split of 
Germany. 

As another consequence of the change, 62 per cent felt 
that black market activities would decrease; 16 per cent felt 
they would stop altogether. Most West Berliners (84%) thought 
that they would continue to be able to use their East Marks. A 
majority (57%) also foresaw a currency change in East Berlin. 



Report No. 169 (6 May 1949) 



GERMAN APPRAISAL OF "LASTENAUSGLEICH" 

Sample: about 1,500 residents of the American Zone, 250 
West Berliners, and 150 people from Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (12 pp.) 

About three-quarters of the population in AMZON (73%) and 
Bremen (76%) knew the meaning of the term Lastenausgleich, a 
term used to refer to pohcies aimed at equalizing war losses 
among the people. In Berlin, however, only 30 per cent of the 
respondents could give a satisfactory definition of the term. In 
Berhn and Bremen an overwhelming majority (91 per cent and 
89 per cent, respectively) was in favor of the programs; in 
AMZON the people were slightly less enthusiastic (74%). 



288 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



More than half of the respondents felt that the program 
should be carried out immediately and more than eight in ten 
thought it would indeed be carried out eventually. A large 
minority in AMZON and Berlin (43 per cent and 41 per cent, 
respectively) and 50 per cent in Bremen, however, thought it 
could not possibly be carried out fairly. 

Refugees and bombed-out persons were most frequently 
mentioned as the ones who ought to benefit from the program. 
Almost a fourth (24%) of the AMZON respondents expected to 
benefit themselves; almost a third (32%) expected that they 
would have to pay for a Lastenausgleich. 

In AMZON only 40 per cent of the respondents knew that 
German authorities would develop the plans for the equaliza- 
tion program. Among those who knew about the program, 40 
per cent wished that the Americans would carry it out as 
contrasted to only 26 per cent who wanted German authorities 
to implement the plan. Reasons given by the former group were 
almost without exception variants of the theme that the 
Mihtary Government would be more just and more objective 
than German officials. This was particularly the case among 
those expecting to receive something from, rather than pay 
something to, the program. 



Report No. 170 (16 May 1949) 



GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL STRIKES 

Sample: 1,500 residents of the American Zone, 250 West 
BerUners, and 1 50 people in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: February 1949. (9 pp.) 

The large majority of respondents in AMZON (68%), Bremen 
(81%), and Berhn (72%) disapproved of strikes for higher wages. 
In AMZON, however, fewer people disapproved of politi- 
cal than of economic strikes, although more respondents 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 289 



expressed indecisiveness by giving "no opinion." The main 
reason advanced in support of strikes for political purposes was 
to call politicians' attention to the shortcomings of their 
decisions. The main counterargument was that such strikes are 
useless and accomplish nothing. 

Respondents from the younger age group were more 
wiUing to express approval of both economic and pohtical 
strikes, but even with them it was only a minority sentiment. As 
might be anticipated, people in the upper income and better- 
educated groups-where most employers are found-looked 
more askance at strikes for better wages or more food. 
Attitudes on political strikes could not be categorized so easily. 
Among political groups, SPD sympathizers registered widest 
support for strikes, although the extent of approval was still no 
greater than three out of ten. Even among union members, less 
than one out of three supported strikes as an economic or 
political weapon; moreover, present union members were less 
favorable toward the idea of strikes than were would-be 
members. 

Group comparisons for the AMZON population add up to 
the clear suggestion that disapproval of strikes was not an 
attitude localized among particular groups, but was the domi- 
nating sentiment among all the major segments of German 
society. 



290 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 171 (23 May 1949) 



CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN 
MOVIE AUDIENCE 

I. Impact of Currency Reform on Attendance 

Sample: sl representative sample of 3,000 American Zone 
residents, 500 West Berliners, and 300 people in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (6 pp.) 



The currency reform markedly reduced movie attendance, 
especially in West Berlin. About a fifth (21%) of the AMZON 
population went to a movie once a month or more frequently. 
Young people, the better-educated, and those of upper socio- 
economic status attended films more frequently than did 
others. Most moviegoers wished that they could see more 
movies; lack of money was the main reason given for not doing 
so. 

As would be expected, theaters were least accessible to 
AMZON 's rural population. They were most accessible to 
people living in towns between 5,000 and 10,000 population 
rather than in the largest AMZON cities. People living close to a 
theater saw considerably more movies than those at a distance. 

Only a negligible number of Germans (4 per cent in 
AMZON) had seen an American movie in an American theater, 
thus being exposed to productions whose suitabihty for German 
consumption had not been controlled. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 291 



Report No. 172 (23 May 1949) 



CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN 
MOVIE AUDIENCE 

II. Most Popular Type of Movie 

Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone, over 500 
West Berliners, and 300 people from Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (7 pp.) 

Among those who went to movies, a large majority (67 per cent 
in AMZON) selected a film rather than going to any film that 
happened to be showing when they had time. Selection was 
based primarily on advice from friends and the film title, as well 
as advertising. Newspaper commentaries were also instrumental. 

Most people who went to movies hoped to find entertain- 
ment and diversion rather than serious problems, although a 
sizable minority (21 per cent in AMZON) expressed an interest 
in problem films. Movies accenting a love theme appeared to be 
the most popular kind of film; in AMZON, movies featuring 
classical or operatic music vied with revues for second place. 

Of the 26 films people hsted as their favorites, 13 were 
produced in the United States, eight were German, four British, 
and one was from France. In West Berlin, foreign films were 
more popular: Of the fifteen favorite films listed by respon- 
dents, only four were made in Germany. 



292 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 173 (18 May 1949) 



CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN 
MOVIE AUDIENCE 

III. German Versus American Films 

Sample: 3,000 residents of the American Zone, over 500 
West Berliners, and 300 people in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: November 1948. (7 pp.) 

A larger percentage of people in AMZON, West Berlin, and 
Bremen had seen American films than had seen pictures made in 
either Great Britain, France, or Russia. 

About half of the AMZON and Bremen moviegoers (45 per 
cent and 48 per cent, respectively) said that German films were 
better than foreign ones; in West Berhn only 30 per cent felt 
this way. Asked to compare the quality of the best American 
films with the best German films, most people (66 per cent in 
AMZON; 79 per cent in Bremen; 73 per cent in West Berlin) felt 
that they were of about the same cahber. Those who felt that 
German films were better said that they thought the contents 
more worthwhile. Those who rated American films more highly 
cited their technical superiority. Less than one- quarter (21%) 
of the AMZON moviegoers, however, thought that the best 
American pictures were being shown in Germany. 

Although the majority of German moviegoers preferred to 
see German trims, a sizable minority (37 per cent in AMZON) 
said that their evaluation depended on the nature of the film 
rather than its country of origin. Those preferring German films 
stressed the subject matter; they found German movies easier to 
understand, both from a cultural and a language point of view. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 293 



Report No. 174(27 May 1949) 



HESSIANS CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF LIFTING 
THE BLOCKADE 

Sample: a representative sample of 475 people in Frank- 
furt, Giessen, and Kassel. 
Interviewing dates: second week of April 1949. (9 pp.) 

A large majority of Frankfurt (70%), Giessen (54%), and Kassel 
(70%) residents were aware of the fact that a parliamentary 
assembly had been meeting to draw up a constitution for the 
West German government. About three-fourths of these favored 
setting up such a government in the near future. Majorities in 
each of the three cities felt that plans for a West German 
government should not be given up if the Berlin blockade were 
hfted, primarily because this would not change the East-West 
conflict. Opinion divided quite evenly on whether or not Hfting 
the blockade and dropping plans for a West German government 
would improve chances for uniting Germany. 

A large majority of Frankfurt (67%) and Giessen (68%) 
residents and a plurality in Kassel (40%) felt that Frankfurt 
ought to be made the capital city. Almost no support existed in 
this survey for independent governments in the individual 
Laender as opposed to a centralized government. 

Few people in the three cities thought that the Western 
Powers initiated the new West German government primarily as 
a bulwark against communism; the largest proportion of those 
with ideas on the subject thought it was designed for better 
administration and the return of order and normal conditions. 



294 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 175 (June 1949) 



TRENDS IN GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION 

Sample: an unspecified number of persons in the American 
Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: from October 1945 to February 1949 
during which time sixty-seven full-scale surveys were 
conducted. (71 pp.) 

This report summarizes in graphic form major trends of German 
opinion in the American occupied areas, covering ten major 
issues: cares and worries, reorientation, politics, economic 
affairs, food, international relations, BerUn, the occupation, 
media, and expellees. 

Cares and Worries. Up to June 1948, the outstanding 
trend was the rise in anxiety over food. By April 1948, 54 per 
cent of the AMZON public mentioned this as the greatest 
worry. The next in importance was adequate clothing and 
shoes, which had risen to four in ten by 1948. Anxiety about 
prisoners of war and missing persons leveled off at about ten per 
cent in 1947. The category "unemployment and no means of 
support" dropped in 1947 to about 12 per cent. 

The currency reform produced a remarkable shift. From 
the April 1948 high of 54 per cent, concern about food 
dropped to 19 per cent by July 1948, and by 1949 it was as low 
as ten per cent. Concern about clothing and shoes also sharply 
decUned from 40 per cent in April 1948 to one per cent in 
February 1949. From July 1948, money trouble took over as 
the all-pervading claimed worry. Indeed, well over 60 per cent 
mentioned financial problems, far exceeding the peak figure of 
54 per cent that had mentioned food as a major concern. 

Reorientation. A plurahty of Germans appeared doubtful 
of their ability to carry on democratic self-government. If 
forced to make a choice between a government offering 
economic security and one guaranteeing civil liberties, six in ten 
Germans said they would pick the former. The same number, 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 295 



however, said they would not give up the two civil rights of the 
franchise and freedom of the press; four in ten would do so. 

In 1 946 the average figure for the number of persons who 
felt that National Socialism was a good idea badly carried out 
was 40 per cent. In 1947 it had risen to 52 per cent and by 
1948 it was 55.5 per cent. Given the choice between a 
communist and National Socialist government, the trend was 
from neither to National SociaUsm: In November 1946, 17 per 
cent selected National Socialism; in February 1949, 43 per cent 
preferred it, as against two per cent for communism. During this 
period the "neither" vote dropped from 66 per cent to 52 per 
cent. 

From November 1946 until January 1948 majorities held 
that Communists had a right to radio time. From then on the 
trend changed and by February 1949 about six in ten opposed 
giving Communists a chance to air their views. 

On the question of war responsibility, more Germans in 
January 1949 than in November 1947 blamed Germany for the 
outbreak of World War II. 

Politics. The number of Germans who claimed to be 
informed about poUtics dropped from 1945 to 1947 and 
interest in pohtics remained consistently low at about four in 
ten. Disinterest did not, however, imply lack of opinion. 
Approval of the idea of a West German government was 
consistently high and most people felt that its establishment 
would not prove a permanent bar to unification. Although 
confidence in local government officials was not very high, 
there was a definite upward trend. 

Concerning political parties, in AMZON the SPD con- 
tinued to gain in preference over the CDU/CSU, although the 
gain was only marginal. In West Berlin the SPD got much higher 
preference than in AMZON. Since 1945 both parties lost favor 
among the population. 

Economic Affairs. Popular opinion on economic matters 
mirrored the German economic recovery. The trend in con- 
fidence in the D-Mark was upward, gaining twenty points from 



296 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 

July 1948 to February 1949. Approval of currency reform 
measures remained at a very high level, averaging about nine out 
of ten. Although money and high prices in general were great 
cause for concern, after June 1948 majorities felt that prices 
would go down. In January 1949, 52 per cent of the AMZON 
Germans claimed to be better off than they had been a year 
earlier, at which time 57 per cent had said they were worse off 
than a year prior to that time. Nonetheless, in February 1949, 
57 per cent claimed that they could not make ends meet on 
their income. 

In January 1948, more people thought that conditions 
would get worse than thought they would get better, but 
immediately after the currency reform almost three-fourths 
expected an improvement in the near future. By January 1949, 
however, it had again fallen, but only to approximately the 
two-thirds level. 

Well over half the respondents continued to feel that a 
local black market existed to a serious degree and majorities 
thought that local officials ought to increase their efforts to do 
something about it. 

Food. In the spring of 1946 six in ten AMZON Germans 
claimed that they did not get enough food to do their work 
well. By January 1949 the situation had been reversed and only 
four in ten made this claim. Confidence in the fairness of the 
food-rationing system also appeared to be enjoying an upturn 
following a decline from the very high point registered in the 
fall of 1945 and spring of 1946. 

International Relations. Since February 1948 majorities 
of varying sizes favored a Western European Union. The 
consistently large proportion of respondents with no opinion 
indicated concern over WEU's effect on future war or peace; 
within a period of eight months the majority tendency was that 
it would lessen the chances for war but, at the same time, the 
fraction seeing war as a possible result grew. During 1948 there 
was a steady upward trend in awareness of the Marshall Plan; by 
December the figure had risen to 83 per cent in AMZON. A 
majority consistently thought that the prime motive for 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 297 



American aid to Europe was to prevent the spread of 
communism, although during 1948 belief in an altruistic motive 
rose nine points. Half the population feared that the United 
States would not adequately meet Europe's future needs; very 
few (about four per cent), however, ever stated that the United 
States would stop all assistance. Nearly seven in ten felt that the 
United States would have the most influence on world affairs 
during the next ten years. From August 1948 to February 
1949, the proportion thinking that the Soviet Union would be 
the dominant world power nonetheless rose from 11 to 16 per 
cent. During the previous year, about six in ten people felt that 
there would be another world war in the next 25 or 30 years, 
but an optimistic three in ten said there would be a good chance 
to avoid it. 

Berlin. Whereas about seven in ten AMZON Germans 
expected that the Americans would stay in BerUn, as many as 
nine in ten West Berliners held this view. In contrast, more 
AMZON residents than West Berliners consistently felt that the 
Western Powers were doing all they could to relieve West 
Berhn's distress. Both AMZON and West Berlin residents gave 
outstanding support (over 90 per cent) to the correctness of 
Western pohcy regarding West Berlin. 

Occupation. Up to January 1948, majority opinion was 
that the United States should hasten the reconstruction of 
Germany to prevent its becoming a prey to communism. By 
February 1949 the figure had dropped from 57 per cent to 49 
per cent; at the same time the view that the Germans should 
reconstruct their country alone rose from 16 to 20 per cent. 

Whereas in November 1947 only 39 per cent had felt that 
the United States had furthered the reconstruction of Germany, 
by August 1948, 63 per cent thought so. In 1946 seven in ten 
said that the Allies would cooperate to bring about a united 
Germany before withdrawing. In February 1949, eight in ten 
said they would not do so. 

Media. In January 1947, three-quarters of the population 
felt the news to be more trustworthy then than it had been 



298 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



during the war; by January 1948 the figure had dropped to 47 
per cent, with the less trustworthy column remaining constant 
at about five per cent but the no opinion column growing 
steadily. Throughout the postwar period, more than seven in 
ten AMZON residents consistently claimed to read newspapers 
regularly or occasionally. The radio audience scarcely varied 
during the previous eighteen months. And approximately a 
fourth of AMZON adults claimed to read magazines. 

Expellees. Both natives and expellees were in constant 
and almost unanimous agreement that the expulsions had been 
unjust. During the previous year, native residents tended to 
become more positive in their views on the ability of the 
expellees to get along with local residents. A corresponding 
trend was apparent in the expellees' attitudes toward their 
reception in Germany. There was little change in native opinion 
concerning the expellees' wish to return to their homeland; 
about nine in ten were sure that the expellees wanted to go 
back. The expellees themselves also expressed a desire to return, 
although the negative opinion was consistently greater among 
them than among the native born. 



Report No. 176 (27 May 1949) 

GERMAN OPINIONS ON THE "VOICE OF AMERICA" 

Sample: unspecified number in the American Zone, West 
Berlin, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: last week of April and first two weeks 
of May 1949. (3 pp.) 



The study showed that 41 per cent of the adult population in 
AMZON listened to the "Voice of America" regularly or 
occasionally. Among those who never tuned in, almost seven in 
ten (68%) knew of the program while three in ten had never 
heard of it. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 299 



More than half (56%) of the AMZON audience considered 
the program good. Very few (3%) thought it was poor. The two 
most frequently cited criticisms offered by those who found the 
program fair or poor were that it was propagandistic and that it 
was dull or uninteresting. Of those who liked the program, four 
out of ten stressed that it informed them about hfe in the U.S., 
and another three out of ten merely found VOA interesting. 



Report No. 177 (15 June 1949) 



READERSHIP OF "HEUTE" 

Sample: a cross-section of adults in all cities of 100,000 or 

more in the American Zone, as well as West BerUn and 

Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: May 1949. (13 pp.) 

The study reports on general critical reaction of readers of 
Heute, a publication put out by the United States Mihtary 
Government in Germany, as well as reaction by these readers 
and the general magazine reading public to a specific issue of 
Heute. 

Of the total sample, 32 per cent reported reading Heute 
(the next most popular magazine was Quick with 29 per cent) 
and of magazine readers the Heute readership was 62 per cent 
(57 per cent for Quick). Of the Heute readers, 58 per cent said 
that they usually read the editorials. More women (55%) than 
men (39%) claimed to read the seriaUzed stories. A large 
majority (85%) hked the covers on the magazine. A majority 
(63%) thought the cartoons on the back page were good. 

Heute readers were also asked whether they thought that 
the magazine should carry more information about their own 
country, the United States, and other countries. The largest 
proportion thought that the publication was fine in this regard, 
although more people wanted an increase in information than 
wanted less. On the general question of whether Heute had 



300 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



improved over time, 42 per cent saw no change, 27 per cent 
thought it had improved, five per cent felt it had gotten worse, 
and a large fraction could not make up their minds. Those with 
a university education, from upper socioeconomic levels, and 
men were more inchned than their counterpart groups to notice 
an improvement in the magazine. 

Few (11%) of the readers claimed to subscribe to Heute; 
most (457o) bought it at the newsstand, while 21 per cent got it 
from friends or relatives. Almost all Heute readers (89%) said 
that others also read the copy they read. 

As is the case with magazine readers in general, Heute 
readers were better educated, of higher socioeconomic status, 
and wealthier than the population as a whole. 

All respondents — those who read Heute as well as those 
who read no magazines whatever — were asked to leaf through 
the 13 April 1949 issue oi Heute and to indicate their interest 
in specific items. The items which the largest majorities 
regarded as interesting were a two-page spread of miscellaneous 
pictures with detailed captions (82%), the cartoons (80%), an 
article on students from Marshall Plan countries in the United 
States (78%), "Letter from Vienna" (74%), "Old French 
Actors" (72%), "German Fisherman" (68%), and the fashion 
section (65%). 



Report No. 178 (30 June 1949) 



GERMANS VIEW THE RUHR STATUTE 

Sample: a representative sample of about 1,500 persons in 

the American Zone, 250 in West Berlin, and 150 in 

Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: February 1949. (6 pp.) 

A month after the announcement of the Ruhr Statute — a plan 
for international administration and control of the Ruhr area, 
proposed by the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and Luxembourg - a majority (54%) of those 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 301 



interviewed admitted that they had never heard or read 
anything about it. Among those who professed awareness of the 
plan, only half (27 per cent of entire AMZON sample) knew 
that Russia had not participated in drawing up the Statute. This 
informed group consisted primarily of men, the better edu- 
cated, and those with high socioeconomic status. 

Among all respondents aware of the Ruhr Statute, a strong 
majority (68 per cent in AMZON) disapproved of it. A majority 
of informed respondents in AMZON (62%) and Bremen (53%) 
and almost a majority in West Berhn (48%) felt that the 
economic effect on West Germany would be bad or very bad. 
Most admitted, however, that it would be good for Western 
Europe. 

A major objective of the Ruhr Statute was the reconstruc- 
tion of Western Europe. Almost two-thirds (65%) of the 
AMZON Germans recognized that the Ruhr Statute would 
further this goal, but 57 per cent thought that the Ruhr district 
could be used better. Of this latter group, the largest proportion 
felt that complete German authority would be the most 
efficient way to utilize the Ruhr for this purpose. 



Report No. 179(1 July 1949) 



GERMAN DESIRES AND EXPECTATIONS ON FUTURE 
OWNERSHIP OF THE RUHR FACTORIES 

Sample: aproximately 1,500 residents of the American 
Zone, 250 West Berliners, and 150 people in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: February 1949. (1 1 pp.) 

The survey had a twofold aim: to establish what the respon- 
dents hoped for with regard to future ownership of the Ruhr 
factories as well as what they expected to be the actual 
settlement of the ownership question. 

A majority of respondents in AMZON (51 per cent, as 
contrasted to 66 per cent in West Berlin and 63 per cent in 
Bremen) were in favor of social ownership of the Ruhr factories 



302 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



either by the German national or Land governments or by the 
workers and employees of the factory in question. Of those in 
favor of private ownership (31%), the vast majority favored 
returning the factories to their former owners rather than giving 
them to new private owners. Sex, education, and age compari- 
sons in AMZON indicated substantial similarity of attitudes on 
the ownership question - but not socioeconomic status, as 
indicated by the fact that 52 per cent in the upper classes 
supported private ownership. Viewed according to occupations, 
the greatest support for social ownership existed among 
governmental officials (69%) and master craftsmen (67%); the 
greatest support for private ownership came from farmers (45%) 
and business and professional groups (40%). 

A sharp contrast characterized what Germans hoped for 
and what they actually expected the outcome of the ownership 
question to be. There was widespread behef (42 per cent in 
AMZON, 59 per cent in West Berlin; and 48 per cent in Bremen) 
that the Ruhr factories would ultimately be foreign-owned. 
Most people holding this view anticipated possession by foreign 
governments rather than by private foreign interests. Just as in 
the case of ownership preferences, no sex differences were 
evident in ownership expectations. Age comparisons, however, 
revealed that younger respondents were more likely to expect 
foreign ownership than were their elders. Similarly, half of the 
lower-middle class, those with greater income, and those with 
nine or more years of education anticipated eventual foreign 
ownership, as did pluralities from all the major pohtical parties. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 303 



Report No. 180(1 July 1949) 



BONN AND BERLIN, GERMAN CAPITALS 

Sample: 500 residents of the American Zone, 100 from 
Bremen, and 100 from West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: May 1949. (4 pp.) 

A majority (46 per cent in AMZON, 60 per cent in West Berlin, 
and 66 per cent in Bremen) of Germans agreed with the choice 
of Bonn as the capital of West Germany. While a vast majority 
gave no reason for their view on the choice of Bonn, most 
people who did comment specifically referred to aspects of the 
city itself (e.g., university town, cultural center) or its con- 
venient location. Those who felt that Berhn ought to be the 
capital again at some future date increased in number over 1947 
when the question had last been asked. In AMZON, the 
percentage of those wanting Berlin to be the capital in the 
future rose from 58 per cent in 1947 to 77 per cent in 1949; in 
BerUn it increased from 93 to 97 per cent; and 93 per cent of 
Bremen respondents expressed this wish in 1949. Of the ten per 
cent in 1949 who did not think Berlin should ever again be the 
capital, half thought that the choice should be Frankfurt, and 
two per cent mentioned Munich. 



Report No. 181 (7 July 1949) 

THE RIAS AUDIENCE IN WEST BERLIN 

Sample: a representative cross-section of the West Berlin 

population. 

Interviewing dates: May 1949. (3 pp.) 

Among West Berlin radio listeners, RIAS (Radio in the 
American Sector) continued to be the favorite station, having 
increased its popularity from about 80 per cent in August 1948 
to 91 per cent of the radio audience and 65 per cent of the total 



304 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



population in May 1949. A considerable fraction (36%) noted 
an improvement in programs during the previous year, while 50 
per cent felt the programs had remained qualitatively the same. 
RIAS listeners exhibited no marked group distinctions as 
compared to the general public except with regard to their 
political interests. A large majority (76%) thought there was 
great interest in poHtics in Germany, 68 per cent took a 
personal interest in poHtics, and 92 per cent could correctly 
identify the mayor of West Berlin; comparable figures for 
nonhsteners were 54 per cent, 29 per cent, and 75 per cent, 
respectively. 



Report No. 182 (11 July 1949) 



GERMAN VIEWS ON DENAZIFICATION 

Sample: 1,900 residents of the American Zone, West 

Berlin, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: January 1949. (7 pp.) 

Adverse criticism of the methods of denazification reached a 
high point in early 1949, as the denazification hearings 
approached completion. The predominant opinion (65 per cent 
in AMZON) was that the program had been badly carried out. 
Although exact comparisons with previously expressed attitudes 
were not possible because the questions had been phrased 
differently, there was a strong indication that approval of the 
methods and procedures had declined over the years. In 
November 1945, 50 per cent expressed satisfaction with the 
program. In March 1946 it rose to 57 per cent. By December of 
that year it had dropped sharply to 34 per cent, to 32 per cent 
in September 1947, and further to 17 per cent in May 1949. 
This decline does not necessarily imply hostility to the idea of 
denazification; critics based their objections on its laxness, 
rather than its harshness or unfairness. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 305 



Those who disapproved of the denazification procedures 
were most Hkely to come from upper income groups (83%), to 
be better educated (85%), have a higher socioeconomic status 
(90%), and they were more Hkely to be native residents (69%) 
than expellees from elsewhere (47%), "liberal" conservatives 
(84%), men (71%), and of course, former NSDAP members 
(78%) and their relatives (79%). Critics of the program claimed 
that it had treated the less important former members of the 
NSDAP more harshly than major offenders. People who 
approved the conduct of the hearings tended to talk primarily 
in terms of the justice of punishing the guilty for past crimes 
and misdeeds. 

Generally speaking, majorities in each American-occupied 
area voiced their approval of the idea of denazification; 66 per 
cent in AMZON, 68 per cent in West Berlin, and 64 per cent in 
Bremen. Very revealing, however, is the fact that the opinion- 
leading and most vocal groups — the university educated (49%) 
and the upper socioeconomic groups (55%) — were most likely 
to express their opposition to the principle of denazification. 
Arguments of those who disapproved even the idea of holding 
supporters of Nazism responsible for the regime were scattered. 
The argument most frequently mentioned was that these people 
had been idealists and were therefore not deserving of punish- 
ment. 



306 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 183(21 July 1949) 



PEOPLE IN THREE HESSIAN CITIES CONSIDER THEIR 
RECONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS 

Sample: a representative sample of 475 residents of 
Frankfurt, Giessen. and Kassel. 
Interviewing dates: mid-April 1949. (6 pp.) 

Asked about the main problem of their city, the largest number 
of Frankfurt and Kassel residents (59 per cent and 49 per cent, 
respectively) answered "construction of homes" whereas most 
of the others answered in terms of general reconstruction or 
removal of ruins. 

Two-thirds (68%) of those living in Kassel and half (54 per 
cent and 48 per cent, respectively) of those living in Frankfurt 
and Giessen expressed dissatisfaction with the rate of progress 
in the reconstruction of their cities. Lack of money and 
incompetent officials were considered the main reasons for the 
lack of progress. In Frankfurt 1 1 per cent held the Mayor 
responsible. 

There was httle consistency between the way people felt 
public funds ought to be spent and the way they thought such 
funds were in fact being spent. Almost everyone felt that 
housing should be given priority over all other types of 
construction but most thought that in actual practice anything 
but houses was being built. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 307 



Report No. 183-S (26 July 1949) 



KNOWLEDGE OF THE BONN CONSTITUTION 

Sample: representative sample of more than 1 ,400 people 
in the American Zone, West Berlin, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: late June 1949. (2 pp.) 

Large numbers of Germans were not aware that a Basic Law had 
been framed for a West German Federal Republic. In AMZON 
only 18 per cent of those who did know that it had been 
completed knew something about it. In western Germany 
majorities could not say whether they would ratify it if given a 
chance to do so; in West Berlin, however, 60 per cent would 
vote for it. Significantly, among those respondents who were 
informed on the subject of the constitution, 70 per cent said 
that they would ratify it. 



Report No. 184 (26 July 1949) 

THE "VOICE OF AMERICA" AUDIENCE 

Sample: approximately 1,400 residents of American- 
occupied areas of Germany. 
Interviewing dates: late July 1949. (5 pp.) 



The findings in this report were based on people who claimed to 
be radio hsteners, said that they usually tuned in their radios at 
7 p.m., and also listened to the "Voice of America." An 
additional group comprised those respondents who, when queried 
to the point, claimed to listen to VGA sometimes and correctly 
stated that it was aired at 7 p.m. 

On an average, four in ten residents in all American- 
occupied territories (38 per cent in AMZON and West Berlin, 45 
per cent in Bremen) stated that they listened to the "Voice of 
America" more or less regularly. VGA had not only the most 



308 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



extensive audience of any of the overt American information 
programs, but reached proportionately more of all segments of 
the German society. 

In AMZON 64 per cent of the respondents said that they 
considered the programs good. Negative opinions (27%) rested 
primarily on the view that the programs were uninteresting, did 
not appeal to the listeners' interests, were not objective or were 
biased. 

Majorities (65 per cent in AMZON, 74 per cent in West 
Berlin, and 76 per cent in Bremen) of the audience claimed to 
like the theme music "Oh, Susanna" played at the start of every 
program, but fairly large proportions, especially in Bavaria 
(27%) and Wuerttemberg-Baden (32%) said that they disliked it. 



Report No. 185 (29 July 1949) 



GERMAN OPINIONS ON A PEACE TREATY 
BEFORE UNIFICATION 

Sample: more than 1,400 in the American Zone, West 

Berlin, and Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: late June 1949. (3 pp.) 

Majorities varying from 57 per cent in AMZON, to 59 per cent 
in Bremen, and to 84 per cent in West Berlin would have 
rejected the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the Paris 
Foreign Ministers' Conference to conclude a German peace 
treaty prior to the reestablishment of a united government. It is 
worth noting, however, that considerable fractions in all places 
except Berlin would either have accepted the proposal or 
withheld judgment. Although the idea of a peace settlement was 
attractive to a minority, very few people (2 per cent in 
AMZON) appeared to trust Soviet motives in making the 
proposal, and most (82 per cent in AMZON) suspected ulterior 
purposes. 

Within all population groups, majorities disapproved of the 
Russian proposal for a peace treaty at that time, but those most 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 309 



likely to approve were SPD adherents (27 per cent as opposed 
to only 15 per cent for CDU/CSU adherents), the less educated 
(24%), and those of lower socioeconomic status (24%). 



Report No. 186 (22 August 1949) 
GERMAN OPINIONS ON AMERICAN AID 

Sample: unspecified number comprising a representative 

sample of Germans in the American Zone, West Berlin, and 

Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: January and April 1949. (8 pp.) 



The majority (68%) of Germans thought that Germany could 
produce half or more of the food it needed. However, a 
majority (55 per cent in January, 61 per cent in April) also felt 
that America was at that time supplying half or more of all 
rationed food then being sold in West Germany, In response 
to a question about America's motives in giving this aid, 
respondents most frequently cited humanitarian reasons (37 per 
cent in January, 33 per cent in April). Reasons of self-interest 
(bulwark against communism, to improve business, etc.) also 
received frequent mention. In all instances, the figures for 
Berlin were higher. Confidence that American aid to Europe 
would prove adequate appeared to increase between January 
and April. 

Urban dwellers were more inclined to blame the farmers, 
and farmers were more inclined to blame inefficient distribution 
for the difficulties in the food situation - but there was a 
growing tendency to feel that there were no food problems, 
only a shortage of money. 

Those who understood the background of the offer made 
in the fall and winter of 1948 by several foreign countries to 
supply Germany with certain foods in exchange for machinery 
were more likely to approve the rejection of the offer than were 
those who did not understand what had been asked in exchange. 



310 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Report No. 187 (23 August 1949) 



CURRENT VIEWS ON A SUGGESTED WITHDRAWAL 
OF THE OCCUPIERS 

Sample: 1 .000 respondents in the American Zone, 200 in 
Bremen, and 200 in West Berlin. 
Interviewing dates: late June 1949. (5 pp.) 

The number of AMZON residents who favored Soviet proposals 
for withdrawal by the occupying powers rose from 34 per cent 
in November 1948 to 43 per cent in June 1949. An even larger 
percentage (46%), however, was opposed. Asked whether they 
thought such a withdrawal would endanger German security, 57 
per cent responded negatively and 21 per cent positively. Of 
those who felt that withdrawal would leave Germany politically 
insecure, the most frequently cited consequences were civil war, 
disunity, and pohtical chaos. Soviet aggression and/or a com- 
munist coup also received frequent mention, although fewer 
respondents tended to list this point in June 1949 (16%) than in 
November 1948(24%). 

Suspicion concerning Russia's motives in proposing the 
withdrawal of the occupying powers was very great (55%). Only 
one per cent in AMZON and Bremen and four per cent in West 
Berhn gave Russia credit for having a good motive in proposing 
the withdrawal, namely, to make Germany free and inde- 
pendent. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 31 1 



Report No. 188 (1 September 1949) 



CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDES OF THE GERMAN 
MOVIE AUDIENCE 

IV. Appraisal of Movie Influences 

Sample: a representative sample of 3,000 American Zone 

residents, over 500 West Berliners, and 300 people from 

Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: November 1948. (6 pp.) 

Opinions divided on whether or not American movies gave a 
true impression of how the average American lives, with 44 per 
cent of the AMZON residents feeling that this was the case and 
42 per cent disagreeing. The largest group of those who said 
that the movies do not represent American life (13%) said that 
in general movies portray a world of unreality. When asked 
what they thought to be the basis for selecting movies sent to 
Germany. 16 per cent of those asked in AMZON replied, "to 
familiarize Germans with the American way of life," ten per 
cent felt it was "for democratic indoctrination," and six per 
cent mentioned their "cultural value." 

In AMZON a majority (59%) thought that movies could 
strongly influence people's opinions. Problematic and political 
films were considered most likely to affect people's point of 
view. 

Of those interviewed in AMZON, 74 per cent thought that 
certain movies were undesirable for children. Movies which 
might affect children's political attitudes were not considered as 
dangerous as those which might affect their behavior. There was 
little agreement on who should determine which movies 
children ought to be allowed to see: In AMZON 44 per cent felt 
it should be up to the parents, 46 per cent thought the decision 
should be in the hands of the authorities. 



312 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 

Report No. 189 (21 September 1949) 



THE PUBLIC COMPARES PRESENT AND PAST 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 

Sample: 3,000 in the American Zone, 500 in West Berlin, 

and 250 in Bremen. 

Interviewing dates: July 1949. (4 pp.) 

Most people (48 per cent in AMZON, 57 per cent in West 
Berlin, and 61 per cent in Bremen) felt that their economic 
situation was better in July 1949 than it had been a year earlier. 
Those who felt they were worse off (17 per cent in AMZON 
and West Berlin. 14 per cent in Bremen) were not any 
particular, well-defined, cohesive group. To be sure, many more 
people in the lower income brackets than in the higher brackets 
said that they were not getting along as well as they had in the 
previous year. Also, people with grammar schooling only, or 
those in the lower socioeconomic levels were more likely than 
the better-educated or upper social groups to make this 
complaint. But the differences were not usually marked, and in 
no case did a single group reverse the general trend of attitudes. 
People who felt that they were worse off in July 1949 
tended to view other related economic issues somewhat more 
pessimistically than did those who said that they were better off 
than in the previous year, or than did the AMZON population 
as a whole. They were inclined to take a bleaker view of future 
prospects in the American Zone of Occupation, although the 
plurality view was that conditions would be better. They were 
also slightly more pessimistic about future prices and the value 
of the Mark. Their buying expectations were substantially less, 
and considerably fewer of them claimed that they had enough 
food to perform their jobs adequately. Finally, many more said 
that they could not make ends meet with their current incomes. 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 313 



Report No. 190 (17 October 1949) 



THE MARSHALL PLAN AND WESTERN GERMANY 

Sample: an unspecified number of respondents repre- 
senting a cross-section of residents of the American Zone, 
West Berlin, and Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: last two weeks of August 1949. (8 pp.) 

Large majorities (67 per cent in AMZON, 73 per cent in 
West Berlin, and 76 per cent in Bremen) felt that economic 
conditions in West Germany had improved during the previous 
year. Foreign aid ranked second to currency reform as a 
voluntarily stated reason for this improvement. 

Seven in ten AMZON residents (69%) were aware of 
American aid to Europe and majorities (53%) could identify 
this aid program with the name Marshall Plan, ERP, or EGA. 
Awareness that West Germany and West Berlin were receiving 
Marshall Plan aid was very extensive (67 per cent of the total 
population, 97 per cent of those who knew of an American aid 
plan), particularly among men, the more highly educated, and 
the upper socioeconomic groups. Along those aware of ERP, 71 
per cent knew that the Soviet Union was not included and 62 
per cent knew that the Soviets had not wished to participate. 

Marshall Plan aid was generally (84 per cent in AMZON, 
94 per cent in West Berlin, and 88 per cent in Bremen) regarded 
as favorable to West Germany. A minority of AMZON Germans 
(29%) felt that the United States would use the Marshall Plan to 
influence political and commercial life in West Germany, and an 
additional 45 per cent thought that the United States would 
control the allocation of money and materials without any 
interference in German affairs; only 17 per cent expected the 
United States merely to provide the money and materials, 
leaving their allocation up to the Germans. Few thought that 
such aid was being given unconditionally. In AMZON 63 per 
cent felt that the primary motive for giving assistance was 
United States desire to curb the advance of communism. 



314 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 

Of those who knew about the aid plan and who also read 
newspapers regularly or occasionally, 88 per cent claimed to 
have seen articles on the plan. Among radio listeners, 66 per 
cent recalled broadcasts dealing with it. Majorities (52%) 
believed that the military aid program would not affect the 
economic recovery program. Among those who did see a 
connection between the two programs, 14 per cent felt the arms 
aid would result in increased economic aid. A large majority 
(67%) held that the economic slump during the summer of 
1949 in the United States was not a cause of Europe's economic 
difficulties. 



Report No. 191 (9 December 1949) 

THE STATE OF GERMAN POLITICAL INTEREST AT THE 
OUTSET OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC 

Sample: 500 to 3,000 in the American Zone; 100 to 500 
in West Berlin; and 100 to 300 in Bremen. 
Interviewing dates: several surveys, from May 1949 to 
September 1949.(21 pp.) 

Widespread passivity characterized the state of German political 
interest at the outset of the West German Republic. Only 36 per 
cent of AMZON Germans indicated in May 1949 an interest in 
politics, a figure that dropped to 33 per cent in August 1949. 
By way of contrast, 64 per cent in May and 67 per cent in 
August preferred to leave politics to others. Less than two in 
five (38%) reported great poHtical interest in Germany, almost 
half (48%) thought that there was httle interest, and the 
remainder (14%) had no opinion on the question. Those who 
perceived great interest thought that there either was enough 
(49%) or should be more (35%), whereas those who perceived 
httle interest were more inclined to say that there should be 
more (49%) rather than that there already was enough (40%). 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 315 



Three in ten saw as the chief obstacle to democratic self-govern- 
ment in Germany the fact that people were not sufficiently 
interested. And, asked whether the low degree of participation 
in governmental affairs stemmed from the lack of opportunity 
or the lack of interest, only 22 per cent pointed to the former 
whereas 67 per cent cited lack of interest. 

Low levels of information about politics bolstered conclu- 
sions about its low salience. As few as 58 per cent of the 
AMZON residents knew that the name of their Land's Minister- 
President, although, it must be added, 96 per cent of West 
Berhners and 98 per cent of Bremen residents knew the name of 
their mayor. Less than one in ten in AMZON knew that their 
Land constitutions contained provisions for an initiative or 
were correctly informed about provisions for a referendum. 
About four in ten (39%) were aware of the fact that the 
Parliamentary Council had drawn up a constitution for the 
Federal Republic, and less than half of these (17%) claimed any 
knowledge of its provisions. Although 96 per cent of the 
AMZON Germans knew about the pending election, fewer than 
half of these (47%) knew what the election was about. 

Lack of confidence in political parties and leadership 
contributed to low interest in politics. Only 20 per cent of 
AMZON residents felt that, if called upon to decide, political 
parties would opt for the good of the country, as opposed to 62 
per cent who thought that the parties would pursue their own 
interests. Somewhat over a third (38%) felt that people could 
influence the activities of political parties. The bulk of those 
who perceived little chance of influence (34%) argued that the 
parties would do as they pleased without regard for the wishes 
of the people. Two-thirds of those who thought that the people 
could exert influence thought that this would be desirable, as 
did three-quarters of the more pessimistic. Regarding the Land 
parliaments, about four in ten (41%) thought their members to 
be in touch with public opinion, 30 per cent felt that their 
members welcomed expressions of opinion from the public, and 
29 per cent felt their own interests as citizens sufficiently 
represented in these parliaments. 



316 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY 



Nor were the prospects for political participation any 
greater. To be sure, three-quarters (76%) of the AMZON 
Germans indicated their willingness to work an hour daily 
without pay for the economic reconstruction of Germany. But 
an almost equally large percentage (71%) voiced their unwilling- 
ness to take a responsible position in the political life of their 
community if they were requested to. Only 40 per cent were 
aware of "citizens' meetings" in their communities; as few as 13 
per cent claimed to have attended such a forum. Indeed, less 
than one in five (19%) had attended any political meeting since 
the end of the war. Roughly half this number (11%) had 
attended an election meeting during the campaign going on at 
the time of the survey. 

In this election campaign, which culminated on 14 August 
1949, 80 per cent of AMZON Germans indicated their intention 
to vote and, in fact, 78 per cent of those eligible did vote. Two 
weeks before this vote, 69 per cent had not decided for whom 
they would vote. Almost three-quarters (73%) of those who 
knew of the election had not seen the list of candidates for their 
voting district, and an equal percentage responded negatively or 
with no opinion to queries designed to find out if they were 
familiar with the electoral law. Over half (56%) of the AMZON 
residents could subsequently recall who won the election on the 
national level, 51 per cent were in general satisfied with these 
results, and 19 per cent were dissatisfied. The dissatisfied 
respondents were not only more knowledgeable about the 
electoral outcomes — which party and which candidate for 
chancellor had emerged on top — but they were also more 
informed about the aims of the individual parties. Asked why 
they voted, the largest number (27%) responded that it was 
their duty, 18 per cent hoped to defeat communism, an equally 
large percentage expressed partisan reasons (voting for or 
against a particular party), and 14 per cent hoped to achieve 
better conditions. 

Despite their low level of political interest and participa- 
tion, AMZON Germans gave expression to a norm of participa- 
tion: Almost three in four (73%) thought it a good idea that 



THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 317 



people were able directly to make a proposal for a law; 65 per 
cent thought it "a good idea for the people directly to be able 
to vote on the acceptance of a law, instead of its going through 
the Land parliament"; 60 per cent considered political meetings 
desirable and 67 per cent even considered such forums to be 
worthwhile. As opposed to 23 per cent who favored a 
government by experts, fully two-thirds (68%) of the AMZON 
respondents thought it best that all the people determine the 
political direction that the government should follow. 



INDEX 



(Note The numbers listed after each 
entry refer to report numbers rather 
than to page numbers.) 

Advertising (on Lit fasssaeulen), 115 

Aid (American food), 186. See also 
Marshall Plan 

Air lift, 130, 141, 144; and morale in 
Berlin, 134 

Allies: aid to Germany, 22: and limits on 
German industry, 31; cooperation 
among, 62, 63, 87, 100: loss of 
confidence in, 85 ; attitude toward in 
Bremen, 110; withdrawal from Ger- 
many, 175. See also Occupation a/ic? 
Western Powers 

American Military Government 
Economic policies: reconstruction, 22 
60, 76, 100, 104, 175; food contri- 
butions, 22, 64, 186; inflation, 25; 
food supply, 31, 36; trade unions, 
35; economic difficulties in the 
United States and policy toward 
Europe. 190 
Information policies: films, 20, 158, 
173, 188: licensed newspapers, 21, 
34, 77, 83, 118, 138: licensed maga- 
zines, 43, 53, 108, 177: pamphlets, 
89, 97, 112, 129 
Occupation forces: relations with chil 
dren. 12; and Germans, 24; contacts 
with Germans, 27, 94: and German 
youth, 46, 56; role in bartering and 
black market, 91 



Political policies: opinion of by com- 
munity leaders, 5; town hall meet- 
ings, 155, 159 

America Today (picturama): reaction to 
in Bremen, 158 

Amerika Haus, 102, 145 

Amerikanische Rundschau (American- 
sponsored magazine), 43, 53, 108 

Anti-Semitism, 49, 122; measured on 
German attitude scale, 19; and col- 
lective guilt, 51 

Arbeiter Zeitung (Viennese newspaper) 
23 

Army Youth Program, 46, 56 

Aspekte der Gegenwaertigen Aussen- 
politik (United States State Depart- 
ment pamphlet), 112, 129 

Atomic bomb: and schoolchildren, 12 

Austria: economic problems, 40; knowl- 
edge of Czech coup, 117. See also 
Vienna 



Baden: fusion with Wuerttemberg, 165. 
See also Wuerttemberg-Baden 

Bank accounts, 32 

Bartering: in Berlin, 41: and reconstruc- 
tion of buildings, 52; by Americans, 
91 

Basic Law, 174, 183A. 191 

Baths: number taken, 146 

Bavaria: schoolchildren in, 12; attitude 
toward newspapers, 78; opinions on 



319 



320/ INDEX 



work stoppage in, 157; reaction to 
public forums, 159; social character- 
istics of population, 163 

Bavarian party (Bayernpartei), 111 

Berlin air lift, 130, 134, 141, 144 

Berlin blockade, 130, 141, 150; morale 
during, 132, 134; radio listening 
after, 135; newspaper reading after, 
138; recommendations for settle- 
ment, 147; and Marshall Plan. 149; 
winter of, 150; economic security vs. 
freedom during, 151 ; effect of lifting 
on formation of new government, 
174 

Berlin, University of, 127. See also West 
Berlin 

Bible, 153 

Bi-polarization of world, 17 

Bizonal Economic Council, 107; aware- 
ness of in Bremen, 110 

Bizonia, 107, 110; addition of French 
Zone to, 131 

Black market, 18, 32, 100, 175; in 
Vienna, 40; as cause of food short- 
age, 70; and Americans, 91; in 
Bremen, 110; and currency reform, 
133,168 

Blockade, Berlin. See Berlin blockade 

Bonn, as capital, 180 

Book reading, 13. 153 

Bremen: level of political interest in, 
110; Amerika Haus, 145; radio 
listening in, 148; reaction Xo America 
Today, 158 

Building materials: availability of, 52 

Byrnes, Secretary of State James, 44, 89, 
97 



Capital city: choice of. 71, 174, 180 
Capitalism: American. 79 
Catholics: in politics, 9; in towns of 
5,000 population, 121; and civil ser- 
vice, 152 
CDU. See Christian Democratic Union 
Censorship: of the press, 77; police, 167 
Children: and American occupation, 12; 
and democracy, 12; future expecta- 



tions of, 12; and political prefer- 
ences, 12; and religion, 12; corporal 
punishment of in schools 66; and 
movies, 188. See also Youth 

Christian Democratic Union (CDU): sup- 
port for. 3, 60, 175: and resurgence 
of Nazism, 5; and Landtag elections 
(1946), 26; and civil service, 152 

Christian Socialist Union (CSU): and 
Landtag elections (1946). 26; sup- 
port for. 60 

Church affiliation: and Nazism, 9; and 
Military Government, 9; in politics, 
9; and trade unions, 35; and ex- 
pellees, 84; attendance, \2A. See also 
Catholics, Protestants, ana Religion 

Civil liberties, 82, 114, 114A, 167; vs. 
economic security, 74, 82, 85, 100, 
151, 175; limitations on, 175 

Civil Service: religion and party member- 
ship as qualifications for, 152; men 
vs. women, 156; prestige value of 
government work, 164 

Clay, General Lucius: and denazifica- 
tion, 55 

Cleanhness, 146 

Clothing: as major worry, 29, 60, 175; 
percentage of income for, 32 

Clubs, youth, 96, 99; democracy and, 
96. See also Youth Program 

Collective guilt, 5, 14, 22, 31, 36, 51; 
and Nuremberg Trials, 33; general- 
ized notion, 101 

Communism: vs. National Socialism, 60, 
72, 84, 85, 100, 175; as obstacle to 
European union, 105; West German 
government as bulwark against, 174; 
United States desire to curb, 190 

Communist Party of Germany (KPD): 
merger with SPD, 3; and resurgence 
of Nazism, 5; and Landtag elections 
(1946), 26; support for, 60 

Communists: right to radio time, 48, 
175 

Community leaders: and collective guilt. 
5; and democracy, 5; and denazifica- 
tion, 5; and party preference, 5, 44; 
on rise of Nazis, 5 ; and unification of 



INDEX /321 



Germany, 5; characteristics of, 44; 
and possibility of war, 44 
Concentration camps: documentary film 
on, 20; learned about during Nurem- 
berg Trials, 33 
Concerns and worries, 60, 100, 139 

175; in Bremen, 1 10 
Confidence in the United States, 141, 

143,144 
Constitution, federal. See Basic Law 
Corporal punishment: in schools, 66, 95 
CSU. See Christian Socialist Union 
Currency reform: need for, 32; blamed 
for food shortage, 130; and black 
market, 133, 168; effects of, 133. 
175, 190: newspaper reading in 
Berlin after, 138; chief cares and 
worries after, 139, 175; effect on 
book reading, 153; in West Berlin, 
168; and film attendance, 171. See 
also Reichsmark 
Czechoslovakia: expellees from, 47, 84; 
civil liberties in, 114, 114A; coup in, 
117 



DAF. See National Socialism 

Daylight saving time, 120 

Democracy : meaning of for community 
leaders, 5; and trade unions, 11, 35; 
and Bavarian school children, 12; 
potential for as measured by German 
attitude scale. 19; and Army Youth 
Program, 56; and attitudes toward 
National Sociahsm, 68; potential for, 
72, 74, 82, 93, 175, 191; in youth 
clubs, 96, 99; and government in 
Germany, 98; in Bremen, 1 10 

Denazification, 5, 7, 38, 39, 54, 55, 60, 
80, 93, 182; opinions on by com- 
munity leaders, 5; attitude of former 
NSDAP members toward, 7; level of 
information about, 7, 55; effect on 
job status, 38; and mass media in 
Vienna. 39; reaction to new laws in 
Vienna, 54; and General Clay's 
speech before Laenderrat , 55 



Die Goldene Stadt (film), 20 
Displaced persons. See Refugees 



Economic reconstruction, 62, 142 

Economic security: vs. civil liberties, 74 
82,85, 151, 175 

Economy: of Austria, 40; conditions of. 
60, 189, 190; in Bremen, 110, 
strikes, 170; effect of currency re- 
form, 175; personal income, 175 

Education: level of and religion, 9; aims 
of, 95; religious instruction in 
schools, 95, 126 

Elections: January 1946, 3; Landtag 
(Fall, 1946), 26; right to vote freely 
in, 114, 114A; August 1949, 191 

Emigration, desire for, 93 

Employment: degree of satisfaction with 
job, 6 

Equalization of war burdens, 169 

Europe, prospects for unification of, 44, 
69. See also Western European 
Union 

European Recovery Program. See Mar- 
shall Plan 

Evacuees. See Refugees 

Expellees. See Refugees 

Expenses, family, 4, 32. 41 

Experts vs. politicians in government, 98 



Factories, Ruhr: future ownership, 179 
Farmers: urban dwellers' attitude to- 
ward, 186 
Fibns: American, 20, 171, 173, 188 
attendance, 20; Die Welt im Film 
(newsreel), 20; preferences, 20, 172 
173; Todesmuehlen (documentary) 
20; in Vienna, 39; types of audience 
116; in Munich, 137; America To 
day, 158; attendance after currency 
reform, 171; basis for selection, 172 
foreign, 172. 173; German vs. Ameri- 
can, 173; and children, 188; and 
political attitudes, 188 



322/ INDEX 



■'Flattery scale": and German attitude 
scale, 19 

Food: percentage of income for, 4, 32; 
scarcity of in England and Germany, 
15; rationing, 15, 18, 42, 60, 175; 
supplementary sources of, 18; effect 
of scarcity on job efficiency, 18, 64. 
175; American contributions of, 22. 
64; as major source of concern, 29, 
60, 85, 100; and Military Govern- 
ment, 31, 36; effect of increase in 
rations, 52; as biggest problem facing 
Germany. 62; attitudes toward sup- 
ply of. 64; reasons for shortages, 70; 
adequacy of, 175 

Foreign Ministers' Conference: Moscow 
(March-AprU 1947), 62. 63; London 
(November-December 1947), 75,86, 
87; London Six Power Conference 
(February-June 1948), 131 

Foreign policy: control of, 136 

Foreign trade: control of, 136 

Fort Getty: training for democracy at, 
93 

Frankfurt: Amerika Haus, 145; resi- 
dents' attitude toward blockade and 
West German government, 174; as 
possible capital, 174, 180; recon- 
struction in. 183 

Frankfurter Rundschau: readership, 57 

Freedom of speech. 48, 114, 114A, 175 

Freedoms: perception of degree of, 114, 
114A 

Fuel: as source of concern, 5 2, 85 



Gallup poll: in United States on daylight 
saving time, 120 

German Attitude Scale, 19 

Giessen: residents' attitude toward 
blockade and West German govern- 
ment, 174; reconstruction in, 183 

Goethe: as greatest German, 99; most 
popular author, 153 

Government: type preferred for Ger- 
many, 74; local officials, 85; by 
people, politicians, or experts, 98; 



West German, 136, 174; or adminis- 
tration. 143; jobs with, 156, 164. 
See also Civil Service 

Great Britain: food scarcity in, 15; atti 
tudes toward, 17. 44, 67, 76 

Guilt. See Collective guilt 

Guttman scale: and anti-Semitism, 49 



Health: and food shortage, 18 

Hesse: social characteristics of popula- 
tion, 163; attitude of residents to 
lifting of blockade, 174; reconstruc- 
tion problems in, 183 

Heute (American-sponsored magazine), 
43,53. 108, 177 

History: teaching of, 95 

Hitler: Mein Kampf, 2, 92; as greatest 
German, 12; trust in, 22; guilt for 
regime of, 33, 51; and responsibility 
for National Socialism, 68; responsi- 
bility for power, 94 

Hitler Youth, 99; and Bavarian school- 
children. 12 

Housing: as problem for expellees, 14A, 
28 

Hungary: expellees from, 47 



Illustrierte (Berlin magazine), 108 

Income, family, 4, 32, 41, 100, 189; of 
expellees vs. native population, 84 

Industrialists: responsibility for World 
War II, 90 

Industry: attitude toward limits on, 31, 
36; effect on worker of socialization, 
90; vs. civil service employment, 164 

Inflation: expectation of, 25, 41, 60; 
knowledge of causes, 25; and Mili- 
tary Government, 25 

Information: vs. opinion on Soviet 
Union, 1 13; level of on United States 
and Soviet Union. 1 19 

Insurance, life, 32 

Internationalism, 105 



INDEX /323 



International Military Tribunal (IMT): 
guilt of defendants, 16; interest in, 
16, 33,60: news coverage of, 16, 33, 
60; as source of information, 16, 33; 
reactions to the verdicts, 33; and 
collective guilt, 33; fairness of, 33; 
and community leaders, 44 



Litfasssaeulen ,115 

London Foreign Ministers' Conference 
(November-December 1947): atti- 
tudes toward in West Berlin, 75, 86; 
and Allied cooperation, 87 

London Six Power Conference (Febru- 
ary-June 1948), 131 

Loritz, Alfred: dismissal of, 65 



Jews: as profiting from war, 22. See also 

Anti-Semitism 
Jobs: change in after war, 38; lower 

status, 38: economic security vs. civil 

liberties, 74. 82, 85. 100, 151, 175; 

right to choose, 114, 114A; with 

government, 156, 164 
Joint Export-Import Agency (JEIA), 

128,142 
Judiciary: separate from police, 167 



Kassel: residents' attitude toward block- 
ade and West German government, 
174; reconstruction in, 183 

KPD. See Communist Party of Germany 



Laender budgets: and occupation costs. 

161 
Landtag elections (1946): intention to 

vote. 26 
Languages: knowledge of and attitutdes. 

109 
Lastenausgleich , 169 
Law and order: as function of govern 

ment, 174 
Law No. 3, 6 

Law of National Liberation, 80 
LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party 
Leaders: community, 5, 44. See also 

Community leaders 
Leadership: and Youth Program, Army, 

56; in youth clubs, 96,99 
Leisure: activities, 99 
Liberal Democratic Party: and Landtag 

elections (1946). 26 
Libraries; use of, 1 3 



Machtraub in Ungarn (Military Govern- 
ment pamphlet), 97, 103, 112, 129 

Magazines: American-licensed, 43, 53, 
108, 177; Amerikanische Rund- 
schau, 43, 53, 108; contrasted with 
those of Hitler era, 43, 53, 108, 175; 
Neue Auslese, 43, 53, 108; Neue 
Illustrierte Zeitung, 5 3; readership, 
53; Sie, 53, 108; Illustrierte, 108; 
Heute, 111 

Mannheim: Negro soldiers in, 24 

Marshall, Secretary of State George: 
reaction to speech by, 62 

Marshall Plan, 69, 75, 100, 104, 149, 
175,190 

Mass media, 60, 119; in Vienna, 39; 
trustworthiness of news, 58, 100, 
175. See also Magazines. News- 
papers, Radio 

Mein Kampf: readership, 2, 92 

Men: and women in civil service, 156 

Militarism, 82 

Military Aid: and Marshall Plan, 190 

Military Government. See American Mili- 
tary Government 

Mit Vereinten Kraeften (Military Gov- 
ernment pamphlet), 129 

Morale. 72; in West Berlin during block- 
ade, 132. 134. 150 

Moscow Conference (March-April 1947): 
reasons for failure, 62, 63 

Motion pictures. See F'ilms 

Movies. See Films 

Munich: movie audience. 137; Amerika 
Haus. 145; as capital, 180 



324/ INDEX 



Nagy, Ferenc, 97 

Nationalism: and anti-Semitism, 49; as 

obstacle to European union, 105 
National Socialism: resurgence of and 
community leaders, 5; and religious 
affiliation, 9; and German Workers 
Front (DAP), 11; and labor policy, 
11; as good idea badly carried out, 
22, 31,49,54,60,68,94. 100,175; 
feelings about and newspaper reader- 
ship in Vienna, 23; vs. communism, 
60, 72. 84, 85, 100, 175; trends in 
attitudes toward, 68; tendency to- 
ward and knowing Americans, 94; 
attitude toward in Bremen, 110 
National Socialist German Workers Party 
(NSDAP): former members and po- 
litical participation, 3; and denazifi- 
cation. 7; as nonchurchgoers, 9; and 
bookreading, 13; responsibility for 
war, 22 
Negroes: contact between Negro troops 

and Germans, 24 
Neue Auslese (American-sponsored mag- 
azine), 43, 53, 108 
Neue Illustrierte Zeitung (Soviet-licensed 

magazine), 53 
Neue Presse (Frankfurt newspaper), 57 
Neue Zeitung (American-sponsored news- 
paper), 77, 118, 154 
News coverage: on radio, 1, 45; of 
Nuremberg Trials, 16, 33, 60; in 
Vienna, 30; in Frankfurter Rund- 
schau and Neue Presse, 57; trust- 
worthiness of, 58, 100, 175. See also 
Magazines, Newspapers, Radio 
Newspapers: vs. radio for news, 1. 30, 
58; trustworthiness of reporting on 
Nuremberg Trials, 16, 60; American 
licensed, 21, 34.77,83. 118. 138; in 
Vienna, 23, 30. 39; Wiener Kurier, 
23, 39; dissatisfaction with, 34; li- 
censing of, 34; propaganda in, 34; 
readership. 34, 37, 57, 60, 78, 83, 
110, 118, 175. 190; political influ- 
ence on, 37; rating of, 37; as source 
of news, 45 : Frankfurter Rundschau, 
57; Neue Presse, 57; trustworthiness. 



58, 100. 175; independent vs. party 
press, 77; Neue Zeitung. 77, 118, 
154; readership in Bavaria, 78; in 
Berlin, 83, 118, 138; Tagesspiegel , 
83, 118,138; TelegrafS3, 118, 138; 
readership in Bremen. 110; Soviet 
licensed, 118; readership and Mar- 
shall Plan. 190 
Newsreel: Die Welt im Film, 20 
Nonrefugees: characteristics of in AM- 

ZON,162 
Nordic race: superiority of, 22 
NSDAP. See National SociaHst German 

Workers Party 
Nuremberg: Amerika Haus, 145 
Nuremberg Trials. See International Mili- 
tary Tribunal 



Obedience: to state, 22 

Occupation, occupying troops: and 
German attitude scale, 19; as humil- 
iation, 22, 49, 60; and reconstruc- 
tion, 22, 100, 175;withdrawalof, 22, 
93, 140, 160, 187; community lead- 
ers and, 44; attitudes toward, 76, 94; 
Soviet proposal to withdraw, 160; 
costs, 161; and Lflende/- budgets, 161 

Occupational prestige: civil service vs. 
private industry, 164 

Offen Gesagt (Military Government pam- 
phlet), 89, 97, 103, 112, 129 

Opinion: vs. information on Soviet 
Union, 113; right to express, 114, 
114A 

Optimism: as measure of morale, 72; 
about economic future, 189 



Paris Conference: Soviet proposal for 

peace treaty, 185 
Parliamentary Council, 174 
Peace treaty: hopes for, 62, 63; Soviet 

proposal for, 185 
People: vs. experts and poUticians in 

government, 98 



INDEX/ 325 



Pessimism: correlated with age and edu- 
cational level, 72; about economic 
future, 189 

Police: protection from, 114, 114A; 
attitudes toward, 166, 167; central- 
ized or decentralized, 166; and poli- 
tics, 166; recruitment of, 166 

Political awareness, 3, 74, 175, 191; and 
German attitude scale, 19; and radio 
listening. 106 

Pobtical books and pamphlets, 89, 97 
103, 112. 129 

Political meetings, 3, 155, 159 

PoUtical participation, 3, 72, 85, 88, 
191; and community leaders, 5; and 
Landtag elections (1946), 26; of 
community leaders, 44; of expellees, 
47; and degree of anti-Semitism, 49 

Political parties: preferences, 3,60, 175; 
preference by community leaders, 5, 
44; preference and religion, 9; and 
newspapers, 21, 34, 77; and trade 
unions, 35; poUtical and community 
leaders, 44; and anti-Semitism, 49; 
and morale. 72; expellees vs. natives, 
84; attitudes toward, 93, 191; and 
civil service. 152 

Political strikes. 170 

Politicians: vs. experts in government. 98 

PoUtics: and religion, 9; as career for 
younger generation, 10; and school- 
children, 12; interest in, 36, 60, 74, 
100, 110, 175, 181, 191; and atten- 
tion to news, 83; expellees and. 84; 
and police, 166; and movies, 188 

Prayer Book. 153 

Press: censorship. 77. See also News- 
papers 

Prices, 25.60, 100 

Prisoners of war: attitudes of former, 93 

Propaganda: in newspapers, 21, 34; on 
radio, 45; pro-American, 73; United 
States government pamphlets, 89, 
97, 103. 112. 129 

Protestants: and politics, 9; in AMZON, 
121; and civil service, 1 5 2 

Public forums: Bavarian reaction to. 
159; in Reilingen, 155 



Race: racism, 49, 122; and leadership 
requirements, 82, 98 

Radio: listening habits of audience, 1, 
45, 60, 100, 106, 175; vs. news- 
papers for news, 1, 30, 58; in 
Vienna, 30, 39; in Berhn, 45, 83, 
106, 181; and censorship. 45; music 
on. 45; most popular stations, 45; 
program preferences, 45 ; propaganda 
on, 45; as source of news, 45, 58, 83; 
and freedom of speech, 48; poUtical 
awareness, 106; American accents 
on, 125; in Berhn after blockade, 
1 35 ; and Marshall Plan, 1 90. See also 
RIAS and "Voice of America" 

Radio Berhn, 83, 106 

Radio Bremen, 148 

Radio Leipzig, 106 

Radio Stuttgart. 106 

Rationing: food. 15, 18, 60 

Reading. See Book reading, Magazines, 
Newspapers, United States State De- 
partment Pamphlets 

Reconstruction: Law No. 3, 6; religion 
as force in. 9: attitude toward Ameri- 
can effort in, 22, 60, 63, 76, 85, 
100, 104, 175; cooperation among 
occupying powers, 22; obstacles to, 
22; and poUtical parties, 22; and 
SPD, 22; allocation of building mate- 
rials for, 52; economic, 62, 63, 142; 
AlUed effort in, 76, 85, 100: and 
poUtical activity, 88; attitude toward 
in Bremen, 110; responsibiUty for, 
175; and Ruhr Statute, 178; in 
Frankfurt, Giessen, and Kassel, 183. 
See also MarshaU Plan 

Recreation: in Berlin during blockade. 
134 

Refugees (including displaced persons, 
evacuees, and expellees): future 
plans of, 14A, 50; impact upon 
economy, 14A; justification of ex- 
pulsion. 14A, 28. 47. 81, 100, 175; 
level of information about, 14A; 
political rights and participation of, 
14A. 47, 81; reception in new area, 
14A, 28, 47. 81, 84, 100; desire to 



326/ INDEX 



return home, 28, 47, 50, 81, 100, 
175; problems of, 28, 84; responsi- 
bility for, 28, 47, 81; countries of 
origin, 50, 84; socioeconomic charac- 
teristics and attitudes, 84, 162 

Reich government: claims against, 32 

Reichsmark: anticipated value of, 25; in 
bank accounts, 32; confidence in, 
41. 60, 100; rumors about, 42. See 
also Currency reform 

ReiUngen: town hall meeting, 155 

Religion: as political force, 9; and politi- 
cal preference, 9; and reconstruction, 
9; and schoolchildren, 12: and anti- 
Semitism, 49; expellees vs. natives, 
84; teaching of in schools, 95, 126; 
in AMZON, 121, 124; in West Berlin, 
124; and civil service, 152. See also 
Catholics, Church affiliation, and 
Protestants 

Rent: percentage of income for, 32 

Reparations, 59 

Responsibility: individual, 5, 99, 101 

Reunification. See Unification 

RIAS (Radio in the American Sector), 
83, 106, 181; Varady funkt dazwi- 
schen, 135 

Ruhr: international control of, 131; 
ownership of factories, 179 

Ruhr Statute, 178 

Rumors: about another war, 22, 42, 60; 
trends in, 42 



Savings: use of, 4 

Schiller: as greatest German, 99 

Schoolchildren: attitudes of in Bavaria, 
12 

Schools: in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 61; 
corporal punishment in, 66, 95; reli- 
gious instruction in, 95, 126. See 
also Education 

SED. See SociaUst Unity Party of Ger- 
many 

Self-government for Germany, 3, 110 

Separatism: sentiments for in Hesse, 174 



Sie (American-sponsored magazine), 53, 
108 

Six Power London Conference Accord 
(June 1948), 131 

Soap: lack of, 146 

Social characteristics: of population in 
Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg- 
Baden, 163 

Social class: as viewed by interviewee 
and interviewer, 36 

Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(SPD): merger with KPD, 3; support 
for, 3, 60, 175; and resurgence of 
Nazism, 5; and reconstruction, 22; 
and Landtag elections (1946), 26; 
and civil service, 152 

SociaUst Unity Party of Germany (SED): 
merger with KPD, 3; attitude toward 
in Berhn during air lift, 141 

Socialization: effect on worker, 90 

Soviet Union: as dominant power, 17, 
44, 67, 69, 76, 175; lack of cooper- 
ation, 22; rumors about, 42; change 
in attitude toward by community 
leaders, 44; and reparations, 59; as 
obstacle to European union, 105; 
information and attitudes about, 
113, 119; civU liberties in, 114, 
114A; fear of in West Berlin, 132; 
views on during air Uft, 144; pro- 
posal to withdraw all occupying 
forces, 160, 187; and Ruhr Statute, 
178; proposal for peace treaty, 185; 
fear of aggression by, 187; and Mar- 
shall Plan, 190 

SPD. See Social Democratic Party of 
Germany 

Speech: freedom of, 48 

Spruchkammer: denazification rulings of, 
55 

Standard of living: reduction in, 31; 
improvement in and reparations. 59 

Stimme Amerikas. See "Voice of Amer- 
ica" 

Strikes: work stoppage in Bavaria, 157: 
economic, 170; poUtical, 170 

Students: right to dissent, 127 

Stuttgart: Amerika Haus, 145 



INDEX /327 



Tagesspiegel: (West Berlin newspaper), 
83. 118, 138 

Tax laws: 8, 41 

Telegraf (West Berlin newspaper), 83, 
118, 138 

Tetrachoric coefficient correlation: used 
in newspaper survey, 34 

Todesmuehlen (film), 20 

Town hall meetings: in Reilingen, 155; 
Bavarian reaction to, 159 

Trade: importance of for Austria, 40; of 
major importance for Germany, 63; 
attitudes toward in Berlin 128; con- 
trol of , 136 

Trade Unions: characteristics of mem- 
bers, 11, 35; old and new, 11; and 
the Church, 35; expansion of, 35; 
leadership, 35; level of information 
about, 35; and the Military Govern- 
ment. 35; organization of, 35; poUti- 
cal parties, 35 ; attitudes of members 
toward strikes, 170 

Travel- foreign, 109 

Trustworthiness of news reporting, 58, 
100,175;onIMT, 16,60 

Unemployment: reasons for, 6; as major 
worry, 29; and currency reform, 133 

Unification: and community leaders, 5; 
and Bizonia. 107; under Soviet 
leadership. 123; Volkskongress peti- 
tion, 123; under communism, 131; 
chances for, 174; and peace treaty, 
185 

United Europe: first step toward, 44 

United Nations, 105, 109 

United States: as world leader, 17. 44, 
67, 69, 76, 100, 175; as presented in 
magazines, 43; change in attitude 
toward by community leaders, 44; 
attitudes toward, 73, 79, 85, 141, 

143, 144, 158; capitalism, 79; infor- 
mation on, 119; opinion of as based 
on America Today, 158; attitude to- 
ward in Berlin during air lift, 141, 

144. See also American Military Gov- 
ernment. 



United States Army Youth Program, 46, 
56 

United States of Europe: chances for 
success. 69 

United States Information Centers, 102, 
145 

United States State Department pam- 
phlets, 89, 97, 112, 129 

University of Berlin: in East Berlin, 127 

Utilities: cost of, 32 



Values: in blockaded Berhn. 151 

Versailles Treaty: as cause of war, 5 1 

Vienna: newspapers. 23, 30, 39; party 
composition, 23; newspapers vs. 
radio, 30; radio listening in, 30, 39; 
"Voice of America" in. 30; informa- 
tion media in. 39; mass media and 
denazification, 39; Wiener Kurier, 
39; reaction to new denazification 
laws, 54 

Vienna Fair, 40 

Vienna Philharmonic, 39 

"Voice of America," 1, 106, 176, 184; 
mail to, 14; in Vienna. 30; news 
reports on, 45; audience breakdown, 
45, 184; popularity in Berhn. 135 

Volkskongress petition: for unification, 
123 

Voting habits: as seen in January 1946 
elections, 3; and Bundestag election 
(1949), 26; and Landtag election 
(1946), 26 



War: expectation of another among 
Bavarian schoolchildren, 12; respon- 
sibility for last, 22, 31; rumors of 
another, 22, 42, 60; possibility of 
another, 105, 130; acceptance of as 
price for breaking Berlin blockade. 
147 
Welt im Film (newsreel). 1 16 
Weltpresse (Viennese newspaper), 23 



328 / INDEX 



West Berlin: as capital, 71, 180; news- 
papers, 83, 118, 138; during block- 
ade, 130, 132, 134, 141, 150, 151; 
fear of Russians, 132; Amerika Haus, 
145; financial status of families dur- 
ing blockade, 150; currency change 
in, 168; and Allies, 175 

Western Europe: reconstruction of and 
Ruhr Statute, 178 

Western European Union, 105, 109, 175 

Western Germany: government for, 5, 
131, 175 

Western Powers: prestige, 141, 144; West 
Berlin expectations of during air lift, 
147, 150; and Berlin reconstruction, 
175. See also Allies 



Wiener Kurier (American-sponsored news- 
paper), 23, 39 

Women: and men in civil service, 156 

Worries: chief, 29, 60, 100, 139, 175; in 
Austria, 40 

Wuerttemberg-Baden: expellees and na- 
tives in, 28; school system of, 61; 
characteristics of population, 163; 
fusion, 165 



Youth: United States Army program for, 
46, 56; and schools, 61; group activi- 
ties of, 99; and attitudes toward 
individual responsibility, 101. See 
also Children 



A NOTE ON THE AUTHORS 

Anna J. Merritt, a freelance writer and translator, received her 
B.A. from Smith College. While studying on a Fulbright 
Fellowship she met her husband Richard at the Free University 
of Berlin where they were both exchange students. They have a 
common interest in the German people, and spend nearly every 
third year in Berlin. 

Richard L. Merritt is professor of political science and 
research professor of communications at the University of 
Illinois. He received his B.A. from the University of Southern 
CaHfornia and his Ph.D from Yale University. Honors he 
has received include a Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship, 
a German Government grant for graduate study, a Social Science 
Research Council predoctoral fellowship, and a Fulbright Re- 
search Professorship at the Free University of Berlin. A member 
of the American Political Science Association, Mr. Merritt served 
as editorial associate of The American Political Science Review 
from 1963 to 1967, and is program chairman for the associa- 
tion's 1970 annual meeting. He is also author of Symbols of 
American Community, 1735-1775, Systematic Approaches to 
Comparative Politics, and has co-authored several books includ- 
ing Comparing Nations, and Western European Perspectives on 
International Affairs. 



UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS